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3	
Abstract	
	
Despite	the	media’s	significant	influence	on	British	society’s	transformation	between	1945	and	1979,	
relatively	little	is	understood	about	their	effect	on	the	mythologised	decline	of	trade	unionism.	In	
response,	this	research	forms	the	first	comprehensive	study	of	the	media’s	role	in	the	battle	for	
public	support	between	government	and	trade	unions.	Facilitated	by	the	recent	digitisation	of	
newspaper	sources	and	television	reports,	this	research	assesses	media	content	from	across	the	
political	spectrum,	including	five	national	dailies.	It	explores	coverage	of	particular	moments	in	the	
political	relationship	between	the	government	and	unions,	as	well	as	wider	structural	concerns	in	
economic	discourse.	Beyond	content,	this	thesis	assesses	the	personal	and	political	motivations	
behind	production,	utilising	memoirs	from	prominent	editors	and	journalists,	as	well	as	evidence	
from	the	BBC	and	TUC	archives.	It	reflects	on	the	way	changes	to	the	media	landscape,	including	the	
waning	influence	of	left-wing	media	and	the	rise	of	right-wing	tabloids,	shaped	and	restricted	the	
dominant	frames	of	explanation	for	Britain’s	supposed	decline.	The	influence	of	the	media	on	public	
attitudes	is	assessed	through	extensive	exploration	of	Gallup	polls	and	political	surveys,	enriching	
our	understanding	of	trade	unionism’s	engagement	with	wider	social	change.	
	
Through	these	processes,	the	research	seeks	to	scrutinise	the	validity	of	common	simplistic	
assumptions	about	the	media’s	attitudes	towards	the	labour	movement.	Rather	than	a	story	of	
inevitability	and	relentless	hostility	–	an	impression	which	is	difficult	to	reconcile	with	union’s	rising	
membership	during	the	period	–	coverage	of	industrial	relations	was	fraught	with	inconsistencies	
and	contradictions	which	at	times	favoured	the	union	cause.	Ultimately,	this	thesis	seeks	to	
illuminate	the	cumulative	power	of	industrial	relations	coverage	over	several	decades,	which	was	
fundamental	to	the	political	battles	of	the	1980s.
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6	
Introduction	
	
One	dominant	assumption	underpins	historical	understanding	of	industrial	relations	coverage	during	
the	twentieth	century:	consistent	and	unremitting	media	hostility	towards	unions.	Jean	Seaton,	for	
example,	has	argued	that	‘union-bashing’	is	a	‘convention	of	the	British	media’	that	has	been	
accepted	‘fatalistically’	by	the	unions.1	Several	overviews	of	industrial	relations,	such	as	those	
provided	by	Richard	Hyman,	have	typified	the	press’s	response	to	industrial	unrest	as	one	which	
held	workers	and	trade	unions	‘exclusively	responsible’	for	disagreement.2	Sociologists	Peter	
Beharrell	and	Greg	Philo	argued	in	1977	that,	in	cases	of	serious	crisis	or	conflict,	trade	unions	have	
been	the	media’s	‘favourite	scapegoats’.3	If	such	conclusions	were	based	on	the	two	extremes	of	
twentieth-century	industrial	relations,	the	1926	General	Strike	and	the	1985	miners’	strike,	in	which	
the	press	and	television	media	played	a	significant	role	in	discrediting	the	efforts	of	the	labour	
movement,	this	would	appear	to	be	an	entirely	reasonable	line	of	argument.	Colin	Hay’s	extensive	
assessment	of	media	coverage	during	1979’s	Winter	of	Discontent	also	reinforces	these	perceptions,	
as	coverage	of	the	winter’s	public	sector	strikes	were	found	to	be	decisive	in	buttressing	Margaret	
Thatcher’s	case	against	the	unions.4	However,	little	is	understood	of	the	coverage	between	1926	and	
the	crisis	of	the	late	1970s	Labour	government,	and	such	an	exclusively	negative	perception	of	
media	influence	is	difficult	to	reconcile	with	the	fact	that	trade	unions	consistently	grew	between	
1945	and	1979,	the	zenith	of	its	membership,	and	the	continued	public	belief	that	trade	unions	were	
a	‘good	thing’	for	British	society.5		
	
According	to	Mike	Molloy,	editor	of	the	Daily	Mirror	in	the	late	1970s,	trade	union	leaders	of	the	
period	‘followed	the	wishes	of	the	rank	and	file	and	led	their	mass	members	on	a	yellow	brick	road	
that	ended	directly	at	Margaret	Thatcher’s	door’,	a	journey	which	‘instigated	terrifying	inflation	and	
a	destabilisation	that	nearly	destroyed	the	Labour	Party,	before	finally	putting	the	wind	up	voters.’6	
This	partisan	portrayal	of	the	events	that	led	to	Labour’s	election	defeat	in	1979	is	indicative	of	a	
wider	perception	of	linearity	and	inevitability	to	the	climax	of	tensions	between	government	and	
																																																						
1	Jean	Seaton,	‘Trade	Unions	and	the	Media’,	in	Ben	Pimlott	and	Chris	Cook	(eds),	Trade	Unions	in	British	
Politics:	The	First	250	Years	(London,	1991),	p.	257.	
2	Richard	Hyman,	‘The	Historical	Evolution	of	British	Industrial	Relations’	in	Paul	Edwards	(ed.),	Industrial	
Relations:	Theory	and	Practice	(Oxford,	1995),	p.	50.	
3	Peter	Beharrell	and	Greg	Philo,	‘Introduction’,	in	Peter	Beharrell	and	Greg	Philo	(eds),	Trade	Unions	and	the	
Media	(London,	1977).	
4	Colin	Hay,	‘Narrating	the	Crisis:	The	Discursive	Construction	of	the	“Winter	of	Discontent”’,	Sociology	30	
(1996),	pp.	253-277.	
5	David	Marsh,	'Public	Opinion,	Trade	Unions	and	Mrs	Thatcher',	British	Journal	of	Industrial	Relations	28	
(1990),	pp.	58-59.	
6	Mike	Molloy,	The	Happy	Hack:	A	Memoir	of	Fleet	Street	in	its	Heyday	(London,	2016),	p.	174.	
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unions,	and	the	supposed	futility	of	trade	union	activism.	In	such	portrayals	of	trade	unionism,	it	is	
difficult	to	recognise	the	central	and	positive	relationship	the	trade	unions	enjoyed	with	the	Labour	
government	in	the	immediate	post-war	period.	For	Labour,	the	trade	unions	formed	an	important	
part	in	supporting	their	attempts	to	improve	productivity	while,	for	the	Conservatives,	Churchill’s	
conciliatory	approach	to	the	trade	unions,	eager	to	boost	the	party’s	working	class	appeal,	was	a	
distinct	contrast	to	the	aggressive	style	of	Margaret	Thatcher	three	decades	later.	This	research	
explores	not	only	how	trade	unionism	was	portrayed	by	the	media,	but	the	nuances	that	developed	
in	the	battle	for	public	support	between	the	trade	union	movement	and	high	politics.	Aside	from	a	
few	key	episodes,	scholars	have	overlooked	the	potential	of	the	post-war	media	as	brokers	in	the	
relationship	between	trade	unionism	and	politics.		
	
The	historiographical	background	
This	research	addresses	several	deficiencies	in	historiographical	understanding	to	provide	a	
comprehensive	analysis	of	long-term	trends	in	three	separate	but	interrelated	areas	of	historical	
research.	Historians	John	McIlroy,	Alan	Campbell	and	Nina	Fishman	have	recognised	both	the	recent	
‘general	neglect’	of	trade	unionism	in	the	post-war	period	by	social	scientists	and	historians,	in	both	
dedicated	studies	of	labour	history	and	more	comprehensive	histories	of	the	period	and,	perhaps	
more	significantly	for	this	research,	the	way	myths	about	the	role	of	trade	unions	in	the	post-war	era	
‘extended	and	lodged	themselves	deeper	in	the	public	consciousness’.7		
	
The	historiography	of	the	1926	general	strike	has	an	important	influence	on	the	themes	and	
relationships	explored	in	this	thesis.	Although	historian	Keith	Laybourn	has	questioned	the	
significance	of	the	strike	as	any	kind	of	'watershed'	for	industrial	history,	it	established	important	
trends	in	the	relationship	between	government,	unions	and	the	media.8	May	1926	saw	1.7	million	
strikers	participate	in	an	unsuccessful,	TUC-sanctioned	9-day	general	strike,	which	represented	a	
'defining	moment	in	the	renegotiation	of	the	balance	of	power	among	unions,	industry,	and	the	
state'.9	With	the	country’s	press	impeded	by	the	printers’	involvement	in	industrial	action,	the	
government	issued	the	British	Gazette,	edited	by	Winston	Churchill,	which	condemned	the	strike	
throughout	as	an	‘attempt	to	wreck	the	state’.10	Additionally,	the	Baldwin	government	sought	to	
decisively	influence	the	coverage	of	the	BBC,	as	the	corporation	established	a	genuine	national	
																																																						
7	Alan	Campbell,	Nina	Fishman	and	John	McIlroy,	‘Approaching	Post-War	Trade	Unionism’,	in	Alan	Campbell,	
Nina	Fishman	and	John	McIlroy	(eds),	British	Trade	Unions	and	Industrial	Politics:	The	Post-War	Compromise,	
1945-64	(Aldershot,	1999),	pp.	1-2.	
8	Keith	Laybourn,	The	General	Strike	of	1926	(Manchester,	1993),	p.	103.	
9	Laura	Beers,	Your	Britain:	Media	and	the	Making	of	the	Labour	Party	(London,	2010),	p.	100.		
10	Laybourn,	The	General	Strike,	p.	56.	
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audience	and	purpose	as	an	authoritative	current	affairs	provider.	According	to	Curran	and	Seaton,	
in	this	process,	the	strike	marked	the	transition	from	'propaganda	based	on	lies	and	the	start	of	a	
more	subtle	tradition	of	selection	and	presentation'.11	These	ideas	of	selection	and	presentation	are	
not	only	central	themes	of	research	but	are	inextricably	linked	to	the	trade	union	movement	and	
depictions	of	it.		
	
Historian	Laura	Beers	has	convincingly	argued	that	the	TUC’s	policy	during	the	strike	reflected	the	
leadership’s	deepening	‘hostility’	towards	popular	media,	as	well	as	an	‘unwillingness	to	see	the	
value	of	political	persuasion	and	their	limited	appreciation	of	the	public’s	interests’,	signalled	by	
their	demand	for	printers’	involvement	early	in	the	strike,	which	limited	avenues	of	
communication.12	Although	there	is	debate	about	whether	a	more	sophisticated	publicity	campaign	
would	have	had	an	impact	on	the	fundamental	outcome	of	the	strike,	this	thesis	explores	the	long-
term	legacy	of	such	experiences	on	the	attitudes	of	trade	unionism	towards	the	mass	media.	It	
assesses	the	further	development	of	the	TUC’s	public	relations	strategy	in	a	changing	media	
environment.	Despite	the	TUC’s	development	of	a	broader	media	strategy	after	1926	and	the	
emergence	of	the	TUC’s	Daily	Herald	as	a	serious	force	in	popular	journalism,	Ross	McKibbin	has	
argued	that	the	Conservative’s	electoral	success	in	the	inter-war	period	was	‘achieved	by	creating	a	
coalition	of	classes	and	interests	united	only	by	a	normative	hostility	to	a	political	notion	of	the	
working	class’,	particularly	organised	labour,	which	fed	on	vulgar	stereotypes	‘absorbed	into	the	
language	of	popular	Conservatism’.13	This	work	explores	the	legacy	of	such	stereotypes,	as	they	re-
emerged	and	evolved	in	the	period	after	the	Second	World	War,	despite	trade	unionism’s	bolstered	
status	under	a	Labour	government.	
	
Recent	research	of	post-war	trade	unionism	has	been	dominated	by	assessment	of	Thatcherism’s	
impact	on	the	labour	movement,	despite	increasing	uncertainty	about	the	realities	of	post-war	
political	consensus.	Furthermore,	media	historian	James	Curran	has	highlighted	media	history’s	
continued	difficulty	with	engaging	in	wider	social	trends,	as	the	scholarship	is	often	‘media-centric’.14	
The	combination	of	such	trends	has	clouded	understanding	of	the	complex	relationships	between	
media	and	trade	unions.	James	Thomas’s	work	on	the	Labour	Party	in	the	media	has	convincingly	
argued	that	between	1945	and	1970	the	Labour	Party’s	concerns	were	well	represented	in	the	
																																																						
11	James	Curran	and	Jean	Seaton,	Power	Without	Responsibility:	The	Press	and	Broadcasting	in	Britain	(London,	
1997),	p.	113.	
12	Beers,	Your	Britain,	p.	102.	
13	Ross	McKibbin,	The	Ideologies	of	Class:	Social	Relations	in	Britain,	1880-1950	(Oxford,	1994),	p.	293.	
14	James	Curran,	‘Media	and	the	Making	of	British	Society,	c	1700-2000’,	Media	History	8	(2002),	p.	135.	
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popular	press.15	According	to	Thomas,	it	was	only	after	1970	that	the	balance	of	the	press	began	to	
swing	against	the	left,	following	the	demise	of	key	left-of-centre	newspapers	and	the	transformation	
of	the	Sun.	However,	while	Thomas’s	work	provided	a	comprehensive	analysis	of	the	Labour	Party’s	
relationship	with	and	treatment	by	the	press	in	general	election	coverage,	the	wider	labour	
movement	has	yet	to	be	addressed	by	such	studies.	By	the	late	1960s,	increasing	tensions	between	
Labour	and	the	trade	unions	meant	that	it	was	difficult	to	comprehend	media	coverage	of	the	labour	
movement’s	political	party	and	industrial	unions	as	a	cohesive	subject.		
	
Despite	the	paucity	of	directly	relevant	work,	there	are	some	useful	studies	which	this	work	will	
draw	upon,	which	have	sought	to	forge	links	between	media	coverage	and	trade	unionism.	Tim	
Claydon’s	work	on	the	car	industry,	a	sector	so	central	to	this	research,	Nina	Fishman’s	work	on	the	
1950s	industrial	scene,	and	Colin	Hay’s	reflections	on	the	impact	of	the	media	during	the	‘Winter	of	
Discontent’	have	all	guided	this	research	and	offered	useful	avenues	for	analysis.	However,	as	
valuable	as	these	pieces	of	research	are,	they	do	not	stitch	together	the	broader	trends	of	the	period	
or	enable	historians	to	understand	the	cumulative	impact	of	decades	of	particular	frames	or	the	
influence	of	salient	topics	on	the	media	agenda.		
	
Kevin	Williams	has	warned	that	‘integrated	media	history’	should	avoid	the	tendency	to	reinforce	
‘totalizing	narratives’,	such	as	the	growth	and	dominance	of	right-wing	media	narratives,	without	
understanding	the	resistance	against	such	change.16	This	research	seeks	to	establish	the	often-
overlooked	inconsistencies	in	media	narratives	during	the	post-war	period.	As	Walton	and	Davis	
argued	during	the	late	1970s,	the	media	is	‘too	complex	and	media	personnel	too	varied	for	the	
notion	of	a	“right	wing	plot”	or	deliberate	manipulation	to	hold	water	as	a	complete	theory	of	how	
the	media	works’.17	The	scarcity	of	literature	on	the	topic	has	meant	that	the	frequency	of	coverage	
which	supported	the	aims	of	industrial	disputes,	as	well	as	the	trade	union	response	to	negative	
coverage,	are	yet	to	be	sufficiently	explored.	Jay	Blumler	and	Alison	Ewbank’s	1968	study	of	public	
attitudes	towards	trade	unionism	found	the	media	coverage	of	industrial	relations	was	‘not	strictly	
at	odds	with	the	thesis	which	regards	the	media	as	forces	for	social	and	political	integration’,	but	
could	instead	be	regarded	as	forces	for	the	‘selective	integration’	of	trade	union	interests	in	
																																																						
15	James	Thomas,	Popular	Newspapers,	the	Labour	Party	and	British	Politics	(Abingdon,	2005).	
16	Kevin	Williams,	‘Doing	Media	History’,	in	Martin	Conboy	and	John	Steel	(eds),	The	Routledge	Companion	to	
British	Media	History	(Abingdon,	2015),	p.	33.	
17	Paul	Walton	and	Howard	Davis,	‘Bad	News	for	Trade	Unionists’,	in	Peter	Beharrell	and	Greg	Philo	(eds),	
Trade	Unions	and	the	Media	(London,	1977),	p.	125.	
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coverage,	as	‘gatekeepers’.18	This	research	explores	how	the	media	portrayed	the	aims	and	claims	of	
trade	unions	and,	in	the	process,	introduces	greater	nuance	to	our	broader	understanding	of	the	
relationship	between	media	and	trade	unions.		
	
In	order	to	assess	the	role	of	press	and	television	in	mediating	the	relationship	between	trade	unions	
and	British	politics,	this	research	seeks	to	answer	a	number	of	key	questions	about	content	of	
industrial	relations	coverage.		What	relevant	issues	did	the	media	highlight?	How	did	the	
communication	and	salience	of	these	issues	change	over	time?	How	did	opinions	and	political	
agendas	manifest	themselves	and	show	development	during	the	period?	Arguably	more	
significantly,	why	did	these	agendas	and	priorities	change?	What	kind	of	influence	did	industrial	
correspondents,	editors,	controllers	and	proprietors	have	on	these	changes?	The	intention	is	not	
that	this	work	will	exhaustively	answer	these	questions,	largely	due	to	issues	of	feasibility,	but	will	
provide	some	indication	of	the	key	trends	of	media	coverage,	as	well	as	provide	further	avenues	for	
research.	Moreover,	while	these	questions	emphasise	the	evolution	of	trade	union	coverage,	this	
work	also	raises	and	highlights	important	continuities	and	underlying	assumptions	which	apply	to	
the	period	more	generally.	In	order	to	provide	useful	answers,	this	research	is	underpinned	by	
thorough	analysis	of	the	production,	content	and	reception	of	industrial	relations	news.	
	
Analysing	Media	Content	
The	national	daily	newspapers	analysed	have	been	selected	to	provide	a	mix	of	‘upmarket’	(the	
Times	and	the	Guardian)	‘middle-market’	(the	Daily	Mail	and	the	Daily	Express)	and	‘lower-market’	
or	‘tabloid’	newspapers	(primarily	the	Daily	Mirror),	in	recognition	of	the	historically	strong	
correlation	between	newspaper	choice	and	social	class	in	Britain	and	the	mixed	fortunes	enjoyed	by	
these	three	different	markets.	They	represent	a	spectrum	of	political	attitudes	and	loyalties.	Analysis	
of	the	Daily	Herald,	originally	the	TUC’s	own	newspaper,	and	the	Sun	have	also	informed	this	thesis	
to	varying	degrees	but,	as	they	did	not	publish	across	the	entirety	of	the	period,	and	the	latter	
assumed	the	place	of	the	former,	they	are	not	explored	to	the	same	extent.	While	the	Herald	
enjoyed	success	in	the	pre-war	period,	by	the	1950s	the	realities	of	decline	were	clear	and	coverage	
of	trade	unionism	was	relatively	predictable,	given	the	paper’s	allegiance	to	the	TUC.	Rather	than	
providing	an	in-depth	analysis	of	the	Herald’s	content,	this	thesis	instead	focuses	on	contextual	
material	from	the	TUC	archives.	The	Sun	has	been	included	in	analysis	of	newspaper	content	due	to	
																																																						
18	Jay	Blumler	and	Alison	Ewbank,	‘Trade	Unionists,	the	Mass	Media	and	Unofficial	Strikes’,	British	Journal	of	
Industrial	Relations	8:1	(1970),	p.	53.	
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its	cultural	and	political	significance	after	1974	and	particularly	during	the	1978-9	Winter	of	
Discontent.		
	
The	digitised	availability	of	these	five	core	newspapers,	unlike	the	Herald	or	the	Sun,	has	allowed	
primary	source	analysis	to	be	nuanced	and	extensive	in	its	examination	of	key	trends	in	coverage.	
This	selection	been	surveyed	according	to	date	for	specific	case	studies;	key	words,	referencing	
trends	in	language	in	industrial	relations	coverage;	and	also	by	article	type	or	position.	Front-page	
stories	are	particularly	influential	for	public	opinion	and	are	prioritised	by	editors	because,	on	
average,	front	pages	enjoy	twice	the	readership	of	the	pages	inside	a	newspaper.19	In	the	case	of	the	
Sun,	which	is	not	available	in	digitised	format,	the	front	pages	and	editorial	pages	of	long	periods,	as	
well	as	choice	moments,	have	also	been	probed.	All	of	this	has	combined	to	ensure	that	this	work	is	
grounded	in	primary	sources	which	are	as	representative	of	media	output	as	possible	and	to	ensure	
there	is	a	‘diversity	of	content’.	20	
		
	
Figure	0.1:	National	Circulation	Figures	(1947-1985)	
Sources:	Jeremy	Tunstall,	Newspaper	Power:	The	New	National	Press	in	Britain	(Oxford,	2005),	pp.	41,	47,	54	
and	the	Royal	Commission	on	the	Press,	1947-49:	Report	(Cmd.	7700),	p.	12.21	
																																																						
19	Maxwell	McCombs,	Setting	the	Agenda:	The	Mass	Media	and	Public	Opinion	(Cambridge,	2004),	p.	52.	
20	Adrian	Bingham,	Family	Newspapers?	Sex,	Private	Life	and	the	British	Popular	Press,	1918-1978	(Oxford,	
2009),	p.	7.		
21	In	1947,	the	Manchester	Guardian	was	considered	a	provincial	newspaper	so	it	was	not	incorporated	into	
surveys	of	national	circulation	figures.	By	1965,	the	Daily	Herald	had	been	relaunched	by	the	Mirror	Group	as	
the	Sun	but	was	very	different	to	Murdoch's	1969	Sun	so	it	has	been	incorporated	into	the	Herald	figures.		
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The	circulation	data,	Figure	0.1,	reflect	a	few	important	issues	relevant	to	this	research.	Firstly,	the	
sheer	scale	of	circulation	for	the	selected	newspapers	illustrates	their	centrality	to	British	popular	
culture	in	the	period	assessed.	More	significantly,	they	illustrate	the	evolution	of	press	fortunes	in	
Britain.	While	the	‘quality’	press	enjoyed	a	small	upturn	in	fortunes	over	the	period,	the	‘popular’	
newspapers	generally	experienced	a	decline	in	readership,	thanks	to	rises	in	production	costs,	
exacerbated	by	industrial	unrest,	and	television	competition.	The	exception	to	this	general	trend	
was	the	Sun.	Bought	in	by	Rupert	Murdoch	in	1969,	it	first	established	itself	as	a	Labour-supporting	
paper	and	surpassed	the	Mirror’s	sales	in	1978,	by	which	time	it	was	firmly	pro-Thatcher.	As	the	final	
chapter	on	governance	and	power	explores,	the	Sun	and	its	editor,	Larry	Lamb,	had	a	decisive	impact	
on	how	industrial	relations	were	perceived	in	the	latter	half	of	the	1970s.	Its	appeal	to	individualism	
and	consumerism,	which	targeted	the	‘flat-cappery’	of	Labour’s	‘C2’	youthful	working-class	support,	
provided	countless	problems	for	trade	unions,	the	Labour	Party	and	the	Mirror.22	The	Mail	did	enjoy	
a	small	upturn	towards	the	end	of	the	period,	as	it	also	turned	to	the	tabloid	or	‘compact’	format	to	
improve	its	fortunes	with	a	similar	impact	on	coverage.		
	
The	changes	to	the	media	landscape,	precipitated	by	the	pressures	of	mounting	costs	and	falling	
readership,	were	not	passively	experienced	by	the	press.	These	were	trends	they	were	forced	to	
respond	to,	particularly	through	commercialisation.	While	Adrian	Bingham	has	disputed	James	
Curran’s	claims	that	advertising	revenue	played	a	substantial	role	in	‘maintaining	right-wing	
predominance’,	particularly	during	the	1970s,	he	has	suggested	that	advertising	did	at	least	help	to	
promote	‘a	general	ethos	of	consumerism’.23	In	1974,	the	Mirror	and	Sun	combined	were	read	by	
twenty	five	million	British	consumers,	as	the	potential	of	greater	advertising	revenue	intensified	the	
competition	between	newspapers	-	demonstrated	by	the	Sun’s	increased	advertising	content	
following	the	Murdoch	takeover.24		
	
As	far	as	trade	unionism	was	concerned,	this	consumer	trend	was	almost	as	problematic	as	any	
overtly	political	authority	from	newspapers,	as	union	activity	was	increasingly	portrayed	as	
detrimental	to	such	an	ethos.	The	educative	role	of	newspapers,	“giving	them	what	they	need”,	and	
entertainment	approaches,	“giving	them	what	they	want”,	to	journalism	‘competed	and	collided	
																																																						
22	John	Pilger,	Hidden	Agendas	(London,	2010),	p.	413.	
23	Bingham,	Family	Newspapers,	p.	23.	
24	Dick	Rooney,	‘Thirty	Years	of	Competition	in	the	British	Tabloid	Press’,	in	Colin	Sparks	and	John	Tulloch	(eds),	
Tabloid	Tales:	Global	Debates	Over	Media	Standards	(Oxford,	2000),	p.	99.	
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with	each	other’	across	the	period.25	This	tension	was	not	always	successfully	managed,	exemplified	
by	the	Express’s	‘confusion	between	serious	propaganda	and	entertainment	glitz’,	which	was	an	
important	factor	in	the	Express’s	terminal	decline.26	This	work	seeks	to	understand	the	impact	of	
tabloidization	and	consumerism	on	the	trade	union	movement,	which	simultaneously	fought	for	
wage	increases	to	enable	its	members	to	enjoy	Britain’s	affluence,	but	also	provided	obstacles	to	its	
continuance	through	industrial	action	and	cessations	in	production.		
	
These	changes	to	the	press	landscape	were	complex	and	uneven.	James	Curran	has	highlighted	how	
Fleet	Street	became	‘less	hierarchical’	during	the	1960s	and	early	1970s.	This	allowed	specialist	
correspondents	to	flourish	and	promoted	a	‘more	bipartisan	approach	to	political	reporting	and	
commentary’,	albeit	to	a	more	limited	extent	than	some	have	suggested.27	This	trend	was	significant	
because	it	reflected	the	growing	influence	of	industrial	journalists	at	their	respective	newspapers,	as	
well	as	the	varied	editorial	debates	which	led	governments’	industrial	relations	policy	to	come	under	
scrutiny	from	their	conventional	press	allies,	as	well	as	their	opponents.	The	commercial	demise	of	
the	Herald	and	News	Chronicle	in	the	1950s	seemed	to	suggest	to	many	that	‘rigid	partisanship	was	
no	longer	viable’,	while	the	popularisation	of	television	led	some	to	believe	that	‘bruising	and	
partisan’	press	coverage	was	a	thing	of	the	past.28	Although	this	belief	was	mistaken	its	prevalence	
at	this	time	suggested	the	dominance	of	the	right-wing	press	in	the	1970s	was	far	from	inevitable	
and	these	changes	require	further	exploration.	
	
To	date,	the	Glasgow	University	Media	Group’s	Bad	News	is	the	only	significant	attempt	to	assess	
media	coverage	of	industrial	relations	through	content	analysis.29	The	Glasgow	University	Media	
Group	(GMG)	study	involved	an	entire	team	of	researchers,	studying	all	television	news	broadcasts	
of	a	six	month	period	and,	in	doing	so,	illuminated	key	trends	and	biases	in	broadcast	journalism.	As	
far	as	this	research	is	concerned,	undertaking	a	study	of	similar	depth	was	clearly	not	feasible,	
particularly	given	the	difficulties	in	accessing	television	sources.	Television	experienced	its	greatest	
boom	in	the	five-year	period	between	1955	and	1960	as	household	television	access	soared	from	35	
per	cent	to	75	per	cent,	while	the	press	and	radio	broadcasts	went	into	gradual	decline	from	this	
point.30	From	1955	onwards,	by	looking	at	both	newspapers	and	television	sources	in	tandem,	this	
																																																						
25	Kevin	Williams,	Read	All	About	It!:	A	History	of	the	British	Newspaper	(London,	2010),	p.	13.	
26	Jeremy	Tunstall,	Newspaper	Power:	The	New	National	Press	in	Britain	(Oxford,	2005),	p.	56.	
27	Curran	and	Seaton,	Power	Without	Responsibility,	pp.	67-68.	
28	Tunstall,	Newspaper	Power,	p.	244.	
29	Glasgow	University	Media	Group,	Bad	News	(first	published	1976;	Abingdon,	2010).	
30	James	Obelkevich,	‘Consumption’,	in	James	Obelkevich	and	Peter	Catterall	(eds),	Understanding	Post-War	
British	Society	(London,	1994),	p.	145.	
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research	begins	to	explore	the	relationship	between	broadcast	media	and	the	press,	a	dialogue	that	
is	yet	to	be	adequately	understood	by	those	researching	industrial	relations	coverage.	The	press	has	
often	been	assumed	as	the	partisan	media	force,	worthy	of	investigation,	isolated	from	the	
regulated	and	supposedly	impartial	television	sphere.	Audience	research	surveys	in	1957,	1962	and	
1970	all	found	that	‘viewers	elevated	television	news	to	a	greater	position	of	trust	than	either	radio	
news	or	newspapers’,	including	those	who	said	that	their	main	source	of	news	information	was	
newspapers.31	Blumler	and	Ewbank’s	study	found	that,	while	newspaper	use	amongst	trade	
unionists	tended	to	be	relatively	low,	they	were	‘highly	dependent’	on	television	broadcasts	for	their	
information	and,	more	significantly,	‘impression	of	public	affairs’.32	While	perceptions	of	press	bias	
against	unions	had	an	impact	on	trade	unionists’	consumption	of	newspaper	debate,	this	only	made	
them	more	likely	to	accept	the	narratives	of	television	coverage.	Although	television	coverage	was	
less	explicit	in	the	expression	of	opinion	than	the	press,	this	work	begins	to	uncover	the	way	
television	accepted	many	of	the	press’s	themes	and	agendas,	indicative	of	journalists’	status	as	both	
producers	and	consumers	of	news	coverage.		
	
Unfortunately,	this	area	of	research	has	been	impeded	by	the	availability	of	such	sources,	and	has	
relied	predominantly	on	ITN	clips,	rather	than	entire	programmes.	While	this	conceals	information	
about	the	salience	of	industrial	relations	coverage	and	its	comparison	with	coverage	of	other	issues	
on	the	media	agenda,	this	research	seeks	to	provide	starting	points	for	understanding	the	role	of	
television	in	industrial	relations	coverage.	This	is	particularly	important	for	understanding	the	
dialogue	between	different	types	of	media,	as	well	as	the	way	they	influenced	each	other.	In	parts,	
this	research	has	leant	heavily	on	press	sources	for	more	detailed	understanding	of	media	trends.	
For	the	first	chronological	section,	this	work	has	utilised	alternative	audio	and	visual	sources,	in	the	
form	of	BBC	radio	scripts	and	limited	clips	of	Pathé	newsreels,	indicative	of	patterns	of	media	
consumption	in	the	1950s.		
	
Where	digitised	newspaper	collections	are	concerned,	content	analysis	provides	an	important	
analytical	thread	for	the	thesis.	At	a	basic	level,	keyword	searches	illuminate	core	trends	in	media	
coverage.	Press-invented	industry-specific	phrases	such	as	‘wildcat	strikes’	and	‘flying	pickets’	have	
‘assumed	status	in	political	mythology’,	holding	almost	exclusively	negative	associations	for	the	
trade	union	movement.33	Even	when	the	news	media	attempt	to	adopt	a	‘detached	view’	of	
industrial	relations,	according	to	Walton	and	Davis,	they	made	‘use	of	assumptions	similar	to	those	
																																																						
31	Glasgow	Media	Group,	Bad	News,	p.	5.	
32	Blumler	and	Ewbank,	‘Trade	Unionists,	The	Media	and	Unofficial	Strikes’,	p.	53.	
33	Seaton,	‘Trade	Unions	and	the	Media’,	p.	257.	
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of	the	dominant	commercial,	financial	and	political	interests	in	society’,	far	removed	from	the	
interests	of	the	subjects	of	those	events.34	Reflecting	on	the	social	panic	surrounding	mugging,	
Stuart	Hall	analysed	how	the	use	of	a	media	label	mobilises	‘a	whole	referential	context,	with	all	its	
associated	meanings	and	connotations’	and	can	thus	develop	as	a	‘symbol’	of	society’s	tensions	and	
problems.35	These	labels	or	phrases	condense	pejorative	connotations	and	discourage	critical	
leadership.	Their	incidence	and	use	are	therefore	crucially	relevant	to	this	research.	
	
Figure	0.2	and	Figure	0.3	provide	important	indications	of	the	trends	in	press	coverage	over	the	
period	assessed.	As	newspapers	changed	and	differed	in	size	and	format	over	the	course	of	the	
period,	particularly	after	the	shortages	caused	by	the	Second	World	War,	it	was	important	that	the	
comparisons	were	reflective	of	such	change.	Therefore,	these	comparisons	represent	the	number	of	
articles	or	editorials	using	the	word	‘strike’	or	‘strikes’	as	a	percentage	of	all	articles	produced	by	a	
newspaper	in	a	given	year	rather	than	using	raw	data	which	may	obscure	key	trends.	The	Mirror	and	
Express	have	been	excluded	from	such	quantitative	comparisons	due	to	questions	about	the	
reliability	of	optical	character	recognition	technology	used	for	the	digitisation	of	these	newspapers.	
	
	
Figure	0.2:	Editorial	Mentions	of	Strikes	in	British	Newspapers	(1945-1979)	
	
	
																																																						
34	Walton	and	Davis,	‘Bad	News	for	Trade	Unionists’,	p.	132.	
35	Stuart	Hall,	Chas	Critcher,	Tony	Jefferson,	John	Clarke	and	Brian	Roberts,	Policing	the	Crisis:	Mugging,	the	
State,	and	Law	and	Order,	2nd	edition	(Basingstoke,	2013),	p.	23.	
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Figure	0.3:	Article	Mentions	of	Strikes	in	British	Newspapers	(1945-1979)	
	
The	episodic	nature	of	this	coverage,	as	represented	in	the	prominent	peaks	and	troughs,	forms	an	
important	part	of	the	rationale	for	the	use	of	case	studies.	Strikes	meant	that	confrontations	over	
power	were	at	specific	moments,	rather	than	constant	issues	on	the	media	agenda.	Significantly,	all	
three	newspapers	show	broadly	similar	patterns	of	overall	coverage,	reflecting	a	shared	interest	in	
certain	strike	events	and	suggesting	even	a	media	dialogue.	In	both	the	Times	and	the	Guardian,	in	
contrast	to	the	Mail,	editorial	focus	on	strikes	was	significantly	higher	than	attention	across	all	
articles.	This	suggests	that	the	Mail’s	journalists	blurred	the	line	between	editorial	and	news	
content,	allowing	front	pages	and	other	genres	of	article	to	provide	platforms	for	their	political	
opinions.	Although	editorial	columns	are	a	central	interest	to	analysis,	the	patterns	apparent	in	the	
Mail’s	coverage	underline	the	importance	of	assessing	a	wide	variety	of	articles.	
	
Secondly,	considering	the	historiographical	preoccupation	with	the	late	1970s	and	1980s	as	a	time	of	
industrial	chaos,	the	upturn	in	strike	interest	is	not	as	dramatic	or	as	consistent	as	might	be	
expected.	This	is	particularly	remarkable	as	six	million	days	were	lost	to	strikes	in	1969,	dwarfed	by	
the	1979	figures	when	almost	five	times	the	number,	almost	30	million	days,	were	lost	to	disputes.36	
There	is	little	to	no	correlation	with	this	kind	of	industry	data.	The	late	1940s,	mid	1950s	and	early	
1960s	all	reflected	upturns	in	the	editorials	dealing	with	strikes,	almost	to	1970s	levels.	The	GMG’s	
research	has	suggested	that	the	frequency	and	duration	of	strikes	does	not	necessarily	determine	
																																																						
36	Craig	Lindsay,	‘A	Century	of	Labour	Market	Change,	1900-2000’,	Labour	Market	Trends	111	(2003),	p.	139.	
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the	level	of	coverage	it	receives,	or	its	perceived	‘newsworthiness’.37	Why	did	these	peaks	happen	
and	did	they	mark	changes	in	media	portrayals	or	public	impressions	of	trade	unionism?	On	this	
basis,	it	appears	to	be	unlikely	that	the	1950s	was	the	tranquil	decade	that	many	have	portrayed	it	
to	be	but	this	requires	further	scrutiny.	
	
Production	of	Industrial	Relations	Coverage	
The	greatest	challenge	of	this	research,	despite	the	problems	associated	with	television	analysis,	is	
to	understand	the	production	and	the	reception	of	media	content,	in	order	to	evaluate	the	popular	
impact	of	the	media.	This	includes	the	rationale	and	motivations	for	changes	in	media	behaviour	and	
response,	while	the	reception	amongst	unions	adds	a	further	element	to	this	exploration.	In	
assessing	production,	this	research	has	employed	both	archival	evidence,	from	the	BBC	Written	
Archives	Centre,	as	well	as	the	extensive	collections	of	memoirs	from	news	editors,	proprietors,	
specialist	journalists	and	some	relevant	politicians.	These	journalists	include	the	likes	of	leading	
industrial	journalists	John	Cole	of	the	Guardian	and	Geoffrey	Goodman	of	the	Daily	Herald	and	Daily	
Mirror.	On	the	part	of	editors,	the	memoirs	of	Alistair	Hetherington,	the	Guardian’s	editor	from	the	
mid-1950s;	Hugh	Cudlipp,	Chairman	of	the	Mirror	Group	who	wrote	extensively	about	his	
experiences	on	Fleet	Street;	and	latterly	Larry	Lamb,	the	editor	of	the	Sun	newspaper	in	the	1970s,	
are	some	of	the	many	that	have	informed	this	research.	Assessing	the	experience	of	both	journalists	
and	editors	has	allowed	this	research	to	understand	and	explore	the	nature	of	the	dialogues	and	
processes	behind	the	production	of	industrial	relations	coverage	during	the	period.	
	
Specialist	journalism	since	the	1960s	was	affected	by	the	polarization	in	the	press	landscape	
prompted	by	tabloidization.	While	specialism	experienced	great	investment	at	‘upmarket’	
newspapers,	their	counterparts	at	‘downmarket’	newspapers	found	themselves	increasingly	
marginalised	(apart	from	politics,	sports	and	lifestyle	areas)	and	specialists’	autonomy	on	stories	was	
‘very	far	from	absolute’,	despite	the	increased	personalisation	of	newspaper	columns.38	This	trend,	
which	took	grip	in	the	1970s,	was	particularly	problematic	for	labour	specialists	as	industrial	
relations	became	more	dominant	on	the	media	agenda.	Therefore,	discerning	the	control	and	
autonomy	of	specific	journalists	is	difficult	and	this	is	clear	from	the	respective	journalists’	memoirs.	
The	fact	that	both	Alistair	Hetherington	and	John	Cole	recall	Cole	having	a	determining	influence	on	
the	editorial	line	of	the	Guardian	on	industrial	relations	issues	demonstrates	the	power	of	specialists	
																																																						
37	Glasgow	Media	Group,	Bad	News,	p.	18.	
38	Tunstall,	Newspaper	Power,	p.	159.	
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in	the	quality	press,	and	thus	makes	Cole’s	account	of	such	issues	particularly	interesting.39	In	
contrast,	for	the	likes	of	the	Mirror,	it	has	been	necessary	to	balance	Geoffrey	Goodman’s	
recollections	against	the	likes	of	Hugh	Cudlipp	and,	latterly,	Mike	Molloy,	as	they	appear	to	have	had	
greater	influence	on	the	line	pursued	by	the	paper	on	industrial	relations,	despite	Goodman’s	short-
lived	personalised	column.	Goodman	believed	his	role	and	status	was	gradually	‘eroded	at	the	
margins’,	until	1979	when	the	importance	of	industrial	correspondents	‘sharply	diminished’	–	a	
process	which	owed	as	much	to	the	influence	of	‘spin	doctors’	as	to	the	‘preferences	of	the	editorial	
command’.40	
	
The	TUC	and	BBC’s	archives	offer	the	opportunity	to	see	the	thought	processes	and	tensions	behind	
both	television	production	and	union	responses	to	such	issues.	At	times,	the	TUC	and	BBC	were	in	
direct	conversation,	as	the	labour	movement	grew	concerned	with	its	developing	image,	and	sought	
direction	on	how	to	improve	its	public	relations,	as	well	as	ways	the	BBC	might	aid	them	in	this	
pursuit.	During	some	periods,	however,	there	is	a	noteworthy	lack	of	such	dialogue,	as	well	as	an	
absence	of	broader	discussion	inside	the	trade	union	movement	about	media	strategy.	This	research	
reflects	on	the	impact	of	the	TUC’s	mentality	towards	the	media,	in	an	attempt	to	establish	unions	
as	more	than	simply	passive	targets	of	media	coverage.	Writing	in	the	late	1970s,	Toni	Griffiths,	a	
former	union	press	officer,	argued	that	cynicism	amongst	trade	unionists	towards	the	media	came	
from	‘a	feeling	that	what	is	read	in	the	newspapers	or	seen	on	the	television	is	often	not	like	real	
life’.41	The	archival	evidence	reveals	the	significant	pressures	placed	by	trade	union	members	on	the	
ailing	Herald	in	the	1950s,	as	well	as	the	TUC’s	demands	of	the	BBC,	for	the	news	media	to	do	more	
to	represent	trade	union	activity	as	more	than	simple	strikes,	despite	the	public	demands	for	
‘newsworthy’	stories.	This	research	draws	upon	meeting	and	conference	minutes	at	both	the	BBC	
and	TUC,	on	significant	policy	documents	and	their	reception	inside	each	organisation,	as	well	as	
revealing	internal	and	external	trails	of	correspondence.	The	ebbs	and	flows	of	such	dialogue,	as	well	
as	the	increasing	antagonism	between	these	organisations,	is	important	to	the	research’s	pursuit	for	
a	greater	understanding	of	the	picture	‘behind	the	scenes’.	
																																																						
39	John	Cole	(1927-2013)	was	a	journalist	and	broadcaster	who	became	influential	in	the	industrial	relations	
field	from	the	1950s,	while	writing	for	the	Guardian.	He	became	a	driving	force	at	the	paper	during	the	1960s	
as	news	editor,	as	he	was	given	license	to	take	strong	editorial	lines	by	his	editor	Alastair	Hetherington.		
40	Geoffrey	Goodman,	‘The	Role	of	Industrial	Correspondents’	in	John	McIlroy,	Alan	Campbell	and	Nina	
Fishman	(eds),	British	Trade	Unions	and	Industrial	Politics:	The	Post-war	Compromise,	1945-64	(Aldershot,	
1999),	p.	26.	Geoffrey	Goodman	(1922-2013)	was	a	journalist	and	writer	who	became	one	of	the	leading	
industrial	journalists	of	the	post-war	period.	He	had	spells	at	the	News	Chronicle	and	the	Daily	Herald,	before	
taking	a	senior	post	at	the	Daily	Mirror	in	1969,	when	Murdoch	took	over	at	the	Sun.	
41	Toni	Griffiths,	‘The	Production	of	Trade	Union	News’,	in	Peter	Beharrell	and	Greg	Philo	(eds),	Trade	Unions	
and	the	Media	(London,	1977),	p.	60.	
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Aside	from	the	TUC’s	reaction	to	media	coverage,	this	work	assesses	the	attitudes,	responses	and	
anxieties	of	the	general	public	to	industrial	relations	stories.	Particularly,	this	research	draws	upon	
specialist	public	opinion	studies,	such	as	those	conducted	or	sponsored	by	particular	newspapers	
and	those	conducted	by	social	scientists	such	as	Mark	Abrams,	as	well	as	the	extensive	volumes	of	
Gallup	polls	available	at	this	time.42	The	polling	studies	endorsed	or	sponsored	by	newspapers,	and	
particularly	the	analysis	that	often	accompanies	their	publication,	have	been	treated	with	caution,	as	
they	are	‘designed	with	the	end-product	in	mind	–	a	newsworthy	story	nearly	always	in	line	with	
editorial	policy’.43	These	kinds	of	polls	are	particularly	vulnerable	to	the	‘bandwagon	effect’,	which	
describes	the	respondents’	impulse	to	align	with	a	winning	party	or	favoured	cause.44	This	research	
seeks	to	understand	how	the	construction	of	polling	questions,	as	well	as	the	publication	of	their	
results,	might	have	shaped	opinion,	rather	than	purely	reflecting	public	attitudes.	
	
Where	organised	polling	became	more	sophisticated	and	the	demand	for	regular	polling	intensified	
in	the	latter	part	of	the	period,	this	research	has	been	able	to	analyse	trends	in	attitudes	over	a	
longer	period	and	link	such	changes	to	newspaper	coverage.	Where	this	has	not	been	possible,	
largely	through	irregular	polling	or	absence	altogether,	this	research	has	sought	to	understand	public	
opinion	at	pivotal	moments	in	industrial	relations	coverage.	It	was	not	uncommon	for	Gallup	
pollsters	to	ask	about	public	attitudes	to	the	government’s	handling	of	a	particular	industrial	dispute	
or	where	their	sympathies	lay	between	strikers	and	employers.	Gallup	polls	were	largely	responsive	
to	the	media	agenda	and	thus	the	questions	themselves	alert	us	to	the	prevalence	of	certain	
attitudes.	For	example,	as	observed	in	Figure	0.4,	it	has	not	been	possible	to	chart	public	perceptions	
of	union	power	in	any	quantitative	way	because	respondents	were	only	asked	if	they	felt	unions	
were	‘too	powerful’	from	1973	onwards.	
	
																																																						
42	Dr.	Mark	Abrams	(1906-1994)	was	an	influential	social	scientist	who	worked	extensively	on	techniques	for	
surveying	public	opinion.	From	1946,	he	directed	Research	Services	Ltd	(RSL)	which	was	a	founding	company	in	
Ipsos	MORI.	From	the	early	1960s,	he	became	an	important	influence	within	the	Labour	Party.	
43	Martin	Roiser	and	Tim	Little,	‘Public	opinion,	trade	unions	and	industrial	relations’,	Journal	of	Occupational	
Psychology	59	(1986),	p.	260.	
44	Catherine	Marsh,	‘Back	on	the	Bandwagon:	The	Effect	of	Opinion	Polls	on	Public	Opinion’,	British	Journal	of	
Political	Science	15	(1985).	
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Figure	0.4:	Gallup	Poll	Approval	Ratings	(1954-1979)	
Source:	David	Marsh,	'Public	Opinion,	Trade	Unions	and	Mrs	Thatcher',	British	Journal	of	Industrial	Relations	28	
(1990),	pp.	58-59.	Based	on	Gallup	poll	analysis	where	‘popularity’	represents	the	deduction	of	the	number	of	
those	who	regard	unions	as	a	'bad	thing'	from	those	who	regard	them	as	a	'good	thing'.	
	
Figure	0.4	provides	a	key	insight	into	British	attitudes	that	underpins	this	research.	It	is	noteworthy	
for	a	few	key	reasons.	Firstly,	it	confirms	the	expected	slump	in	trade	union	perceptions	over	the	
period	but	suggests	this	did	not	evolve	in	an	entirely	uniform	way,	rather	like	the	overview	of	media	
coverage.	By	1964,	popularity	ratings	had	recovered	to	almost	match	1954	levels,	with	just	a	one	per	
cent	change,	which	challenges	the	perception	of	terminal	or	inevitable	decline	in	the	popularity	of	
trade	unions.	Secondly,	despite	the	gradual	fall	in	union	popularity	after	1964,	there	were	
fluctuations	in	approval	which	reflected	the	irregularity	and	volatility	in	attitudes	to	unions	and	
alludes	to	the	influence	of	media	coverage.	This	inconsistency	is	an	aspect	which	this	research	seeks	
to	scrutinise	further.	Even	at	the	peak	of	union	tensions	prior	to	Margaret	Thatcher’s	election	in	
1979,	it	is	notable	that	still	more	members	of	the	public	regarded	unions	as	a	‘good	thing’,	as	
opposed	to	a	‘bad	thing’,	albeit	by	only	15	per	cent.	Moreover,	approval	numbers	show	relatively	
little	change	over	the	entirety	of	the	period,	with	the	decline	in	net	popularity	attributed	
predominantly	to	the	decline	in	neutral	responses,	as	the	trade	union	issue	became	increasingly	
divisive.	These	patterns	further	query	common	understandings	of	the	trade	unions	and	suggests	that	
the	unions’	problems	stemmed	from	something	more	complex	than	merely	public	image.	This	
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complexity	will	be	further	illuminated	by	this	research’s	analysis	of	the	language	and	themes	of	
media	coverage.	
	
While	such	Gallup	polls	are	useful	in	exploring	public	attitudes,	it	is	important	that	this	study	is	clear	
about	what	constitutes	the	public	and	elucidates	the	way	the	‘public’	was	discussed	by	newspapers	
across	the	period.	In	contemporary	media	studies,	Stephen	Coleman	and	Karen	Ross	have	cited	
British	trade	unionists	as	an	example	of	‘counterpublics’,	those	social	groups	that	have	a	‘dialectical	
relationship	with	the	“general	public”’.	45	The	media	have	tended	to	respond	to	this	separation	by	
characterising	such	groups	as	blameworthy	for	particular	social	conditions,	representing	contentious	
events	from	the	perspective	of	the	social	elite.	This	separation	happened	to	such	an	extent	that	
Martin	Roiser	and	Tim	Little	criticised	the	tendency	of	pollsters	during	the	1980s	to	isolate	trade	
unionists	from	‘the	public’	in	opinion	polling,	through	exclusive	categorisation	and	questionnaires	
that	were	constructed	in	a	‘partisan	manner’.	46	Considering	that	the	trade	union	movement,	led	by	
the	TUC,	was	viewed	as	a	partner	in	the	post-war	settlement	and	thus	part	of	the	political	
establishment,	the	historical	process	of	separation	of	trade	unionism	from	concepts	of	‘the	public’	is	
complex.	This	is	a	development	which	this	research	seeks	to	further	illuminate.	
	
Agenda	Setting	
The	chosen	methodological	approach	for	this	research	is	informed	by	a	conceptual	framework	
underpinned	by	the	work	of	media	theorists,	in	particular	from	the	work	stemming	from	‘agenda-
setting	theory’	and	the	analysis	of	frame	building	processes.	In	their	pioneering	research	of	the	1968	
US	election,	Maxwell	McCombs	and	Donald	Shaw	argued	that	editors	and	staff	played	an	important	
part	in	‘shaping	political	reality’,	by	determining	what	constituted	important	public	issues	or	topics	
for	debate,	primarily	as	a	result	of	a	news	story’s	salience.47	They	argued	that,	regardless	of	the	news	
media’s	specific,	sometimes	extreme,	biases,	there	were	‘professional	norms	regarding	major	news	
stories	from	day	to	day’,	indicative	of	a	shared	agenda	and	dialogue	about	particular	issues.48	Before	
assessing	the	nature	of	language	around	given	subjects,	the	fact	those	subjects	were	contestable	is	
informative	in	itself.	In	his	own	research	on	the	theme	of	agenda-setting,	McCombs	has	highlighted	
the	close	relationship	between	agenda-setting	and	polling	results.	McCombs	argues	opinion	polls	
																																																						
45	Stephen	Coleman	and	Karen	Ross,	The	Media	and	the	Public:	“Them”	and	“Us”	in	Media	Discourse,	
(Chichester,	2010),	p.	74.	
46	Roiser	and	Little,	‘Public	opinion,	trade	unions	and	industrial	relations’,	p.	260.	
47	Maxwell	McCombs	and	Donald	Shaw,	‘The	Agenda-Setting	Function	of	Mass	Media’,	The	Public	Opinion	
Quarterly	36	(1972),	p.	176.	
48	Ibid.,	p.	184.	
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form	primary	‘measures’	of	agenda-setting,	particularly	in	the	case	of	open-ended	questions.49	This	
research	uses	both	content	analysis	of	newspapers	and	the	results	of	such	opinion	polls	in	an	
attempt	to	make	sense	of	the	media’s	agenda-setting	influence	on	public	perceptions	of	trade	
unions,	before	scrutinising	the	more	conventionally	‘biased’	linguistic	content	of	media	coverage.	
Although	trade	unionism	in	its	own	terms	did	not	always	feature	prominently	on	the	media	agenda,	
other	important	topics,	such	as	industrial	productivity	and	economic	inflation,	played	an	important	
part	in	maintaining	interest	and	shaping	understanding	of	industrial	relations.		
	
In	order	to	simplify	and	clarify	analysis	of	such	sources,	the	research	is	performed	through	the	
interrogation	of	particular	media	‘frames’.	According	to	Robert	Entman,	‘to	frame	is	to	select	some	
aspects	of	a	perceived	reality	and	make	them	more	salient	in	a	communicating	text,	in	such	a	way	as	
to	promote	a	particular	problem	definition,	causal	interpretation,	moral	evaluation,	and/or	
treatment	recommendation	for	the	item	described’	and	in	doing	so,	‘simultaneously	direct	attention	
away	from	other	aspects’.50	Problems	with	industrial	productivity,	competitiveness	and	industrial	
unrest	could	all	have	been	explained	by	a	multitude	of	factors,	such	as	company	mismanagement;	
government	policy	failure;	the	pressures	of	industrial	modernization;	foreign	competition;	and	trade	
union	militancy,	amongst	many	others.	This	research	seeks	to	understand	the	balance	of	these	
frames	of	explanation	and	pays	close	attention	to	the	position	of	labour	in	explaining	Britain’s	
troubles.		
	
As	framing	theorists	have	suggested,	the	formation	of	such	frames,	or	‘frame	building’	is	equally	
important.	Dietram	Scheufele	highlighted	three	core	aspects	to	frame	building:	journalistic-centred	
influences;	‘organizational	routines’,	such	as	the	type	or	political	orientation	of	the	medium;	and	
external	sources	of	influence,	such	as	politicians	or	interest	groups.51	As	far	as	journalistic-centred	
influences	are	concerned,	in	1978	sociologist	Mark	Fishman	highlighted	the	significance	of	the	role	
of	journalists	as	audiences	themselves.	A	‘theme’	or	frame	can	‘spread	throughout	a	community	of	
news	organizations’,	constructing	large-scale	‘media	waves’.52	Organisations	often	decided	what	to	
print	or	broadcast	and	how	to	communicate	it	based	on	a	wider	media	dialogue.	More	specifically	to	
this	research,	journalists	were	also	members	of	unions,	while	editors	and	proprietors	often	had	to	
deal	with	the	impact	of	industrial	unrest	amongst	journalists	and	printers.	This	was	a	particularly	
																																																						
49	McCombs,	Setting	the	Agenda,	p.	19.	
50	Robert	Entman,	‘Framing:	Toward	Clarification	of	a	Fractured	Paradigm’,	Journal	of	Communication	43,	
(1993),	pp.	52,	54.		
51	Dietram	Scheufele,	‘Framing	as	a	Theory	of	Media	Effects’,	Journal	of	Communication	49	(1999),	p.	115.	
52	Mark	Fishman,	‘Crime	Waves	as	Ideology’,	Social	Problems	24	(June	1978),	pp.	531-543.	
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divisive	issue	during	the	late	1970s.	These	‘frame-building’	influences	have	been	of	particular	
interest	in	the	exploration	of	the	‘production’	elements	of	the	primary	research,	particularly	the	TUC	
and	BBC	archival	evidence.		
	
Periodisation	and	Chronology	
Bingham	and	Conboy	have	reflected	on	the	importance	of	the	long	view	in	media	history,	in	order	to	
appreciate	the	‘cumulative	influence	of	the	popular	press’,	such	as	the	subtle	processes	of	framing,	
agenda-setting	and	marginalisation	of	certain	groups	or	opinions.53	The	ambitious	scope	of	this	
project,	in	its	analysis	of	over	thirty	years	of	media	history,	allows	the	research	to	chart	broad	
patterns	of	coverage,	enhanced	through	the	use	of	content	analysis.	Although	a	number	of	scholars	
have	highlighted	the	pitfalls	of	‘narrative-driven	decadology’,	the	choice	to	broadly	structure	this	
work	in	ten	year	cycles	-	1945-59,	1960-69	and	1970-79	-	has	been	defined	by	critical	events,	across	
both	media	and	industrial	relations.54	If	the	1960s	Labour	Government	had	chosen	to	seriously	
address	trade	union	policy	earlier	in	its	tenure,	or	the	‘Winter	of	Discontent’	label	had	been	used	as	
persuasively	during	the	1974	miners’	strike	as	it	was	during	the	public	sector	strikes	of	1978-79,	the	
chronological	structure	would	have	been	different.	As	Lawrence	Black	has	highlighted,	rather	than	
‘debunking’	the	decadology	of	this	period,	particularly	the	1970s,	this	research	attempts	to	account	
for	this	tendency.55	
	
The	late	1940s	and	1950s	forms	the	first	of	the	chronological	sections.	This	was	a	period	that	has	
been	nostalgically	typified	as	a	time	of	reinvention	and	renewal,	in	which	unions	enjoyed	the	
benefits	of	political	consensus	and	conciliation.	Nina	Fishman	characterises	the	latter	half	of	the	
decade	as	the	first	time	that	the	political	establishment	seriously	considered	union	conduct	and	
regulation.56	According	to	Robert	Taylor,	it	was	during	the	mid-1950s	that	trade	unions	went	from	
being	perceived	as	‘essential	and	responsible	partners	in	the	creation	of	a	more	competitive	
economy’	to	‘obstacles	to	growth’	that	were	‘incapable	of	modernizing	themselves’.57	The	prosperity	
of	this	period	and	Labour’s	exile	from	government	prompted	serious	questions	about	the	party’s	
relationship	with	the	working	classes	and	how	it	could	adapt	to	concepts	of	affluence	and	
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Class	History	82,	(2012),	p.	175.	
56	Nina	Fishman,	‘“Spearhead	of	the	Movement”?:	The	1958	London	Busworkers'	Strike,	the	TUC	and	Frank	
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consumerism.	Colin	Crouch,	whose	research	was	orientated	around	British	trade	unions’	relationship	
with	high	politics,	suggests	that	the	post-war	compromise	came	to	an	end	in	1959.58	This	age	of	
industrial	relations,	and	public	perceptions	of	it,	is	much	more	complex	than	the	broader	
historiography	has	understood.	Moreover,	outside	industrial	relations,	this	period	also	accounts	for	
political	television’s	inauguration	and	adjustment,	until	1959	provided	a	‘watershed’	for	the	
medium,	as	the	pace	of	adaptation	quickened.59		
	
The	second	chronological	section	charts	industrial	relations	coverage	of	the	1960s,	paying	particular	
attention	to	the	experiences	of	the	Wilson	government,	which	prompted	a	‘new	era	of	state	
interventionism’.60	Labour	wrestled	with	the	demands	of	a	union	movement	eager	to	share	in	the	
economic	benefits	of	the	industrial	revolution	promised	by	Labour’s	‘white	heat’	rhetoric.	Geoffrey	
Goodman,	an	influential	journalistic	figure	for	this	research,	has	described	1969’s	‘In	Place	of	Strife’	
proposals	for	trade	union	reform	as	the	‘final	lightning	conductor’	for	a	shift	in	the	Labour	
government’s	policy	and	a	clear	indication	of	changing	attitudes.61	In	the	media	sphere,	1969	was	
the	year	that	Rupert	Murdoch	took	over	the	Sun,	which	sparked	the	rise	of	the	revamped	tabloid	
newspaper	as	it	slowly	abandoned	its	support	of	the	Labour	party	to	emerge	as	a	principal	supporter	
of	Thatcherism.		
	
1979	provides	a	clear	conclusion	for	this	research,	as	‘the	Winter	of	Discontent’	–	a	series	of	high	
profile	and	controversial	public	sector	strikes	–	provided	arguably	‘the	key	moment	in	the	pre-
history	of	Thatcherism’,	thanks	in	large	part	to	the	media’s	manufactured	crisis.62	This	was	a	time	
when	media	organisations	experienced	the	impact	of	industrial	unrest	in	direct	terms,	after	the	BBC	
agreed	to	an	expensive	pay	deal	in	the	winter,	while	the	Times	was	forced	to	close	for	a	year	due	to	
a	printing	dispute.	Other	newspapers	wrestled	with	the	print	unions,	often	at	great	expense,	and	
strikes	in	other	industries	had	an	impact	on	newspapers’	advertising	revenue.	John	Cole,	by	the	early	
1970s,	felt	‘the	Zeitgeist	was	turning	against	the	unions’	and	1979	provided	a	climax	to	such	
tensions.63	These	three	periods	of	industrial	relations	coverage	provide	the	foundation	for	thematic	
analysis	of	Britain’s	governance	and	its	economic	prosperity.			
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Thesis	Outline	
Along	with	this	clear	chronological	structure,	this	thesis	is	underpinned	by	two	key	themes	of	
research.	The	first	of	the	themes	is	based	on	the	intersection	of	trade	unionism	with	British	politics,	
while	the	second	explores	the	perceived	and	portrayed	impact	of	trade	unionism	on	the	British	
economy	and	its	future	prosperity.	Such	a	combination	of	chronological	and	thematic	approaches	
ensures	that	the	research	is	both	reflective	of	key	changes	but	is	also	responsive	to	the	clear	
continuities	of	the	period	and	guards	against	the	pitfalls	associated	with	overtly	narrative	history	
which	might	lack	analysis	or	evaluation.	
	
Political	power	and	issues	of	governance	provide	the	first	thematic	strand	to	analysis.	While	both	
Lewis	Minkin	and	Peter	Dorey	have	sought	to	challenge	such	assumptions,	the	relationship	between	
organised	labour	and	party	politics	has	been	generally	perceived	as	an	antagonistic	one,	much	like	
the	relationship	with	the	media.	Labour’s	‘disputatious	and	controversial	relationship’	with	the	trade	
unions	has	become	one	of	‘the	most	contentious	in	British	political	life’	and	some	commentators	
have	questioned	why	the	formal	ties	between	the	two	still	exist.	64	The	less	formal	association	
between	the	Conservative	Party	and	trade	unionism	has	‘often	been	a	fraught	one,	characterised	by	
mutual	suspicion	and	sporadic	open	hostility’,	largely	due	to	the	difference	in	values	between	the	
two,	and	the	majority	of	relevant	historiography	and	social	science	literature	has	ignored	the	
conciliatory	beginnings	to	this	relationship.65	This	research	explores	how	these	perceptions	of	
increasing	antagonism	were	managed	and	mediated	by	the	media,	and	the	subsequent	impact	this	
had	on	the	position	of	trade	unions,	as	newspapers	sought	to	bolster	the	popular	position	of	their	
political	allies.	As	Britain	was	gradually	perceived	to	be	ungovernable,	particularly	in	the	1970s,	
public	anxiety	grew	about	the	power	of	trade	unionism	and	its	supposed	threat	against	
parliamentary	democracy.	By	the	mid	1970s,	as	initial	polling	data	has	illustrated,	a	significant	
proportion	of	the	public	regarded	trade	unions	to	be	‘too	powerful’.	This	research	examines	how	
public	understanding	of	trade	union	power	change	and	how	media	coverage	contributed	to	this	
impression.	
	
In	order	to	produce	a	rounded	and	nuanced	study,	which	is	aware	of	the	pitfalls	of	exploring	purely	
sensationalised	headline	coverage,	these	two	thematic	threads	are	approached	in	very	different	
ways.	Although	both	have	the	analysis	of	media	content	at	their	heart,	the	first	is	intended	to	probe	
key	moments	of	political	tension	between	government	and	unions.	As	such,	the	chapters	about	
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politics	are	based	on	selected	case	studies,	primarily	industrial	disputes.	Geoffrey	Goodman	recalled	
that	‘for	a	long	time	–	far	too	long	in	my	opinion	–	we	remained,	largely,	strike	and	strife	
reporters’.66	While,	as	many	scholars	have	rightly	attested,	trade	union	activity	in	the	post-war	
period	was	about	more	than	strife,	it	is	somewhat	inevitable,	given	the	focus	of	industrial	specialists	
in	the	press,	this	research	is	drawn	to	issues	of	strife	and	industrial	tension.	This	research	attempts	
to	contextualise	this	coverage	with	broader	social	trends	and	political	developments.	In	order	to	do	
this,	these	cases	of	industrial	strife	are	placed	alongside	moments	of	controversy	in	policy	and	the	
wider	impact	of	strikes	on	politics,	as	seen	in	1974’s	general	election.	Lastly,	these	chapters	reflect	
on	the	influence	of	key	personalities	involved	in	the	intersection	of	trade	unionism	and	politics,	such	
as	Labour’s	Barbara	Castle	and	union	chief	Frank	Cousins.	These	chapters	cover	a	range	of	different	
industries,	from	public	transport	to	health	services,	selected	on	the	basis	of	their	political	interest	
and	media	salience.		
	
Media	narratives	of	Britain’s	economic	future	are	the	focus	of	analysis	for	the	research’s	second	
thematic	strand.	The	management	of	the	economy,	a	new	feature	of	the	post-war	period,	and	the	
framing	for	its	evolving	problems	had	an	important	impact	on	the	position	of	trade	unions.	State	
interventionism	in	the	economy,	demonstrated	most	clearly	through	nationalisation	of	key	
industries,	drastically	altered	the	connection	between	the	state	and	British	citizens.	This	
interventionism	applied	not	just	to	the	management	of	vital	aggregates	of	economic	prosperity	but	
also	the	‘economic	understanding	and	behaviour	of	the	populace’,	including	the	management	of	
expectations	around	wages.67	As	the	economy	deteriorated	and	public	anxiety	grew,	the	
government’s	interventionist	attitude	placed	it	under	severe	public	pressure.	Subsequently,	the	
attempts	to	curb	wages,	to	improve	productivity	and,	in	some	cases,	bail	out	struggling	industries,	
often	put	significant	pressure	on	the	position	and	expectations	of	trade	unions.		This	research	
explores	the	tensions	between	the	demands	on	the	state	and	the	expectations	of	trade	unionism.	
	
The	chapters	which	assess	the	trade	union	relationship	with	the	economy	are	based	primarily	on	
two	industries	central	to	debate;	the	mining	industry	and	the	motor	industry.	Both	of	these	sectors	
experienced	the	impact	of	government	interventionism,	of	serious	industrial	discontent,	and	the	
intense	scrutiny	of	the	British	media.	The	struggle	of	these	industries	became	symbolic	of	Britain’s	
changing	place	in	the	world	and	its	increasing	social	and	political	disorder.	Analysis	of	these	
industries	tends	less	towards	particular	moments	of	controversy	but	explores	the	nature	of	the	
																																																						
66	Goodman,	‘The	Role	of	Industrial	Correspondents’,	p.	28.	
67	Jim	Tomlinson,	‘Re-inventing	the	“moral	economy”	in	post-war	Britain’,	Historical	Research	84	(2011),	p.	
356.	
	
	
27	
industrial	and	economic	agendas	of	the	media	and	the	impact	these	had	on	both	the	industries	
themselves	and	those	working	within	them.	The	decline	of	Britain’s	mass	manufacturing	in	the	car	
industry	was	‘the	key	symbol	of	Britain’s	perceived	industrial	weakness	in	the	post-war	years’,	with	
an	indisputable	pattern	of	deterioration,	and	a	large	share	of	the	culpability	for	this	has	traditionally	
been	attributed	to	industrial	strife.68	While	it	is	not	the	purpose	of	this	research	to	interrogate	the	
validity	of	this	perception	of	blame,	as	there	are	already	valuable	studies	in	this	field,	this	work	
examines	how	the	media	helped	to	create	and	sustain	such	a	perception	through	the	use	of	
moralised	frames	and	narratives.	While	Tim	Claydon’s	work	on	the	car	industry	is	a	valuable	
contribution	to	understandings	of	this	sector,	this	research	seeks	to	contextualise	this	coverage	and	
broaden	its	scope,	so	as	to	tie	it	into	broader	themes	of	industrial	relations	coverage.	
	
On	the	other	hand,	the	National	Union	of	Miners,	the	kind	of	unified	trade	union	which	the	car	
industry	could	not	boast,	experienced	industrial	tension	stirred	by	the	emerging	antagonism	
between	pit	and	union	politics.	This	process	was	exacerbated	by	public	ownership,	an	issue	which	
‘exploded’	in	response	to	the	frustrations	and	anxieties	caused	by	the	industry’s	managed	decline	
and	the	relationship	with	the	1964	Labour	Government.69	An	industry	once	central	to	Britain’s	post-
war	economic	recovery,	and	bound	in	narratives	of	tradition	and	nostalgia,	its	decline	was	addressed	
in	different	terms	but	often	with	a	similar	emphasis	on	the	responsibility	of	the	workforce.	This	
research	addresses	how	the	industrial	relations	coverage	of	these	two	industries	was	influenced	by	
the	key	trends	in	economic	discourse,	particularly	regarding	employment,	productivity	and	inflation,	
and	their	attempts	to	bolster	or	undermine	the	economic	policies	of	incumbent	governments.	
	
This	research	scrutinises	how	the	supposed	separation	between	‘political’	and	‘industrial’	action	by	
unions	broke	down	over	the	period.	Given	the	1974	miners’	strike	had	significant	repercussions	for	
the	Heath	government	of	the	1970s,	and	economic	decline	became	increasingly	central	to	the	
political	agenda,	this	overlap	in	themes	reflects	the	intense	scrutiny	on	industrial	relations	by	the	
1970s.	The	Winter	of	Discontent	was	so	decisive	in	shaping	the	political	landscape	due	to	the	
centrality	of	such	issues	to	political	and	economic	debate.	Secondly,	as	this	research	is	responsive	to	
complexity	and	nuance,	it	explores	changes	beyond	these	narrow	boundaries.	The	GMG’s	research	
suggested	that	the	most	important	‘filter’	through	which	news	is	chosen	was	‘the	cultural	air	we	
breathe’	or	the	‘ideological	atmosphere	of	our	society’.70	This	alludes	to	a	certain	deep-seated	level	
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of	popular	opinion	which	was	fundamental	to	the	way	the	media	communicated	industrial	relations	
coverage,	as	well	as	the	way	it	was	perceived	and	understood.	Although	this	analysis	is	divided	along	
political	and	economic	boundaries,	there	is	a	sustained	effort	to	ensure	that	the	coverage	is	
contextualised	by	important	social	and	attitudinal	changes.		
		
Jean	Seaton	has	highlighted	the	significance	of	British	exceptionalism	for	understanding	the	
relationship	between	media	and	public.	Seaton	argued	that	the	Second	World	War,	‘the	last	national	
story	that	had	a	legitimate	and	satisfactory	“us	and	them”	in	it’,	progressively	lost	influence	over	
ideas	of	Britishness,	despite	the	powerful	myths	surrounding	it.71	The	period	under	scrutiny	saw	
Britain’s	position	in	the	world	change	significantly,	through	a	loss	of	empire	and	trade,	and	ideas	of	
Britishness	came	under	challenge	from	the	Troubles	in	Northern	Ireland	and	campaigns	for	
independence	in	Wales	and	Scotland.	This	research	seeks	to	understand	the	impact	of	these	changes	
in	self-perception	on	understandings	of	British	industry	and	trade	unionism.	In	the	late	1950s,	a	
combination	of	‘general	angst’	about	the	Suez	Crisis	and	the	decline	of	Empire,	along	with	evidence	
of	economic	boom	elsewhere	in	Europe,	‘combined	to	create	a	“What’s	Wrong	with	Britain”	furore	
that	led	to	a	culture	of	declinism	that	has	persisted	ever	since’.72	This	research	examines	how	the	
media’s	preoccupation	with	the	nation’s	economic	problems,	rooted	in	ideas	British	exceptionalism,	
exerted	particular	pressure	on	the	image	of	trade	unions	and	labour	force.	
	
The	relationship	between	perceptions	of	class	and	media	coverage	of	trade	unionism	is	of	particular	
interest	for	this	research.	Affluence	more	widely,	beyond	economic	policy,	had	important	
repercussions	for	both	the	relationship	between	Labour	and	the	TUC	and	for	support	for	trade	
unions	more	generally,	as	frustration	grew	with	the	supposed	‘grab	culture’	of	persistent	wage	
claims.		While	the	latter	half	of	the	period	is	associated	with	economic	decline,	the	vast	majority	of	
citizens	experienced	a	significant	upturn	in	living	standards	between	1945	and	1979,	as	
conceptualisations	of	class	evolved	and	adapted.	In	her	exploration	of	twentieth	century	working-
class	history,	Selina	Todd	suggested	that	the	emerging	class	tensions	of	the	late	1960s	and	1970s	
existed	between	the	economically	powerful	‘capitalist’	minority	and	the	supposedly	powerless	
majority.73	This	perspective,	while	popular,	does	not	align	with	the	fact	that	the	major	trade	unions	
frequently	and	often	successfully	challenged	the	establishment,	as	demonstrated	by	the	experiences	
of	Edward	Heath’s	government	and	the	failures	of	Labour’s	In	Place	of	Strife	policy	reforms,	and	
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perceptions	of	excessive	union	power	symbolised	through	the	Winter	of	Discontent.	Perhaps	such	a	
perception	of	minority	capitalist	power	is	partly	accounted	for	by	the	view	that,	despite	membership	
which	peaked	at	around	fourteen	million,	trade	unionists	were	increasingly	understood	to	be	
isolated	from	conceptualisations	of	the	‘public’,	‘majority’	or	‘nation’.		
	
This	research	explores	the	inconsistencies	of	perceived	union	power	and	social	marginalisation	and	
the	media’s	hand	in	managing	such	perceptions.	As	James	Curran	has	suggested,	analysing	class	in	
the	post-war	media	is	an	‘ambitious	project’	as	the	current	scholarship	lacks	a	coherent	narrative	
that	‘describes	the	distributional	battles	between	social	classes	in	terms	of	power,	status	and	
material	rewards,	and	described	the	evolving	role	of	the	media	in	relation	to	these’.74	
	
Chapter	Outline	
The	six	chapters	that	follow	alternate	between	the	two	central	themes	of	research.	The	first	chapter	
addresses	issues	of	power	and	governance,	based	on	coverage	of	the	late	1940s	and	1950s.	This	
chapter	explores	the	media’s	framing	of	the	dynamics	of	power	both	within	the	labour	movement	
and	the	evolution	of	the	relationship	between	unions	and	government	at	a	time	of	supposed	
political	consensus.	In	doing	so,	it	will	utilise	the	cases	of	the	1955	dock	strike,	an	inter-union	
dispute,	and	the	1958	London	bus	strike,	led	by	Frank	Cousins,	General	Secretary	of	the	Transport	
and	General	Workers	Union.75	These	two	case	studies,	as	well	as	attitudes	towards	Cousins’s	
leadership,	provided	important	indications	of	public	anxiety	about	the	motivations	of	unions,	as	the	
media	used	politicised	analysis	to	delegitimise	claims.	The	second	chapter	is	based	on	the	same	
period	but	looks	closely	at	the	impact	of	Britain’s	evolving	economic	status	on	perceptions	of	trade	
unionism.	As	with	all	of	the	chapters	focused	on	the	economy,	it	analyses	broad	trends	in	both	the	
mining	industry	and	motor	industry,	where	the	cases	of	redundancy	at	the	British	Motor	Company	
(BMC)	and	the	Standard	Motor	Company,	and	the	subsequent	disputes,	are	of	particular	interest.		
This	chapter	will	scrutinise	the	causal	links	drawn	by	the	media	between	nationalisation	and	strife,	
and	the	implications	of	such	a	narrative.	
	
The	third	and	fourth	chapters	will	assess	the	relationship	between	trade	unionism	and,	firstly,	British	
politics,	and	secondly,	the	economy,	in	the	1960s.	Focussed	primarily	on	the	experiences	of	the	
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Labour	Party	in	reconciling	its	close	relationship	with	the	labour	movement	with	the	increasing	
pressure	for	reform	of	trade	union	power,	the	third	chapter	will	address	how	press	and	television	
sought	to	mediate	these	issues.	Beyond	Labour’s	controversial	attempts	to	curb	union	power	
through	the	In	Place	of	Strife	proposals	in	1969,	the	1966	Seamen’s	strike	prompted	debate	about	
the	scale	of	union	power,	and	will	form	another	important	case	study.	The	fourth	chapter	will	
analyse	the	discussions	provoked	by	recurring	unofficial	strikes	in	Britain’s	struggling	car	industry,	
the	position	of	supposed	militant	shop	stewards,	and	the	impact	of	the	government’s	moralised	
‘productivity’	rhetoric	on	the	reputation	of	unions	and	the	dominant	explanations	for	Britain’s	
supposed	decline.	It	will	also	provide	evidence	of	how	concepts	of	consensus	on	economic	policy	
began	to	fracture	in	media	debate,	and	the	impact	of	this	division	on	attitudes	towards	trade	union	
claims.	
	
The	final	two	chapters,	focus	on	the	1970s	and	the	climax	of	tensions	between	the	government	and	
the	trade	unions,	again	with	the	same	thematic	division	between	them.	The	first	reflects	on	the	
differences	in	attitudes	and	portrayals	demonstrated	by	the	media	of	the	1974	miners’	strike,	in	the	
build	up	to	February’s	general	election,	and	1978-79’s	Winter	of	Discontent.	It	will	reflect	on	the	
influence	of	the	Sun	and	tabloidisation	in	the	contrasts	in	response,	as	well	as	increased	anxiety	
about	the	Labour	Party’s	ability	to	wrestle	with	the	power	of	trade	unionism.	The	final	chapter	seeks	
to	establish	the	impact	of	increased	government	interventionism,	exemplified	by	cases	of	
nationalisation	at	British	Leyland	and	interference	in	wage	settlements	at	Ford,	on	media	attitudes	
towards	the	labour	force.	It	analyses	the	links	made	between	Britain’s	spiralling	inflation	and	the	
myths	of	‘the	British	disease’	in	industry,	which	implicated	the	labour	force	as	a	primary	factor	in	
Britain’s	decline.	Finally,	it	assesses	the	impact	of	declinist	rhetoric	on	concepts	of	social	cohesion	
and	class,	focussing	on	the	media’s	portrayal	of	trade	union’s	contribution	to	social	tension.	Over	the	
course	of	the	thesis,	the	demarcation	between	the	two	central	themes	blurs	and	fades,	as	issues	of	
industrial	relations	and	economic	development	became	gradually	more	central	to	the	political	
agenda.			
	
Ultimately,	this	research	probes	the	dominant	assumptions	about	the	attitude	of	the	mainstream	
news	media	towards	trade	unions,	in	order	to	uncover	significant	nuances	and	complexities	in	
industrial	relations	coverage	between	the	Second	World	War	and	the	election	of	Margaret	Thatcher.	
Despite	the	lack	of	comprehensive	analysis	of	the	media’s	role	in	the	relationship	between	high	
politics	and	trade	unions,	relevant	issues	have	been	mythologised	and	bound	in	political	symbolism.	
Rather	than	assuming	the	existence	of	crude	neoliberal	conspiracies	against	left-wing	unions,	this	
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work	examines	the	cumulative	impact	of	changes	to	society,	the	evolution	of	cultural	attitudes,	and	
shifts	in	journalistic	values	on	the	political	position	and	the	public	perceptions	of	trade	unions.	The	
uses	and	changes	to	the	framing,	the	shaping	of	political	agendas	and	the	use	of	moralised	and	
politicised	language	were	significant	in	media	portrayals	of	the	trade	unions.	Coverage	of	industrial	
action	was	not	exclusively	negative	but	sought	to	legitimise	and	delegitimise	union	activity	in	
complex	ways,	depending	on	political	allegiances,	commercial	pressures	and	issues	of	public	
concern.	Unions	were	not	passengers	in	these	processes	and	sought	to	defend	their	interests,	albeit	
with	limited	resources	and	widespread	cynicism	about	their	value.	It	was	not	until	the	mid-1970s	
that	the	cumulative	effect	of	decades	of	coverage	was	apparent	on	the	reputation	of	the	unions.	
Years	of	media	preoccupation	with	wage-stimulated	inflation	and	industrial	decline;	frustration	with	
the	nature	of	state	interventionism	in	industry;	and	moralised	and	politicised	judgement	on	union	
activity	was	exploited	for	dramatic	political	effect.	The	Sun	played	an	important	part	as	a	catalyst	for	
such	changes,	exploiting	its	cultural	capital	and	its	appeal	to	those	traditionally	sympathetic	to	
labour	interests.	
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Chapter	One	–	Political	trade	unionism	and	Cold	War	binaries	
Power	and	Governance,	1945-59	
	
In	1952,	in	his	study	The	British	Worker,	Ferdynand	Zweig	argued	that	the	unions	were	‘the	bulwark	
of	industrial	peace	and	lawfulness’.1	Yet,	by	1958,	British	newspapers	were	providing	front-page	
coverage	of	‘the	most	critical	strike	threat	for	30	years’.2	While	this	change	alludes	to	the	period’s	
significance	for	the	relationship	between	government	and	unions,	the	extent	of	this	development	
has	often	been	underestimated.	In	rejection	of	common	historiographical	perceptions	of	the	decade	
as	a	‘a	tranquil,	moderate	interlude’	between	the	turbulent	1940s	and	1960s,	this	piece	illustrates	
how	industrial	action	in	the	1950s	saw	the	emergence	of	many	of	the	key	media	narratives	which	
have	typified	industrial	relations	coverage	in	the	post-war	period.3	In	this	short	six-year	period	
increasing	tensions	between	unions	and	government	prompted	the	media	to	frame	industrial	action	
with	new	political	significance,	as	concerns	about	labour	militancy	grew.	Although	the	1950s	has	
been	regarded	as	a	period	of	media	restraint,	characterised	by	‘a	decline	in	press	partisanship’,	
media	commentary	on	industrial	relations	illustrates	the	maintenance	and	evolution	of	long-term	
trends	in	media	language	and	framing.4	The	ideas	of	precedent	and	tradition	are	important	threads	
to	the	research,	in	order	to	establish	the	reasons	for	the	influence	of	industrial	coverage	later	in	the	
period.	
	
Primarily,	this	chapter	analyses	and	illuminates	a	number	of	critical	trends	in	media	coverage	of	
industrial	relations	during	the	1950s.	During	a	period	known	for	its	emerging	affluence,	an	influential	
factor	in	portrayals	of	industrial	tranquillity,	this	section	explores	the	problem	trade	unions	had	in	
maintaining	their	‘relevance’	in	a	society	which	became	increasingly	familiar	with	rising	living	
standards	and	full	employment.	Tony	Crosland’s	The	Future	of	Socialism	wrestled	with	the	
challenges	the	Labour	party	experienced	in	‘trying	to	choose	an	appropriate	response	to	the	age	of	
affluence’	and	such	political	problems	filtered	down	to	the	wider	labour	movement,	or	at	the	very	
least	perceptions	of	it.5	As	improved	living	standards	placed	greater	emphasis	on	individual	
consumers,	this	chapter	assesses	how	understandings	of	collectivism	and	labour	solidarity	were	
shaped	and	redefined,	including	ideas	of	leadership	and	responsibility.	This	discussion	helped	to	
																																																						
1	Ferdynand	Zweig,	The	British	Worker	(1952),	p.	181.	
2	Daily	Mail,	11	April	1958,	p.	1.	
3	Fishman,	‘“Spearhead	of	the	Movement”?’,	p.	287.	
4	Thomas,	Popular	Newspapers,	p.	35.	
5	Catherine	Ellis,	‘Total	Abstinence	and	a	Good	Filing-System?	Anthony	Crosland	and	the	Affluent	Society’,	in	
Lawrence	Black	and	Hugh	Pemberton	(eds),	An	Affluent	Society?	Britain’s	Post-war	‘Golden	Age’	Revisited	
(Aldershot,	2004),	p.	69.	
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foster	the	atmosphere	and	conditions	for	the	high-profile	political	debates	of	the	late	1960s	and	
1970s.	
	
Secondly,	this	chapter	scrutinises	the	divisive	framing	constructed	by	the	media	in	depicting	the	
unions’	battle	for	public	support.	In	particular,	it	reflects	on	powerful	political	binaries	constructed	in	
relation	to	industrial	militancy,	as	well	as	the	boundaries	between	‘industrial’	and	‘political’	strikes	
and	the	role	of	this	demarcation	in	defining	the	limits	of	media	support.	Finally,	it	considers	the	
depiction	of	the	British	public	in	media	reports,	both	with	regards	to	the	framing	of	growing	trade	
unionism	in	relation	to	a	‘public’	and	the	fluidity	of	public	support.	While	the	1970s	have	often	been	
portrayed	as	an	era	of	public	hostility	towards	industrial	action,	little	is	understood	of	the	public’s	
position	in	the	decade	that	followed	the	Second	World	War.	This	is	one	of	a	number	of	shortcomings	
in	historiographical	understanding	which	this	work	begins	to	address.	The	selection	of	sources	in	this	
chronological	section	has	been	made	in	response	to	the	relevant	media	trends	during	the	1940s	and	
1950s.	This	has	meant	that	television	coverage,	during	its	formative	years	has	played	a	
supplementary	role	to	core	analysis	of	the	then	booming	press.	
	
Crisis	in	the	docks:	Inter-Union	Disputes			
Inter-union	disputes,	a	common	issue	in	1950s	industrial	relations,	posed	important	questions	about	
the	interests	and	responsibilities	of	trade	unions,	particularly	in	nationalised	industries.	The	first	case	
study	of	this	chapter,	the	1955	dock	strike,	took	place	in	a	year	when	industrial	action	was	high	on	
the	media	agenda	even	when	the	scale	of	industrial	unrest	in	1955	was	not	statistically	noteworthy.		
In	1953,	1.3	million	workers	were	involved	in	industrial	disputes,	more	than	twice	the	number	of	
1955,	and	in	1957	more	than	8.4	million	days	were	lost	to	disputes,	compared	to	the	3.7	million	days	
in	1955.6	This	underlines	the	irregular	relationship	between	coverage	and	strike	propensity.	This	
media	attention	was	primarily	inspired	by	significant	strikes	in	nationalised	industries,	which	
coincided	with	the	government’s	declaration	of	a	State	of	Emergency.	In	this	context,	there	was	an	
upsurge	in	the	level	of	newspaper	articles	addressing	strikes	in	1955	and,	by	1957,	public	approval	
for	trade	unionism	hit	a	record	post-war	low,	as	only	53	per	cent	deemed	unions	a	‘good	thing’.	This	
figure	which	would	not	be	rivalled	until	the	early	1970s.7		
	
Although	it	could	reasonably	be	argued	that	the	self-interest	of	media	outlets	contributed	to	a	surge	
in	coverage,	at	a	time	when	industrial	action	had	caused	a	month-long	stoppage	to	press	production	
																																																						
6	Lindsay,	‘A	Century	of	Labour	Market	Change’,	p.	139.	
7	George	Gallup,	The	Gallup	International	Public	Opinion	Polls,	Great	Britain:	Volume	1,	1937-1964	(New	York,	
1976),	p.	418.	
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and	rail	strikes	had	halted	distribution,	the	themes	of	industrial	relations	coverage	during	1955	
suggested	something	more	complex.	Media	debate	highlighted	a	number	of	emerging	issues	about	
the	nature	of	power	inside	the	trade	union	movement	which	extended	beyond	the	short-term	
fortunes	of	the	newspaper	industry.	Like	the	aforementioned	rail	strike,	industrial	action	in	the	
country’s	docks	was	motivated	by	an	inter-union	dispute,	pitting	two	unions	in	the	same	industry	
against	each	other.	The	1955	dock	dispute,	prompted	by	an	official	strike	from	National	
Amalgamated	Stevedores	and	Dockers	(NASD)	union	members	from	northern	docks,	over	their	
rights	to	representation	on	boards	in	union-employer	negotiations,	provoked	further	interest	and	
concern	from	a	multitude	of	media	sources.	The	opposition	of	the	TGWU	leadership	to	this	action,	
along	with	the	NASD’s	alleged	‘poaching’	of	discontented	members	from	the	TGWU,	intensified	the	
dispute.		
	
Across	the	political	spectrum,	newspapers	were	swift	to	emphasise	the	self-defeating	nature	of	
inter-union	disputes,	although	the	frames	of	explanation	were	diverse.	According	to	the	Daily	Mail,	
‘continual	strikes	over	paltry	or	personal	issues	corrupt	and	degrade	the	trade	union	movement’,	
alluding	to	the	strike’s	contribution	to	the	declining	reputation	of	the	trade	union	movement	
amongst	the	wider	public.8	As	far	as	many	of	the	Conservative-supporting	newspapers	were	
concerned,	the	dock	strike	was	one	built	on	‘trivialities	and	technicalities’.9	For	many,	such	strikes	
were	particularly	concerning	because	so	many	inter-union	disputes	were	perceived	to	be	‘scarcely	
more	than	periodical	eruptions	of	permanent	–	though	often	imaginary	–	grievances’,	which	
indicated	an	awareness	of	the	possibility	of	a	long-term	upturn	in	industrial	disputes.	Almost	
universally,	providing	a	point	of	consensus	on	industrial	relations,	the	dock	strike	was	rejected	as	
legitimate	industrial	action,	regardless	of	the	support	for	the	stated	grievances.		
	
The	Mail	linked	such	strikes	to	the	threat	of	international	trade	competition	through	a	direct	
comparison	with	the	fortunes	of	Germany,	the	enemies	of	old,	who	were	‘taking	orders	for	ships,	
locomotives	and	steel-mills	which	should	have	come	to	us’.	This	was	rhetoric	which	indicated	a	
sense	of	national	pride	and	privilege	which	industrial	action	sought	to	threaten	and	tapped	into	the	
tropes	of	war.	The	article	concluded	that	such	strikes	were	‘wilful	sabotage	on	our	commerce’.10	This	
type	of	framing,	with	futile	dock	strikes	as	a	selfish	threat	to	economic	prosperity,	rather	than	an	
indication	of	a	failing	organisational	structure,	has	many	connections	with	the	popularised	media	
frames	of	explanation	for	the	faltering	economy	of	the	1960s	and	1970s.	Although	the	affluent	
																																																						
8	Daily	Mail,	8	November	1954,	p.	1.	
9	Daily	Mail,	10	May	1955,	p.	1.	
10	Daily	Mail,	1	July	1955,	p.	1.	
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1950s	lay	in	relative	contrast	to	the	later	period,	particularly	with	regards	to	public	perception,	
media	sources	were	already	proposing	that	union	militancy	could	be	directly	linked	to	the	fortunes	
and	failures	of	the	economy.		
	
Meanwhile,	the	Daily	Mirror,	while	not	essentially	critical	of	the	dockers’	readiness	to	strike,	was	
similarly	concerned	by	the	self-defeating	nature	of	this	particular	dispute	on	the	docks,	reflecting	a	
widespread	discontent.	It	argued	that	it	was	‘farcical	that	a	union	should	be	swiping	or	nudging	the	
bosses	with	one	hand	and	belting	another	union	with	the	other	hand’.11	Consistently,	the	Daily	
Mirror’s	position	was	that	union	efforts	were	being	misdirected	at	other	unions,	instead	of	
‘protesting	against	injustice	done	to	them	by	the	employers’,	which	upheld	an	adversarial,	class-
oriented	framing	of	industrial	relationships.12	Industrial	action,	according	to	the	Mirror,	was	a	
weapon	to	be	reserved	for	clashes	with	employers,	not	fellow	trade	unionists.	The	Mirror’s	position	
was	concerned	with	the	solidarity	within	the	movement,	rather	than	the	impact	of	inter-union	
disputes	on	the	wider	reputation	of	the	organised	labour	movement.	It	framed	the	continuation	of	
the	strike	in	June	as	union	indiscipline,	with	the	headline	‘Dock	Strikers	Defy	TUC’.13	Regardless	of	
the	validity	of	the	NASD’s	intention	to	seek	representation	in	northern	ports,	it	was	not,	‘by	any	
interpretation	of	trade	union	principles’,	a	legitimate	reason	for	striking.14	In	this	case,	there	
appeared	to	be	little	support	of	any	kind	for	the	dockworkers	and	the	press	were	reluctant	to	
encourage	any.	For	left-wing	editorial	perspectives,	inter-union	disputes	threatened	ideas	of	
solidarity	and	collectivism,	concepts	which	members	of	the	left-wing	press	were	keen	to	buttress	
and	celebrate.	
	
Responsibility,	as	with	many	strikes	during	the	period,	was	a	popular	theme	to	criticisms.	The	Times	
argued	that	such	inter-union	disputes	were	‘an	abnegation	both	of	the	responsibilities	upon	which	
trade	union	rights	are	erected	and	of	the	nation’s	larger	interests’.15	Although	the	Times	recognised	
the	rights	for	which	the	NASD	workers	were	striking,	it	felt,	as	a	priority,	they	should	‘find	a	new	
sense	of	responsibility’	through	a	return	to	work.16	This	discussion	of	responsibility	and	duty	was	
indicative	of	the	way	the	press	regularly	used	moral	ideas	to	exert	pressure	on	the	trade	union	
movement	to	reform	from	within.	In	response	to	these	problems,	many	sources	concluded	that	it	
																																																						
11	Daily	Mirror,	7	October	1954,	p.	2.	
12	Daily	Mirror,	19	May	1955,	p.	2.	
13	Daily	Mirror,	30	June	1955,	p.	20.		
14	Daily	Mirror,	19	May	1955,	p.	2.	
15	The	Times,	4	November	1954,	p.	5.	
16	The	Times,	2	July	1955,	p.	7.	
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was	the	obligation	of	the	TUC	to	re-establish	a	sense	of	public	duty	perceived	to	be	lacking	in	the	
docklands	through	a	reassertion	of	their	own	authority.		
	
Collectivism	and	the	individual	
The	influence	of	collectivist	ideals	was	important	in	shaping	media	coverage.	Following	the	
conclusion	of	the	rail	and	newspaper	strikes	and	the	death	of	Arthur	Deakin,	the	Daily	Express	
commended	the	TUC	as	they	had	‘bestowed	normalcy	on	Britain’,	though	felt	many	people	would	be	
‘grateful’	but	‘confused’	by	the	TUC	leaders’	role	as		‘industrial	peacemakers’.17	In	this	opinion	piece,	
Trevor	Evans	suggested	that	the	TUC	General	Council,	despite	criticism	from	inside	the	movement,	
had	recognised	its	‘duty	to	the	general	public	as	well	as	a	responsibility	to	its	own	members’.18	
Similarly,	although	it	was	one	of	the	few	articles	to	suggest	that	the	next	government	would	need	to	
take	action	against	strikes,	the	Mail	commended	Jock	Tiffin,	then	General	Secretary	of	the	powerful	
TGWU,	as	he	tried	to	exercise	his	influence	against	the	Stevedores	and	maintain	discipline	amongst	
London	dockers.19	The	Times	even	went	so	far	as	to	suggest	that	it	was	‘natural’,	that	the	public	eye	
should	turn	to	the	‘unprecedented	influence’	of	the	TUC	to	‘lead	the	unions	concerned	back	to	
sanity’,	once	again	drawing	on	concepts	of	a	moral	responsibility	and	suggestive	of	misguided	
influences	on	individual	trade	unions.20	The	focus	in	these	cases	was	not	on	the	government’s	
influence	on	industrial	relations,	which	was	frequently	notable	in	its	absence,	but	on	the	TUC	to	
operate	as	industrial	arbiters.	The	widespread	approval	of	the	demands	of	the	TUC’s	disputes	
commission,	in	declaring	that	the	discontented	workers	must	be	returned	to	the	TGWU	and	all	
strikers	must	return	to	work,	alludes	to	the	general	respect	and	enthusiasm	for	the	TUC’s	
intervention	at	a	time	when	industrial	action	was	becoming	widespread,	and	concerns	were	
emerging	about	the	unions’	sense	of	civic	duty.		
	
Indicative	of	the	widespread	acceptance	of	collectivism	at	that	time	it	is	notable	that	the	individual	
rights	and	attitudes	of	the	workers	were	largely	peripheral	in	media	debate,	certainly	in	‘popular’	
newspapers.	According	to	Jim	Phillips,	the	dock	strike	was	the	consequence	of	Arthur	Deakin’s	
hostile	attitude	to	port	activism	which	had	‘damaged	hugely	the	credibility	of	the	TGWU	in	the	
docks’,	in	contrast	to	the	NASD	which	was	‘perceived	as	more	responsive	to	workers	and	their	
																																																						
17	Daily	Express,	2	May	1955,	p.	6.	
18	Daily	Express,	2	May	1955,	p.	6.	
19	Daily	Mail,	17	May	1955,	p.	1.	
20	The	Times,	2	June	1955,	p.	7.	
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workplace	concerns’.21	Very	few	contemporary	media	sources	commented	on	the	discontent	
amongst	rank	and	file	members,	although	the	Times	did	highlight	attitudes	of	‘suspicion	and	
frustration’	from	dockworkers	towards	both	representatives	and	employers,	a	trend	that	reached	
‘far	beyond	the	docks.’22	Although	the	decision	of	the	TUC	disputes	commission	pointed	to	a	
welcome	reassertion	of	the	leadership’s	authority,	it	also	alluded	to	the	problems	of	representation	
and	democracy	for	the	rank	and	file.	Democratic	rights	would	simply	be	delivered	through	the	
implementation	of	secret	ballots,	according	to	the	Mail,	in	order	to	prevent	workers	from	being	
intimidated	into	supporting	strikes	where	the	reasoning	was	‘obscure	or	capricious’.23	The	idea	that	
workers	could	be	‘poached’	from	a	union	and	then	‘returned’,	as	the	TUC	had	ruled,	was	a	generally	
accepted	one,	as	unions	were	assumed	to	defend	the	rights	of	their	workers.		
	
Only	the	Guardian	and	Times	queried	the	position	of	individual	agency	in	this	exchange.	The	Times	
suggested	that	the	strike	had	prompted	debate	about	‘the	right	of	a	worker	to	join	the	union	of	his	
choice’	and	subsequently	lamented	that	the	TUC	made	‘no	provision’	for	discontented	workers	to	
transfer	between	unions	or	establish	new	means	of	representation.24	The	Guardian	was	the	most	
impassioned	in	criticising	‘labour	monopolies’	by	the	country’s	biggest	unions,	as	it	argued	that	there	
was	‘far	more	oppression	by	trade	unions	than	by	any	group	of	employers’	and	that,	while	the	law	
had	once	sought	to	protect	trade	unionists	against	employers,	now	there	was	‘growing	opinion	
which	wants	the	law	to	give	more	protection	against	aggressive	trade	unionism’.25	This	indicated	a	
gradually	emerging	change	in	attitude	towards	the	protective	responsibility	of	the	law	in	industrial	
relations.	It	also	reflected	growing	awareness	of	the	unions’	strength.	The	Guardian	warned	that	if	
unions	continued	to	‘prefer	strikes	to	using	common	sense’	then	they	would	be	‘simply	inviting	
repressive	legislation’,	such	was	the	strength	of	public	and	political	opinion	against	industrial	
action.26	In	the	face	of	waning	support	for	the	union	movement,	such	discussion	illustrated	an	
awareness	of	the	possibility,	or	perhaps	even	a	threat,	that	relatively	minor	strikes	could	have	long-
term	and	damaging	implications	for	the	future	of	the	labour	movement.	
	
	
	
																																																						
21	Jim	Phillips,	‘Anti-Communism	and	Trade	Unionism:	A	Brief	Response	to	Tom	Sibley’,	Historical	Studies	in	
Industrial	Relations	29	(2010),	p.	120.		
22	The	Times,	4	November	1954,	p.	5.	
23	Daily	Mail,	17	May	1955,	p.	1.	
24	The	Times,	18	May	1955,	p.	11.		
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Media	approaches	and	influences	
The	analysis	of	‘journalistic-centred	influences’	in	the	construction	of	media	frames	in	1950s	
industrial	relations	coverage	is	highly	complex	and	the	specific	role	of	individuals	and	personalities	is	
often	concealed.27	Hugh	Cudlipp,	then	editor	of	the	Mirror,	referred	to	a	prevalent	journalistic	
approach	that	was	directed	but	not	inflexible,	as	individual	columnists	were	‘free	to	differ	from	“the	
policy”	and	frequently	enjoyed	doing	so’.28	Similarly,	Alistair	Hetherington,	the	Guardian’s	editor	
from	1956,	recalled	staff	were	encouraged	to	write	‘as	individuals,	being	neither	exploited	as	
personalities	nor	cut	and	trimmed	like	robots’	and	were	instead	‘left	to	absorb	the	atmosphere’	of	
the	newsroom.29	This	indicated	the	same	trend	of	journalistic	autonomy	during	a	period	of	
diminished	partisanship.	Useful	insights	on	the	Guardian’s	industrial	relations	perspective	during	the	
1950s	comes	from	the	memoirs	of	John	Cole.	Cole	recalled	that	the	journalists	at	the	Guardian	
‘intended	to	be	sympathetic	to	Labour,	with	or	without	a	capital	L’,	in	response	to	the	many	pro-
Conservative	newspapers,	but	this	intention	was	often	‘tortured’	or	compromised	by	the	
newspaper’s	Liberal	roots,	its	fairly	conservative	readership	and	the	‘modern	reality’	of	the	strength	
of	the	Labour	Party.30		
	
This	conflict	in	representing	the	concerns	of	labour	was	apparent	in	the	industrial	relations	coverage	
of	the	dock	strike.	While	sympathetic	to	the	demands	and	concerns	of	the	strikers,	the	Guardian’s	
editorial	position	was	notably	critical	of	the	formal	organisations	at	the	top	of	the	labour	movement,	
the	TUC’s	centralised	leadership,	which	had	created	such	a	conflict	inside	the	movement.	In	a	June	
opinion	piece,	the	Guardian	continued	the	analogy	with	commodity	monopolies,	highlighting	that	as	
men	were	not	commodities,	‘attempts	to	force	them	to	remain	members	of	particular	unions’	were	
‘bound	to	fail’	and	the	TUC	should	have	turned	its	attention	to	‘devising	ways	of	making	trade	
unionism	more	liberal’	and	‘achieve	stability	without	crippling	arthritis’.31	This	position	argued	that	it	
was	not	the	diversification	of	union	representation	which	was	problematic	but	the	inability	of	the	
structures	above	it	to	respond	to	change.	In	1957,	Cole,	then	the	Guardian’s	new	industrial	
correspondent,	continued	to	query	the	power	and	influence	of	the	major	trade	unions,	with	criticism	
																																																						
27	Scheufele,	‘Framing	as	a	Theory	of	Media	Effects’,	p.	115.	
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of	the	Labour	party’s	system	of	block	voting,	though	he	concedes	that	this	was	a	debate	which	did	
not	become	‘fashionable	in	Labour	circles’	until	the	1980s.32	In	many	ways,	the	narratives	of	the	
Guardian	in	the	1950s	signalled	an	emerging	awareness	of	the	vulnerabilities	and	inflexibilities	of	
existing,	centralised	trade	union	structures	which	would	come	under	further	scrutiny	thereafter.	
	
In	the	world	of	visual	media,	and	as	a	point	of	contrast,	British	Pathé’s	coverage	had	a	rather	
different,	lighter	emphasis	from	these	complex	political	arguments.	As	Scott	Althaus	has	suggested,	
while	newsreels	became	more	“serious”	in	the	post-war	era,	indicated	by	the	intense	coverage	of	
strikes,	the	medium	‘remained	firmly	bound	to	the	tastes	of	audiences	who	sought	escape	and	
diversion	in	the	cinemas’.33	Although	guided	by	the	printed	media	agenda,	as	newsreel	cameramen	
would	frequently	be	simply	handed	a	newspaper	clipping	to	direct	their	visual	coverage,	newsreel	
commentary	was	less	interested	in	the	tangled	political	debates	of	the	broadsheets.34	Influenced	by	
newspaper	narratives,	coverage	of	the	dock	strike	focussed	on	the	simple	and	popular	narrative	of	a	
‘pointless	and	costly	squabble’	which	paralysed	‘export	lifelines’.35	However,	six	weeks	into	the	
strike,	British	Pathé	lamented	that	the	strike	had	provided	‘astonished	victims’	in	the	form	of	the	
Russian	rowing	team	that	was	due	to	compete	at	the	Henley	Regatta	that	summer.	This	connection	
was	indicative	of	the	editors’	desire	to	maintain	an	association	with	entertainment	and	sport,	to	
bring	relief	to	a	divisive	issue.	Such	an	angle	was	a	common	theme	in	newsreel	strike	coverage	that	
had	shown	men	reading	women’s	magazines	during	the	printers’	strike,	while	chimpanzees	read	the	
newspapers	on	their	return.	As	Althaus	has	argued,	and	as	newsreel	coverage	of	strikes	suggests,	the	
common	assumption	that	visual	“soft	news”	formats	are	a	relatively	recent	development	is	a	
mistaken	one.	Although	newsreel	commentary	was	rarely	apolitical	and	often	tapped	into	the	
frames	of	explanation	popularised	by	the	press,	in	this	case	those	present	in	the	Express	and	the	
Mail,	the	commentary	editors’	preference	to	prioritise	entertainment	was	evident	and	noteworthy.		
	
Although	there	was	almost	unanimous	condemnation	of	the	1955	dock	strike,	the	motivations	for	
media	criticism	were	varied.	The	complex	dialogue	between	different	media	sources	suggested	that	
public	perceptions	of	the	responsibilities	of	the	TUC	at	this	time	were	very	much	conflicted,	placing	
the	organisation	in	a	difficult	position.	On	the	one	hand,	the	likes	of	the	Express	and	Mail	were	
enthusiastic	for	the	TUC	to	assert	its	authority	for	the	sake	of	a	swift	resolution	and	public	
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contentment,	yet,	on	the	other	hand,	the	Guardian	and	Times	hoped	the	TUC	would	adapt	as	an	
organisation	in	order	to	deliver	on	its	responsibilities	to	democratic	and	representative	trade	
unionism.	In	many	ways,	this	conflict	posed	the	primacy	of	the	collective	against	the	individual.	This	
tension	illustrated	the	problems	for	the	trade	union	leadership	of	governing	a	rapidly	evolving	labour	
movement	that	departed	from	many	organisational	traditions,	in	a	changing	economy,	while	
responding	to	the	expectations	of	media	outlets	that	were	responding	to	change	in	different	ways	
and	thus	exerting	conflicting	pressures.	There	were	important	balances	to	the	BBC’s	commentary	of	
union	issues.	While	its	journalists	recognised	that	recent	strikes	had	been	controversial,	it	added	a	
layer	of	nuance	which	permeated	later	coverage	of	strikes	over	redundancy,	as	it	adjudged	that	
‘conduct	which	is	not	altogether	justifiable	is	often	understandable’.36	
	
Frank	Cousins:	Moderate	or	militant?		
In	1956,	a	change	in	leadership	prompted	new	questions	about	the	rights	and	responsibilities	of	
trade	unions,	as	Frank	Cousins	was	elected	as	General	Secretary	of	the	Transport	and	General	
Workers	Union,	the	country’s	largest	single	union.	His	two	most	notable	predecessors,	Ernest	Bevin	
(1922-1945)	and	Arthur	Deakin	(1945-1955)	exhibited	firm	but	conservative	leadership.	They	
advocated	the	government’s	restrictive	wage	policies,	despite	wider	union	opposition,	and,	in	the	
case	of	Deakin,	expressed	forthright	anti-communist	feeling	on	the	TUC	General	Council.	Cousins’s	
arrival	on	the	industrial	scene	undoubtedly	introduced	a	‘new	stridency	into	relations	between	
Whitehall	and	trade	unions’	and	the	media	often	highlighted	problems	with	Cousins’s	style	of	
leadership	and	oration.	37	These	criticisms	were	unusually	personalised	for	industrial	relations	
content,	which	was	indicative	of	the	preoccupation	with	trade	union	leadership,	as	well	as	new	
trends	in	tabloid	coverage.	In	their	response	to	Cousins’s	speech	at	the	1956	TUC	Annual	Congress,	
the	Mail	emphasised	Cousins’s	‘bad	manners’	and	‘offensiveness	towards	Mr	MacMillan’	instead	of	
his	political	message.38	Randolph	Churchill,	in	his	1957	opinion	article	entitled	‘Mr	Over-rated’,	
argued	that	it	was	primarily	Cousins’s	‘brashness’	that	had	been	a	major	problem	for	his	relationship	
with	the	TUC,	rather	than	the	because	of	a	difference	in	political	attitudes.39		
	
The	personalised	criticism	of	Cousins	routinely	overlooked	the	similarities	of	his	style	with	his	
predecessors.	Trevor	Evans,	industrial	correspondent	writing	for	the	Express	prior	to	the	TGWU	
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elections,	had	called	for	Deakin’s	successor	to	‘respect	tradition’.	40	A	respect	for	TGWU	tradition	
from	the	Express	was	not	unexpected,	given	their	aging	readership,	and	Trevor	Evans’s	interest	in	
the	legacy	of	Ernest	Bevin,	evident	in	the	extensive	biography	he	wrote	in	1946.41	Bevin’s	notoriety	
and	influence	was	apparent	in	radio	scheduling	as,	six	years	after	his	death,	at	the	height	of	a	
national	strike	in	the	engineering	industry	led	by	Cousins,	the	BBC	broadcasted	a	‘candid	portrait’.42	
However,	there	were	only	minor	differences	in	personal	style	between	Cousins	and	his	widely	
respected	predecessors,	who	were	the	consistent	reference	point	for	media	assessment	of	Cousins’s	
political	outlook.	When	Jock	Tiffin,	Cousins’s	immediate	predecessor,	was	elected,	it	was	envisaged	
in	the	Times	that	he	would	be	less	‘aggressive	and	spectacular’	in	his	methods	than	Deakin	and	
Bevin,	suggesting	that,	although	their	style	had	been	framed	more	positively,	they	also	had	exhibited	
a	certain	personal	forcefulness.43	As	Geoffrey	Goodman,	the	prominent	industrial	journalist,	
observed,	smoothness	and	diplomacy	were	‘not	among	the	routine	arts	of	trade	union	leadership’,	
which	Deakin	and	Cousins	both	reflected.44	Therefore,	the	difference	in	their	public	image	was	
largely	influenced	by	the	shifting	political	climate	that	Cousins	entered	into.	
	
While	the	similarity	in	persona	between	Cousins	and	Deakin	was	overlooked,	their	difference	in	
political	outlook	was	undeniable.	The	media’s	expectations	of	the	TGWU	political	leadership	formed	
a	challenging	legacy	for	Cousins.	Cousins	followed	staunch	anti-communists	in	Deakin	and	Tiffin	who	
had	firmly	rejected	the	influence	of	militant	shop-stewards	and	sought	to	bolster	the	relationship	
between	the	TUC	and	government.	On	the	national	stage,	at	the	Labour	conference	in	October	1952,	
Deakin	was	quoted	in	the	Times	as	he	expressed	his	concern	about	the	“vicious	attacks”	of	
“dissident	elements”	that	created	division	and	challenged	the	rightful	and	“responsible”	leaders	of	
the	union	movement.45	He	advocated	a	simplified	popular	narrative	that	framed	the	responsibility	
and	moderation	of	the	union	establishment	against	the	reckless	militancy	of	some	rank	and	file	
members,	an	agenda	that	the	media	undoubtedly	absorbed.	The	Cold	War	context	gave	a	new	
reality	to	such	moderates	versus	militants	rhetoric.	Geoffrey	Goodman	lamented	the	‘casual,	lazy	
assumption’	that	nearly	all	disputes	at	that	time,	certainly	all	unofficial	ones,	were	‘some	form	of	
Communist	conspiracy,	if	not	worse	–	such	as	the	hand	of	Moscow’.46	With	the	exception	of	the	
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Express	for	a	brief	period,	anti-Communism	was	rife	amongst	the	press	during	the	early	stages	of	the	
Cold	War,	where	the	‘changing	political	atmosphere	was	making	life	difficult	for	those	sympathetic	
with	Communism’	and	newspapers,	particularly	national	tabloids,	found	that	anti-communism	could	
be	‘sensational,	and	profitable,	too’.47	The	BBC,	while	declining	to	ban	Communism	from	its	
airwaves,	remained	‘extremely	touchy’	on	the	subject,	particularly	with	regards	to	balancing	its	
commitments	to	freedom	of	speech	with	responsibility	to	national	security.48	The	pervasiveness	of	
such	attitudes	in	media	newsrooms,	as	an	extension	of	wider	social	anxiety,	made	such	binaries	
particularly	powerful	and	thus	problematic	for	those,	like	Cousins,	who	looked	to	escape	such	
polarised	conceptualisations	of	union	politics.	
	
In	the	Daily	Mail,	such	themes	endured	Deakin’s	death,	evidenced	by	regular	articles	on	the	conduct	
of	‘a	minority	of	militants,	extremists	and	Communists’	and	the	newspaper’s	desire	that	‘union	
leaders	should	repudiate	them’.49	These	issues	frequently	constituted	front	page	news.	The	concept	
of	a	spectrum	of	political	views	within	the	union	was	very	rarely	entertained	by	the	press,	where	the	
popularity	of	Communist	shop	stewards	was	the	result	of	a	political	‘apathy’	because	union	
members	‘did	not	bother’	to	use	their	own	democratic	power	to	oppose	Communist	influence.50	The	
Mirror,	considering	the	TGWU	elections	in	1955,	sought	to	buttress	the	leadership,	arguing	that	the	
role	of	Deakin’s	successor	would	be	to	defend	the	anti-communist	principles	of	‘Deakinism’,	as	
Communism	threatened	‘an	all-out-attempt	towards	control	of	the	biggest	union	in	Britain’.51	The	
idea	of	impassioned	and	politically	active	local	officials	using	their	personal	links	to	inspire	
enthusiasm	and	sympathy	for	industrial	causes	from	those	members	with	less	well-defined	political	
beliefs,	supposed	moderates,	was	rarely	considered.		
	
It	was	this	binary	framing	of	union	politics,	which	reflected	an	attitude	shared	by	the	majority	of	the	
national	media	and	the	TGWU’s	national	leadership,	that	created	a	problematic	position	for	Frank	
Cousins’s	attempts	to	reunify	the	union.	Cousins	found	that,	in	this	kind	of	political	atmosphere,	‘the	
gulf	between	full-time	officials	and	rank	and	file	had	widened	dangerously’	and	that	officials	had	
been	appointed	because	of	their	anti-Communism,	leaving	the	TGWU’s	organisational	structure	with	
‘serious	weaknesses’.52	The	election	of	Cousins	signalled	a	fresh	attitude	to	political	extremism	
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within	the	trade	union	movement,	in	his	rejection	of	such	a	dualistic	political	outlook.	Although	
Cousins	was	‘forthright	about	having	no	time	for	Communism’,	his	refusal	to	condemn	Communism	
in	the	same	way	as	Deakin	meant	that,	as	Nina	Fishman	analysed,	‘the	press	could	not	get	the	
measure	of	this	new	General	Secretary’.53		
	
Through	the	assessment	of	industrial	relations	coverage	from	the	TUC	Congress	of	1956	to	June	
1958,	at	the	peak	of	the	controversial	London	busmen’s	strike,	the	apprehension	about	Cousins’s	
political	position,	and	the	tendency	of	popular	newspapers	to	adopt	binary	oppositions	was	clear.	It	
was	difficult,	at	least	as	far	as	the	media’s	depictions	were	concerned,	for	trade	unionists	to	endorse	
industrial	action	without	it	being	portrayed	as	something	sinister	or	overtly	politicised.	In	his	
rejection	of	the	government’s	proposed	wage	restraint,	Cousins	led	the	TGWU	in	a	more	radical	
direction,	though	that	alone	would	have	hardly	been	noteworthy,	given	that	the	TGWU	‘could	
scarcely	have	been	less	radical	in	the	past’.54	However,	the	speech	was	particularly	significant	
because	of	its	belligerent	style	and	politicised	message	which	complicated	the	established	political	
binaries	of	Deakinism.	Overtly	politicised	messages	had	been	associated	with	Communist	
“dissidents”	amongst	the	rank	and	file,	in	contrast	to	the	moderation	of	union	leadership,	
buttressing	the	status	quo.	The	Mail	was	prompt	to	declare	Cousins	as	a	‘man	of	the	Left’	who	was	
‘willing	to	hazard	the	solvency	of	Britain’	to	deliver	a	change	in	government.55	Even	the	left-of-centre	
Mirror	framed	Cousins’	rejection	of	government	policy	as	a	declaration	of	war,	although	it	
emphasised	the	failures	of	government	that	had	provoked	such	a	political	speech.56	
	
Wage	restraint	and	economic	choices	
In	response	to	growing	concerns	about	inflation,	an	important	false	dichotomy	emerged	in	the	press,	
which	drew	attention	to	widespread	rises	in	wages.	Cousins’s	decision	to	reject	the	government’s	
proposed	wage	policies	was	particularly	contentious	because	of	its	implications	for	these	popular	
economic	narratives.	As	far	as	papers	like	the	Express	were	concerned,	the	choice	for	government	
was	either	to	enforce	wage	caps,	a	confrontational	act,	or	face	the	unsustainable	prospect	of	wage	
‘leap-frogging’	–	the	regular	and	cyclical	increase	in	wages	which	would	sentence	the	economy	to	
inflation.	It	was	in	this	context	that	Michael	Cummings	introduced	the	Express	readers	to	the	
cartoon	of	‘Mr	Rising	Price’	or	occasionally	the	‘Right	Honourable	Rising	Price,	Minister	for	Inflation	
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Production’,	which	offered	recurring	and	potent	satire	of	successive	government’s	attempts	to	
battle	with	prices.	Evidence	from	the	British	Cartoon	Archive	provides	evidence	of	the	cartoon’s	
popularity	and	endurance,	as	Cummings	showed	both	Edward	Heath,	in	1971,	and	Margaret	
Thatcher,	in	1988,	struggling	with	this	shadowy	figure.	Figure	1.1	depicts	Mr	Rising	Price	being	freed	
from	Macmillan’s	grip	by	‘Union	Wage	Demands’,	reflecting	the	way	this	relationship	between	
unions	and	prices	infiltrated	political	satire.		
	
Figure	1.1:	‘Union	Wage	Demands’,	Daily	Express,	28	May	1956,	p.	6.	
	
In	1955,	the	Mail	declared	that	‘if	wages	go	on	unchecked	we	shall	all	be	out	of	jobs	because	there	
won’t	be	anything	left’.57	Arguments	like	this	suggested	that	government	intervention	was	required	
because	there	was	little	faith	that	the	unions	were	able,	or	willing,	to	self-regulate.	This	support	for	
government	intervention	applied	pressure	on	the	collaborative	relationship	between	unions	and	
government	and	rested	the	short-term	responsibility	on	the	side	of	the	labour	movement	to	curb	its	
demands	to	avoid	repercussions	from	the	government.	Wage	policies	were	coming	to	be	seen	as	the	
responsible	way	of	managing	the	economy	and	it	was	an	idea	which	Cousins’s	speech	directly	
opposed.		
	
Gallup	polling	by	the	middle	of	the	decade	reflected	the	false	dichotomy	of	wage	restraint	or	
rampant	inflation	that	had	characterized	the	accounts	of	the	right-wing	press.	Polling	in	January	
1954,	respondents	were	asked	‘Which	would	you	prefer:	keep	wages	as	they	are	and	stop	prices	
rising,	or	let	prices	and	wages	both	go	up?’,	to	which	80	per	cent	agreed	to	wage	restraint,	a	
response	which	reflected	the	power	of	this	framing.58	Wage	debates	were	seldom	contextualized	by	
the	Conservative’s	broader	and	‘internally	inconsistent’	economic	policy,	which	had	used	rising	
wages	to	justify	the	proposed	removal	of	universal	welfare,	while	the	advantages	of	welfare	were	
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used	to	justify	proposals	for	wage	restraint.59	The	majority	of	the	media	did	not	debate	the	
implication	of	cuts	to	welfare	on	the	atmosphere	inside	many	unions	and	the	importance	these	cuts	
placed	on	the	maintenance	of	wage	increases.	
	
Only	the	left-wing	press	sought	to	interrogate	the	validity	of	the	supposed	economic	choice	between	
wage	restraint	or	the	acceptance	of	inflation.	The	Daily	Mirror	was	in	a	clear	minority	in	suggesting	
that	the	responsibility	lay	with	government	to	manage	the	cost	of	living	through	price-controls,	so	as	
to	deter	demands	for	increased	wages:	‘the	blunt	truth	is	that	the	Government	have	failed	to	keep	
down	prices.	And	wages	have	chased	the	rising	prices’,	it	argued	a	year	prior	to	Cousins’s	divisive	
speech.60	As	far	as	the	Mirror	was	concerned,	the	confrontation	over	a	proposed	wage	policy	was	
not	because	of	the	irresponsibility	of	unions	or	workers	but	provoked	by	the	failures	of	the	
Conservative	government	to	assist	working	people	with	the	rising	cost	of	living.	Sydney	Jacobson’s	
front-page	editorial	column	that	followed	Cousins’s	TUC	speech	argued	that	Cousins	had	been	
provoked	by	the	fact	that	the	Government	had	‘failed	to	convince	them	that	it	has	any	remedy	for	
soaring	prices,	except	to	demand	restraint	and	sacrifice	from	workers’.61	In	this	context,	the	
language	of	sacrifice	became	pertinent,	as	it	was	felt	that	the	burden	of	economic	stability	was	being	
placed	unfairly	on	the	working	population.	According	to	Gallup	polls,	respondents	considered	the	
cost	of	living	a	priority	and	results	from	April	1957	suggested	the	vast	majority	of	respondents,	80	
per	cent,	favoured	price	management	as	a	means	of	alleviating	economic	pressure,	while	only	53	per	
cent	favoured	wage	management	as	a	suitable	alternative.62	
	
The	allocation	of	economic	responsibility	for	inflation	was	divisive,	and	arguably	the	mid-1950s	saw	
the	right-wing	press	establish	the	foundations	for	the	rhetoric	of	‘reckless	unionism’	and	economic	
irresponsibility	that	was	to	characterize	the	decades	following.	As	this	narrative	had	apparently	
taken	grip	the	BBC	held	an	‘Any	Questions?’	debate	where	the	question	was,	‘In	view	of	the	
country’s	economic	situation,	does	the	team	think	that	the	Trade	Unions	are	acting	irresponsibly	in	
pressing	pay	claims	at	the	present	time?’63	Although	this	question	did	not	suggest	BBC	agreement	
with	the	rhetoric	of	irresponsibility,	it	showed	the	how	press	attitudes	could	permeate	the	walls	of	
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BBC	neutrality,	illustrated	through	the	question’s	framing.	While	the	narratives	of	both	sides	of	the	
press	were	about	the	allocation	of	responsibility,	it	is	important	to	note	that	the	press	utilised	
framing	which	was	often	orientated	around	the	abdication	of	economic	and	political	responsibility,	
emphasizing	the	obligations	of	the	opposing	side,	rather	than	the	grasping	of	their	own	
opportunities.	This	kind	of	framing	had	the	potential	to	deliver	a	detrimental	blow	to	the	
government-union	relationship,	as	well	as	to	public	understanding	of	the	problems	with	trade	
unionism,	framed	as	the	concern	of	‘another’.		
	
Of	the	national	press,	only	the	Guardian	seriously	considered	the	notion	that	the	political	message	
of	Cousins’s	speech	may	have	been	hastily	judged,	as	it	highlighted	his	desire	to	‘give	an	impression	
of	reasonable	moderation’	in	an	ITV	interview	and	rejected	the	idea	that	union	leaders	‘had	any	such	
reckless	purpose	seriously	in	mind’	as	to	challenge	the	authority	of	government.64	In	recognising	this	
complexity,	the	Guardian	was	exceptional	in	the	national	press	for	its	rejection	of	the	conventions	of	
a	moderates	versus	militants	binary	framework.	In	a	later	opinion	piece	during	the	bus	strike,	
entitled	‘The	Perplexing	Mr	Cousins’,	the	Guardian	argued	that	the	image	of	‘a	militant	Mr	Cousins	
dragging	a	mass	of	reluctant	busmen	into	a	strike’	had	been	created	by	the	nation’s	media	because	
of	‘the	public’s	craving	for	a	personality	cult’.65	That	public	interest	had,	much	to	the	disgust	of	the	
Mirror,	prompted	Express	reporters	to	monitor	Cousins	very	closely.	This	included	his	holiday	during	
the	bus	strike,	after	which	a	sun-tanned	Cousins	was	described	as	‘perturbed	about	the	growing	
public	picture	of	him	as	the	union	Big	Boss’.	66	This	was	an	impression	that	the	Express	had	
frequently	demonstrated	to	its	political	advantage	by	emphasising	the	gap	between	Cousins’s	
supposedly	privileged	position	as	a	union	leader,	‘the	Big	Boss’	and	the	plight	of	striking	workers.	
Moreover,	the	right-wing	press	was	repeatedly	irked	by	Cousins’s	apparent	personal	ambition	and	
drew	attention	to	his	allegedly	divided	interests.	The	Express	was	concerned	with	Cousins’s	
‘embarrassing	selfishness’,	exhibited	in	his	‘unseemly	haste	in	coveting	a	juicy	plum’,	as	he	failed	in	
his	attempt	to	claim	the	Daily	Herald’s	directorship.67	In	comparison	with	the	Express’s	industrial	
relations	coverage	against	the	paper’s	broader	approach,	it	was	conspicuously	partisan,	as	multiple	
historians	have	highlighted	the	Express’s	moderate	political	approach	during	the	1950s.	James	
Thomas’s	analysis	of	the	Express’s	political	coverage	suggested	that,	while	its	limited	election	
coverage	‘contained	vestiges	of	earlier	partisanship’,	as	this	coverage	of	Cousins	exemplifies,	broadly	
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speaking	the	Express	showed	little	of	its	anti-socialism	and	in	1959	it	was	‘particularly	sympathetic’	
to	Labour’s	manifesto.68		
	
The	BBC	were	anxious	to	maintain	their	relationships	with	the	trade	union	movement	in	a	more	
unpredictable	political	environment.	At	the	same	congress	as	Cousins’s	speech,	Jack	Ashley,	then	
working	as	a	producer	and	organiser	for	the	BBC,	noted	that	a	motion	had	been	proposed	criticising	
the	BBC	for	its	interference	in	the	conduct	of	trade	union	elections.	This	was	largely	rebuffed	by	
leaders,	including	Cousins,	but	supported	by	many	rank	and	file	members.	It	was	a	‘dangerous’	
trend,	according	to	Ashley,	‘because	Trade	union	leaders	will	inevitably	follow,	to	a	greater	or	lesser	
extent,	popular	feeling	among	the	rank	and	file’	and	he	urged	caution	in	BBC	coverage	of	elections	
to	prevent	‘hostility	and	organised	opposition	of	the	trade	union	movement’.	69	This	desire	to	keep	
unions	on	side	is	particularly	interesting,	given	the	tensions	at	the	time	between	the	government	
and	the	BBC	regarding	the	Suez	crisis.	Moreover,	it	gives	further	indication	that	Cousins’s	
increasingly	belligerent	attitude,	so	heavily	criticised	by	the	press,	was	influenced	by	the	political	
atmosphere	amongst	the	rank	and	file.		
	
Cousins’s	problems	were	only	intensified	by	the	involvement	of	unions’	traditional	media	ally,	the	
Mirror,	where	editorials	repeatedly	emphasised	the	importance	of	Cousins’s	political	role.	At	the	end	
of	1956,	the	Mirror	gave	Cousins	the	title	of	‘The	Politician	of	the	Year’,	describing	him	as	‘clearly	a	
political	force	that	no	politician	–	least	of	all	the	Labour	Party	leaders	–	can	afford	to	ignore’,	despite	
the	fact	it	noted	Cousins’	lack	of	interest	in	personal	political	status	(Figure	1.2).	While	Cousins	had	
clearly	attempted	to	cool	the	political	heat	surrounding	his	speech,	his	media	supporters	revelled	in	
his	readiness	to	confront	government	policies	that	had	irked	elements	of	the	British	labour	force,	
the	core	of	the	Mirror’s	conventional,	though	increasingly	diverse,	readership.	Three	months	on	
from	the	TUC	Congress,	the	article	reiterated	the	existence	of	‘open	conflict’	between	Cousins	and	
government	as	he	apparently	‘swung	his	massive	union	behind	more	aggressive	Left-wing	policies	
for	the	Labour	Party’,	and,	once	again,	reminded	readers	of	the	political	legacy	of	his	predecessors.	
In	this	summary,	Cousins’s	regular	attempts	to	emphasise	the	responsibility	required	in	
accompanying		“aggressive”	unionism	were	not	recognised,	as	he	was	described	as	the	‘new	boy	
about	to	challenge	the	old	guard’	through	his	‘combination	of	working-class	leadership	and	political	
socialism’,	in	order	to	emphasise	the	social	and	political	disparities	between	Cousins	and	the	
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Conservative	government.70	In	contrast,	a	similarly	personalised	article	from	the	Herald,	written	by	
Goodman,	preferred	to	emphasise	Cousins’s	interest	in	‘democracy’	and	‘solidarity’,	the	intricacies	
of	his	approach	to	the	strike,	and	his	positive	impact	inside	the	union	movement,	rather	than	
outside	it.71	
	
Figure	1.2:	‘The	Politician	of	the	Year’,	Daily	Mirror,	19	December	1956,	p.	9.	
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Frank	Cousins’s	public	profile	provided	the	Mirror	with	the	purpose	it	had	so	often	lacked	in	its	
attempt	to	remind	readers	of	the	continued	relevance	of	class	identity	and	political	choice.	In	his	
analysis	of	the	Express	and	Mirror,	A.C.H	Smith	argued	that	in	many	instances,	the	Mirror	of	the	
1950s	had	struggled	‘to	discern	the	persistence	of	a	class	structure	below	the	glitter	of	affluence’,	
despite	the	fact	that	many	working-class	Labour	voters,	often	Mirror	readers,	‘tended	overwhelming	
to	describe	the	two	main	parties	as	differing	in	class	interest’.72	Undoubtedly,	under	the	
chairmanship	of	Cecil	King,	the	political	intent	of	the	newspaper	became	less	predictable	than	under	
his	predecessor	as,	according	to	his	editor	Hugh	Cudlipp,	King	‘privately	exchanged	ideas	with	all	
factions	of	all	parties’	to	ensure	that	his	top	executives	were	‘inoculated	against	pressure	from	any	
one	source’.73	Rather,	according	to	Cudlipp,	the	Mirror’s	popularity	during	the	1950s	was	derived	
from	‘its	forthright	attitudes’,	rather	than	a	particular	political	intent.74	Although	this	portrayal	of	
Cousins	was	advantageous	for	the	Mirror	in	impressing	its	political	agenda,	the	lack	of	emphasis	on	
Cousin’s	moderating	influence	on	negotiations	did	little	to	alleviate	tensions	within	the	trade	union	
movement.		
	
While	the	Mirror	was	fast	to	adapt	to	the	changing	times	the	Herald	faced	the	constant	challenge	of	
making	industrial	news	commercially	appealing,	in	order	to	arrest	its	decline	in	readership	without	
angering	its	traditional	audience.	Hugh	Cudlipp,	then	editor	of	the	Mirror,	the	Herald’s	commercial	
rival,	believed,	for	many	pro-Labour	readers,	‘the	pudding	appeared	in	the	Herald	and	the	sauce	in	
the	Daily	Mirror’.75	Roy	Greenslade	has	even	gone	as	far	as	to	describe	the	Herald	as	a		‘dull	relic	of	
prewar	Britain’,	with	a	predominantly	male,	poor	and	aging	readership,	compared	to	the	youthful	
appeal	of	the	Mirror.76	An	illustration	of	their	problems	was	found	in	the	correspondence	of	Vincent	
Tewson,	TUC	General	Secretary.	In	1953,	Mr	Daines,	Secretary	of	the	London	Labour	Party,	wrote	to	
Tewson	to	ask	that	‘some	latitude	might	be	encouraged	in	the	presentation	of	industrial	and	political	
news	items	and	features’	in	the	Herald	so	that	issues	‘were	open	to	a	variety	of	viewpoints	and	
expressed	in	a	more	lively	manner’.77	Tewson’s	reply	recognised	the	problem	with	the	‘brightness	of	
the	paper’	but	complained	that	‘instead,	of	taking	what	I	think	is	a	very	sensible	line	in	your	criticism,	
																																																						
72	A.C.H.	Smith,	Paper	Voices:	The	Popular	Press	and	Social	Change,	1935-1965	(London,	1975),	pp.	144,	149.		
73	Hugh	Cudlipp,	Publish	and	be	Damned	(London,	1953),	p.	284.		
74	Hugh	Cudlipp,	At	Your	Peril	(London,	1962),	p.	348.		
75	Ibid.,	p.	349.	
76	Roy	Greenslade,	Press	Gang:	How	Newspapers	Make	Profits	from	Propaganda	(Basingstoke,	2004),	p.	113.	
77	DS	Daines	to	Vincent	Tewson,	17	September	1953;	TUC	Archive,	Modern	Records	Centre,	University	of	
Warwick	(MSS.292/790.2).	
	
	
50	
most	people	seem	to	want	a	six-page	paper	full	of	reports	of	speeches,	something	like	a	copy	of	
“Hansard”,	which	reflected	the	important	conflict	the	editors	were	faced	with	negotiating.78		
	
Throughout	the	1950s,	the	General	Secretary	regularly	received	letters	from	trade	unionists	who,	
despite	‘full	knowledge	of	the	problems	facing	the	Herald	in	the	matter	of	improving	circulation’,	
were	concerned	by	the	‘lack	of	industrial	news	and	the	misreporting	of	disputes’,	particularly	the	
‘stress	on	inter-union	differences’,	in	line	with	the	editorial	agenda	of	other	popular	newspapers.79	
However,	Tewson	continued	to	support	the	Herald,	knowing	that	its	endorsement	for	the	labour	
movement	was	a	‘tremendous	factor	at	election	times’	and	it	was	thus	‘entitled	to	expect	some	
loyalty	in	all	its	difficulties	from	the	most	loyal	supporters	of	the	Movement’.80	Such	a	position	from	
Tewson	illustrated	anxiety	about	the	damage	of	division	inside	the	movement,	as	well	as	the	
importance	of	maintaining	as	much	support	as	possible	from	the	national	dailies.	However,	despite	
TUC	patience,	these	the	Herald’s	tensions	were	poorly	managed,	under	pressure	from	trade	
unionism,	and	the	example	here	was	emblematic	of	the	‘identity	crisis’	which	ultimately	led	to	its	
demise.81	Meanwhile,	Cudlipp	believed	the	Mirror	to	be	developing	its	political	edge,	where	its	
‘forthright	attitudes’,	rather	than	the	Herald’s	‘entirely	uncritical	manner’,	formed	a	key	factor	in	its	
commercial	popularity.82	
	
The	London	Bus	Strike	and	‘political’	trade	unionism	
The	London	bus	strike,	a	lengthy	dispute	from	May	1958,	led	by	Cousins,	was	important	in	
influencing	media	understanding	of	the	motives	and	aims	of	industrial	action	in	nationalised	
industries.	The	bus	strike,	in	comparison	to	other	strikes	in	nationalised	industries,	illustrated	the	
complex	boundaries	of	support	from	those	media	outlets	usually	associated	with	anti-union	
messages.	Over	the	course	of	the	decade,	in	response	to	the	rise	in	industrial	disputes,	discussion	
arose	over	the	political	legitimacy	of	decisions	to	strike.	In	December	1954,	the	Mail	suggested	that	
those	involved	in	the	threatened	rail	strike,	had	a	‘genuine’	case	for	a	strike	over	pay,	which	should	
have	legitimised	its	escalation	to	an	official	strike.83	In	contrast,	in	June	1955,	the	Mail	felt	that	
recent	stoppages,	including	the	dock	strike,	had	not	been	‘genuine’	because	they	had	either	been	
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‘worked	up	by	agitators’	or	happened	because	unions	‘ceased	to	be	loyal	to	one	another’.84	This	
value-laden	but	ill-defined	language	was	not	unique	to	the	Mail,	as	the	Express	drew	a	distinction	
between	the	‘real’	and	‘worked-up’	grievances	that	were	being	exploited	by	Communist	trade	
unionists	(Figure	1.3).85	In	both	of	these	newspapers,	the	differences	in	the	motivations	for	strikes	
defined	their	legitimacy	and	created	limits	for	their	support,	where	the	perceived	influence	of	
militants	and	agitators	played	an	influential	role.	Those	strikes	that	were	seen	to	be	about	pay	and	
conditions,	industrial	in	nature,	were	considered	legitimate,	whereas	those	that	were	disputes	about	
the	dynamics	of	power	both	within	the	union	movement	and	outside,	particularly	those	over	union	
policy,	were	not.	This	illustrated	a	strong	binary	distinction	between	the	industrial	and	the	
supposedly	political	strike.	The	1957	national	shipbuilding	and	engineering	strikes	had	already	
threatened	to	complicate	this	demarcation,	as	the	dispute	‘which	was	thought	to	be	purely	
industrial,	was	found	to	be	partly	political	…	shown	by	the	remarks	of	Socialist	and	Labour	leaders’.86	
However,	the	bus	strike	in	the	following	year	forged	new	ground	in	eroding	such	simplistic	
conceptualisations	of	industrial	action	and	provoked	further	questions	about	the	political	
significance	of	major	strikes	in	nationalised	industries.	
	
	
Figure	1.3:	‘The	Reds	in	Britain’,	Daily	Express,	21	May	1955,	p.	6.	
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The	London	bus	strike	lasted	for	six	weeks,	following	a	dispute	over	the	levels	of	pay	for	Central	and	
Country	area	London	busmen.	An	arbitration	award,	decided	by	the	Industrial	Court	and	accepted	by	
London	Transport,	concluded	that	because	of	the	difference	in	skills,	only	those	working	in	the	
Central	area	should	be	given	a	wage	increase,	at	a	lower	rate	than	had	originally	been	demanded	by	
the	unions.	In	response,	the	strike	leadership	argued	for	an	all-round	wage	increase	that	would	
redistribute	the	arbitration	offer	across	both	districts.	This	was	firmly	rejected	by	London	Transport.	
It	was	the	convoluted	nature	of	this	dispute	that	makes	this	case	particularly	interesting	for	
research,	as	it	threatened	to	complicate	the	simplicity	of	the	demarcation	of	the	‘industrial’	from	the	
‘political’.	
	
Predictably,	the	media	were	divided	in	pinpointing	the	cause	for	the	deadlock	in	negotiations	that	
prolonged	the	strike.	The	Express	argued	that	the	problem	lay	with	the	busmen’s	refusal	to	accept	
the	award,	which	reflected	Cousins’s	‘desire	to	prove	that	a	powerful	trade	union	means	what	it	says	
when	it	submits	a	claim’	and	broke	with	the	traditions	of	union	leadership,	as	‘for	generations,	trade	
union	negotiators	who	got	more	than	fifty	per	cent	of	what	they	asked	for	assumed	they	won’.87	
Meanwhile	the	Mirror	disputed	such	a	depiction	of	the	union’s	position,	pointing	to	Cousin’s	
willingness	to	make	‘big	concessions’,	despite	a	tough	negotiating	committee,	and	highlighted	the	
apparently	‘narrow	gap	between	the	two	sides’	which	the	government,	rather	than	the	unions,	
appeared	unwilling	to	close.88	This	kind	of	dialogue	reflected	an	expectation	throughout	media	
circles,	and	indeed	more	widely,	that	the	two	sides	should	come	to	some	kind	of	compromise.	As	far	
as	the	Guardian	was	concerned,	this	expectation	was	a	symptom	of	a	‘bad	tradition’	that	had	
developed	within	industrial	relations	where	‘conciliation	means	splitting	the	difference’	as	if	the	
process	of	industrial	arbitration	was	‘another	form	of	bargaining’.89	The	government’s	unwillingness	
to	split	the	difference,	to	compromise	on	the	distribution	of	the	wage	award	as	the	busmen	had	
hoped,	suggested	a	break	with	tradition	and	highlighted	new	tensions	between	more	militant	unions	
and	government.	This	lengthy	dispute	clearly	had	wider	ramifications	and,	as	London	fought	on,	
politically	orientated	debates	erupted.			
	
The	Mirror’s	main	objection	was	that	the	government	appeared	to	be	using	the	strike	to	
demonstrate	their	commitment	to	transforming	attitudes	towards	wage	increases.	As	the	strike	
came	to	a	climax,	a	front-page	article	declared	that	it	was	‘ridiculous	to	pretend’	that	the	strike	was	
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a	‘straight	fight	between	the	London	Transport	Executive	and	the	Transport	Workers’	when	the	
government	was	‘plainly	using	the	nationalised	industries	to	enforce	its	policy	of	wage	restraint’.90	
While	debate	rumbled	on	about	the	propensity	of	workers	in	nationalised	industries	to	strike,	the	
Mirror’s	position	on	the	bus	strike	suggested	that	the	pattern	was	caused	by	those	industries’	
vulnerability	to	the	government’s	provocative	policy	changes.	By	the	nature	of	their	ownership,	the	
wage	policies	of	nationalised	industries	were	those	most	easily	shaped	by	government.	Only	a	
couple	of	days	after	the	publication	of	the	Mirror’s	article,	an	opinion	piece	in	the	Guardian	
suggested	that	‘in	the	sort	of	free	enterprise	economy	that	the	Government	is	trying	to	run,	strikes	
and	industrial	disputes	are	part	of	the	order	of	things’	where	‘firm	and	sometimes	aggressive	
bargaining	may	be	necessary’.	Although	it	advocated	acceptance	of	the	Industrial	Court’s	offer,	it	
suggested	that,	in	return,	the	government	should	‘be	willing	to	allow	glimmers	of	light	to	appear	at	
the	end	of	the	tunnel	of	restrictionism’.91	Clearly,	according	to	this	perspective,	a	shift	in	the	
government’s	economic	and	political	approach,	as	shall	be	illuminated	in	the	second	chapter,	had	
provoked	an	aggressive	response	from	unions.	Proponents	of	this	position	framed	government,	
rather	than	unions,	as	the	initiators	of	lengthy	strikes.		
	
In	arguing	the	government’s	position,	the	Mail	made	the	strike	a	matter	of	Cousins’s	personal	
politics,	as	they	suggested	that	Cousins’s	‘real	quarrel’	was	with	the	government’s	economic	policy	
rather	than	the	London	Transport	Executive,	and	‘his	real	purpose’	was	to	achieve	‘his	political	
ends’.92	This	explanation	of	the	strike	suggested	that	the	acceptable	‘industrial’	terms	on	which	the	
strike	appeared	to	be	fought,	were	a	mask	for	other	interests,	and	explicitly	Cousins’s,	political	
motivations.	Even	the	Guardian	was	highly	critical	of	the	Labour	Party’s	attempts	to	‘score	party	
points	by	exploiting	the	London	bus	strike	as	a	political	issue’,	in	an	article	which	recognised	that	the	
strike	has	‘political	aspects	but	were	not	‘party	political’.93	This	was	a	further	indication	of	the	
strike’s	ability	to	challenge	the	established	expectations	and	boundaries	of	political	discussion.	It	
also	reflected	the	widespread	concern,	not	just	from	the	right-wing	press,	about	the	intentions	of	
left-wing	supporters	towards	public	sector	strikes.	The	Labour	Party	was	‘storing	up	trouble	for	itself’	
by	allowing	trade	unionists	to	assume	that	it	would	have	behaved	any	differently	to	the	current	
Conservative	government.	This	illustrated	concern	about	the,	arguably	inevitable,	readiness	of	the	
Labour	Party	to	criticise	government	policy	in	order	to	remain	popular	with	their	trade	unionist	
allies,	and,	secondly,	discomfort	with	the	close	links	between	Labour	and	the	unions.		
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In	contrast,	the	Mail	concluded	that	the	rejection	of	the	busmen’s	negotiated	claim	was	a	
‘fundamental’	matter	of	‘principle’,	as	if	they	had	done	otherwise,	they	would	have	had	to	‘flout	the	
findings	of	the	court’	and	‘admit	the	anti-inflation	policy	was	nonsense’.94	In	arguing	the	
government’s	case,	a	language	of	politics	was	notably	absent.	The	rejection	of	the	union’s	claim	was	
not	openly	recognised	as	a	political	matter.	The	upholding	of	government	policy	was	recognised	as	
primarily	an	issue	of	defending	the	sanctity	of	court	judgements,	rather	than	expressing	a	political	
conviction	in	the	management	of	inflation.	By	framing	industrial	relations	as	an	issue	of	the	unions’	
political	hostility	to	the	fulfilment	of	government	‘principle’,	the	increased	militancy	of	industrial	
relations	could	be	considered	a	fault	with	trade	unionism,	rather	than	an	inevitable	response	to	
changes	initiated	by	government.	
	
The	jarring	of	political	perspectives	was	very	apparent	in	the	Express’s	response	to	articles	published	
in	the	Herald	at	the	beginning	of	the	strike,	which	described	the	Herald’s	argument	that	the	
Government	were	‘waging	industrial	war	to	impose	pay	cuts’	as	an	‘incredible	conclusion’	from	
‘addled	argument	and	muddled	thinking’.	This	kind	of	open	media	dialogue	was	one	which	the	
Herald,	then	TUC-affiliated,	appeared	reluctant	to	engage	with,	reflective	of	generalised	TUC	
attitudes	to	the	press.	The	lack	of	action	against	such	coverage	was	a	frustration	for	a	number	of	
unionists,	including	Len	Murray.95	When,	later	that	year,	prominent	Express	columnist	Trevor	Evans	
wrote	an	article	about	the	TUC’s	allegedly	favourable	encounter	with	the	Conservative	Chancellor,	
Murray	wrote	to	George	Woodcock,	then	Assistant	General	Secretary	of	the	TUC.96	Murray	
suggested	that	the	TUC	depart	from	their	‘normal	aloofness’	to	‘keep	the	record	straight’	by	writing	
a	letter	to	the	Express	or	by	asking	the	Herald	to	respond.	97	This	was	a	request	that	Woodcock	
steadfastly	denied.	While	a	response	may	have	had	little	effect	on	the	views	of	the	Express’	typical	
readership,	this	apparent	disregard	from	the	TUC	allowed	the	Express	to	put	forward	its	pro-
government	agenda	to	its	readers	without	opposition	or	scrutiny.	This	‘aloofness’	described	by	
Murray	typified	much	of	the	TUC’s	approach	at	this	early	stage,	with	little	evidence	of	a	wider	
strategy	towards	tackling	prejudicial	coverage.		
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As	far	as	involvement	in	this	emerging	political	debate	was	concerned,	the	BBC,	constrained	by	its	
commitments	to	neutrality	and	objectivity,	made	a	limited	contribution	to	discussion,	indicative	of	
the	corporation’s	wider	concern	about	covering	politics	at	this	time.	Some	BBC	staff	were	initially	
wary	about	developing	the	corporation’s	coverage	of	industrial	disputes.	In	response	to	criticism	by	
the	Director	General	for	being	‘too	timid’	in	its	treatment	of	strikes,	the	Controller	of	the	Light	
Programme	urged	that	producers	should	be	‘extremely	cautious’	about	expanding	the	coverage,	and	
suggested	that	radio	news	was	the	best	route	for	implementing	a	change	in	policy.98	A	1956	internal	
report	had	voiced	problems	in	‘getting	the	issues	fairly	explained	in	a	broadcast’	while	making	sure	
‘not	to	do	anything	that	might	make	a	settlement	more	difficult’	or	‘prejudice	negotiations’	in	both	
the	‘national	interest’	and	in	‘light	of	the	efforts	of	Government	to	impose	restrictions	on	the	BBC’s	
news	services’.99	In	1958,	Harman	Grisewood,	then	Chief	Assistant	to	the	BBC	Director	General,	was	
concerned	that	the	BBC’s	trade	union	coverage	seemed	‘merely	an	agglomeration	of	various	
producers’	wishes	and	to	lack	point,	purpose	or	depth,	that	could	desirably	be	given	it	by	an	element	
of	general	planning’.100	To	a	certain	extent	this	implies	that	media	strategy	had	been	exposed	by	the	
abrupt	rise	in	industrial	action,	particularly	in	nationalised	industries.	However,	it	also	presents	
evidence	of	critical	self-awareness	of	the	problems	with	such	an	approach	and	the	requirement	for	
some	kind	of	reform	of	policy,	particularly	as	the	nature	of	television	coverage	began	to	change	
rapidly	during	the	latter	part	of	the	decade.	The	changing	face	of	industrial	relations	necessitated	
large	media	bodies	like	the	BBC	adapting	their	strategies	for	trade	union	coverage	through	
centralised	control.		
	
The	political	significance	of	the	strike,	as	far	as	the	press	was	concerned,	was	best	summarised	in	a	
concluding	opinion	article	in	the	Times.	Although	the	bus	strike	ultimately	failed	and	the	arbitration	
award	was	upheld,	the	promise	of	a	review	of	Country	pay	reflected	that	‘the	principle	of	the	
sanctity	of	arbitration	awards’	had	‘been	sacrificed	in	the	end’	and	left	London	Transport	to	‘split	
very	fine	hairs	to	maintain	the	argument’.101	With	the	intensity	of	media	debate	surrounding	the	bus	
strike,	and	the	divided	political	opinions	that	came	with	it,	this	commentary	suggests	that	the	bus	
strike’s	conclusion	was	about	the	government	saving	public	face,	rather	than	the	sound	execution	of	
important	political	principles.	In	this	regard,	the	‘newsworthiness’	of	the	strike	played	an	important	
part	in	its	resolution,	as	any	apparent	compromise	would	have	been	heavily	scrutinised	by	the	press.	
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It	appears	that	some	commentators	were	quite	aware	of	the	political	intentions	behind	the	
resolution,	as	well	as	its	long-term	implications,	particularly	as	they	felt	such	issues	were	‘liable	to	
reappear	unless	some	more	sensible	way	of	dealing	with	the	situation	is	devised’,	suggestive	of	an	
inevitability	to	industrial	conflict	at	this	time.	It	was	the	bus	strike	that,	according	to	former	
industrial	correspondent	Geoffrey	Goodman,	ushered	a	‘turning	point’	and	‘change	in	emphasis’	for	
this	‘fuzzy	and	unrealistic	demarcation’	between	the	industrial	dispute	and	the	political	strike.102	This	
is	apparent	in	the	strained	and	continued	debate	amongst	the	print	media	over	the	legitimacy	of	the	
strike.	The	lengthy	stoppage	revealed	the	political	power	of	a	major	strike	in	a	national	industry,	
even	when	the	dispute	was	officially	endorsed	by	the	union	leadership	and	‘industrial’	in	nature,	a	
matter	of	pay	and	conditions.	The	economic	context	and	incoherent	government	policy	had	
‘encouraged	the	union	movement	to	see	political	strategies	as	a	supplement,	not	a	replacement	for	
industrial	ones’,	forging	new	ground	and	confusing	the	media’s	established	understandings	of	
industrial	relations.103	
	
The	language	of	solidarity	
Traditionally,	it	was	unofficial	strikes	which	were	most	likely	to	be	deemed	political	by	the	press.	The	
bus	strike’s	status	as	a	union-sanctioned,	official	dispute,	prevented	its	critics	from	using	the	
powerful	labels	like	‘wildcat’,	latterly	widely	popularised	by	the	media	as	a	method	for	delegitimising	
action.	However,	the	media	did	not	just	popularise	its	own	critical	language	for	trade	unionism	but	
also	drew	on	the	language	and	principles	of	those	within	the	trade	union	movement.	No	other	
example	demonstrated	this	more	clearly	than	media	discussions	of	the	motives	of	the	bus	strike.	
Initially,	the	mid-decade	inter-union	disputes	had	prompted	the	Mail	to	adjudge	these	disputes	as	‘a	
corruption	and	degradation	of	the	ideals	of	brotherhood’.104	This	emphasis	on	the	increasingly	
fractious	state	of	union	relations,	allowed	the	press	to	pick	apart	union	ideals.	In	the	case	of	the	
victimisation	of	non-strikers	during	and	after	disputes,	a	growing	concern	amongst	the	right-wing	
and	centrist	press,	the	Express	argued	that	their	plight	reflected	that	‘the	rigorous	morality	of	
solidarity	[had]	been	affronted:	the	god	of	loyalty	is	a	jealous	god’.105	Not	only	was	this	evocative	of	
trade	union’s	proud	history	of	solidarity	but	also	referenced	concepts	of	virtue	and	immorality	which	
would	become	an	increasing	feature	of	industrial	relations	coverage	more	broadly.	Similarly,	even	
the	Mirror	said	cases	of	victimisation	were	a	‘spit	in	the	face	for	the	spirit	of	fraternity’.106	In	such	
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examples,	the	solidarity	of	strikers	uniting	against	non-strikers,	or	“scabs”,	was	not	recognised	as	a	
legitimate	expression	of	union	ideals	and,	on	numerous	occasions,	the	press	sought	to	question	
union	members’	adherence	to	core	union	principles	by	reflecting	division	within	key	unions.	
Amongst	its	blow	by	blow	accounts,	the	Herald	expressed	support	for	the	busmen’s	‘comradeship’,	
even	in	defeat,	but	this	commendation	was	relatively	unusual.107	
	
As	demonstrated	in	the	case	of	the	bus	strike,	unified	demonstrations	of	union	solidarity,	ones	which	
did	not	reflect	internal	fractures,	also	experienced	intense	criticism.	On	the	one	hand,	the	Express,	
one	of	the	dispute’s	harshest	media	critics,	had	argued	that	Cousins	was	‘entitled	to	take	pride	in	the	
solidarity	of	his	members’,	in	view	of	the	longevity	and	intensity	of	the	strike,	rather	than	in	the	
upholding	of	certain	principles.108	However,	there	were	concerns	that	the	union’s	desire	for	a	wage	
increase	for	all	members,	rather	than	the	most	skilled,	was	not	a	legitimate	expression	of	union	
solidarity.	The	Guardian,	often	sympathetic	to	the	concerns	of	the	labour	movement,	was	the	main	
critic	of	such	a	principle.	It	regarded	the	demand	for	an	all-round	wage	increase,	as	‘vital	in	the	
present	politics	of	bus	trade	unionism’	but	one	that	had	‘done	great	harm’	to	industry	and	trade	
unionism.109	In	this	case,	the	expression	of	virtuous	principles	of	unionism	was	framed	as	a	problem	
with	union	politics,	which,	as	this	chapter	has	already	explored,	was	a	framing	burdened	with	social	
disapproval.	In	a	later	article,	the	Guardian	suggested	that	the	argument	for	the	collective	pay	
increase	was	‘superficial	justice’	which	‘diminished	what	should	be	the	rewards	for	real	skill’.110	This	
argument	reflected	a	belief	that	such	demonstrations	of	solidarity	and	equality,	in	their	broadest	
terms,	could	have	damaging	effects	on	the	fortunes	of	those	individuals	in	skilled	jobs.	In	a	multitude	
of	ways,	the	media	constructed	a	nuanced	and	complex	understanding	of	solidarity	which	proved	to	
be	difficult	for	striking	unions	to	negotiate.	
	
This	inconsistent	application	of	camaraderie	and	solidarity,	used	primarily	as	a	means	of	
delegitimising	union	action,	connected	with	wider	concerns	about	the	rights	of	the	individual,	both	
inside	and	outside	trade	unions.	Soon	after	the	bus	strike,	Trevor	Evans’s	column	in	the	Express	was	
keen	to	emphasise	that	extraordinary	influence	of	unions,	given	that	‘fewer	than	half	employees	
belong	to	any	union	at	all’.	As	it	‘paid	to	organise’,	this	was,	according	to	Evans,	‘the	day	when	the	
individual	who	is	heard	is	exceptional’,	despite	being	in	the	majority.111	This	kind	of	article	reflected	
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the	perception	that	it	was	increasingly	attractive	to	join	a	union	as	a	means	of	furthering	political	
aims;	such	was	the	strength	of	collectivism	and	collective	action	in	the	mid-1950s.	The	concern,	
sometimes	verging	on	hysteria,	about	the	bus	strike	was	a	key	example	of	this.	Similarly,	the	extent	
to	which	supposedly	militant	strike	leaders	represented	the	views	of	the	rank	and	file	was	a	highly	
contentious	issue.	The	wishes	of	members	were	often	conflated	with	those	of	particularly	Frank	
Cousins,	and	vice	versa,	to	the	point	where	it	became	no	longer	clear	where	intentions	lay.	The	Mail	
was	confident	that	the	bus	strike	was	‘unwanted	by	the	union’	and	‘by	most	of	the	men	dragged	into	
it’.112	Likewise,	the	Times	was	concerned	that	the	taking	of	votes	at	branch	meetings	to	continue	the	
strike	‘strengthened	the	hand	of	extremists	because	nobody	likes	to	appear	faint-hearted’.113	This	
was	indicative	of	a	concern	that	union	members	were	voting	for	strikes	because	a	public	vote	
pressured	them	into	doing	so,	not	because	they	felt	a	personal	commitment	to	its	motivations	or	
aims.		
	
This	type	of	anxiety	about	the	bus	strike	was	symptomatic	of	wider	concern	about	the	effect	of	
organised	labour	on	the	rights	and	independence	of	the	individual.	Shortly	after	the	bus	strike,	the	
BBC	broadcast	an	edition	of	‘It’s	My	Opinion’	on	the	subject	of	secret	ballots.114	Throughout	the	
decade	there	was	heated	debate	about	the	pressures	of	public	ballots,	where	the	Mail	felt	that	a	
secret	ballot	would	help	to	control	strikes	and	negate	the	need	for	‘repressive	legislation’,	which	was	
still	an	unpopular	prospect	for	the	vast	majority.115	Liability	for	implementing	this	‘simple	reform’	lay	
with	‘responsible	trade	unions’,	reflecting	a	preference	for	the	unions	to	self-regulate	than	require	a	
more	interventionist	role	from	the	government,	which	might	damage	a	delicately	balanced	
relationship.	Much	like	the	dispute	over	inflation	control,	this	was	a	debate	focussed	on	
responsibility	and	morality.	
	
The	dynamics	of	public	support		
For	Nina	Fishman,	the	TGWU’s	inability	to	mobilise	public	support	was	a	key	reason	for	the	strike’s	
failure	as,	had	there	been	support,	‘more	moderate	members’	of	the	General	Council	‘might	have	
swung	behind	Cousins’.116	In	the	case	of	public	support,	the	political	arguments	of	the	press	were	
undoubtedly	influential,	which	Fishman	said	had	‘ranged	from	unsympathetic	to	implacably	
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hostile’.117	However,	the	media’s	communication	and	portrayal	of	public	sympathy	and	support	was	
also	significant.	The	“us”	and	“them”	narrative	of	economic	and	political	responsibility	was	also	
relevant	to	nuanced	understandings	of	‘the	public’	and	its	collective	opinion.	By	the	middle	of	the	
decade,	almost	10	million	members	of	Britain’s	workforce	belonged	to	a	trade	union.118	Yet,	on	a	
consistent	basis,	the	press	suggested	a	degree	of	separation	between	the	public	and	trade	unionists,	
an	‘other’.	Although	the	inter-war	press	hostility	towards	the	labour	force,	described	by	Ross	
McKibbin,	had	eroded	by	the	1945	election,	by	the	1950s,	once	again	under	a	Conservative	
government,	this	work	suggests	there	was	a	re-emergence	of	the	dislocation	of	organised	labour	
from	the	British	conservative	‘public’.119	For	example,	following	the	TUC’s	intervention	in	a	number	
of	strikes	in	1955,	the	Express	distinguished	the	TUC’s	‘duty	to	the	general	public’	from	its	
‘responsibility	to	its	own	members’.120	This	impression	was	clearly	felt	within	the	trade	union	
movement.	Although	George	Woodcock,	Assistant	General	Secretary	of	the	TUC,	did	not	‘look	upon	
the	bulk	of	ordinary	trade	unionists	as	people	separated	from	the	general	public	but	as	a	part	of	it’,	
he	recognised	the	modern	tendency	to	make	a	‘sharp	distinction	between	trade	union	members	and	
the	rest	of	the	population’.121	
	
In	the	1950s,	the	“distance”	between	the	public	and	trade	unionists	was	less	stark	than	typically	
assumed.	The	media	regularly	acknowledged	the	shared	opinions	of	trade	unionists	and	non-trade	
unionists	in	response	to	militancy.	When	a	strike	at	BEA	erupted	over	the	sacking	of	a	shop	steward	
who	‘stood	for	anarchy’,	the	Express	announced	that	customers	were	‘tired	of	the	constant	
inconvenience	inflicted	on	them	by	unjustified	strikes’	and	trade	unionists	were	‘tired	of	the	damage	
done	to	their	hard-won	bargaining	position’.122	Tim	Claydon’s	work	on	media	coverage	of	industrial	
relations	in	the	post-war	car	industry	has	highlighted	the	tendency	of	the	British	press	to	assume	
clear	divisions	between	supposed	“moderates”	and	“militants”,	and	it	was	extremists,	rather	than	
wider	trade	unionism,	that	the	press	of	the	1950s	sought	to	isolate	from	‘public	opinion’.123	
Moreover,	these	militants	were	depicted	as	a	minority	of	a	silent	majority,	just	as	had	been	the	case	
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in	the	1926	General	Strike,	where	coverage	had	‘detached	workers	from	their	class	backgrounds	and	
obscured	the	causes	of	the	conflict’.124	
	
Therefore,	few	assumptions	could	be	made	about	broader	public	support	for	industrial	action	at	this	
time.	First	posed	as	an	issue	in	1952,	polling	data	across	the	decade	reflected	a	gradual	decline	in	
approval	for	unions.	However,	the	majority	of	media	outlets	considered	public	sympathy	as	open	to	
persuasion,	as	patient	but	not	unequivocal	in	its	support	for	strikes.	Trade	union	academic	Ben	
Roberts,	speaking	on	BBC	radio,	said	that	the	public	had	‘regarded	the	rail	strike	with	tolerance’	and	
‘sympathy’	in	1955	and,	as	a	result,	the	government	felt	it	had	no	need	to	contemplate	‘any	
legislation	to	curb	the	power	of	trade	unions’.125	Despite	public	scrutiny	of	wage	rises,	the	majority	
of	those	polled	in	November	1957	thought	that		unions	striking	for	wage	increases	were	at	least	
‘partly’	justified	in	their	demands,	with	a	quarter	of	respondents	against	them.126	The	public,	in	
general,	were	believed	to	be	‘ready	to	sympathise	with	a	genuine	labour	grievance’,	where	the	
inclusion	of	‘genuine’	was	used	to	qualify	opposition	in	the	case	of	“political”	strikes	and	militancy.127	
There	was	a	public	atmosphere	of	compromise	in	the	majority	of	cases,	where	53	per	cent	of	
respondents	felt	that	in	cases	where	agreement	could	not	be	reached,	employers	should	meet	
unions	half	way.128	In	the	case	of	the	bus	strike,	the	Mirror	felt	that	public	sympathy	would	be	
decisive	in	shaping	its	conclusion,	as	‘no	strike’	could	succeed	without	it.129	Although	the	strike	was	
ultimately	unsuccessful	this	kind	of	commentary	suggested	that	the	Mirror	perceived	public	support	
to	be	attainable,	even	during	a	contentious	dispute.	However,	as	Woodcock	noted,	‘the	attention	
and	criticism	that	is	now	being	direct	towards	trade	unions	is	not	against	the	general	idea	of	trade	
unionism	but	against	particular	trade	union	activities’.130	This	was	where,	on	a	number	of	press	
platforms,	the	bus	strike	fell	foul.		
	
Conclusions	
The	media’s	expectations	of	trade	unions	had	a	dramatic	impact	on	coverage	of	the	changes	within	
the	trade	union	movement	in	the	mid-1950s.	Anxiety	about	the	lack	of	strong	centralised	leadership,	
following	the	legacy	of	a	prominent	and	forceful	personality	like	Arthur	Deakin,	attracted	criticism	
from	the	media,	long	before	Frank	Cousins	offered	a	controversial	alternative.	Across	the	press	
																																																						
124	Curran	and	Seaton,	Power	Without	Responsibility,	p.	47.	
125	Ben	Roberts,	‘Industrial	Relations	in	Britain’,	BBC	Radio,	27	June,	1955;	BBC	Written	Archive	Centre,	(T86).		
126	Gallup,	Gallup	Polls:	Volume	1,	p.	435.	
127	Daily	Mirror,	24	May	1954,	p.	1.	
128	Gallup,	Gallup	Polls:	Volume	1,	p.	435.	
129	Daily	Mirror,	30	May	1958,	p.	1.	
130	The	Listener,	23	July	1959.	
	
	
61	
spectrum,	in	the	case	of	the	Guardian	in	the	dock	strike	and	the	Express	following	the	bus	strike,	the	
power	of	trade	union	leadership	and	organisation	and	its	implications	for	the	position	of	the	
individual	became	a	pertinent	issue.	Notions	of	collectivism,	while	nevertheless	pervasive	in	media	
discussion,	began	to	erode	and	change.	By	this	time,	they	were	increasingly	used	as	a	tool	to	
delegitimise	inter-union	disputes	and	buttress	the	central	leadership	of	the	TUC.	With	this	rapidly	
changing	political	landscape	in	mind,	it	seems	difficult	to	justify	the	perception	of	the	1950s	as	a	
tranquil	decade	typified	by	political	consensus.		
	
Although	by	the	end	of	1958	the	likes	of	the	Express	felt	that	there	had	been	a	‘decisive	shift	in	
power’	in	the	TUC	which	signalled	a	‘return	to	the	era	of	Right	Wing	responsibility’,	the	events	of	the	
mid-1950s	had	provoked	a	series	of	questions	about	the	state	of	the	relationship	between	unions	
and	the	establishment.131	As	the	introduction	to	this	chapter	discussed,	public	trade	union	approval	
reflected	a	notable	slump,	dropping	by	eighteen	per	cent	between	1953	and	1957.	Public	
uncertainty	about	the	contribution	of	trade	unions	showed	a	notable	increase	during	this	interlude,	
rather	than	turning	deliberately	against	the	movement,	and,	it	is	notable	that,	to	a	certain	extent,	
the	drop	in	public	approval	begun	to	recover	by	the	end	of	the	decade.132		
	
Unions	were	clearly	well	aware	of	the	negative	public	impression	that	had	been	created	and	TUC	
General	Council	minutes	show	that,	by	1960,	prominent	trade	unionists	like	Anne	Godwin	were	
already	‘very	concerned	about	the	image	of	the	trade	union	movement	projected	in	the	press’	and	
felt	that	‘attention	should	be	given	to	methods	of	combatting	the	false	image’.133	The	events	of	the	
1950s	undoubtedly	placed	new	emphasis	on	the	requirement	for	positive	publicity	for	the	trade	
unions,	although	there	was	a	clear	lack	of	strategy	on	the	part	of	trade	unions.	Debate	remains	
about	the	electoral	impact	of	the	industrial	disputes	of	the	mid-1950s	but	they	established	
important	precedents	for	media	coverage	of	strikes.	Firstly,	and	most	significantly,	the	crumbling	of	
the	fabricated	demarcation	between	the	‘industrial’	and	the	‘political’	ensured	that	strikes	after	
1958	in	nationalised	industries	were	increasingly	seen	as	challenges	to	government,	a	perception	
which	was	intensified	by	the	impassioned	rally	calls	of	newspapers	like	the	Mirror.	In	this	context,	it	
became	more	difficult	for	unions	to	win	the	support	of	right	wing,	Conservative-supporting	
newspapers,	as	the	divisions	between	competing	frames	and	narratives	of	explanation	and	
responsibility	became	more	starkly	drawn.		
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However,	as	much	as	the	1950s	sparked	something	new	in	the	reporting	of	industrial	relations,	it	
also	reflected	the	resilience	of	established	norms	to	change.	Frank	Cousins’s	complex	and	frequently	
negative	public	image	was	largely	due	to	the	determination	of	the	right-wing	and	centrist	press	to	
engage	the	“moderates	versus	militants”	binary	that	had	been	established	by	Deakin	after	the	war,	
to	pigeonhole	Cousins,	who	broke	with	tradition.	Public	concern	about	the	influence	of	communism	
promoted	the	separation	of	a	minority	of	trade	unionists	from	concepts	of	‘public’,	in	an	attempt	to	
isolate	union	extremism	and	evoke	inter-war	attitudes	towards	class.	This	fabricated	division	
deepened	and	engulfed	wider	trade	unionism	in	the	following	years,	allowing	media	criticism	of	
union	activity	to	be	more	starkly	defined,	as	the	relationship	between	the	organised	labour	
movement	and	government	began	to	break	down.	
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Chapter	Two	–	Affluence,	Anxiety	and	‘the	Robot	Age’	
Economic	Futures,	1945-59	
	
Impressions	of	Britain’s	economic	future	altered	significantly	between	1945	and	1959.	During	the	
optimism	which	broadly	characterised	the	British	economic	outlook	of	the	Attlee	government,	
despite	continued	austerity,	Jim	Tomlinson	has	argued	that	there	was	an	absence	of	the	economic	
narrative	of	a	‘British	disease’	of	self-inflicted	terminal	decline	which	typified,	on	the	one	hand,	the	
inter-war	period	that	preceded	it	and,	on	the	other	hand,	rhetoric	of	the	years	that	followed	it.	
Instead,	social	problems,	particularly	in	relation	to	housing	shortages	and	rising	living	costs,	were	
seen	not	as	a	result	of	a	‘social	malaise’	but	as	a	legacy	of	war,	‘reversible	by	sensible	policy	design’.1	
The	Mail	declared	that	industrial	action	was	‘the	worm	in	the	rose	of	prosperity’	as	workers	went	on	
strike	‘over	matters	which	would	once	have	seem	trivial’	and	did	not	‘resist	the	temptation	to	be	
selfish’.2	The	successes	of	the	economy	during	the	1950s	brought	into	sharp	focus	the	right-wing	
press’s	belief	that	strikes	should	be	reserved	for	desperation	in	hard	times,	for	depression	and	
poverty.	Bernard	Hollowood,	economist	and	editor	of	Punch	magazine,	writing	for	the	Daily	Mail	in	
1957,	expressed	the	confident	belief	that	within	the	next	twenty	years	there	would	be	‘no	strikes’	
and	insisted	that,	thanks	to	the	welfare	state,	class	struggle	was	‘dead’,	as	union	in-fighting	
suggested	the	conflict	was	now	‘worker	against	worker’.3	This	chapter	studies	the	relationship	
between	Britain’s	emerging	affluence	and	the	persistence	of	industrial	action.	David	Kynaston	
suggested	that,	by	1956,	a	narrative	of	British	‘declinism’	seemed	to	be	‘well	under	way’.4	Amongst	
other	issues,	this	chapter	begins	to	uncover	the	contribution	of	industrial	relations	coverage	to	this	
shift	in	economic	narrative	and	the	outlook	for	Britain’s	industrial	future.	
	
This	chapter	explores	the	challenges	to	government	in	the	management	of	expectations,	as	Britain	
found	a	new	place	in	the	world	economy	and	dealt	with	the	challenges	of	declining	industries	
through	nationalisation.	As	a	result,	international	comparison	and	competition	became	increasingly	
significant	across	this	early	post-war	period.	The	study	of	the	motor	industry	allows	this	chapter	to	
explore	media	attitudes	towards	modernisation	and	automation.	Mass	industrial	action	in	1956	at	
the	British	Motor	Corporation	(BMC,	latterly	the	nationalised	British	Leyland)	and	the	Standard	
Motor	Company	(Standards),	highlighted	the	tensions	that	arose	from	increased	mechanisation.	
Widespread	redundancy,	allegedly	provoked	by	the	introduction	of	new	technologies,	and	indicative	
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of	difficult	relationships	between	employers	and	unions	in	the	motor	industry,	left	many	concerned	
by	the	state	of	industrial	relations	in	modernising	industries,	particularly	the	automotive	industry,	
perceived	to	be	one	of	the	pillars	of	Britain’s	export	market.	Tim	Claydon’s	study	has	illustrated	that	
the	number	of	press	reports	of	disputes	in	the	motor	industry	showed	a	notable	rise	from	1956	
onwards.5		
	
Union	tensions	were	far	from	isolated	to	privatised	industries,	as	the	coal	industry	contended	with	
pit	strikes	which	raised	questions	over	the	wisdom	of	widespread	nationalisation.	Despite	a	notable	
downturn	in	strike	levels	following	nationalisation,	an	infrequently	recognised	long-term	trend,	the	
persistent	militancy	of	the	miners	prompted	many	to	make	links	between	nationalisation	policies	
and	strike	disruption.6	This	chapter	assesses	the	media’s	framing	of	industrial	relations	in	these	very	
differing	contexts,	reflecting	on	its	ability	to	educate	or	advise	the	public	about	Britain’s	rapidly	
evolving	economic	future,	where	public	knowledge	was	limited.	Moreover,	this	chapter	reflects	on	
the	media’s	response	to	a	perceived	lack	of	trade	union	accountability,	and	its	implications	for	
Britain’s	economy.	In	doing	so,	it	scrutinises	the	ways	newspapers	sought	to	redefine	the	boundaries	
of	acceptable	industrial	action	and	challenged	the	conventions	of	trade	union	activity	by	looking	to	
the	American	example.	
	
Nationalisation:	Unions	against	the	national	interest?	
Geoffrey	Goodman	recalled	that	the	Attlee	government’s	programme	of	nationalisation	left	the	
country	‘buzzing	with	movement	and	political	argument’,	a	vibrancy	of	debate	which	drew	him	to	
industrial	journalism.7	However,	it	is	important	that	the	media	coverage	of	nationalisation	is	firstly	
situated	in	the	broader	political	and	economic	context.	The	Labour	Party’s	1945	forward-looking	and	
successful	election	manifesto,	Let	Us	Face	the	Future,	concluded	by	suggesting	that	the	
‘fundamental’	choice	for	Britain’s	voters	was	between	the	Conservative	‘protection	of	the	rights	of	
private	economic	interest’	and	Labour’s	‘wise	organisation	and	protection	of	economic	assets	of	the	
nation	for	the	public	good’.8	Inevitably,	that	manifesto	focus	placed	a	particular	emphasis	on	both	
the	party’s	aims,	working	for	the	shared	public	good,	and	their	means,	economic	policy	led	by	
nationalisation.		
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The	pattern	of	large-scale	nationalisation	included	a	number	of	‘highly	labour-intensive,	declining	
industries,	responding	to	adverse	shifts	in	demand’.9	The	management	of	decline	had	not	been	part	
of	the	‘original	remit’	of	nationalised	industries	but	pre-war	expectations	for	Britain’s	economic	
future	had	been	radically	different	to	the	reality	presented	to	the	government	in	1945.10	However,	
there	was	initially	a	strong	public	belief	that,	particularly	for	coal,	nationalisation	was	‘the	only	road	
forward’,	as	wartime	mining	output	had	fallen	year	on	year.11	According	to	the	Daily	Herald,	Labour	
had	been	given	a	mandate	‘to	replan	the	economy	of	the	country,	not	to	tinker	with	it’.12	
Nationalisation	was	enacted,	despite	the	Conservatives’	‘feeble	contentions’,	so	that	these	
industries	could	be	‘made	more	efficient’,	necessary	if	the	nation	was	to	‘prosper’.13	This	was	
indicative	of	a	change	in	attitude	towards	economic	management,	as	the	1940s	‘inaugurated	a	
public	policy	concern	with	productivity	that	was	to	become	a	constant	feature	of	Britain	in	the	
second	half	of	the	century’,	partly	triggered	by	emerging	perceptions	of	‘American	superior	
efficiency’	and	concerns	about	foreign	competition.14		
	
Initially	met	with	optimism,	it	was	hoped	that	for	many	sectors,	particularly	the	notoriously	militant	
coal	industry,	the	transfer	to	public	ownership	would	instil	a	new	sense	of	‘civic	responsibility’	
amongst	unions,	motivated	by	the	sake	of	public	gain,	while	modernising	industry	and	increasing	
productivity.	Initially,	nationalisation	seemed	to	deliver	on	such	promise,	as	the	Mirror	reported	on	
an	increase	in	productivity	and	a	‘new	spirit’	amongst	mine	workers,	all	allegedly	prompted	by	
nationalisation.15	Issues	of	public	interest	and	industrial	decline	underpinned	much	discussion	of	
nationalisation	in	the	period	following	1945,	placing	particular	pressure	on	the	essentially	sectional	
interests	of	trade	unions.	However,	according	to	Catherine	Ellis,	while	union	officials	often	
‘welcomed’	nationalisation,	workers	‘seemed	indifferent’	to	its	introduction,	contributing	to	the	
‘increasingly	lukewarm’	attitude	of	the	electorate	at	the	turn	of	the	decade.16	While	this	suggested	a	
discrepancy	between	general	opinion	and	Goodman’s	portrayal	of	media	and	political	debate,	
widespread	scepticism	was	clear	from	the	polling	data.	As	early	as	1950,	although	71	per	cent	of	
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those	polled	deemed	the	nationalisation	of	medical	services	to	have	been	‘good’,	indicative	of	the	
popularity	of	NHS	services	and	the	foundations	of	Labour’s	popularity,	only	45	per	cent	felt	similarly	
about	the	nationalisation	of	coal	and	49	per	cent	felt	the	nationalisation	of	the	railways	was	simply	
‘bad’.17	Indeed,	Labour’s	persistence	with	nationalisation	policies	in	face	of	such	public	disapproval	
supports	Laura	Beers’s	suggestion	that	it	was	not	until	at	least	the	late	1950s	that	opinion	polls	took	
an	active	role	in	shaping	‘political	strategy’.18	The	first	part	of	this	chapter	assessing	Britain’s	mid-
century	economic	outlook	seeks	to	explain	the	relationship	between	the	media	coverage	of	trade	
unions	and	the	waning	popularity	of	nationalisation.		
	
Perhaps	unsurprisingly,	many	business	owners	did	not	encounter	the	introduction	of	nationalisation	
positively	and	they	mobilised	against	the	policy	to	powerful	effect.	The	1942	establishment	of	lobby	
group	Aims	of	Industry,	backed	by	the	likes	of	Rolls	Royce	and	Tate	&	Lyle	saw	anti-nationalisation	
propaganda	intensify	after	the	war	with	a	great	deal	of	financial	clout.	Although	predominantly	
targeted	at	provincial	newspapers,	the	Aims	of	Industry	press	division	instigated	BBC	features,	
where,	in	the	first	6	months	of	1949,	Aims	speakers	gave	forty-one	broadcasts	on	Home	and	Light	
programmes	for	the	BBC.19	In	the	January	prior	to	the	1950	general	election,	362	magazines	and	
newspapers	gave	11,269	column	inches	to	‘Aims	of	Industry	inspired	stories’	which	addressed	issues	
such	as	the	steel	industry,	profits,	bureaucracy	and	‘free	enterprise	achievements’,	while	over	a	
million	signatures	were	obtained	in	petition	for	the	government	to	abandon	plans	to	nationalise	
sugar	refinement.20	In	H.H	Wilson’s	contemporaneous	assessment	of	this	campaign,	he	suggested	
that	although	this	kind	of	propaganda	had	not	single-handedly	turned	public	opinion	against	the	
Labour	Party’s	domestic	policy,	problems	elsewhere,	particularly	housing	and	the	cost	of	living,	were	
allowing	such	propaganda	to	gain	traction.	The	popularity	of	such	campaigns	provides	a	greater	
insight	into	nationalisation’s	visibility	in	media	outlets,	even	if	this	was	not	necessarily	at	the	
instigation	of	newspaper	editors.	Moreover,	the	ability	of	such	campaigns	to	mobilise	public	support	
in	favour	of	sectional	interests,	in	opposition	to	a	popular	government,	lay	in	stark	contrast	to	the	
trade	union	movement	which,	as	this	chapter	explores,	failed	to	organise	effectively	and	was	divided	
on	how	to	promote	its	cause.	Moreover,	the	success	of	Aims	of	Industry	illustrated	the	vulnerability	
of	Labour	policies	and	provided	important	political	context	for	the	press’s	response	to	
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15	(1951),	p.	231.	
20	Ibid.,	pp.	236-237.	
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nationalisation,	as	scrutiny	of	trade	unionism’s	involvement	in	public	ownership	gave	further	reason	
to	question	the	wisdom	of	pursuing	further	projects.	
	
A	measure	of	the	strong	feeling	behind	nationalisation	was	the	large	number	of	complaints	the	Daily	
Herald	received	for	publishing	anti-nationalisation	advertising.	In	a	copied	letter	sent	to	all	
complainants,	often	local	union	branches,	the	editor,	Percy	Cudlipp,	argued	that	‘there	can	not	be	
the	slightest	question	of	the	advertisement	doing	any	harm	to	the	Labour	cause’,	appearing	in	a	
strongly	pro-Labour	newspaper,	‘nor	is	any	question	of	financial	profit	to	the	newspaper	involved’	
owing	to	the	number	of	adverts	offered	to	the	Daily	Herald	at	that	time.	For	those	editing	the	
Herald,	‘the	issue	is	simply	whether	we	should	suppress	an	advertisement	from	the	other	side	
because	we	disagree	with	the	political	opinion	which	it	expresses;	and	our	decision,	after	
consideration,	was	to	publish	it.’21	The	editorial	director	of	Odham’s	Press,	John	Dunbar,	expressed	
his	incredulity	towards	such	complaints,	lamenting	those	who	‘prate	about	“freedom	of	speech”	and	
who	are	convinced	apparently	that	it	should	apply	only	to	themselves	and	not	to	the	other	fellow.’22	
Perhaps	this	was	further	evidence	of	the	Herald	being	caught	behind	the	times,	as	coverage	of	
nationalisation	became	increasingly	reactionary	and	antagonistic	as	public	support	waned,	often	
with	little	regard	for	‘balance’	or	freedom	of	speech.	By	disappointing	those	loyal	to	nationalisation,	
particularly	trade	union	members,	it	jeopardised	the	loyalty	of	its	dwindling	readership.	On	an	issue	
where	nationalisation-supporting	trade	unionists	were	increasingly	marginalised,	in	favour	of	rising	
scepticism,	the	alleged	detachment	of	the	Daily	Herald	(although	of	course	their	opinion	columns	
suggested	otherwise)	was	particularly	alarming	for	its	readers.		
	
Although	the	Mirror	seemed	most	concerned	about	the	impact	of	nationalisation’s	disappointments	
on	relationships	within	the	parliamentary	Labour	Party,	for	many	other	media	outlets	such	failures	
raised	questions	about	the	role	of	trade	unions	in	these	industries.	‘What	has	happened	to	the	sense	
of	common	purpose	that	it	was	hoped	nationalisation	would	bring?’	asked	the	Times	in	a	1953	
report	on	another	round	of	negotiations	over	miners’	wages.23	The	adopted	form	of	public	
ownership	in	the	coal	and	rail	industries	was	seen	to	irreparably	and	detrimentally	alter	the	
dynamics	of	trade	unionism,	at	the	expense	of	national	economic	recovery.	According	to	the	Daily	
Mail,	unions	were	‘weakened’	by	a	nationalised	system	where	union	leaders	‘take	on	boss	status	
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and	–	unlike	good	bosses	–	get	out	of	touch	with	their	followers’	which	was	‘bad	for	industrial	
discipline	and	economic	recovery’.24	Although	the	change	of	ownership	had	removed	the	‘traditional	
hatred’	between	workers	and	employers,	there	was	frustration	that	this	had	not	been	replaced	by	
‘love	or	even	affection	for	their	new	masters’	and	those	managing	nationalised	industries	were	
treated	‘not	precisely	as	enemies,	but	as	“hostile	witnesses”’	by	workers.25	The	changes	to	
management	had	meant	a	degradation	of	union	solidarity	and	detracted	from	worker	focus	on	the	
wider	national	economic	picture.	Nationalisation’s	alleged	erosion	of	trade	union	authority	had	
contributed	to	the	loss	of	the	“old	spirit”	amongst	workers	to	a	‘cumbrous,	unwieldy	and	inhuman’	
system.26	Without	the	traditional	structures	of	authority	and	a	sense	of	shared	responsibility,	once	
again	referencing	collectivist	ideals,	it	was	apparently	inevitable	that	British	industry	would	lag	
behind	its	international	competitors,	particularly	as	nationalisation	had	been	such	an	expensive	
exercise	for	government.		
	
Simplistic	links	between	strikes	and	nationalisation	were	consistently	made	by	opponents	of	state	
intervention.	As	far	as	the	Mail’s	commentary	was	concerned,	the	relative	peaceful	existence	of	iron	
and	steel	industries	in	contrast	to	the	allegedly	turbulent	coalmining	industry	came	down	to	the	‘one	
factor’	of	nationalisation,	rather	than	managers	or	workers,	a	situation	which	would	render	the	
nationalisation	of	iron	and	steel	as	an	‘unforgiveable	crime’.27	This	choice	of	framing	made	strikes	an	
issue	of	the	government’s	economic	policy,	rather	than	the	agency	or	decision-making	of	the	labour	
force	or	its	managers.	However,	strikes	in	nationalised	industries,	particularly	the	mining	industry	
and	in	the	hotly-disputed	public	transport	industries,	were	particularly	divisive	because	of	their	
perceived	intent.	Assessments	of	the	rank	and	file’s	attitude	to	nationalisation	ranged	from	a	matter	
of	frustration	to	a	deliberate	manipulation	of	state-managed	industry.	Fundamentally,	as	a	letter	to	
the	Times	in	1958	argued,	the	transfer	to	public	ownership	meant	that	‘the	immediate	target	is	the	
public	itself’,	as	‘hitting	the	public’	was	no	longer	‘incidental’	and	had	replaced	the	previous	‘strategy	
of	hitting	the	employer’.28	This	framing	of	the	relationship	between	the	general	public	and	the	
unions	did	not	always	result	in	negative	coverage	for	workers.	During	the	1954	railway	strike,	the	
Mail	regarded	those	who	worked	in	the	nationalised	industry	as	‘our	employees’	and	thus	the	public	
was	‘responsible	for	seeing	that	they	get	a	fair	crack	of	the	whip’,	particularly	as	the	prosperous	
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economy	made	it	unreasonable	for	Britain	to	plead	otherwise.29	Despite	its	support	for	the	
government,	the	Herald	sided	with	rail	workers	to	suggest	that	there	had	been	‘wasted	years	of	
increasing	strife,	bitterness	and	frustration’	on	the	railways	because	the	state	had	failed	to	be	the	
‘model	employer’	through	the	provision	of	‘fair	and	adequate	wages’.30	
	
In	its	assessment	of	the	bus	strike,	the	Times	placed	linked	issues	of	wage	policies	and	the	
government’s	authority	over	nationalised	industries	with	industrial	unrest,	which	suggested	that	the	
problems	of	strikes	in	nationalised	industries	were	always	‘liable	to	reappear’	as	long	as	those	
industries	bore	the	brunt	of	government	pay	policies.31	This	issue	of	government	interventionism	in	
nationalised	industries	became	something	of	an	ongoing	theme,	as	it	wrestled	with	the	problems	of	
legislating	on	wages	in	the	private	sector.	The	Guardian,	as	it	placed	greater	emphasis	on	the	
responsibility	of	unions,	felt	that	the	most	‘realistic	comment’	on	the	nationalisation	‘question’	had	
come	from	Arthur	Deakin,	Frank	Cousins’s	predecessor,	who	had	suggested	that	many	of	the	rank	
and	file	had	regarded	nationalisation	‘merely	from	the	point	of	view	of	how,	in	the	shortest	possible	
time,	they	can	get	better	wages	and	conditions’.32	This	was	indicative	of	the	frustrations	felt	by	both	
conservative	leaders	of	major	trade	unions	and	those	commentators	traditionally	sympathetic	to	
labour	concerns,	with	the	perceived	willingness	of	unions	to	abuse	nationalisation	for	financial	gain	
at	a	time	when	post-war	Britain	was	grappling	with	its	recovery.		
	
Frustration	with	the	alleged	manipulation	of	nationalised	industry	was	phrased	much	more	starkly	in	
another	Guardian	article	in	the	following	year.	An	editorial	piece	lamented	that	if	repeated	
concessions	for	miners	were	merely	to	avoid	further	strikes,	‘it	means	that	the	whole	framework	of	
nationalisation	is	simply	a	convenient	administrative	form	for	the	payment	of	blackmail’,	which,	by	
its	very	nature,	would	soon	have	‘diminishing	effect’.33	This	was	indicative	of	the	feeling	that,	in	its	
current	state	and	with	labour	relations	seemingly	unimproved,	the	management	of	nationalised	
industry	was	becoming	wholly	unsustainable.	It	also	suggested	that	there	had	been	a	manipulative	
intent	behind	initial	support	from	the	labour	movement	for	nationalisation,	rather	than	as	a	means	
to	make	an	active	contribution	to	a	revitalised	British	economy.	According	to	a	1957	Gallup	Poll,	24	
per	cent	of	Labour	supporters	believed	that	the	workers	of	a	nationalised	industry	felt	the	benefits,	
above	all	else,	while	26	per	cent	felt	no	one	benefitted	from	nationalised	industry.	Such	polling	was	
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indicative	of	the	disillusionment	with	nationalisation,	even	by	supporters	of	the	party	that	
introduced	it.34	As	far	as	popular	opinion	was	concerned	nationalisation	had	failed	to	serve	the	
public	interest,	largely	due	to	workers’	willingness	to	demand	so	much	from	it.	Geoffrey	Goodman	
summarised	left-wing	frustration,	in	an	article	for	the	Herald,	that	in	this	battle	for	support	the	
Labour	Party	had	not	‘shouted	loud	enough’	about	nationalisation’s	‘immense	successes’,	and	had	
instead	communicated	ideas	‘defensively’.35	
	
Public	Ownership	and	Patriotism	
According	to	Eric	Hobsbawm,	1945	saw	the	‘remarkable	marriage	of	patriotism	and	social	
transformation’	and	this	thread	of	patriotism,	a	legacy	of	war,	was	ever-present	in	debates	
surrounding	nationalisation	and	the	union	question.36	For	the	Mail,	striking	for	wages	that	were	
‘paid	by	the	people’	was	simply	‘unpatriotic’,	an	inevitable	outcome	of	the	changes	brought	about	
by	nationalisation.37	Nationalisation	meant	that	the	strike	‘was	more	an	act	of	political	coercion	than	
an	industrial	dispute’.38	This	sort	of	coverage	combined	anxieties	about	industrial	action’s	
politicisation	with	its	relationship	to	patriotism	and	the	nation,	to	powerful	effect.	The	article	was	
one	of	a	series	of	articles	Mail	wrote	on	issues	in	the	nationalised	rail	industry	which	drove	at	the	
impact	‘Socialism’	had	on	the	status	of	industrial	action,	implicating	both	the	tactics	of	government	
and	unions.	Even	in	newspapers	which	accepted	the	government’s	interventionism	in	industry,	the	
rail	strike	was	‘a	strike	against	the	nation’,	according	to	the	Mirror’s	front	page	headlines.39	The	
Express	was	keen	to	impress	that	labour	discontent	in	nationalised	industries	was	so	significant	that	
it	was	beginning	to	attract	attention	from	their	American	allies	and	competitors.	As	part	of	a	series	
of	published	extracts	from	a	US	‘Report	on	Britain’,	‘to	let	readers	share	the	fascination	of	knowing	
what	other	people	are	saying	about	them’,	the	Express	revealed	concern	from	across	the	pond	that	
‘neither	the	Labour	Government	nor	labour	unions	have	found	a	way	to	get	along	with	labour	in	its	
third	role	–	that	of	employer	in	the	big	nationalised	industries’,	contributing	to	Britain’s	‘greatest	
domestic	problem’:	labour	relations.40	Such	reporting	was	indicative	of	a	concern	with	Britain’s	
image	and	the	contrasts	that	lay	between	successful	American	industry	and	ailing	British	industry.	
The	Times	drew	on	the	German	example	as	a	point	of	comparison	suggesting	that	German’s	relative	
economic	success	in	the	period	since	the	war	had	been	contributed	to	by	a	labour	force	which	had	
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not	‘pressed	for	outright	nationalisation’,	but	instead	had	‘striven	first	and	foremost	for	joint	
direction	of	privately	owned	industry’.41	This	focus	on	the	international	stage	was	symptomatic	of	
anxiety	about	Britain’s	relative	decline	and	such	framing	suggested	that	it	was	trade	unionism’s	
alleged	manipulation	of	the	nationalisation	project	which	was	hindering	Britain’s	effort	to	be	
competitive.		
	
Overall,	the	failure	of	private	ownership	had	forced	many	to	accept	the	prospect	of	nationalisation	
but	the	change	had	offered	limited	improvement,	shifting	the	dynamics	of	negotiations	within	
industry.	Nationalisation,	via	the	currents	of	its	‘socialist’	support	and	its	impact	on	conciliatory	
machinery,	inevitably	led	many	to	scrutinise	the	position	of	trade	unions,	as	the	spirit	of	the	rank	
and	file	became	even	more	significant	for	Britain’s	industrial	future.	Labour’s	rhetoric	around	public	
interest	and	national	prosperity,	defeating	‘One	Nation’	Conservatism,	had	been	hugely	successful	in	
winning	public	support	and,	to	a	certain	extent,	the	legacy	of	this	is	clear	in	media	discussions.	In	the	
spirit	of	national	unity	lay	a	point	of	apparent	political	consensus,	even	as	the	Conservatives	
remained	critical	of	nationalisation.	However,	the	popularity	of	such	language	inevitably	placed	
pressure	on	those	with	divided	economic	interests,	including	Labour’s	traditional	allies,	the	trade	
unions.	Trade	unions	were	perceived	as	eager	to	exploit	nationalisation	for	their	own	purposes,	
despite	evidence	which	suggests	there	was	a	great	deal	of	apathy	and	scepticism	amongst	the	rank	
and	file.	Without	a	clear	media	campaign	and	dependent	on	nationalised	industries	for	their	
livelihoods,	unlike	the	pro-business	Aims	for	Industry,	as	well	as	facing	criticism	from	conservative	
union	leaders,	Arthur	Deakin	being	a	clear	example,	nationalisation	became	part	of	the	‘union	
question’.		
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Figure	2.1:	Mentions	of	‘Automation’	in	British	Dailies	
	
Promise	of	Progress:	Automation	and	The	Second	Industrial	Revolution	
While	the	period	immediately	following	the	war	had	raised	questions	about	the	sustainability	of	
nationalisation	projects	for	Britain’s	future,	it	also	prompted	a	great	deal	of	public	anxiety	about	
Britain’s	long-term	technological	development	and	its	impact	on	both	industry	and	the	individual.	
Strikes	at	both	BMC	and	Standards	factories	over	unexpected	and	swiftly	announced	mass	
redundancy	brought	these	issues	clearly	into	light.	Automation,	the	mechanisation	of	production,	
rose	to	prominence	on	the	media	agenda,	as	the	chief	cause	for	such	redundancies	and	the	promise	
of	a	new	‘Robot	Age’.	
	
The	media	framing	of	technological	innovation	for	their	audiences	was	hugely	significant	for	debates	
about	Britain’s	economic	future,	particularly	in	cases	of	union	discontent.	Although	the	term’s	roots	
lay	in	1940s	America,	the	word	‘automation’	was	rarely	used	in	the	early	1950s	in	British	media	
spheres.	Quantitative	content	analysis	suggests	that	it	was	only	after	1955	that	discussion	of	the	
issue	took	off	(Figure	2.1).	1956,	of	particular	interest	to	this	discussion,	saw	the	number	of	article	
mentions	of	‘automation’	treble	on	the	previous	year,	across	press	outlets.	Although	1956	is	perhaps	
better	recognised	by	British	historians	for	the	emergence	of	the	Suez	crisis,	significant	in	damaging	
both	the	economy	and	national	confidence,	the	large	quantity	of	coverage	given	to	automation,	
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despite	this	climax	in	foreign	affairs,	reflects	the	degree	of	concern	it	inspired.	This	sudden	up-turn	
in	discussion	meant	that,	although	the	issue	of	automation	soared	to	the	top	of	the	media	agenda,	
according	to	a	Gallup	poll	in	early	1956,	only	48	per	cent	of	the	public	understood	the	meaning	of	
‘automation’,	almost	a	decade	after	the	word	had	first	been	used.	Of	that	knowledgeable	
proportion,	as	much	as	27	per	cent	did	not	have	an	opinion	as	to	whether	such	developments	in	
industry	were	beneficial,	which	further	illustrated	the	lack	of	public	understanding.42	The	Times,	in	a	
1955	column,	observed	public	‘alarm	and	despondency	at	the	sudden	peppering	of	scientific	and	
popular	pages	alike	with	the	queer	word	automation’,	lamenting	that	‘the	trouble	with	automation	
is	that	it	attaches	the	Greek	prefix	to	a	Latin	word	which	is	quite	imaginary’,	although	one	doubts	
that	this	was	the	primary	reason	behind	public	confusion.43	It	is	also	notable	that,	while	it	would	be	
unrealistic	to	expect	such	a	specific	issue	to	maintain	such	a	prominence	on	the	media	agenda,	
latent	discussion	of	automation	was	maintained	beyond	1956-7,	indicating	that	the	issue	had	a	
permanent	impact	on	media	debate.	
	
Dennis	Chong	and	James	Druckman’s	work	suggests	that,	in	light	of	the	complexity	of	1950s	
industrial	relations	and	the	lack	of	public	knowledge	of	technological	development,	media	framing	of	
automation	had	the	potential	to	be	particularly	powerful.	They	argue	that	readers	who	are	better	
informed	are	less	likely	to	be	swayed	by	how	others	‘frame	the	issues	for	them’	and,	as	part	of	public	
‘learning’	through	media	frames,	citizens	are	typically	more	susceptible	to	the	effects	of	framing	
when	they	are	newly	exposed	to	a	particular	issue,	as	they	are	unaware	of	its	effects;	‘public	opinion	
ought	to	be	more	malleable	at	this	stage’.44	In	a	rapidly	changing	post-war	world,	where	the	social	
satisfaction	of	full	employment	was	threatened	with	the	technological	development	triggered	by	
investment,	the	media	could	have	acted	as	an	important	guide	for	understanding	such	economic	
transformation.	
	
It	is	important	to	appreciate	the	relationship	between	discussions	of	automation	and	wider	media	
interests,	outside	the	industrial	relations	field.	Although	the	early	1960s	are	typically	identified	as	
the	period	for	intense	technological	optimism,	important	social	issues	of	the	1950s	underpinned	the	
media’s	interest	in	modernisation.	As	Martin	Bauer	and	Jane	Gregory	analysed,	citing	examples	from	
the	Daily	Telegraph,	the	saliency	of	science	and	technology	on	the	media	agenda	rose	from	1956	
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onwards,	peaking	in	the	early	1960s.45	The	period	between	1954	and	1967	is	also	noteworthy	for	its	
relative	optimism,	according	to	this	quantitative	research,	a	factor	which	again	declined	in	the	
1960s.	Bauer	and	Gregory	have	also	highlighted	the	government-centred	nature	of	such	debates	as	
investment	in	nuclear	power	and	Britain’s	contribution	to	the	space	race	were	government-funded	
ventures,	‘public	technologies’,	connecting	party	policy	and	the	interests	of	the	taxpayer	with	
technological	modernisation.	Although	Bauer	and	Gregory	found	the	space	race	and	nuclear	power	
were	the	dominant	themes	of	such	discussions,	it	is	clear	that	there	were	commonalities	in	these	
discussions	and	those	surrounding	automation,	particularly	with	regards	to	its	relationship	with	
government	policy.		
	
Outside	the	fields	of	science	and	technology,	Woodrow	Wyatt’s	frustration	that	to	the	public	it	was	
‘the	curves	of	Diana	Dors	that	matter,	not	the	down	curves	of	British-motor	exports’,	suggested	that	
public	disengagement	with	the	specifics	of	economic	forecasts,	contented	by	rising	living	standards,	
may	have	further	increased	the	scope	for	the	media	to	shape	impressions	of	‘automation’.46	
Although	a	long	way	from	the	days	of	Page	Three,	media	content	was	becoming	increasingly	
entertainment-focussed	in	order	to	respond	to	the	evolving	demands	of	its	readership,	arguably	at	
the	expense	of	educating	readers	about	the	intricacies	of	industrial	modernisation.	These	tastes	
encouraged	more	simplistic	explanation	and	greater	interest	in	crisis	coverage.	
	
An	important	aspect	of	this	framing	was	reference	to	Britain’s	history.	This	meant	not	only	framing	
through	public	understandings	of	war	and	nationalism,	in	face	of	foreign	competition,	but	also,	
perhaps	less	predictably,	reference	to	Britain’s	industrial	past.	In	the	case	of	automation,	Britain’s	
proud	industrial	heritage,	namely	the	Industrial	Revolution,	became	a	common	reference	point	for	
both	sides	of	the	debate.	The	post-war	changes	to	industry	constituted	‘the	Second	Industrial	
Revolution’,	despite	the	historical	contention	that	there	had	already	been	multiple	revolutions	in	
industry.	Explaining	its	American	etymology,	automation	was	applied	directly	to	this	new	frame:	
‘Automation	(it’s	a	word	from	America)	stands	for	a	second	industrial	revolution.	It	is	as	vitally	
important	as	that.’47	This	analogy	linked	the	peak	of	Britain’s	historical	achievement	to	hope	for	its	
industrial	future.	According	to	D.C.	Coleman,	the	1950s	saw	the	diffusion	of	the	idea	of	the	Industrial	
Revolution	as	a	symbol	of	‘heroic	technical	achievement’,	moving	into	popular	media	as	‘a	portent	of	
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social	change	for	the	better’.48	This	kind	of	rhetoric	was	rich	in	media	anticipation	of	the	new	age:	
‘automation	will	mean	a	stupendous	rise	in	standards	of	living’.49	It	was	the	popularisation	of	the	
Industrial	Revolution	‘myth’	which,	according	to	Coleman,	underpinned	the	‘white	heat’	rhetoric	of	
the	1960s	as	politicians	capitalised	on	this	symbol.50	Industrial	action	at	major	factories,	as	witnessed	
most	prominently	in	the	car	industry	during	1956,	threatened	to	complicate	this	popular	rhetoric	of	
seamless	development	and	technological	optimism.	
	
Significantly	for	this	research,	public	acceptance	of	what	John	Agar	describes	as	a	utopian	
‘futurological	fad’,	was	not	universal	and	the	new	industrial	revolution	was	allied	to	social	anxiety.51	
Intentionally	or	otherwise,	the	industrial	revolution	conceptualisation	did	not	just	evoke	the	national	
historical	memory	of	progress	but	also,	in	the	face	of	industrial	discontent,	undercurrents	of	social	
turmoil	and	rebellion.	Across	the	political	spectrum,	the	press	was	frustrated	by	the	resonances	
between	the	current	strikes	at	Standards	and	BMC	and	historical	unrest.	The	Express	asked	‘must	the	
machines	of	the	new	Industrial	Revolution	cause	the	same	bitter	strife	as	did	those	of	the	first?’52	
This	position	was	symptomatic	of	the	frustration	felt	by	those	eager	for	the	modernisation	of	
industry.	Similarly,	on	a	centre-page	spread,	indicative	of	the	attention	paid	to	such	issues,	the	
Mirror	pleaded	for	lessons	to	be	learnt	from	the	experience	of	‘the	loom-smashers	of	a	century	and	
a	half	ago’.53	Even	the	Herald,	urged	the	nation	to	avoid	the	‘days	of	the	Luddites’.54	Considering	that	
1950s	discontent	was	a	long	way	from	those	historical	experiences,	the	widespread	adoption	by	
tabloids	of	this	hyperbolised	parallel	acted	as	more	of	a	‘slippery	slope’	warning,	rather	than	realistic	
analysis	of	the	current	situation.		
	
In	recognition	of	these	disturbing	historical	parallels,	the	press	was	often	critical	of	the	decision	to	
take	strike	action	against	the	redundancies.	The	Times	described	the	position	taken	by	strikers	as	
‘morally	weak’,	where	public	opinion	was,	although	respectful	of	‘trade	union	loyalty’,	‘sympathetic	
with	those	who	have	refused	to	strike’.55	Once	again,	the	press	demonstrated	a	willingness	to	use	
morality	as	a	way	of	delegitimising	industrial	action.	Prior	to	these	strikes,	public	opinion	was	in	the	
balance	as	38	per	cent	of	those	polled	in	1955	believed	that	unions	were	‘justified	in	opposing	the	
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introduction’	of	machines,	while	the	same	number	opposed	such	action.56	The	attempts	to	enforce	
‘no	redundancy’	at	the	Standards	picket	line	were	portrayed	by	the	Times	as	a	‘Communist	slogan’	
which	had	‘pre-occupied’	leadership,	as	they	‘failed	to	perform	their	proper	trade	union	function’	in	
pressing	for	compensation	and	protection.57	Such	frames	of	explanation	for	the	strike	suggested	that	
the	left-wing	had	successfully	driven	unions	into	making	unrealistic	demands,	at	the	expense	of	
individual	rights.	Striking	about	an	inevitability	of	economic	change	was	framed	as	futile	and	
unsustainable,	as	the	Mail	declared	that	‘striking	against	such	hard	economic	facts	would	be	
midsummer	madness’.58	As	Tim	Claydon	has	highlighted,	even	the	Mirror	would	only	support	the	
strike	if	it	was	in	opposition	to	the	manner	of	redundancy,	rather	than	the	reality	of	redundancy	
itself.	The	strikers	were	clearly	well	aware	of	the	media’s	negative	depiction	of	their	battle	against	
redundancy.	This	awareness	and	cynicism	was	demonstrated	in	the	answer	an	employee	gave	in	ITV	
interviews	outside	the	Austin	factory:	‘Are	you	an	engineer?	Well	then	you	mind	your	own	business.	
When	you’re	an	engineer,	you	can	talk	to	me!’,	which	was	met	by	cheers	from	those	crowded	
around	him	at	the	picket	line.59	While	interviews	were	generally	non-confrontational,	lines	of	
enquiry	followed	the	frame	of	reference	provided	by	the	press.		
	
The	Daily	Mirror’s	response	to	industrial	action	over	automation	was	driven	by	the	same	intent	
which	had	brought	them	so	much	success	during	and	immediately	after	the	war.	James	Thomas	
suggested	the	refusal	of	the	Mirror	to	explicitly	support	Labour	in	the	1945	general	election	was	
driven	by	the	belief	that	such	political	sectionalism	had	‘long	been	identified	as	the	enemy	to	
national	and	progressive	renewal’.60	Although	the	automotive	strikes	over	redundancy	had	little	to	
do	with	the	Mirror’s	electoral	support	of	the	Labour	party,	which	was	once	again	subdued	in	the	
1955	election,	its	refusal	to	support	strikers	at	the	BMC	and	Standards	factories	demonstrated	a	
similar	hesitancy	about	partisanship.	The	Mirror’s	rhetoric	in	the	late	1950s	aimed	to	be	more	
‘inclusive’,	a	case	of	‘the	modern	against	the	traditional’,	rather	than	the	class-based	rhetoric	of	the	
1940s.61	Targeting	young	and	upwardly	mobile	audiences	as	part	of	a	successful	post-war	marketing	
strategy,	in	contrast	to	the	struggling	Daily	Herald,	meant	the	Mirror’s	support	for	unions	could	not	
extend	to	rejection	of	automation	and	the	supposed	promise	of	progress	for	British	industry.	The	
Mirror’s	response	to	the	strikes	against	automation	thus	gives	further	credence	to	James	Thomas’s	
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claim	that	the	‘over-riding	priority	of	the	paper	in	the	age	of	affluence	was	not	so	much	“Forward	
with	the	People”	…	as	“Forward	with	the	Shareholders”.62	
	
The	Complexities	of	Media	Support	
That	is	not	to	say	that	criticism	of	strike	action	was	devoid	of	sympathy	for	those	threatened	by	
unemployment.	Across	the	political	spectrum	there	was	a	recognition	of	the	social	anxiety	
surrounding	automation’s	threat	to	the	full	employment	that	Britain’s	post-war	consensus	had	been	
built	around.	According	to	an	article	in	the	Mail,	redundancy	was	‘the	topic	of	the	year’	in	1956,	
discussion	of	which	had	‘turned	the	industrial	world	upside	down’.63	The	links	drawn	by	the	media	
between	redundancy	and	automation	are	clear	from	more	than	analysis	of	the	headlines.	The	
quantitative	data,	Figure	2.2,	reflects	an	upsurge	in	discussion	of	redundancy	from	1956	onwards,	
much	like	discussions	of	‘automation’.	
	
	
Figure	2.2:	Mentions	of	‘Redundancy’	in	British	Dailies	
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In	a	front-page	article	entitled	‘A	Stupid	Strike’,	indicative	of	the	views	on	the	strike	itself,	the	Mail	
conceded	that	post-war	Britain	had	entered	an	age	of	social	welfare	where	no	longer	‘men	could	be	
thrown	on	the	scrap-heap	with	nothing	to	tide	them	over’.64	In	agreement,	the	Times	felt	that	the	
public	would	have	found	it	‘morally	disturbing	that	a	man	who	has	given	15	or	20	years	good	service	
to	a	firm	should	be	liable	to	dismissal	on	a	weeks’	notice’,	indicative	of	the	broad	criticism	for	the	
implementation	of	redundancy	by	the	BMC	and	Standards	management.65	ITV	News	were	prompt	to	
ask	management	if	they	felt	the	problem	of	decreased	automotive	demand	had	been	‘badly	
handled’	by	the	firm.66	Although	none	of	this	could	be	said	to	support	industrial	action,	there	was	
evidence,	in	an	age	of	increased	welfare	spending,	that	greater	care	should	be	taken	to	support	and	
protect	workers.	
	
However,	challenging	corporate	attitudes	towards	mass	redundancy	was	difficult	for	the	media.	The	
BBC	on	multiple	occasions	described	frustration	with	finding	management	representatives	who	were	
willing	to	speak	for	its	programmes	on	the	strike.	The	head	of	regional	programming,	Denis	Morris,	
expressed	concern	that	the	absence	of	management	viewpoints	from	coverage	might	mean	the	BBC	
was	not	‘reporting	as	objectively	as	we	would	wish’	but	the	management	was	keen	to	‘reserve	some	
shots	in	their	locker	to	fire	at	those	conducting	any	subsequent	enquiry’.	Morris	attempted	to	
convince	BMC	management	that	they	had	a	‘far	better	case	than	has	been	made	public’	and	their	
silence	on	the	issue	had	been	‘politically	inept’,	in	an	effort	to	persuade	them	to	appear	but	he	was	
left	dissatisfied.67	This	case	exemplified	the	broadcast	media’s	continued	difficulty	to	find	
management	representatives	willing	to	contribute	to	programmes,	in	contrast	to	the	frank	
responses	provided	by	shop	floor	representatives.	
	
It	is	clear	where	the	lines	of	media	support	for	redundant	workers	were	drawn.	The	likes	of	Jon	
Murden	have	sought	to	establish	the	significance	of	1956	for	the	establishment	of	new	employment	
rights	in	response	to	redundancy	and,	certainly,	there	is	evidence	of	broad	support	for	such	
measures	from	the	contemporary	media.68	Politicians	were	similarly	critical	and	Iain	Macleod,	the	
Conservative	Labour	minister,	went	to	great	lengths	to	disassociate	himself	from	the	conduct	of	
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management.69	It	seems	likely	without	such	widespread	support	for	the	rights	of	individual	workers	
in	the	wake	of	the	BMC	redundancies,	the	strikes’	historical	significance	would	have	been	muted.	
However,	as	Tim	Claydon	argues,	across	the	political	spectrum,	the	press	were	‘upholding	
managerial	prerogative’	to	enforce	such	redundancies,	even	if	they	disagreed	with	the	approach	of	
management.70	Media	disagreed	with	the	conduct	of	management	but	not	the	final	decision	to	
enforce	such	extensive	redundancies	and	rejected	the	moves	by	unions	to	oppose	such	a	decision.	
The	mistreatment	of	workers	had	not	undermined	the	media’s	support	for	the	management’s	
decision	to	enforce	redundancies.	This	nuance	in	media	support	is	indicative	of	broader	trends	which	
supported	the	‘rights’	of	the	individual,	seen	as	a	threatened	political	entity,	rather	than	the	growing	
power	of	the	collective	trade	union	movement,	based	largely	on	legal	immunities	rather	than	rights.	
The	examples	at	BMC	and	Standards	saw	a	similar	delineation	in	media	support	as	was	at	the	docks,	
in	that	media	concern	with	the	rights	of	the	individual	did	not	drive	them	to	support	strikes.	
Moreover,	in	a	time	of	affluence	and	improved	living	standards,	this	orientation	of	press	coverage	
illustrated	the	increasing	prioritisation	of	national	economic	performance	over	the	concerns	and	
pressures	on	workers,	no	longer	seen	to	be	under	the	same	threats.	
	
Redundancy:	A	‘reality	of	the	market’	and	US	competition	
The	Express	reports	of	the	strikes	over	redundancy	demonstrated	a	clear	tension	in	industrial	
relations	coverage	in	an	evolving	media	landscape.	On	the	one	hand,	it	was	well	aware	of	the	
genuine	public	anxiety	about	the	implications	of	automation	on	employment.	In	view	of	this,	it	
printed	front-page	headlines	like	‘Automation	–	2640	sacked’	accompanied	by	suggestions	that	
‘automation	now	means	the	sack	–	permanently	–	for	2,640	workers’,	drawing	a	direct	causal	link	
between	redundancy	and	automation.71	On	the	other	hand,	in	direct	opposition	to	this	frame	of	
explanation,	the	paper’s	editorial	columns	suggested	that	automation	was	‘the	wrong	bogey’.	
Instead,	it	suggested	that	those	made	redundant	at	Standards	were	‘victims	not	of	the	machines	but	
the	market’,	where	strikes	merely	compromised	attempts	to	increase	efficiency.72	According	to	this	
perspective,	as	the	Express	attempted	to	promote	the	advantages	of	technological	innovation,	
automation	would	not	have	been	seen	as	an	issue	if	‘business	were	better’,	in	the	face	of	dwindling	
demand.	Such	a	contradiction	between	front-page	news	and	editorial	coverage	illustrated	the	
tensions	in	making	the	newspaper	commercially	appealing	to	its	audience,	engaging	with	an	issue	
prominent	on	the	wider	media	agenda,	and	a	political	desire	to	drive	home	the	benefits	of	private	
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investment	in	order	to	arrest	a	threatened	slump.	The	commercial	pressures	on	newspapers	blunted	
the	political	persuasiveness	of	its	editorial	narrative	of	a	divisive	issue.	Although	Trevor	Evans	may	
have	questioned	why	the	public	was	so	‘frightened	of	a	little	word’	like	automation	(Figure	2.3),	the	
conflicting	messages	in	his	paper’s	own	coverage	appeared	to	provide	the	answer.73	
	
	
Figure	2.3:	‘Why	be	frightened	of	a	little	word?’,	Daily	Express,	16	May	1956,	p.	6.	
	
Similarly	to	the	Express	editorials,	British	Pathé	devoted	time	to	addressing	the	issue	of	a	stuttering	
economy,	as	it	reported	on	the	‘saturation’	of	the	car	industry,	‘the	spectre	that	stands	at	the	elbow	
of	every	boom’,	indicative	of	the	belief	that	Britain’s	current	economic	success	would	be	a	short-
term	one,	at	least	without	significant	structural	change	–	which	included	the	contribution	of	trade	
unions.74	This	‘boom	and	bust’	narrative	was	becoming	increasingly	popular	and	Pathé’s	coverage	
was	indicative	of	such	a	trend.	The	swift	success	of	automation’s	introduction,	according	to	the	
Express,	‘may	mean	the	difference	between	unprecedented	prosperity	or	virtual	extinction	as	a	
trading	nation’.75	As	Jim	Tomlinson	has	underlined,	there	was	a	certain	inconsistency	between	
popular	perceptions	of	Britain’s	status	as	a	world	trader	and	its	trading	successes.	Despite	this	
concern	with	Britain’s	declining	share	in	the	world	manufacturing	market,	a	‘striking	feature’	of	the	
post-war	years	was	the	rapid	expansion	of	manufactured	exports,	delivering	the	first	account	
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surpluses	in	140	years.76	However,	the	focus	on	Britain’s	share	of	the	international	manufacturing	
market	meant	such	achievements	largely	went	unrecognised.	
	
German	economic	successes	became	particularly	concerning	for	the	media	in	1956	as	West	German	
vehicle	exports	had	finally	overtaken	Britain’s,	and	newspapers	rarely	shared	in	Macmillan’s	
‘sneaking	admiration’	for	German	ingenuity.77	Notably,	there	was	a	fatalism	creeping	into	
descriptions	of	Britain’s	economic	future,	where	unions	were	seen	to	be	a	major	contributor	to	such	
a	demise.	In	a	front	page	article	on	redundancies	at	Standards,	or	merely	‘sackings’,	the	Mail	was	
keen	to	impress	that	consistent	rises	in	living	standards	were	‘not	a	law	of	nature,	or	of	man	either’	
and	that,	as	the	country	enjoyed	economic	boom,	‘bust	lurks	just	around	the	corner’.78	The	industrial	
action	taken	by	unions	would	‘merely	make	real	unemployment	more	certain’,	drawing	a	distinction	
between	redundancy	in	an	economy	rich	with	alternative	employment	from	permanent	and	
systemic	unemployment.79	According	to	this	frame,	futile	industrial	action	was	acting	as	a	catalyst	
for	Britain’s	economic	demise	and	it	appeared	to	be	gain	traction	with	the	electorate.	David	
Kynaston’s	analysis	of	a	BBC	poll	in	the	winter	of	1955-56	has	found	that	an	increasing	minority	of	
respondents	who	perceived	Britain	to	be	in	a	state	of	economic	decline	were	‘mainly	blaming	the	
trade	unions’.80	
	
The	focus	on	automation	as	a	means	for	meeting	the	demands	of	a	newly	global	market,	particularly	
in	reference	to	its	German	competitors	is	an	interesting	one,	seemingly	bound	up	in	the	language	of	
‘technological	optimism’.	A	focus	on	efficient,	mechanised	production,	although	attractive	to	both	
nationalistic	and	modernising	rhetoric,	may	have	rather	missed	the	point.	Tony	Judt’s	work	on	the	
dual	economies	of	Britain	and	Germany	suggested	that	the	struggle	of	the	1950s	British	car	industry	
was	driven	by	a	focus	on	the	quantity	of	output,	bound	in	the	emerging	preoccupation	with	
‘productivity’,	rather	than	the	quality	of	product.	Although	the	‘shoddy	quality	of	British	cars	
mattered	little’	in	the	immediate	post-war	years,	thanks	to	a	captive	market,	once	such	an	
unfortunate	reputation	had	been	established	‘it	proved	impossible	to	shake’,	as	overseas	consumers	
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turned	to	domestic	alternatives.81	The	relationship	with	such	failures	and	the	issue	of	automation	
was	rarely	made	clear,	perhaps	as	the	media	were	unwilling	or	unable	to	recognise	the	inferiority	of	
British	products	to	their	European	counterparts,	such	was	the	strength	of	post-war	patriotic	rhetoric.	
	
Perhaps,	feeling	the	pace	on	the	world	market	and	not	much	more	than	a	decade	after	the	war,	the	
creation	of	parallels	with	Britain’s	wartime	experience	of	international	rivalry	was	inevitable.	The	
Express	were	keen	to	impress	that	automation	was	the	economic	‘weapon’	with	which	to	‘beat	the	
Germans	and	the	Japanese	in	world	markets’.82	This	provided	an	explicit	indication	of	the	media’s	
willingness	to	play	on	the	nationalist	legacies	of	wartime	rhetoric.	Discussions	of	economic	
competition	with	Britain’s	wartime	enemies	tapped	into	the	‘existing	schemata’	of	individual	and	
collective	‘belief	systems’	–	a	key	element	of	successful	media	framing.83	However,	in	the	case	of	the	
‘trade	union	question’,	identification	and	fascination	with	the	example	of	a	foreign	‘other’	was	less	
one-dimensional,	although	that	it	should	be	the	American	model	was	not	entirely	surprising.	The	
example	of	Walter	Reuther’s	reforms	in	American	industrial	relations,	as	leader	of	the	United	
Automobile	Workers,	was	not	only	referenced	but	almost	universally	praised	by	the	national	
newspapers,	encouraged	by	US	economic	success.	American	labour’s	supposed	acceptance	of	the	
role	of	automation	was	driven	by	the	knowledge	that	such	changes	meant	‘less	drudgery,	more	
prestige	for	labour,	better	pay	and	more	goods’.84		To	the	British	press,	this	indicated	a	difference	in	
priorities,	towards	a	greater	level	of	education	and	a	better	understanding	of	welfare,	rather	than	
trade	unionism’s	traditional	drive	for	wages.	Under	Reuther,	the	American	trade	unions	had	
‘forestalled	extremist	trouble-making’	by	creating	redundancy	packages	as	a	‘shock-absorber	when	
machines	oust	them’.85	This	was	indicative	of	the	belief	that	British	trade	unionism	could	likewise	be	
reformed	from	within,	campaigning	for	alternative	security	in	order	to	soothe	the	concerns	of	a	
threatened	workforce	and	slow	down	the	drive	for	higher	wages.	Significantly,	using	the	case	of	Ford	
in	the	US	as	an	exemplar,	such	financial	‘burdens’	could	be	‘borne	mainly	by	industry	and	not	the	
State’,	‘rather	than	methods	which	dam	the	wellsprings	of	enterprise’;	a	language	that	suggested	
that	the	primacy	of	private	profit	was	a	natural	and	healthy	part	of	an	economy	to	be	safe-
guarded.86	
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British	media’s	enthusiasm	for	Reuther’s	measures	neglected	to	recognise	that	American	
automotive	workers’	wages	were	far	higher	than	those	in	Europe	and	Reuther	was	under	pressure	
from	Ford	for	pushing	for	them	to	internationally	uncompetitive	levels,	contrary	to	the	supposedly	
‘statesmanlike’	British	and	German	leaders.87	Although	not	publicly	recognised	by	either	party	
involved,	the	relationship	between	Reuther	and	the	British	media	was	mutually	beneficial:	Reuther’s	
influence,	particularly	at	major	conferences,	could	soften	British	trade	unionism’s	critical	response	
to	automation,	while	such	a	drive	for	improved	standards	in	Britain,	including	increased	job	security,	
would	alleviate	the	pressure	on	Reuther’s	expensive	American	labour	force.	Even	before	Reuther’s	
appearance,	there	was	evidence	that	public	belief	in	trade	union	priorities	was	finely	balanced,	as	
the	same	number	of	people	believed	long-term	contracts	were	a	priority	for	unions,	as	those	who	
believed	higher	wages	to	be	important,	according	to	a	Gallup	poll	from	August	1956.88	Focus	on	
Reuther	as	a	particular	individual	was	also	symptomatic	of	the	increasing	personalisation	of	politics	
by	the	media,	as	industrial	relations	was	coming	to	be	recognised	as	a	core	element	of	the	British	
political	scene.	As	far	as	the	conservative	wing	of	the	nation’s	dailies	were	concerned,	a	strong	
personality	like	Reuther	was	the	perfect	antidote	to	other	strong,	and	supposedly	militant	
personalities	that	were	beginning	to	emerge	from	the	British	labour	movement,	principally	Frank	
Cousins.	
	
Reuther’s	role	was	not	just	significant	in	media	coverage	for	soothing	public	anxieties	around	
modernisation	and	advancement	of	British	industry.	Coverage	of	Reuther’s	speeches	also	offered	
encouragement	for	those	anxious	about	their	individual	personal	fortunes	beyond	job	security.	
According	to	Richard	Crossman’s	column	in	the	Mirror,	Reuther	had	earned	the	title	of	TUC	Man	of	
the	Year	in	1957	because	he	had	illuminated	‘new-style	militant	trade	unionism’	which	did	not	
‘merely’	seek	high	wages	but	‘security	against	sickness,	redundancy	and	old	age;	for	a	share	in	
management	and,	above	all,	for	more	leisure’.89	Although	this	was	not	the	pro-automation	line	that	
many	of	the	conservative	newspapers	had	emphasised	in	coverage	of	Reuther’s	speeches,	it	was	
indicative	of	a	broad	shift	in	understandings	of	trade	unions’	responsibilities	for	the	security	of	their	
members	in	industry.	The	Mail	was	particularly	concerned	that	the	unions’	demand	for	wages	to	
keep	pace	with	the	cost	of	living	illustrated	belief	in	‘an	inalienable	right	to	high	and	constantly	rising	
standards’,	despite	the	fact	this	was	not	extended	to	the	‘professional	classes’,	whose	standards	had	
been	‘seriously	reduced’.90	This	provided	the	first	indication	of	an	‘equality	of	sacrifice’	narrative	in	
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the	union	context,	language	which	linked	to	wartime	and	rationing,	and	confirmed	earlier	fears	
about	a	squeeze	on	the	middle	classes.	An	emphasis	on	job	security	and	leisure	time	offered	the	
opportunity	to	address	middle	class	interests	while	providing	a	modified	platform	for	trade	
unionism.		
	
Like	Crossman,	Anthony	Crosland	argued	for	trade	unions	to	pay	‘greater	attention	to	non-wage	
privileges’,	going	as	far	as	to	declare	the	expansion	of	trade	union	interests	as	‘one	of	the	most	
important	reforms	now	needed	in	British	industry’.91	Crossman	and	Crosland’s	contribution	to	the	
debate	illustrated	that	this	shift	permeated	the	Labour	Party’s	political	outlook	and	was	thus	far	
from	isolated	to	the	daily	newspapers.	The	Times	reflected	a	discomfort	with	a	long-established	
‘national	tendency	to	regard	the	security	of	the	worker	as	a	matter	for	the	Government	rather	than	
for	the	industry	to	which	he	belongs’,	where	the	unions	had	‘curiously	neglected’	the	issue	of	
redundancy.92	With	the	future	of	the	British	economy	at	stake	and	further	upheaval	seemingly	
inevitable,	it	was	this	wider	issue	which	came	under	scrutiny	following	the	industrial	strife	of	1956.		
	
The	burden	of	responsibility	
Social	anxiety	about	both	the	strength	of	unions	in	forcing	supposedly	unreasonable	strikes	and	the	
long-term	impact	of	industrial	modernisation	on	employment	required	remedy.	It	is	notable	that,	at	
this	point,	concepts	of	reform	were	widely	accepted	and	discussed,	indicative	of	the	situation’s	
perceived	fluidity	and	adaptability	during	flourishing	economic	times.	The	divisive	issue,	however,	
was	based	on	who	should	lead	such	change.	The	primary	emphasis	from	the	Mirror	was	the	
government’s	plans	for	‘the	Robot	age’,	a	legacy	of	the	strong	relationship	between	unions	and	
government	that	had	existed	under	Labour	before	1950.	It	felt	that	it	was	imperative	that	Macleod	
got	‘rid	of	the	idea	that	the	Government	can	stand	aloof	and	let	employers	and	unions	muddle	
through’,	suggesting	that	government	accountability	for	labour	relations	was	problematic	and	the	
dynamics	between	employers	and	unions	required	responsible	mediation.93	In	the	case	of	events	at	
Standards,	the	Herald	argued	that	the	‘chief	blame’	rested	not	on	workers	or	‘ham-fisted’	employers	
but	government,	who	had	‘no	plan	to	meet	the	age	of	automation’.94	Deflecting	the	tide	of	pressure	
on	the	unions,	the	Mirror	argued	on	a	centre-page	spread	(Figure	2.4)	that	politicians	had	to	‘ensure	
that	workers	in	factories	and	office	understand	the	Robot	Revolution,	are	prepared	for	it,	and	are	
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convinced	that	they	will	benefit	from	it’.95	This	broke	the	responsibility	of	government	broadly	into	
three	sections,	all	of	which	were	a	point	of	media	debate	–	education,	preparation	and	persuasion.	
In	September	1956,	49	per	cent	of	those	polled	by	Gallup	felt	that,	in	line	with	TUC	demands,	British	
industry	required	a	‘greater	measure	of	planning	on	the	part	of	Government’,	while	only	21	per	cent	
disagreed	with	this	proposition.96	Editorial	columns,	from	both	the	Mirror	and	the	Herald,	worked	
hard	to	exert	pressure	on	the	government,	including	making	demands	on	public	funds	to	help	invest	
in	infrastructure	and	redistribute	wealth.97	The	Mirror	also	argued	that,	given	Labour’s	roots	in	
campaigning	for	employment	rights,	where	‘workers’	interests	may	be	threatened’,	‘the	intelligent	
introduction	of	automation’	could	provide	an	important	point	of	Labour	in	opposition.	98	This	was	
indicative	of	the	belief	that	all	politicians	shared	some	responsibility	in	the	future	of	Britain’s	
industry.	
	
Figure	2.4:	‘Political	Planning	or	Chaos?’,	Daily	Mirror,	1	July	1955,	pp.	10-11.	
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The	three	aspects	that	the	Mirror	alluded	to	–	education,	preparation	and	persuasion	–	were	issues	
which	other	newspapers,	particularly	the	Mail	and	the	Express,	felt	extended	beyond	the	remits	of	
government	responsibility.	The	Times	argued	that	there	was	a	need	for	‘employers	generally	to	get	
together	with	the	trade	unions	generally,	if	necessary	with	the	good	office	of	Government,	to	find	a	
means	whereby	the	transfer	of	labour	can	take	place	with	a	minimum	of	friction’.99	Forging	a	new	
collective	policy	on	redundancies	was	of	primary	concern,	though	it	would	require	the	unions	to	
accept	their	inevitability.	Whilst	the	broadsheets	set	about	encouraging	a	degree	of	cooperation	
between	interested	parties	–	government,	employers	and	unions	-	in	tackling	such	problems,	other	
newspapers	placed	a	greater	degree	of	emphasis	on	the	responsibility	and	duty	of	trade	unions.	The	
problems	with	redundancy	and	a	lack	of	security	for	workers,	signified,	according	to	the	Mail,	‘the	
failure	of	the	governing	body	of	the	great	trade	union	movement	to	give	a	lead	to	its	constituent	
members’.	A	failure	of	leadership	at	the	top	of	the	union	hierarchy	was	an	increasingly	prevalent	
narrative	to	explain	the	unexpected	levels	of	industrial	strife	at	a	time	of	emerging	prosperity,	as	
was	observed	in	the	previous	chapter.	Trade	unions	had	either	been	caught	out	by	contemporary	
industrial	changes	or	had	been	neglectful	of	their	duties,	and	should	have	‘foreseen	and	forestalled’	
the	problems	at	Standard	Motors	and	the	‘initiative	should	have	sprung’	from	collective	union	
policy.100	The	Times	felt	that	‘little	local	Canutes’,	shop	stewards,	had	distracted	the	unions	from	
providing	a	clear	policy	in	acceptance	of	redundancy,	indicative	of	a	perceived	erosion	of	the	
leadership’s	authority.101	In	this	sense,	a	lack	of	leadership	regarding	automation	in	union	policy	had	
meant	that	the	unions	had	hampered	the	nation’s	economic	progress,	much	like	they	had	in	
nationalised	industries.	Redundancy	through	industrial	modernisation	had	long	been	an	inevitability	
of	industrial	change	which	unions	had	failed	to	prepare	for.	
	
The	BBC’s	preparation	of	programmes	on	trade	unionism	also	demonstrated	concern	for	the	
educative	role	of	the	trade	union	movement,	to	reshape	the	perceptions	of	their	membership	and	
its	attitudes	towards	the	economy.	Despite	the	BBC’s	commitment	to	impartiality,	this	was	
Indicative	of	the	broader	media	agenda	informing	and	influencing	broadcast	journalism.	
Programmes	were	supposedly	devised	to	be	‘as	much	about’	the	‘friendly	and	amicable	routine’	of	a	
hundred	industries	‘which	never	finds	its	way	into	the	news’,	as	the	‘more	sensational	aspects	of	its	
theme’.102	However,	staff	preparing	a	BBC	‘Special	Enquiry’	programme	on	trade	unions	in	1956,	
suggested	that	they	would	ask	George	Woodcock	a	set	of	probing	questions,	for	which	his	co-
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operation	was	assumed.	The	first	of	these	was	‘Have	trade	union	leaders	a	thorough	grasp	of	the	
general	economic	set-up	of	the	country?’,	indicative	of	a	scepticism	towards	the	economic	
awareness	of	union	leadership,	perhaps	prompted	by	the	supposed	lack	of	foresight	regarding	job	
security.	Secondly,	it	was	suggested	that	Woodcock	might	face	the	issue	of	‘to	what	extent	are	the	
trade	unions	trying	to	educate	their	members	about	the	broader	industrial	and	economic	issues?’,	
implying	that,	at	the	very	least,	the	BBC	considered	that	this	might	be	part	of	the	concern	of	trade	
unions.	Finally,	it	was	proposed	that	the	question	of	‘now	that	the	trade	unions	have	by	and	large	
achieved	their	main	objectives	–	better	wages	and	conditions	–	what	are	their	future	objectives?’	
should	be	posed	to	Woodcock	and	other	trade	unionists	appearing	on	the	programme.103	This	
aligned	strongly	with	the	conservative	media’s	suggestion	that	there	should	be	a	change	of	emphasis	
in	the	priorities	of	trade	unions,	to	move	beyond	an	emphasis	on	financial	settlements.	BBC	
coverage	of	trade	unions,	particularly	in	high	profile	‘Special	Enquiry’	programmes,	was	thus	far	from	
impervious	to	the	frames	and	emphases	of	the	press	in	criticising	the	role	of	trade	unions	in	Britain’s	
economic	present	and	future.	
	
Reflecting	on	both	the	Mirror’s	emphasis	on	governmental	intervention	and	the	Express’s	frustration	
with	trade	union	leadership,	it	is	notable	the	way	responsibility	for	Britain’s	economic	future	was	
framed	invariably	in	negative	terms.	Determining	the	direction	of	Britain’s	long-term	industrial	policy	
was	continually	treated	by	all	parties	as	a	burden	to	be	deflected	to	other	stake-holders,	rather	than	
an	opportunity	to	be	the	driving	force	behind	Britain’s	development.	The	Mirror’s	position	provided	
potential	opportunities	for	their	Conservative	opponents,	even	if	it	did	require	a	change	in	attitudes	
towards	industrial	interventionism.	Conversely,	the	attitude	of	the	government’s	press	allies	invited	
further	union	influence	over	industrial	reform.	However,	the	discussion	of	responsibility	was	rarely	
understood	in	such	terms.	This	appears	to	be	symptomatic	of	increasing	public	anxiety	about	the	
complexity	of	Britain’s	post-war	industrial	outlook	and	the	pressures	of	adapting	to	a	new	world	
economy,	where	Britain	could	no	longer	assume	the	same	supremacy.	Moreover,	although	many	
have	challenged	perceptions	of	economic	or	political	consensus,	the	discussion	is	a	further	indication	
of	the	apparent	convergence	of	politics	at	that	time,	between	a	relatively	conservative	trade	union	
leadership	and	a	Conservative	government	considerate	of	public	concern	about	full	employment.	
Although	debate	and	discussion	about	the	position	of	trade	unions	in	Britain’s	economic	future	was	
increasingly	antagonistic,	as	has	been	explored,	it	is	apparent	that	neither	side	saw	a	transfer	of	
responsibility	as	dangerous	or	threatening	to	their	political	ideals.	The	disharmony	between	unions	
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and	employers,	as	seen	at	Standards	and	the	BMC,	were	understood	to	be	temporary	and	could	be	
answered,	through	planning	and	reform.			
	
The	outcomes	and	impressions	of	debate	on	public	opinion	were	complex.	In	May	1956,	48	per	cent	
of	those	polled	by	Gallup	understood	automation	to	mean	‘machines	taking	over	jobs’.104	At	first	
sight,	this	would	seem	to	suggest	that	criticisms	of	automation	had	been	successfully	communicated	
to	the	public,	aware	of	the	threat	to	social	welfare.	However,	in	the	same	poll,	48	per	cent	
understood	automation	to	be	a	‘good	thing’,	compared	to	just	11	per	cent	who	considered	it	as	
simply	a	‘bad	thing’.	105	By	August,	after	the	turmoil	of	repeated	strikes	over	redundancy,	the	figure	
showed	little	change,	as	50	per	cent	believed	automation	to	be	‘a	good	thing’.106	Jim	Tomlinson’s	
work	on	the	post-war	economy	has	indicated	a	clear	transition	in	priorities	during	the	mid-1950s	
which	represented	a	‘major	shift	in	political	calculation	and	culture’	as	economic	performance,	
rather	than	social	equality,	became	increasingly	dominant	in	the	rhetoric	of	electoral	politics.107	
Evidently,	debate	surrounding	the	role	of	trade	unions	in	the	national	economy	was	no	exception	
and	it	appears	that	the	conservative	dailies	were	winning	the	argument.	Although	the	public	were	
well	aware	of	the	potential	employment	displacement	created	by	automation,	impressions	of	the	
modernisation	process	remained	positive,	with	the	nation’s	economic	future	in	mind.	Here,	the	
choices	provided	by	Gallup	polling	epitomised	the	binaries	and	false	dichotomies	of	media	debate,	
while	the	topic’s	pervasiveness	in	polling	reflected	its	prominence	on	the	media	agenda.	Given	this,	
the	conflict	in	conclusions	provided	by	polling	suggests	that	public	opinion,	while	positive	about	
automation,	was	far	less	one-dimensional	than	the	narratives	presented	to	readers	of	national	
dailies.	
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Figure	2.5:	‘Vicky	Cartoon’,	Daily	Mirror,	14	May	1956,	p.	3.	
	
Just	as	the	‘automation’	debate	underpinned	changes	to	media	rhetoric	and	dialogue,	there	is	
evidence	of	the	issue	reflecting	change	in	the	media’s	visual	culture.	Figure	2.5	depicts	a	cartoon	by	
Victor	‘Vicky’	Weisz	from	the	centre	pages	of	the	Mirror	which	reveals	important	trends	in	the	
function	of	cartoons	in	1950s	media	culture.	Jon	Agar,	in	his	reflections	on	the	significance	of	
machines	for	political	cartoonists,	noted	how	cartoonists	consistently	utilised	technology	‘as	a	
metaphor	for	human	relationships	and	values’,	including	popular	understanding	of	‘automata	as	
heartless	and	unemotional	to	accuse	government	of	the	same	faults’.	108	This	‘Vicky’	cartoon,	with	a	
tall	and	foreboding	robot	standing	over	a	shadowed	worker,	the	latter	labelled	as	‘the	human	
problem	of	redundancy’,	certainly	alludes	to	such	criticisms	of	government	policy.	More	broadly,	
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Agar	highlighted	the	impact	of	a	change	in	social	attitudes	during	the	1960s,	as	portrayals	of	science	
and	technology	became	increasingly	hostile	and	satirical.109	With	the	proliferation	of	technology	in	
media	debate	and	increasing	scrutiny	of	its	social	impact,	this	change	seems	unsurprising.	However,	
this	cartoon,	along	with	others	from	the	‘automation’	debate,	indicates	that	this	transition	in	the	
depiction	of	technology	may	have	had	deeper	roots,	particularly	from	left-wing	cartoonists	sharing	
in	the	Mirror’s	social	concerns	about	automation.	
	
In	sum,	the	future	of	Britain’s	industrial	economy	after	the	Second	World	War	was	depicted	as	one	
intrinsically	entwined	with	the	behaviour	of	trade	unions.	This	chapter	has	analysed	a	number	of	
complex	and	divisive	issues	in	the	media’s	depiction	of	trade	unions’	involvement	in	Britain’s	post-
war	economic	future.	Concepts	of	decline,	as	observed	in	analysis	of	the	automotive	industry	and	
dwindling	enthusiasm	for	nationalisation,	slowly	permeated	the	media	agenda	and	public	
consciousness,	particularly	in	relation	to	Britain’s	position	on	the	world	stage.	Trade	union	
involvement	in	obstructing	moves	to	modernise	industry	and	their	failure	to	invest	in	the	ideals	of	
nationalisation	were	progressively	framed	as	chief	causes	for	Britain’s	declining	influence	in	world	
markets,	despite	the	many	other	expenses	associated	with	the	nationalisation	project.	Inevitability,	
this	gave	way	to	comparisons	with	German	and	American	competitors,	particularly	their	conciliatory	
machinery	and	the	priorities	of	their	trade	unions.	According	to	the	British	media,	the	American	
example	provided	a	blueprint	for	its	own	unions,	despite	much	higher	wages	in	the	American	
automotive	industry	and	similar	disquiet	about	the	behaviour	of	their	unions.		
	
As	living	standards	and	wages	improved,	it	was	increasingly	suggested	that	unions	should	demand	
less	in	financial	terms	from	both	state	and	private	employers.	In	the	case	of	the	mining	industry,	
wage	increases	were	portrayed	as	becoming	habitual,	despite	relatively	high	pay.	Instead,	trade	
union	leadership,	which	was	consistently	found	lacking	in	authority	in	both	industries,	should	seek	to	
educate	workers	about	the	benefits	of	changes	to	industry,	particularly	in	the	case	of	automation,	
where	job	security	and	long-term	contracts	should	be	the	focus	of	their	campaigns	and	policies.	
Although	pro-Labour	newspapers	such	as	the	Mirror	sought	to	address	this	emphasis	on	unions,	as	
opposed	to	government	policy,	the	dominant	rhetoric	placed	responsibility	at	the	feet	of	the	unions.	
Such	a	change	of	emphasis	was	indicative	of	an	increasing	prioritisation	of	national	economic	
performance	over	increasing	working	class	living	standards,	as	trade	unions	were	encouraged	to	
tackle	issues	that	business	could	afford	to	make	concessions	on.	It	was	in	these	narrowing	terms	that	
																																																						
109	Ibid.,	p.	194.	
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trade	union	activism	and	power	were	deemed	legitimate,	alongside	the	increased	anxiety	about	
‘politicised’	industrial	action,	as	analysed	in	the	first	chapter.	
	
The	media	did	recognise	the	difficulties	in	adapting	to	change	for	the	unions,	both	in	the	structural	
changes	to	negotiation	mechanisms	in	nationalised	industries	and	in	the	abrupt	redundancies	
provoked	by	automation,	but	in	neither	case	did	this	legitimise	the	decision	by	leaders	to	take	
industrial	action.	It	was	not	unusual	for	the	media	to	be	sympathetic	to	the	problems	presented	in	
cases	of	industrial	unrest	but	there	were	clear	limitations.	Concern	about	the	treatment	of	workers	
rarely	translated	into	outright	support,	as	observed	in	coverage	of	the	1955	dock	strikes,	for	fear	of	
jeopardising	national	prosperity.		
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Chapter	Three	–	Cracks	in	Labour’s	‘jerry-built	façade	of	unity’	
Governance	and	Power,	1960-69	
	
The	early	1960s	marked	further	frustration	for	the	Labour	Party	and	its	trade	union	allies.	Mark	
Abrams’s	polling	analysis,	published	periodically	in	Socialist	Commentary	throughout	1960,	
scrutinised	why	Labour	had	lost	the	1959	General	Election	to	the	Conservatives.	It	concluded	that	
Labour’s	image	was	‘increasingly	obsolete’	because	both	supporters	and	non-supporters	identified	
Labour	with	‘the	working	class’.1	This	was	problematic	because	‘many	workers,	irrespective	of	their	
politics,	no	longer	regard	themselves	as	working	class’.2	Abrams’s	work	suggested	that	Labour’s	
image	was	becoming	increasingly	dated	and	‘out-of-touch’	with	modern	society.	Abrams	felt	that	
Labour	had	lacked	sufficient	‘machinery’	to	fully	utilise	survey	findings	in	order	‘shape	effective	
political	propaganda’	during	the	1950s.3	In	contrast,	those	that	felt	unions	were	doing	a	good	job	did	
so	because	they	‘equated	the	unions	with	the	protection	of	the	interests	of	the	working	class’.4	
There	was	a	real	risk	by	1960	of	Labour	maintaining	its	traditional	ties	at	the	cost	of	keeping	pace	
with	the	upwardly	mobile	British	electorate.	Abrams’s	polling	was	discussed	by	Labour’s	National	
Executive	Committee	and	Abrams’s	polling	had	an	increasing	influence	on	Labour	policy,	as	he	was	
recruited	to	an	official	post	in	1962.5	The	impact	of	Labour’s	subsequent	attempts	to	reinvent	its	
public	image	on	the	position	of	trade	unionism	in	British	politics	is	of	particular	interest	in	this	
chapter.		
	
Indicative	of	the	rehabilitation	of	the	Labour	Party’s	image,	the	1964	general	election	returned	a	
narrow	parliamentary	majority,	following	highly	partisan	support	from	the	Mirror.	In	contrast,	
traditional	Conservative	press	support	had	been	far	more	muted,	following	a	period	of	intense	
criticism	during	the	Vassall	and	Profumo	affairs.	Response	to	these	scandals	demonstrated	‘the	
transformation	of	the	political,	cultural,	intellectual	and	social	climate’	of	the	early	1960s	and	
‘contributed	to	the	lack	of	enthusiasm	for	a	discredited	Conservative	old-guard’,	during	emerging	
economic	problems.6	As	1964	ended	thirteen	years	of	Conservative	rule,	albeit	narrowly,	and	Fleet	
Street	enthused	about	Wilson’s	promise	of	industrial	modernisation,	it	would	be	reasonable	to	
																																																						
1	Mark	Abrams,	‘Why	Labour	Has	lost	Elections,	Part	One:	Party	Images’,	Socialist	Commentary	(May	1960),	p.	
9.	
2	Ibid.,	p.	9.	
3	Mark	Abrams,	Public	Opinion	Polls	and	Political	Parties,	The	Public	Opinion	Quarterly	27:1	(1963),	p.	17.	
4	Mark	Abrams,	‘Why	Labour	Has	lost	Elections,	Part	Seven:	Trade	Unions	and	Politics’,	Socialist	Commentary	
(August	1960),	p.	9.	
5	Peter	Gurney,	The	Making	of	Consumer	Culture	in	Modern	Britain	(London,	2017),	p.	177.	
6	James	Thomas,	Popular	Newspapers,	p.	59.	
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assume	Labour’s	victory	signalled	a	positive	change	for	trade	unionism.	However,	the	picture	was	
much	more	complex	for	the	wider	labour	movement.	The	key	findings	from	a	special	enquiry	by	
Gallup	on	behalf	of	the	Telegraph	in	1964	found	that	the	unions’	traditional	allegiance	to	the	Labour	
Party	had	started	to	erode,	while	Labour	enjoyed	successes	with	other	social	groups	conventionally	
allied	to	the	Conservative	Party.7	This	suggested	that,	in	light	of	the	evidence	presented	by	Abrams,	
amongst	others,	Labour	had	actively	attempted	to	distance	the	party	from	the	wider	labour	
movement	between	1960	and	1964,	in	order	to	appeal	to	floating	voters,	as	popular	
disenchantment	with	the	Conservative	party	grew.		
	
The	first	case	study	of	this	chapter	assesses	media	coverage	of	a	major	strike	by	the	National	Union	
of	Seamen	(NUS)	in	1966	which	provoked	the	first	declaration	of	a	national	State	of	Emergency	in	
over	a	decade.	In	such	dramatic	circumstances,	the	responsibility	for	communicating	the	scale	of	the	
NUS’s	threat	to	national	prosperity	lay	with	the	national	press,	while	Harold	Wilson	used	television	
and	newspaper	coverage	to	mixed	effect.	This	chapter	explores	the	effect	of	the	media’s	attitudes	
towards	the	incumbent	government	on	the	portrayal	of	union	disputes,	as	Harold	Wilson	attempted	
to	enforce	strict	measures	to	quell	industrial	action,	through	emergency	action	in	1966	and	
legislative	proposals	in	1969.	During	the	NUS	strike,	the	media’s	party-political	bias	produced	
coverage	which	defied	convention,	as	unions	roused	sympathy	from	the	Conservative	press.	In	
January	1969,	piloted	by	Barbara	Castle,	Labour	published	its	controversial	In	Place	of	Strife	White	
Paper	–	the	debate	of	which	forms	the	second	of	this	chapter’s	case	studies.8	Although	unsuccessful,	
this	ill-fated	publication	formed	the	most	serious	legislative	attempt	by	any	government	in	the	post-
war	period	to	remodel	industrial	relations	in	Britain.	Castle	was	adjudged	to	have	‘seriously	
underestimated’	the	proposals’	impact,	as	Labour	MPs	concluded	that	‘a	rupture	in	the	relationship	
between	the	industrial	and	political	wings	of	the	Labour	Party	was	a	completely	unacceptable	price	
to	pay’	for	the	Bill’s	success.9	Unsurprisingly,	this	Bill	provoked	a	great	deal	of	media	debate	
surrounding	the	relationship	between	Labour	and	the	trade	unions,	as	well	as	the	extent	of	trade	
unionism’s	political	power	in	Britain.	Near-universal	media	support	for	government	legislation	
proved	to	be	problematic	when	negotiations	with	the	TUC	began	to	falter.	
	
																																																						
7	The	Gallup	Poll	Group,	Trade	Unions	and	the	Public	in	1964:	An	Enquiry	Made	for	the	Sunday	Telegraph	
(London,	1964),	p.	2.	
8	Barbara	Castle	(1910-2002)	was	a	prominent	Labour	politician	and	one	of	Harold	Wilson’s	key	allies.	A	
member	of	parliament	for	the	entirety	of	the	period	studied,	she	held	a	number	of	significant	cabinet	posts,	
including	the	Secretary	of	State	for	Employment	and	Productivity	between	1968	and	1970.	
9	Gerald	Dorfman,	Government	Versus	Trade	Unionism	in	British	Politics	Since	1968	(Basingstoke,	1979),	p.	23.	
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This	chapter	reflects	on	the	ways	newspapers	sought	to	define	the	boundaries	between	‘political’	
and	‘industrial’	trade	union	activity,	as	an	extension	of	1950s	debate,	and	how	this	shaped	
perceptions	of	legitimacy	and	acceptability.	Throughout,	this	chapter	analyses	how	journalists	
negotiated	the	way	these	two	supposedly	distinct	ideas	interrelated	and	overlapped.	While	during	
the	1966	strike	politicians	and	politics	encroached	on	the	traditionally	‘industrial’	sphere	of	union	
action,	concerted	political	pressure	from	the	unions	played	an	important	part	in	determining	the	
fate	of	In	Place	of	Strife.	Union	involvement	in	British	policy	direction	also	provided	challenging	
questions	about	Britain’s	governability,	across	the	media	spectrum,	as	Labour	managed	the	tensions	
between	its	traditional	labour-based	support	and	the	expectations	of	the	disgruntled	wider	public.	
This	tension	was	often	framed	as	a	dilemma	for	Wilson’s	loyalties,	a	matter	of	country	versus	party.		
These	strains	on	Labour	politics	and	the	media	verdict	on	their	management	is	a	further	aspect	of	
analysis.	Looking	ahead	to	the	following	chapter	on	coverage	of	Britain’s	economic	future,	this	
section	of	the	thesis	reflects	on	the	media’s	operation	of	specific	frames	of	explanation	for	Britain’s	
emerging	economic	troubles.	As	British	industry	came	under	increasing	scrutiny	over	the	period,	
prompted	by	a	rash	of	unofficial	strikes	in	the	early	1960s	as	well	as	concerns	about	industrial	
productivity,	multiple	frames	of	explanation	were	provided	by	the	media.	They	competed	for	
credibility	during	the	decade	and	their	deployment	slowly	evolved.	Ultimately,	analysis	of	1969’s	
industrial	debates	illustrates	the	success	and	proliferation	of	labour-oriented	frames	of	explanation.	
	
Politicised	Industrial	Relations:	The	Seamen’s	Strike,	1966		
Under	Labour,	the	politicisation	of	industrial	relations	continued	to	inspire	public	concern,	despite	
an	improvement	in	trade	unionism’s	public	image	since	1958.	The	Telegraph’s	polling	analysis	found	
that	although	unions	and	strikers	enjoyed	‘considerable	support’	when	their	claims	were	deemed	
‘justified’,	union	‘involvement	in	politics	tended	to	be	deprecated’	by	both	the	general	public	and	
union	members.10	According	to	this	survey	there	was	damage	to	union	reputation	whenever	there	
was	‘weakness	in	pursuing	the	legitimate	aims	of	the	union	members’	or	‘squabbling	over	political	
issues’.11	Thus	the	relationship	between	unions	and	politics	remained	on	the	public	agenda	and	
indicated	the	enduring	perception	that	unions	could	operate	successfully	without	involving	
themselves	in	the	political	sphere.	This	was	an	essential	component	of	media	attempts	to	define	‘the	
political’	from	‘the	industrial’,	in	order	to	determine	the	legitimacy	of	union	activity.	Moreover,	
there	was	mounting	media	pressure	on	Labour’s	relationship	with	trade	unionism	between	1964	and	
1966.	These	attitudes	provided	important	social	context	for	the	1966	strike	by	the	NUS.		
																																																						
10	Gallup	Poll	Group,	Trade	Unions	and	the	Public	in	1964,	p.	2.	
11	Ibid.,	p.	2.	
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Although	Labour	extended	their	parliamentary	majority	in	that	year’s	general	election,	the	
enthusiasm	of	the	British	media	had	begun	to	wane,	as	the	Mirror’s	support	of	a	Labour	vote	‘could	
hardly	have	been	more	grudging’.12	According	to	an	article	by	John	Grigg	in	the	Guardian	in	late	
1965,	as	doubts	about	Labour’s	economic	plan	grew,	‘appeasement’	and	‘political	cowardice’	by	
both	Conservative	and	Labour	politicians	in	negotiations	with	unions	had	threatened	the	national	
economy.	If	Wilson	failed	to	tackle	the	‘unpopular’	unions,	he	may	have	to	‘say	goodbye	to	the	
floating	voters	–	not	to	mention	the	pound’.13	A	‘day	of	reckoning’	was	imminent	and	media	
patience	appeared	to	be	wearing	thin	with	a	conciliatory	approach	to	industrial	relations	that	had	
failed	to	alleviate	industrial	strife	or	address	shortcomings	in	productivity.	The	latter	of	these	themes	
is	analysed	more	closely	in	Chapter	Four.	Long	before	the	NUS	went	on	a	strike	that	threatened	to	
cripple	British	exports,	the	media	that	had	been	so	important	for	Labour’s	electoral	successes,	
established	demand	for	a	showdown	with	the	unions.		Media	support	for	1965’s	Board	for	Prices	
and	Incomes	only	intensified	pressure	on	Labour’s	relationship	with	trade	unions,	as	the	Mirror	
demanded	that	‘if	persuasion	fails	–	and	it	nearly	has	failed	–	there	must	be	coercion’,	where	
coercion	was	defined	as	‘the	new	nice	word	for	compulsion’.14	
	
In	May	1966,	the	NUS	announced	industrial	action,	primarily	motivated	by	a	demand	for	a	reduction	
in	compulsory	hours	from	56	hours	per	week	to	40	hours,	thereby	assuming	increased	pay	for	
regular	weekly	hours	and	greater	overtime	payment	for	those	weeks	spent	at	sea.	From	the	outset,	
coverage	of	the	strike	was	acutely	politicised,	as	ITV	commentators	identified	the	determination	of	
‘internal	union	politics’	where	‘even	if	by	some	miracle	the	executive	called	off	the	strike	an	
unofficial	strike	would	almost	be	bound	to	follow’.	15	This	highlighted	the	influence	of	the	left	wing	
of	the	union	and	tapped	into	continued	public	concern	about	the	kind	of	unofficial	strikes	which	had	
plagued	the	previous	Conservative	government.	According	to	the	Mail,	seen	in	Figure	3.1,	this	was	a	
‘fight	to	the	finish’,	as	it	evoked	the	political	significance	of	1926	in	its	front	page	article.16		
	
Although	this	episode	in	British	industry	is	rarely	emphasised	by	modern	historians,	dwarfed	by	the	
industrial	events	of	1968	and	1969,	the	strike	was	important	in	shaping	the	relationship	between	
Labour	and	the	unions,	as	well	as	the	dynamics	of	media	support.	For	Paul	Foot,	the	1966	Seamen’s	
																																																						
12	Thomas,	Popular	Newspapers,	p.	62.	
13	Guardian,	20	December	1965,	p.	14	
14	Daily	Mirror,	28	October	1966,	p.	3.	
15	ITV	Evening	News,	12	May	1966.	
16	Daily	Mail,	14	May	1966,	p.	1.	
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strike	dispelled	‘the	fashionable	euphoria	about	a	classless,	affluent	society’,	the	kind	of	society	
which	Wilson’s	Labour	had	tried	to	appeal	to,	and	‘removed	once	and	for	all	the	idea	that	industrial	
relations	in	British	society	are	a	polite,	friendly	affair’,	indicative	of	the	bitterness	surrounding	the	
episode.17	The	strike	also	had	a	profound	impact	on	the	media	sphere.	For	newspapers	sympathetic	
to	the	labour	movement,	the	1966	NUS	strike	represented	a	dilemma.	Industrial	relations	of	the	late	
1950s	had	represented	a	clear	dichotomy	between	the	Conservative	government	and	the	rebellious	
trade	unions	–	a	scenario	which	was	relatively	simple	for	such	newspapers	to	negotiate.	A	national	
strike	stirred	by	the	policies	of	a	largely	popular	Labour	government	was	a	much	more	complex	
situation	to	mediate.	Having	made	demands	for	determined	and	steadfast	governance	of	industrial	
relations	and	the	new	incomes	board,	support	of	Labour	in	this	strike	was	not	entirely	surprising.	
However,	the	consistency	of	this	support,	even	as	Wilson	employed	controversial	political	tactics	
against	the	strikers,	was	particularly	noteworthy	and	the	conventional	strategies	of	conservative	
newspapers	became	more	widespread.	
	
	
Figure	3.1:	‘A	fight	to	the	finish’,	Daily	Mail,	14	May	1956,	p.	1.	
	
The	relationship	between	government	and	media	in	the	negotiation	of	the	strike	was	more	complex	
than	a	simple	media	demand	for	confrontation	with	the	unions.	As	Keir	Thorpe’s	valuable	article	on	
the	strike	identifies,	it	was	‘unsurprising’	that	Wilson	‘wished	to	shape	media	coverage’.	18	This	was	
																																																						
17	Paul	Foot,	‘The	Seamen’s	Struggle’,	in	Robin	Blackburn	and	Alexander	Cockburn	(eds),	The	Incompatibles:	
Trade	Union	Militancy	and	the	Consensus	(London,	1967),	pp.	169,	206.	
18	Keir	Thorpe,	‘The	“Juggernaut	Method”:	The	1966	State	of	Emergency	and	the	Wilson	Government's	
Response	to	the	Seamen's	Strike’,	Twentieth	Century	British	History	12	(2001),	p.	475.	
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indicative	of	an	increasingly	transactional	relationship	between	government	and	media,	in	response	
to	the	media’s	increasingly	politicised	motives.	Wilson	was	well	aware	that	a	close	relationship	with	
the	Labour-supporting	media	was	vital	to	the	continued	prosperity	of	his	Labour	government.	
Geoffrey	Goodman,	after	he	had	written	a	critical	article	for	the	newly-established	Sun	newspaper,	
was	called	by	Wilson’s	press	secretary	‘to	explain	the	error	of	[Goodman’s]	ways	and	how	[his]	
critical	words	had	upset	Wilson’.19	Wilson’s	sensitivity	to	criticism	from	then	Labour-supporting	Sun	
was	unsurprising	but	his	attempts	to	apply	pressure	on	influential	journalists	suggested	that	Wilson	
was	well	aware	of	the	need	to	improve	his	public	standing	in	an	increasingly	critical	atmosphere.	
Such	an	approach	was	ineffective,	given	that	Goodman	left	Lloyd-Hughes	in	‘no	doubt	what	he	
should	do	with	his	–	and	the	Prime	Minister’s	–	opinions’,	providing	further	evidence	of	Wilson’s	
fragile	position	amongst	labour	journalists.20		
	
The	Mirror’s	criticism	of	the	NUS	strike	shared	a	number	of	similar	traits	to	the	conservative	press	
coverage	of	the	1958	bus	strike,	indicative	of	the	way	certain	frames	and	narratives	had	begun	to	
permeate	the	media	sphere	more	widely.	The	headline	editorial	from	the	Mirror’s	16	May	edition,	
entitled	‘Calling	All	Seamen’,	provides	a	clear	insight	into	these	kinds	of	patterns	of	coverage.21	In	
the	same	style	as	appeals	made	during	the	bus	strike,	aware	of	its	core	union	readership,	this	article	
made	a	much	more	aggressive	attempt	to	isolate	the	seamen	from	the	public	more	generally	and	
openly	criticize	their	actions.	The	confrontational	attitude	of	the	NUS	was	a	clear	target	for	criticism,	
as	the	seamen	had	allegedly	told	both	the	employers	and	the	Minister	of	Labour,	Ray	Gunter,	to	‘go	
to	hell’	and	treated	Wilson’s	intervention	with	‘similar	contempt’.	It	was	clear	the	Mirror	would	not	
celebrate	the	labour	movement’s	disdain	for	governmental	authority	in	the	same	tone	it	had	
celebrated	Cousins’s	rebellion	in	1958.	Throughout	coverage	of	the	strike,	the	portrayal	of	the	NUS	
position	as	unreasonable	or	irrational	was	particularly	popular	in	the	Mirror’s	editorial	columns.	
From	the	same	article,	subheadings	of	‘blackmail’	and	‘archaic’	gave	a	clear	indication	of	the	frames	
employed,	with	seamen	allegedly	‘demanding	feather-bedding	for	their	industry’	from	the	
Government,	‘which	means	YOU’.22	Undoubtedly,	support	for	the	government’s	incomes	policy	was	
important	in	motivating	this	narrative	of	blackmail	and	extortion	as	a	threat	to	public	life,	where	the	
parallels	with	the	1950s	conservative	press	were	clear.	The	kind	of	discussions	that	had	been	seen	in	
the	late	1950s,	which	impressed	the	importance	of	the	right	to	strike	or	the	strength	of	legal	
																																																						
19	Goodman,	Bevan	to	Blair,	p.	121.	
20	Goodman,	Bevan	to	Blair,	p.	121.	
21	Daily	Mirror,	16	May	1966,	pp.	1-2.	
22	Daily	Mirror,	16	May	1966,	pp.	1-2.		
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immunities	enshrined	in	the	traditions	of	trade	unionism,	were	notably	absent	from	coverage.	The	
tone	and	framing	of	coverage	had	radically	altered.	
	
Moreover,	the	emphasis	on	the	impact	of	a	potential	settlement	on	the	taxpayer’s	purse	was	
indicative	of	the	Mirror’s	attempts	to	involve	the	readership	directly	in	the	strike	and	provoke	
outright	public	opposition.	This	bore	many	parallels	with	previous	right-wing	criticism	of	strikes	in	
nationalised	industries	during	the	1950s.	It	was	partly	motivated	by	continued	frustration	with	the	
apparent	pervasiveness	of	public	apathy	towards	industrial	relations,	despite	Britain’s	dwindling	
economic	record.	Six	weeks	later,	Cassandra’s	column	lamented	that	‘on	the	face	of	it,	the	public	
couldn’t	care	less’	about	the	NUS	strike,	despite	the	paper’s	earlier	promises	of	holiday	disruption	
and	rising	food	prices.	It	appeared	that	politics	and	industrial	action	only	became	meaningful	to	the	
public	when	it	intersected	their	every	day	life	and	it	was	thus	critical	that	the	media	highlighted	such	
junctures	in	order	to	mobilise	public	opinion.		
	
Although	British	Pathé	contended	that	the	effects	of	the	strike	were	‘felt	all	over	the	country	with	
soaring	food	prices’,	it	was	soon	clear	that	the	reality	of	the	general	public’s	experience	was	very	
different.23	Nevertheless,	the	Guardian	impressed	that	‘the	illusion	that	the	British	economy	can	
function	without	a	shipping	industry	cannot,	however,	be	sustained	indefinitely’.	24	Such	predictions	
of	bleak	outcomes,	in	the	absence	of	immediate	public	crisis,	paralleled	the	coverage	of	the	
conservative	tabloids	during	the	bus	strike.25	As	a	further	indication	of	frustration	with	public	apathy,	
the	Cassandra	article	impressed	‘foreigners’	were	‘amazed’	that	Britain,	‘the	sick	man	of	Europe’,	
‘whistles	while	he	works	–	or	doesn’t	work’.26	Such	concern	with	Britain’s	international	reputation	
was	increasingly	widespread,	across	the	media	spectrum.	In	the	weeks	following	the	strike’s	
conclusion,	just	as	the	Express	had	in	1958,	the	Mirror	published	extracts	from	the	New	York	Times	
on	its	front	page	because	it	was	‘important	for	people	of	Britain	to	know	just	how	our	economic	
crisis	is	viewed	in	other	countries’.27	With	growing	American	influence	in	the	Cold	War	geopolitical	
context,	media	analysis	of	views	from	across	the	Atlantic	only	further	increased	scrutiny	of	the	
British	industrial	scene,	and	offered	the	opportunity	to	impress	the	strike’s	importance	on	the	
disengaged	British	public.	Moreover,	as	the	seamen’s	strike	had	hit	British	exports	in	particular,	
concern	with	international	trade	during	the	NUS	strike	was	even	more	acute.	
																																																						
23	‘Strike	Blockades	Britain’,	British	Pathé,	May	19	1966.	
24	Guardian,	21	June	1966,	p.	8.	
25	Guardian,	21	June	1966,	p.	8.	
26	Daily	Mirror,	24	June	1966,	p.	6.	
27	Daily	Mirror,	13	July	1966,	p.	1.	
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The	most	controversial	aspect	of	the	strike	was	Harold	Wilson’s	Commons	speech	on	20	June	1966,	
which	attempted	to	expose	‘a	tightly	knit	group	of	politically	motivated	men’	within	the	NUS.28	For	a	
Prime	Minister	to	publicly	condemn	internal	trade	union	politics	was	exceptional	and	underlined	the	
significance	of	the	strike	for	the	Labour	government,	impatient	to	bring	the	episode	to	a	close.	There	
were	concerns	amongst	Labour	MPs	that	Wilson’s	speech	had	made	‘the	anti-Communist	smear	a	
weapon	that	every	Tory	could	use’.29	In	media	spheres,	the	speech	served	to	solidify	and	entrench	
the	political	divisions	that	had	already	emerged,	as	a	number	of	left-of-centre	publications	followed	
Wilson’s	lead.	Wilson	knew,	although	he	had	not	used	the	word	‘Communist’,	no	one	in	the	House	
or	the	press	‘had	any	doubts	whom	[he]	had	in	mind’.30	Although	Cassandra’s	column	in	the	Mirror	
may	well	have	feigned	bewilderment	at	Wilson’s	decision	to	‘be	so	delicate’	in	specifying	the	
political	influences	on	the	NUS,	Cassandra’s	willingness	to	‘put	two	and	two	together	and	make	four	
–	or	any	multiple	of	four	Communists	who	may	be	twisting	the	seamen	to	their	own	ends’	illustrated	
Wilson’s	confidence	in	the	media	to	assist	him.31		
	
The	Observer	also	supported	Wilson’s	attempts	to	expose	so-called	extremism.	As	Wilson’s	
backbenchers	expressed	disgust	with	such	tactics,	it	rejected	claims	that	such	public	exposure	was	
‘witch-hunting’,	and	instead	argued	that	Britain’s	‘best	defence’	against	extremist	politics	was	‘not	
restrictions	on	the	activities	of	Communists	but	publicity’,	as	Wilson	had	exemplified.32	In	this	spirit,	
the	Observer	and	Guardian	both	published	a	number	of	investigation	articles	which	claimed	to	
contain	evidence	of	Communist	infiltration	of	the	NUS	and	‘secret	deals’,	although	such	claims	seem	
to	have	predominantly	been	based	on	the	contents	of	Morning	Star	editorials.33	Regardless	of	such	
investigations’	validity,	these	articles	reaffirmed	the	papers’	commitment	to	supporting	Wilson’s	
political	intervention	to	condemn	both	the	strike	and	the	unions	more	broadly.		
	
In	such	a	context,	the	‘moderates	versus	militants’	binary	of	the	conservative	tabloids,	notable	
during	the	1956	BMC	strike,	began	to	permeate	the	narratives	of	liberal	broadsheets.	An	opinion	
column	from	the	Guardian	declared	that	there	was	‘clear	evidence	that	extremists	have	been	active’	
in	the	strike,	despite	a	lack	of	concrete	evidence	presented	in	the	article,	which	was	‘the	result	of	a	
																																																						
28	HC	Deb,	20	June	1966,	vol.	730,	cols	38-54. 
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30	Harold	Wilson,	The	Labour	Government,	1964-1970:	a	personal	record	(Harmondsworth,	1974),	p.	236.	
31	Daily	Mirror,	22	June	1966,	p.	6.	
32	Observer,	3	July	1966,	p.	8.	
33	Observer,	26	June	1966,	p.	11.	
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deliberate	and	organized	campaign’,	indicating	the	paper’s	acceptance	of	some	kind	of	Communist	
plot	to	influence	the	seamen’s	executive.	However,	more	significantly,	the	article	sought	to	isolate	
subversive	‘militants’	from	the	moderate	majority.	34	According	to	this	article,	‘the	unanswered	
question	so	far,	is	why	the	more	moderate	officials	and	executive	members	have,	apparently,	failed	
to	put	up	any	really	effective	stand	against	the	militants’.	35		This	suggested,	firstly,	political	intent	
was	a	binary	dynamic	rather	than	a	spectrum	of	views	and,	secondly,	the	more	conservative	
elements	of	the	union	had	been	culpable	in	allowing	Communism	to	prosper	inside	the	union.		
	
Wilson’s	relationship	with	the	press	
The	Guardian’s	support	of	Wilson’s	stern	response	to	the	strike	was	important,	given	the	
deterioration	of	the	relationship	between	Wilson	and	Cecil	King,	chairman	of	the	Mirror,	at	that	
time.	In	the	March	before	the	strike,	King	described	his	intention	‘to	break	loose	from	any	close	
connection	with	the	Labour	Party’,	although	he	recognised	that	the	Mirror	could	not	support	the	
Conservatives,	given	that	it	was	‘hysterically	pro-Labour	at	the	election’.36	Hugh	Cudlipp,	chairman	of	
the	Mirror	and	close	confidante	of	King,	described	the	relationship	between	King	and	Wilson	as	a	
‘duel’.	Between	1966	and	1968,	King	was	the	‘deathwatch	beetle	in	Wilson’s	powerhouse,	
ceaselessly	expressing	misgivings	to	Wilson’s	own	cabinet	members,	overtly	encouraging	disloyalty	
and	disillusion’.37	In	such	a	climate,	Cudlipp	felt	that	his	self-appointed	role	during	this	period	was	
‘above	all	to	prevent	an	overt	and	acrimonious	disassociation	between	the	Mirror	and	the	Labour	
movement’.38	This	provides	some	insight	into	the	tense	media	climate	that	Wilson	had	to	manage	
after	1966.		Similarly,	Thorpe	noted	that	the	Observer’s	contribution	to	the	‘brief	phase	of	“red	
scare”’	ran	contrary	to	the	‘frosty	relations’	between	Wilson	and	many	of	the	newspaper’s	leading	
journalists.39	Although	the	Observer’s	coverage	pulled	behind	Wilson’s	cause	in	this	1966	case,	
Wilson	was	known	to	have	a	fractious	relationship	with	Nora	Beloff,	the	paper’s	political	
correspondent.40	This	context	makes	the	consistency	of	the	Guardian	and	Mirror’s	coverage	all	the	
more	significant.	Despite	clear	disharmony	between	key	personalities,	industrial	relations	
represented	a	key	area	where,	despite	the	union	sympathy	of	many	readers,	Wilson’s	line	was	
broadly	followed.	
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The	media’s	framing	of	the	NUS	leadership	gave	a	very	clear	indication	of	attitudes	towards	the	
broader	political	context	and	the	strike	more	generally.	Where	the	Observer	found	fault	in	the	
contemporary	NUS	leadership,	the	Daily	Mail	found	promise.	The	lifestyle	of	previous	NUS	leaders,	
driving	luxury	cars	and	smoking	cigars,	was	recognized	by	both	papers	but	with	very	different	tone	
and	framing	to	suit	their	judgment	of	the	contemporary	leadership.	The	Observer	reflected	on	an	
NUS	tradition	of	‘some	of	the	strongest	leaders	in	trade	union	history’,	who	‘could	be	driven	to	fury	
at	the	very	suggestion	of	Communist	activity’,	nostalgic	about	the	Deakin	era	of	union	control.	Such	
an	important	legacy	had	been	undermined	by	the	‘increased	democratization’	and	the	lack	of	‘strong	
men	among	the	unwieldy	48-man	executive’.41	This	negative	framing	of	increased	representation	in	
trade	union	governance	had	much	in	common	with	the	demands	for	strong	leadership	found	in	the	
conservative	papers	during	the	bus	strike,	using	the	same	language	to	criticize	Frank	Cousins.	In	
contrast,	the	Daily	Mail	portrayed	Bill	Hogarth,	the	NUS	general	secretary,	as	a	well-intentioned	but	
failed	reformer,	who	had	successfully	overturned	the	‘enormous	gulf	between	the	top	and	bottom	
echelons’	that	had	existed	in	the	1950s.42	Rather,	according	to	the	Mail,	Hogarth’s	failures	were	a	
matter	of	unrealistic	expectations,	as	he	was	asked	to	simultaneously	democratize	the	union,	
‘modernize	an	industry	still	mentally	in	some	respects	in	the	windjammer	era’,	and	win	pay	and	
conditions	concessions	of	such	a	scale	that	they	might	have	taken	20	years	to	achieve.	43		
	
The	contrasts	in	portrayals	and	understandings	of	the	NUS	leadership’s	role	in	the	strike,	at	least	
until	Wilson’s	speech	on	Communist	pressures,	underlines	the	way	in	which	many	of	the	established	
norms	of	1950s	reporting	were	turned	on	their	head	by	the	mid-1960s.	The	expectations	of	
leadership	and	democracy	inside	unions,	across	the	media	spectrum,	had	radically	altered,	in	order	
to	serve	the	political	agenda	of	the	newspapers.	The	increased	democratization	and	the	decline	of	
conservative	union	leadership	had	complicated	the	task	for	any	government	trying	to	maintain	
control	over	Britain’s	industrial	scene.	With	the	Wilson	government	seeking	to	address	immense	
economic	pressure,	the	media	support	of	the	new	Prices	and	Incomes	policy	meant	abandoning	
some	of	the	principles	of	previous	industrial	relations	coverage.			
	
Of	course,	while	many	traditions	of	industrial	relations	coverage	were	inverted,	that	did	not	mean	
the	conservative	press	explicitly	supported	the	strike.	Although	the	likes	of	the	Times	‘painted	a	
more	sympathetic	picture	of	the	seamen	than	Wilson	probably	would	have	liked’	unlike	the	events	
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of	the	mid-1950s,	the	strikers	lacked	outright	media	support.44	Ultimately,	the	rejection	by	the	NUS	
of	the	Pearson	settlement,	the	recommendations	of	a	public	enquiry	that	were	widely	regarded	as	
generous	settlement,	invited	universal	criticism	and	ended	all	sympathetic	coverage.	Above	all,	the	
Daily	Mail	was	broadly	critical	of	Labour’s	handling	of	the	strike,	particularly	after	Wilson’s	dramatic	
speech.	Wilson	was	consistently	portrayed	as	an	unwise	and	inconsistent	negotiator,	lacking	
sufficient	‘statesmanship’	to	handle	such	problems.45		The	Mail	was	swift	to	highlight	the	
inconsistencies	of	Wilson’s	no-nonsense	approach	to	incomes,	noting	that	‘the	doctors	did	not	even	
have	to	justify	it	[their	rise	in	wages]	to	the	Prices	and	Incomes	Board’,	which	suggested	that	
Wilson’s	position	was	dictated	by	more	than	a	commitment	to	an	economic	policy	but	a	different	
agenda.46	The	Times	also	gave	indications	of	partial	sympathy	for	the	seamen,	commenting	that	it	
was	‘sad	that	British	seamen	should	be	the	anvil	on	which	this	hammer	should	fall’,	as	other	strikes	
had	been	vulnerable	to	similar	treatment	from	government.47	The	NUS	strike	appeared	to	these	
newspapers	to	have	been	chosen	by	Wilson	to	use	as	an	example,	rather	than	because	it	was	
particularly	exceptional.	
	
However,	the	primary	discomfort	of	the	conservative	press	was	Wilson’s	outspoken	approach	to	
handling	the	dispute.	Personality	politics,	once	again,	had	a	significant	impact	on	the	coverage	of	
industrial	relations.	As	far	as	many	columnists	were	concerned,	Wilson	flattered	to	deceive,	as	they	
labelled	him	a	‘great	impressionist’	who	ignored	‘the	fine	print	of	his	words’,	much	to	the	
disillusionment	of	his	MPs.48	Throughout	the	strike,	the	Mail’s	discomfort	with	Wilson’s	charismatic,	
personality	politics	was	clear	and	a	major	foundation	for	criticism.	In	response	to	Wilson’s	claims	
about	the	political	influences	inside	the	NUS,	the	Mail	declared	that	‘the	gravy	does	not	thicken’	but	
that	Wilson’s	comments	were	a	‘professional	exhibition’.	This	article	argued	that	‘Communists	were	
not	doing	anything	they	don’t	always	try	to	do’,	in	stoking	the	strike	fire,	and	asked	‘whether	any	
Prime	Minister	is	entitled	to	pick	out	individuals	involved	in	an	industrial	dispute	and	shove	them	in	
the	limelight	in	this	way’.49	The	Times	was	equally	sceptical	of	Wilson’s	claims,	arguing	that	he	was	
only	able	to	claim	he	had	substantiated	his	allegations	because	they	were	‘imprecise	and	therefore	
not	capable	of	strict	proof	or	disproof’.50	This	kind	of	coverage	typifies	a	‘state	of	mind’	amongst	the	
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press,	described	by	historian	Ben	Pimlott,	which	perceived	Wilson	as	‘weak,	two-faced,	and	morally	
corrupt’	and	eventually	became	‘so	pervasive	that	it	did	not	need	a	plot	to	back	it	up’.51		
	
Although	the	Express	was	far	more	convinced	of	Wilson’s	claims	about	Communist	infiltration	it	felt	
Wilson’s	promise	of	an	investigation	was	‘something	of	an	anti-climax’,	deeming	his	response	to	
have	not	been	strict	enough	in	tackling	‘dangerous’	extremism.52	Throughout	the	strike,	the	
conservative	press	framed	the	strike	as	a	problem	for	the	government,	rather	than	employers,	
economy,	or	the	industry	more	widely.	Again,	this	was	likely	driven	by	a	desire	to	apply	political	
pressure	on	Wilson.	Responsibility	for	the	strike’s	satisfactory	conclusion	lay	with	the	Prime	
Minister,	rather	than	the	union	or	their	employers,	and	the	conservative	press’s	scepticism	about	
Wilson’s	style	of	government	and	broader	political	agenda	made	them	far	less	willing	to	absorb	and	
accept	the	vague	language	of	Communist	infiltration	and	extremism.	This	further	illustrated	the	
willingness	of	the	press	to	use	industrial	relations	coverage	to	fulfil	wider	political	agendas.	
	
Of	the	limited	historiography	on	the	strike,	much	is	made	of	the	damaging	impact	it	had	on	Wilson’s	
relationship	with	his	left-wing	backbenchers.	This	analysis	has	highlighted	that	this	fracture	
extended	to	the	media’s	relationship	with	trade	unions.	The	willingness	of	elements	of	the	left-of-
centre	press	to	utilise	narrow	binary	narratives	of	union	militancy;	to	denounce	the	trade	union	
movement’s	continued	democratisation;	and	accuse	unions	of	‘blackmail’	demonstrated	a	sharp	
breakdown	in	existing	relationships	with	trade	unionism.	That	it	was	the	conservative	press	that	
provided	the	most	sympathetic	media	voice,	driven	by	criticism	for	Wilson’s	style	of	governance,	
perhaps	best	illustrated	the	radical	changes	in	the	dynamics	of	industrial	relations	coverage	since	the	
1950s.	This	demonstrated	the	significance	of	newspapers’	party	political	agendas	in	shaping	the	
direction	of	their	industrial	relations	coverage.		
	
In	delivering	his	political	goals	–	ending	the	strike	and	supporting	the	Incomes	policy	–	Harold	Wilson	
was	undoubtedly	successful	and	the	media’s	acquiescence	in	this	mission	was	vital,	as	they	
legitimised	the	government’s	politicisation	of	industrial	relations.	Wilson’s	decision	to	publicly	
‘expose’	political	influence	inside	the	NUS,	which	the	media	inevitably	recognised	as	Communism,	
was	hugely	significant	for	public	impressions	of	the	government’s	handling	of	the	strike.	Following	
coverage	of	Wilson’s	comments	on	NUS	politics,	50	per	cent	of	those	polled	felt	the	government	was	
‘doing	all	it	should’	to	settle	the	dispute,	an	increase	of	18	per	cent	on	the	previous	month,	while	57	
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per	cent	felt	his	statement	had	helped	towards	a	settlement.53	For	many	members	of	the	public,	
Wilson’s	intervention	was	a	decisive	moment	in	the	strike	and	ensuring	its	conclusion.	67	per	cent	of	
those	polled	agreed	that	the	‘political	group’	named	by	Wilson,	embellished	by	the	press,	was	
responsible	for	the	length	of	the	strike,	either	to	a	‘great’	or	‘some’	extent,	which	further	indicated	
that	Wilson	and,	perhaps	more	significantly,	his	media	allies	had	been	successful	in	convincing	a	
majority	of	the	public	of	the	strength	of	Communist	influences	inside	the	NUS.54	As	the	Labour	Party	
had	begun	to	distance	itself	from	its	traditional	ties	with	trade	unionism,	the	NUS	strike	coverage	
suggested	the	media	would	follow	them	in	this	pursuit.		
	
If	Paul	Foot	believed	it	was	Wilson	who	‘brought	politics	centrally,	and	unequivocally	into	industrial	
relations’	this	was	not	without	enthusiasm	or	encouragement	from	his	media	allies,	and	that	was	
not	without	precedent,	given	the	events	of	the	bus	strike.	If,	as	Geoffrey	Goodman	argued,	the	
industrial	relations	of	the	late	1950s	blurred	the	lines	between	the	industrial	and	the	political,	the	
events	of	1966	represented	their	permanent	erasure.	The	strike	also	established	the	media’s	
tendency	to	frame	the	politicisation	of	industrial	relations	as	union-instigated,	despite	the	explicit	
intervention	of	major	political	personalities.		
	
The	Lost	Labour	Voter:	In	Place	of	Strife	
The	Labour	Party’s	evolving	relationship	with	class	attitudes	played	an	important	part	in	shaping	the	
policy	debates	of	the	late	1960s.	In	1968,	Socialist	Commentary	commissioned	Abrams	to	conduct	
another	survey,	published	in	February	1969,	in	search	of	‘the	lost	Labour	voter’.	According	to	
Abrams,	a	‘massive	defection’	had	caused	Labour	to	lose	‘nearly	half’	of	its	committed	support	since	
the	1966	election.55	In	reflecting	on	the	survey’s	results,	Abrams	reported	that	there	was	a	
‘considerable	feeling’,	particularly	among	the	middle	classes,	that	a	‘stricter	line	should	be	taken	
with	the	unions’,	where	a	majority	believed	unofficial	strikes	should	have	been	made	illegal	and	
where,	across	all	classes,	a	majority	of	people	disliked	strikes	and	looked	to	the	Government	to	‘do	
something	about	them’.56	This	suggested	that,	amongst	the	middle	classes,	Labour	had	thus	far	
disappointed	with	a	perceived	leniency	in	industrial	relations	policy,	despite	public	appetite	for	
firmer	action.	On	the	other	hand,	‘rather	more	of	the	ex-Labour	people	[defectors]	than	of	others	
thought	that	the	Government	had	been	too	strict’	in	its	handling	of	union	affairs,	which	highlighted	a	
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key	predicament	for	the	Labour	party	in	its	reorientation	towards	the	middle	class	vote	–	the	risks	of	
haemorrhaging	traditional	support.	Of	the	former	Labour	voters,	79	per	cent	identified	as	working	
class,	and	the	‘lost	Labour	vote’	was	to	‘disaffected	working	class	voters’,	many	of	whom	indicated	
they	would	abstain	from	voting	at	the	next	election,	put	“keeping	down	prices”	as	‘top	priority’	and	
felt	the	government	had	‘not	kept	its	promises’	on	industrial	relations	reform.	With	popular	demand	
for	government	action,	Labour	now	seemed	to	be	faced	with	the	choice	of	reengaging	the	working	
class	vote	with	more	conciliatory	measures	to	deal	with	strikes	or	bow	to	the	emerging	middle	class	
vote	by	introducing	more	severe	sanctions.		
	
So	why	were	the	growing	number	of	middle	class	voters	so	enthusiastic	for	further	laws	to	curb	
trade	unions?	If	the	late	1950s	had	been	responsible	for	sparking	a	narrative	of	declinism,	by	the	late	
1960s	the	conceptualization	of	the	country’s	perceived	economic	struggle	as	a	kind	of	‘British	
disease’,	a	peculiar	depressed	national	exceptionalism,	was	a	firm	part	of	the	mainstream	media	
discourse.	By	1967,	Britain’s	faltering	industrial	productivity	had	been	identified	as	a	key	symptom	of	
this	disease	and	this	was	viewed	by	contemporaries	as	‘predominantly	a	“labour”	problem’,	
concerned	with	the	workforce	and	the	unions,	including	strikes.57	This	economic	frame	was	vital	in	
establishing	industry	and	unions	as	the	focus	of	middle	class	attention.	Moreover,	the	perception	
that	the	government	was	responsible	for	British	economic	improvement	continued	to	be	notably	
popular.	It	was	this	expectation	that	underpinned	the	creation	of	the	Donovan	Commission,	an	
inquiry	into	British	labour	law	and	collective	bargaining,	‘itself	a	monument	to	the	growing	obsession	
with	industrial	relations	in	1960s	Britain’	and	the	prelude	to	Barbara	Castle’s	In	Place	of	Strife	
proposals.58		
	
These	expectations	of	government	did	not	mean	that	interventionism	in	British	industry	was	wholly	
embraced	and	this	further	complicated	the	government’s	mediation	of	industrial	issues.	Across	the	
board,	according	to	Abrams’s	poll,	there	was	opposition	to	government	‘having	a	hand	in	controlling	
wages’,	despite	early	support	for	the	government’s	new	incomes	policy.	This	unified	position	on	
wages	was	labelled	by	Abrams	as	the	‘illogicality	of	people’s	thoughts…	either	unable	or	unwilling	to	
face	up	to	the	cause	and	effect	relationship’	between	wages	and	prices.	It	seems	then	that,	by	the	
time	1969	came	around,	public	opinion	regarding	industrial	relations	was	incredibly	complex	and	
difficult	for	policymakers	to	negotiate.	Labour’s	problems	were	compounded	by	increasing	public	
doubt	about	Labour’s	status	as	the	best	party	to	handle	disputes.	In	October	1964,	42	per	cent	of	
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those	polled	by	Gallup	believed	Labour	to	be	best	equipped	but	by	November	1968,	this	number	had	
steadily	dropped	to	26	per	cent.59	At	the	same	time,	several	dents	in	Labour’s	media	relationship,	
including	Wilson’s	‘almost	criminally	over-complacent	devaluation	broadcast’,	along	with	the	very	
public	denunciation	of	Wilson	by	Cecil	King	of	the	Mirror,	meant	that	‘the	credibility	gap’	between	
the	government’s	words	and	deeds	soon	‘widened	into	a	chasm’.60		
	
When	Castle	came	to	propose	legislation	in	early	1969,	the	issue	of	industrial	politics	and	disputes	
had	become	a	divisive	issue	for	Labour.	Castle	published	In	Place	of	Strife	to	revise	British	industrial	
relations,	through	a	raft	of	radical	reforms,	including	a	compulsory	cooling-off	period	before	official	
strikes,	along	with	some	punitive	sanctions,	such	as	financial	penalties	for	non-compliance.	A	threat	
to	the	bed	of	legal	immunities	enjoyed	by	British	trade	unionism,	the	proposals	were	met	with	
hostility	from	both	the	TUC	and	a	number	of	Labour	MPs.	Castle	attempted	to	use	articles	in	
Tribune,	the	left-leaning	Labour	newspaper,	to	insist	this	that	she	accepted	the	need	for	‘stronger’	
trade	unions	and	the	proposals	formed	the	government’s	attempt	to	‘claim	for	[unions]	a	positive	
new	role	as	a	vital	expression	of	democracy’.61	Such	appeals	failed	to	convince	opponents	inside	her	
party.	In	contrast,	the	print	media,	with	one	notable	exception,	were	largely	supportive	of	Castle’s	
attempts	to	reform	trade	unions	and	adopted	varied	tactics	for	cementing	the	support	of	the	
readership.	In	Place	of	Strife	offered	Labour	the	opportunity	to	regain	some	of	the	credibility	it	had	
lost	in	media	circles	during	the	preceding	years.	Although	this	episode	was	not	particularly	notable	in	
the	wider	patterns	of	coverage	previously	explored,	it	was	an	important	moment	during	a	broad	and	
gradual	rise	of	industrial	relations	issues	on	the	news	agenda.	
	
In	light	of	the	trend	towards	increased	polling,	newspapers	were	anxious	to	use	public	opinion	to	
buttress	their	own	editorial	positions.	The	diversity	of	public	opinion	was	not	clear	from	the	front-
pages	of	the	Mirror,	as	it	published	powerful	polling	results	of	its	own.	Labelled	as	the	‘biggest	
opinion	poll	ever	conducted	among	trade	unionists	on	vital	industrial	issues’	the	Mirror	professed	to	
know	‘what	the	workers	really	think	about’	the	proposals.	It	summarised	these	thoughts	as	
‘overwhelming	support	for	the	strike-curb	proposals’,	highlighting	72	per	cent	in	favour	of	secret	
ballots	and	73	per	cent	support	for	a	cooling-off	period,	amongst	Castle’s	less	controversial	
proposals.62	Public	doubt	about	proposals	to	fine	unofficial	strikers,	with	only	53	per	cent	support,	
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was	obscured	as	the	article	continued	on	the	following	page.63	Such	selectivity	illustrated	the	
Mirror’s	political	intentions,	as	well	as	their	attempts	to	shape	readers’	perceptions	of	the	political	
landscape,	particularly	trade	unionists.		
	
Although	the	Daily	Mail	did	not	go	to	the	same	lengths	to	survey	opinion,	it	too	drew	upon	such	
polls	to	contend	that	the	proposals	had	the	support	of	‘the	public	including	the	vast	majority	of	
ordinary	trade	unionists’,	in	order	to	convince	its	readers	of	the	strength	of	public	demand	for	
reform.64	Whereas	trade	unionists	had	often	found	themselves	isolated	from	media	
conceptualisations	of	‘the	public’	in	previous	years,	with	‘moderates’	accused	of	being	apathetic	in	
resisting	militancy,	coverage	in	this	instance,	as	means	of	isolating	the	dissenting	voices	of	Labour	
and	the	TUC,	drew	upon	the	opinions	of	the	rank-and-file.	The	reintegration	of	trade	unionism	into	
understandings	of	a	British	‘public’	not	only	reflected	a	certain	political	expediency	to	the	tabloid	
coverage	of	In	Place	of	Strife,	it	also	reflected	the	fluidity	of	such	an	idea,	at	a	time	of	political	
uncertainty	and	anxiety.		
	
Wilson	was	well	aware	of	the	importance	of	press	support	and,	more	significantly,	published	opinion	
polls.	In	an	attempt	to	buttress	his	position	in	negotiations	with	the	TUC	over	the	proposals,	he	
raised	the	72	per	cent	figure	with	Vic	Feather.	The	problem	for	Wilson	was	that	he	was	far	less	
popular	than	the	proposals,	as	Feather	quoted	Wilson’s	30	per	cent	popularity	rating.	This	lack	of	
approval	which	rendered	him	‘virtually	powerless’	and	meant	that	his	continuance	as	prime	minister	
soon	‘ceased	to	be	a	bargaining	chip’.	65	It	was	difficult	to	insist	on	the	supremacy	of	opinion	polling	
when	that	same	source	also	undermined	his	position	as	leader,	particularly	if	one	wanted	to	
threaten	departure	to	push	proposals	through	–	as	was	the	case	later	that	year.	
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Figure	3.2:	‘Bloody	Good	Sense!’,	Daily	Mirror,	18	January	1969,	p.	1.	
	
The	Mirror	repeatedly	sought	to	convince	its	traditional	unionized	readership	of	the	merits	of	the	
proposals,	not	just	through	the	selective	publication	of	polling,	but	also	through	the	positive	framing	
of	proposals	in	its	opinion	columns.	Castle’s	‘revolutionary	new	deal’	not	only	made	‘bloody	good	
sense’	but	offered	the	opportunity	to	bring	order	to	the	‘jungle	of	industrial	relations’,	which	
deserved	the	support	of	‘every	unionist,	every	employer	and	every	politician’.66	It	offered	‘both	
trade	unionists	and	employers	a	first-class	new	deal’	and	in	doing	so	was	‘far	and	away	the	most	
important	of	the	uncompleted	tasks	of	the	Wilson	government’.67	Well	aware	of	the	common	
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criticisms	of	In	Place	of	Strife’s	proposals,	the	Mirror	sought	to	establish	these	changes	as	a	
restoration	of	order	to	negotiations,	rather	than	a	deliberate	attack	on	trade	unions.	Although	the	
Mirror	confronted	the	issue	of	fines,	it	was	swift	to	emphasize	that	these	would	also	apply	to	
‘bosses’	and	the	new	laws	would	also	place	certain	responsibilities	on	employers,	all	as	part	of	an	
effort	to	‘improve	the	atmosphere	between	Britain’s	workers	and	their	bosses’.68	Rather	than	a	
check	on	union	power	or	influence,	the	Mirror	headlined	the	White	Paper	as	a	‘curb	on	strikes’	-	the	
very	issue	which	had	concerned	the	public,	across	the	board,	in	Abrams’s	survey.69	Throughout	the	
episode,	the	Mirror	demonstrated	a	clear	awareness	of	the	likely	social	makeup	of	its	readership,	
preserving	a	sense	of	unity	in	various	forms,	while	pressing	a	very	clear	agenda	in	favour	of	
legislation.		
	
Elsewhere,	however,	media	language	was	far	more	adversarial,	as	the	White	Paper	was	framed	as	a	
battleground	for	the	government	and	the	TUC.	The	Times	commanded	‘respect’	for	the	
Government’s	intentions,	despite	the	fact	it	promised	a	‘head-on	collision	with	the	main	interest	on	
which	it	is	founded’.70	When	the	Cabinet	gave	proposals	the	go-ahead	in	April	1969,	the	Express	
declared	this	was	‘Strike	Law	War’.71	According	to	this	framing,	the	proposals	were	a	deliberate	and	
necessary	attempt	to	curb	the	heightened	and	irresponsible	power	of	trade	unionism,	capitalizing	on	
public	animosity.	This	dominant	combative	narrative,	adopted	by	the	majority	of	newspapers,	
undercut	any	attempts	by	the	Mirror	to	cast	the	proposals	in	a	positive	light.	An	‘aggressive	political	
lady’,	Castle’s	fine	sanctions	offered	‘a	condemned	man	the	choice	of	a	firing	squad	or	the	gallows’.72	
In	all	of	this	language	of	combat	and	battle,	the	Express	gave	attention	to	the	CBI’s	response,	
headlined	‘Too	Soft!	Bosses	rap	Mrs	Castle’,	suggesting	that	there	was	plenty	of	appetite	for	further	
reform	and,	inevitably,	confrontation.73	Moreover,	this	language	of	battle	and	antagonism	did	not	
just	encompass	Labour’s	relationship	with	the	TUC,	the	‘ancient	beam’	which	now	creaked,	but	
internal	Party	dynamics,	as	the	Daily	Mail	appreciated	the	cracks	in	the	Labour	Party’s	‘jerry-built	
façade	of	unity’	-	a	recurring	metaphor	in	its	coverage.74	Throughout	coverage,	there	was	a	
suggestion	that	the	important	relationships	both	inside	the	Labour	Party	and	outside	were	at	
breaking	point	and	would	be	shaped	by	the	outcomes	of	the	government’s	attempts	to	legislate	on	
union	issues.	
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Woman	in	Power:	Barbara	Castle	
Perhaps	Barbara	Castle’s	passionate	and	confrontational	style	partly	inspired	this	depiction	of	an	
open	battle.	While	there	was	a	great	deal	of	scepticism	about	Castle’s	department,	as	the	Guardian	
labelled	the	Ministry	of	Labour	as	‘increasingly	schizophrenic’,	this	was	mitigated	by	optimism	about	
Castle’s	personal	strengths	and	the	hope	that	she	could	‘produce	a	new	kind	of	conciliation,	less	
crude	than	the	splitting	of	differences’.75	Parallels	were	drawn	with	Queen	Elizabeth	I,	as	both	were	
‘eloquent’	and	‘feminine,	not	averse	to	using	tears	at	the	right	moment’,	when	caught	in	the	eye	of	a	
‘political	hurricane’.76	A	woman	of	‘immense	energy	and	persuasive	powers’,	she	was,	in	the	
judgement	of	the	Times,	a	woman	who	knew	‘how	to	use	feminine	charm	and	when	to	be	tough’.77	
Analysis,	and	general	support,	of	Castle’s	political	role,	was	built	firmly	upon	her	personality	and	
gender,	more	than	her	political	experience.		
	
Even	the	Observer	began	its	1969	‘Woman	in	Power’	interview	with	Castle	with	two	questions	about	
her	husband,	Ted,	which	asked	how	she	had	met	him	and,	prompted	by	her	answers,	why	Castle	
‘needed	him’	before	moving	onto	her	political	reflections	and	ideologies.78	Undoubtedly,	this	
interview	pointed	to	a	concern	with	Castle’s	gender	but,	perhaps	more	significantly,	such	a	line	of	
questioning	tapped	into	a	broader	trend	of	personalization.	Such	a	tendency,	well	established	in	the	
print	media	and	unsettling	for	those	in	political	life,	had	now	begun	to	permeate	broadcast	media.	In	
October	1968,	Tony	Benn	expressed	his	frustration	that	political	discussion	was	‘oversimplified’	and	
conflict	was	‘artificially	sharpened’	by	the	BBC,	concluding	that	broadcasting	was	‘really	too	
important	to	be	left	to	the	broadcasters’.79	Such	a	speech	was	indicative	of	the	erosion	of	the	
relationship	between	politicians	and	the	media,	particularly	the	Labour	Party	and	the	BBC	during	the	
late	1960s	and	early	1970s,	which	would	be	crucial	to	winning	any	public	argument	over	trade	
unions.			
	
BBC	television	reporting	of	the	Bill	was	prominent	in	Panorama	coverage.	The	BBC	interviewed	both	
Wilson	and	Castle	at	different	moments	and	employed	a	confrontational	style	which	adopted	many	
of	the	frames	of	reference	of	press	commentary.	Firstly,	it	is	notable	that	by	this	stage	even	BBC	
interviewers	regarded	unofficial	strikes	as	‘perhaps	the	central	problem’	for	industrial	relations	
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reform,	when	putting	questions	to	Wilson.80	This	was	indicative	of	the	prevalence	of	explaining	
Britain’s	industrial	problems	as	a	result	of	workers’	attitudes,	rather	than	wider	systemic	issues	
based	around	modernisation	and	productivity.	Secondly,	concern	about	the	power	of	the	left	of	the	
Labour	Party	and	the	trade	unions	to	determine	the	direction	of	industrial	reform	was	expressed	by	
Robin	Day,	who	‘rejected	deference	to	politicians’	and	was	known	for	‘probing	and	sometimes	blunt	
questions’,	in	a	tone	which	irritated	Barbara	Castle.81	Day’s	questions	about	the	state	of	the	Bill	were	
framed	using	words	like	‘weaken’	or	‘water-down’	rather	than	‘negotiation’	or	‘compromise’.82	This	
was	despite	David	Dimbleby’s	earlier	suggestion	to	Harold	Wilson	on	Panorama	that	union	co-
operation	was	‘essential’	to	the	success	of	legislation.83	The	language	of	antagonism	and	animosity	
which	underpinned	the	majority	of	press	coverage	had	begun	to	permeate	the	purportedly	impartial	
journalism	of	the	BBC.		
	
The	clear	exceptions	to	the	White	Paper’s	press	endorsement,	of	those	papers	analysed	in	this	
study,	were	the	editorial	columns	of	the	Guardian.	The	Guardian	was	far	from	alone	as	a	newspaper	
in	criticizing	the	proposals	but	it	perhaps	formed	the	most	notable	voice	of	media	dissent.	
Throughout	the	episode,	the	Guardian	advocated	a	more	conciliatory	tone	to	reform,	feeling	that	
harsh	sanctions	would	only	antagonise	unions.	Indeed,	the	Guardian’s	columns	argued	that,	
although	the	Bill	would	‘almost	certainly	be	popular	in	the	country	at	large’,	‘enforcement	through	
law	will	lead	to	new	disputes’.84	John	Cole,	then	the	Guardian’s	news	editor	and	the	unsigned	author	
of	the	majority	of	these	columns,	adopted	a	line	of	argument	which	he	understood	to	be	‘not	
universally	popular	within	the	office’	and	he	suspected	that	even	his	editor	Alistair	Hetherington	
‘was	not	at	all	certain’	of	his	judgment,	particularly	after	an	tense	face-to-face	meeting	with	Castle	
which	Cole	remembered	as	a	‘full	and	frank	exchange	of	views’.85	The	lunch	between	
representatives	of	the	Guardian	and	Castle,	was,	according	to	Alistair	Hetherington,	a	‘fiery	occasion’	
where	Castle	‘started	her	attack	on	John	Cole	even	before	she	had	a	drink	in	her	hand,	and	he	
replied	in	kind’.86	Castle,	intensely	aware	of	the	Guardian’s	considerable	influence	on	centre-left	
policy	attitudes,	had	failed	to	convince	a	crucial	media	outlet	of	its	standpoint.	Instead,	the	Guardian	
columns,	accompanied	by	the	Observer	and	Goodman’s	columns	in	the	Sun,	brought	into	question	
the	entire	economic	frame	of	explanation	which	In	Place	of	Strife’s	popularity	was	built	upon.	The	
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Guardian	was	sceptical	about	the	role	of	strikes	in	Britain’s	economic	crisis,	concerned	that,	in	
pursuing	the	perceived	“strike	problem”,	April’s	revised	Bill	did	not	engage	with	the	‘most	serious	
issues’	for	British	industry	of	‘poor	productivity,	weak	management,	reluctance	to	export,	and	low	
investment’.87	Moreover,	although	the	Bill	was	intended	to	cut	the	number	of	strikes,	it	failed	to	
address	the	issue	of	communication	between	workers	and	employers	-	the	‘dominant	cause’	of	
unofficial	strikes.	The	Observer	contended	that	it	was	‘neither	possible	nor	desirable’	to	abolish	
strikes	completely,	particularly	given	they	were	not	‘the	cause	of	our	economic	malaise’,	and	that	if	
ministers	were	less	prepared	‘to	play	the	role	of	firemen,	there	would	be	fewer	fires’.88	A	legislative	
shortcut	would	not	only	fail	to	remedy	the	symptoms	of	the	‘British	sickness’	but,	in	encouraging	the	
government	to	intervene,	it	would	further	damage	industrial	relations.	
	
Rather	than	framing	the	debate	between	Castle	and	the	TUC	as	a	battle,	this	was	a	question	of	
whether	the	TUC	could	‘save	Labour’,	particularly	given	the	‘personal	implications’	for	Wilson,	as	
failure	to	agree	would	leave	the	Government	‘doomed’.89	Once	Castle’s	proposals	stumbled,	it	was	a	
matter	of	whether	the	TUC	would	help	Labour	save	face,	rather	than	placing	the	onus	on	
government	to	induce	the	TUC	to	accept	proposals.	While	the	likes	of	the	Times	and	the	Express	
made	demands	for	harsher	measures,	the	Guardian’s	coverage	was	very	much	mindful	of	the	TUC’s	
power.	Throughout	the	episode,	Cole	was	given	the	licence	to	attack	the	proposals	as	he	saw	them,	
indicative	of	the	paper’s	tradition	of	‘relying	on	the	judgment	of	the	person	who	has	done	the	work	
on	a	subject’,	given	Cole’s	knowledge	of	trade	unions	on	both	sides	of	the	Atlantic,	rather	than	
follow	a	narrow	editorial	agenda.	John	Cole,	then,	was	chiefly	responsible	for	establishing	the	
Guardian	as	a	dissenting	voice	in	media	coverage.	It	rejected	common	frames	of	explanation	for	
Britain’s	industrial	struggles,	as	well	as	questioning	the	balance	of	power	in	negotiations.	Although	
this	dissent	did	not	become	popular	amongst	the	press,	it	undoubtedly	fuelled	debates	within	the	
Labour	Party,	mirrored	in	the	likes	of	Tribune.	Moreover,	as	Hetherington	recalled,	this	episode	
helped	to	shape	the	Guardian’s	line	of	argument	for	the	early	1970s,	when	the	issues	became	more	
‘intense’.90		
	
As	debate	surrounding	the	proposals	continued,	the	Mirror	became	increasingly	concerned	with	the	
impact	the	episode	was	having	on	the	public’s	faith	in	British	politics.	In	an	editorial	entitled	‘Politics	
in	Ferment’,	the	paper	reflected	on	the	‘fever’	around	trade	union	reform	and	proposals	in	major	
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newspapers	for	a	‘different	approach	to	the	political	realities	of	today’,	including	the	Telegraph’s	
argument	for	a	new	coalition	government	to	deal	with	trade	union	policy.	91	The	Mirror	reflected	
that	such	ideas	would	always	be	raised	when	there	was	‘public	disillusion	over	the	ineffectiveness	of	
the	main	political	Parties’,	particularly	when	there	was	a	divided	government	‘and	an	Opposition	
with	nothing	better	to	offer’.92	It	was	clear	that	the	prolonged	discussion	over	Castle’s	White	Paper	
had	prompted	a	raft	of	concerns	about	the	ability	of	either	major	party	to	deal	with	the	‘problem’	of	
trade	unions,	not	just	the	Labour	Party.	By	late	1968,	it	had	been	clear	that	public	concern	about	
Labour’s	ability	to	deal	with	the	problem	of	strikes	and	‘trade	disputes’	was	symptomatic	of	a	
general	disillusionment	with	party	politics,	as	41	per	cent	of	those	polled	felt	there	wasn’t	much	to	
choose	between	the	Conservatives	and	Labour	on	industrial	relations	policy,	up	from	16	per	cent	in	
1966.93	Goodman	believed	that	‘public	disenchantment	toward	Parliament,	and	the	widespread	
conviction	that	its	debates	scarcely	ever	reflect	the	realities	of	life,	is	less	a	criticism	against	
individual	MPs	than	against	our	inadequate	system	of	popular	representation’.94	
	
Overall,	the	media	reception	for	In	Place	of	Strife’s	proposals	was	about	as	good	as	Labour	could	
have	hoped	for,	in	light	of	their	fragile	relationship	with	the	media.	By	this	time,	the	Mirror’s	attitude	
to	government	policy	had	softened	since	1967,	mostly	due	to	Cecil	King’s	dramatic	exit,	and	Geoffrey	
Goodman,	another	critic,	was	yet	to	make	his	move	to	the	Mirror	from	the	declining	Sun.	Although	
the	right-wing	press	may	have	preferred	stricter	sanctions,	there	was	a	general	appreciation	that	
Labour’s	proposals	were	as	radical	as	party	circumstance	would	feasibly	allow.	In	Place	of	Strife’s	
proposals	addressed	concerns	with	British	industry,	according	to	the	pervasive	frames	of	explanation	
in	the	media,	namely	that	the	labour	force	was	at	the	root	of	Britain’s	problems.	The	Guardian’s	
response	was	perhaps	the	only	disappointment	but,	given	Cole’s	role	in	steering	its	coverage	and	his	
concern	with	wider	industrial	issues	and	alternative	economic	frames,	this	was	not	wholly	surprising.		
	
Surrender	’69:	A	crisis	of	control	and	authority	
Media	reaction	to	the	Bill’s	collapse	was	predictable.	The	face-saving	alternative,	a	‘solemn	and	
binding	agreement’	with	the	TUC,	was	received	with	almost	universal	dissatisfaction.	Following	a	
language	of	battle	and	conflict,	the	decision	to	accept	the	TUC	agreement	was,	according	to	the	
Daily	Mail,	‘the	greatest	surrender	in	modern	British	politics’,	after	Wilson	and	Castle	had	‘weakly	
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and	cynically	betrayed	their	promises’.95	The	Express	followed	a	similar	line	(Figure	3.3),	and	
declared	that	‘not	since	Napoleon	turned	his	face	towards	Paris	from	the	outskirts	of	Moscow	has	
the	been	such	a	massive	retreat’	as	Wilson’s	settlement	with	the	TUC.96	As	far	as	the	press	was	
concerned,	this	historic	battle	over	industrial	reform	had,	by	its	very	nature,	produced	a	winner	and	
a	loser.	The	warmest	press	response,	from	the	Mirror,	was	tepid.	It	declared	the	settlement	was	
neither	a	climb	down	or	a	triumph,	and	while	‘applause	would	be	inappropriate’,	its	front-page	
editorial	column	argued	Wilson	had	‘no	alternative’	as	a	Labour	Prime	Minister.	In	its	defence	of	
Wilson,	the	paper	referenced	discomfort	with	the	power	of	unions,	both	over	the	Labour	Party	and	
democracy	more	widely.	The	settlement	exemplified	trade	union	influence,	‘a	power	outside	the	
precincts	of	parliament	as	great	as	that	which	exists	within’,	more	than	humiliation	for	Wilson.97	
Wilson’s	faith	in	this	final	settlement	was	his	‘biggest	gamble’,	as	its	failure	would	drive	Labour	‘into	
the	wilderness	for	two	decades’.98	While	many	would	suggest	that	In	Place	of	Strife	had	been	
Labour’s	final	chance	to	deal	with	the	British	disease,	the	Mirror	clung	to	the	hope	that	the	new	
agreement	may	solve	Wilson’s	woes.	
	
	
Figure	3.3:	‘Surrender	’69’,	Daily	Express,	19	June	1969,	p.	1.	
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In	retrospect,	the	largely	positive	portrayal	of	Castle	had	done	little	to	strengthen	the	government’s	
position	with	the	unions.	Philip	Ziegler	has	suggested	that	if	Castle	had	been	‘less	colourful,	less	
eloquent,	less	persuasive’,	the	very	traits	that	encouraged	the	newspapers,	her	White	Paper	might	
have	enjoyed	greater	success.99	Although	Castle	did	meet	many	of	these	trade	union	leaders	in	
person,	it	is	not	unreasonable	to	suggest	that	press	coverage	played	a	part	in	creating	this	
impression,	such	was	the	hunger	for	personality	politics.	In	Ziegler’s	judgement,	‘cautious	and	male-
chauvinist	union	leaders	resented	the	pressure	of	this	redoubtable	Amazon	and	reacted	against	it	by	
a	stubborn	determination	not	to	yield’,	evidenced	by	the	numerous	conversations	which	took	place	
between	Castle,	Wilson	and	the	TUC	leaders.100	In	1969,	the	idea	of	a	largely	male	dominated	trade	
union	leadership	being	dictated	to	by	a	determined	and	colourful	female	personality,	as	the	press	
had	suggested,	was	uncomfortable	for	many.	Moreover,	Castle	felt	that	her	political	allies	were	glad	
to	‘abandon’	her	to	her	political	‘fate’.101	Although	absent	from	Wilson’s	account	of	the	episode,	
Castle	recalled	Wilson’s	rejection	of	the	TUC’s	June	Proposals	(‘Programme	for	Action’)	had	been	
outlined	in	a	statement	under	Castle’s	name	while	she	was	out	of	the	country,	much	to	her	
horror.102	The	minister’s	determination	to	continue	in	her	role	the	following	winter	was	regarded	by	
the	likes	of	Peter	Jenkins,	writing	in	the	Guardian,	as	‘foolhardiness’	and	Castle	was	now	regarded	as	
a	potential	‘political	liability’	for	the	government	in	its	negotiations	with	the	TUC.103	Personally	and	
politically	embroiled	in	the	episode,	Barbara	Castle	was	left	with	few	allies	and	her	experience	post-
settlement	demonstrated	the	enthusiasm	of	Labour	politicians	to	disassociate	themselves	from	the	
undoubted	embarrassment,	which	Castle	was	seen	to	embody.			
	
Similarly,	the	right-wing	enthusiasm	for	strict	sanctions	on	trade	unions,	analysed	earlier,	also	
arguably	had	a	counterproductive	impact	on	negotiations.	It	was	the	antagonistic	tone	to	the	press	
coverage	of	In	Place	of	Strife	which	Wilson	viewed	as	decisive	in	shaping	attitudes	towards	the	
proposals.	He	concluded	that	the	TUC’s	negative	response	to	In	Place	of	Strife	had	been	‘whipped	up	
by	the	press:	it	was	hardly	surprising	that	the	public	regarded	them	as	consisting	entirely	of	the	so-
called	“penal	clauses”’.104	Labour	had	constructed	a	bill	built	on	the	language	of	trade	unionism’s	
rights	and	responsibilities	that	had	underpinned	political	commentary	of	trade	unions	since	the	
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Second	World	War.	Castle’s	proposals	gave	unions	and	workers	new	rights,	such	as	the	legal	right	to	
belong	to	a	union,	but	it	was	the	responsibilities,	and	the	associated	penal	clauses,	which	were	the	
emphasis	of	much	of	the	coverage.	This	was	indicative	of	the	public	mood	around	trade	unions,	not	
seeking	to	enable	but	to	restrain	the	TUC,	and	illustrated	an	important	development	in	the	balance	
of	industrial	relations	commentary.	It	also	represented	a	failure	on	Labour’s	part	to	manage	media	
communication	of	the	proposals,	particularly	traditional	press	allies,	as	the	emphases	of	coverage	
only	intensified	confrontation	between	the	TUC	and	the	Party.		
	
Although	the	nature	of	press	coverage	contributed	to	the	Bill’s	demise,	the	alleged	crisis	of	authority	
which	the	Labour	government	endured	after	the	breakdown	of	negotiations	was	partly	of	its	own	
making.	Harold	Wilson	had	told	the	Parliamentary	Labour	Party	(PLP)	at	an	April	1969	meeting	that	
the	passage	of	the	Bill	was	‘essential’	to	employment,	economy,	the	‘recovery	of	the	nation’	and,	
most	significantly,	to	the	Labour	Party’s	‘continuance	in	office’.105	In	doing	so,	Wilson	‘staked	the	
authority	of	the	Government’	on	a	Bill	which	was	already	clearly	unpopular	with	a	large	proportion	
of	the	PLP.106	These	quotes	appeared	in	almost	every	major	newspaper,	raising	the	stakes	on	such	
brinkmanship.	When	the	Bill	failed,	it	was	inevitable	that	such	a	bold	statement	would	come	back	to	
bite.	To	Wilson’s	irritation,	it	was	this	statement	above	all	others	which,	to	his	mind,	‘created	yet	
another	legend,	unscrupulously	fostered	by	Opposition	leaders	and	Opposition	press’	and	used	to	
Labour’s	detriment	at	the	1970	General	Election.107	In	the	shorter	term,	it	prompted	a	raft	of	
criticisms	about	Labour’s	ability	to	govern,	with	the	Express	pondering	if	Wilson	could	ever	recover	
his	‘prestige’.108	The	Express	conceded	the	likelihood	that	Wilson’s	government	would	continue	in	
office,	but	would	‘survive	in	contempt’	as	nothing	could	now	‘bridge	the	credibility	gap	between	the	
Government	and	the	rest	of	the	world’,	which	suggested	that	Wilson’s	defeat	had	dented	more	than	
his	government’s	domestic	reputation.109	
	
While	it	also	recognised	Wilson’s	‘humiliation’	and	‘diminished	authority’,	the	Times	argued	that	the	
‘charade’,	a	term	indicative	of	its	contempt	for	the	episode,	had	been	played	out	on	two	levels	–	an	
argument	about	‘industrial	discipline’	and	a	‘political	power	struggle’.	110		While	the	TUC	
commitments	marked	an	‘advance	to	self-reform	of	the	unions’,	Wilson’s	authority	was	now	
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‘diminished’	inside	the	Labour	Party	and	the	episode	had	left	the	impression	that	Wilson	had	been	
‘forced	to	abandon	his	political	strategy…	in	order	to	quell	mutiny	at	base’.111	This	problem	had	been	
predicted	by	the	media	before	the	collapse,	as	the	Mail	argued	the	Bill	had	provided	the	opportunity	
for	Wilson	to	put	aside	his	party’s	crisis	for	the	sake	of	the	country,	perhaps	at	the	expense	of	a	
general	election	result,	as	the	British	public	would	‘at	least	respect	a	man	who	goes	out	fighting	for	
what	he	knows	to	be	right	for	the	country’.112	The	tension	was	not	lost	on	the	Mirror,	as	
conventional	Labour	allies,	which,	even	in	its	more	softer	verdict	on	the	settlement,	reprinted	its	
April	contention	that	Wilson	should	have	‘put	Country	above	Party	–	and	damn	the	consequences’	as	
what	was	‘immediately	good	for	the	Party	militants	is	not	good	for	Britain’.113	Such	framing,	shared	
on	all	sides,	suggested	that	Wilson’s	ability	to	govern	effectively	had	been	impaired	by	the	
indiscipline	or	disloyalty	of	his	traditional	support.	
	
Coverage	of	In	Place	of	Strife	depicted	and	exacerbated	the	tensions	within	post-war	social	
democracy	identified	by	Stuart	Hall.	Hall	argued	this	contradiction	lay	between	the	‘government-to-
people’	attentions	of	the	Labour	party	in	power,	which	demanded	that	Labour	disciplined	working	
class	groups	in	order	to	serve	a	‘national	interest’,	and	the	‘class-to-party’	rhetoric	of	Labour	in	
opposition,	the	language	of	its	political	ideology	and	working-class	tradition.114	It	appeared	that,	in	
coercing	Wilson	into	compromise,	the	labour	movement	had	put	their	own	‘sectional	interests’	
ahead	of	public	opinion	and	national	interest.	According	to	the	Mail	front	pages,	Britain	now	had	
‘two	masters’,	in	its	foreign	creditors	and	the	TUC	–	not	the	government	-	where	the	creditors	told	
Britain	‘how	to	get	out	of	the	red’	and	the	TUC	prevented	the	country	from	doing	so.115		This	kind	of	
commentary	reinforced	the	sentiment	that	the	government	had	lost	control	of	the	situation	and	it	
was	now	clear	that	it	had	to	choose	between	solving	the	national	debt	or	pandering	to	the	unions,	as	
the	two	were	now	completely	irreconcilable.		
	
In	Place	of	Strife	was	far	more	than	a	public	humiliation	for	Barbara	Castle.	It	symbolised	the	ability	
of	media	forces	to	‘turn’	on	a	government	and	intensified	public	anxiety	about	the	ability	of	
government	to	respond	to	the	supposedly	extreme	power	of	trade	unionism.	What	was	left	of	In	
Place	of	Strife	by	the	end	of	1969,	according	to	the	Guardian,	was	an	‘emasculated	Bill’	which	lacked	
‘both	philosophy	and	principle’,	and	it	would	be	wise	for	the	next	Government	to	‘start	from	
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scratch’.116	Although	the	events	of	1969	once	again	demonstrated	that	the	demarcation	between	
the	industrial	and	political	was	blurred	in	wider	political	culture,	hostility	to	the	Bill	ensured	‘the	
strengthening	of	the	demarcation	between	the	industrial	and	political	sides	of	the	labour	movement	
in	a	way	which	probably	forestalled	similar	“counter-attacks”	on	union	power	in	the	future’.117	While	
there	were	significant	reasons	to	doubt	Heath’s	claims	of	‘industrial	anarchy’	in	Britain,	it	was	true	
that	the	industrial	climate	was	‘bad’,	and,	for	the	Guardian,	the	episode	had	justified	the	opinion	
that	it	could	not	be	improved	by	legislation.118	For	other	newspapers,	with	the	‘labour	problem’	
firmly	established	in	mainstream	political	orthodoxy,	the	failure	of	the	Bill	merely	revealed	that	
cooperation	with	unions	over	industrial	relations	policy	was	now	impossible.	Commentators’	
questions	about	Labour’s	ability	to	successfully	manage	the	union	‘problem’	would	persist	until	the	
1970	general	election,	when	Edward	Heath	shocked	political	commentators	with	his	surprise	win.		
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Chapter	Four	–	Declinism,	Morality	and	Productivity	
Economic	Futures,	1960-69	
	
Would	1960s	Britain	choose	to	be	a	‘lotus	island	of	easy,	tolerant	ways,	bathed	in	the	golden	glow	of	
an	imperial	sunset,	shielded	from	discontent	by	a	threadbare	welfare	state’	or	would	it	‘seek	new	
worlds	to	conquer	in	place	of	those	we	have	lost,	ready	to	accept	growing	pains	as	the	price	of	
growth’?1	This	was	the	dilemma	for	Britain’s	economic	future,	posed	by	Michael	Shanks	in	the	
conclusion	of	his	influential	work,	The	Stagnant	Society,	in	1961.	As	successive	governments,	
Conservative	and	Labour,	failed	to	provide	sufficiently	‘progressive’	responses	to	such	challenges,	
the	economic	narrative	of	the	decade	became	increasingly	‘declinist’.	Although	modern	historians	
have	interrogated	the	validity	of	such	a	pessimistic	interpretation,	particularly	when	compared	to	
recent	British	economic	experience,	they	have	convincingly	theorised	why	such	a	view	existed.	It	was	
inspired	by	a	British	preoccupation	with,	firstly,	its	traditional	manufacturing	industries,	and,	
secondly,	its	share	of	world	markets.	Barry	Supple	has	highlighted	a	century-long	British	
preoccupation	with	economic	failure,	based	on	Britain’s	relative	performance	with	other	countries,	
despite	general	growth.	Ideologically	driven,	according	to	Supple,	understanding	of	British	failure	is	
and	was	underpinned	by	‘the	humiliation	of	the	loss	of	international	power,	the	insecurity	of	
deindustrialisation,	and	the	frustration	of	felt	needs	and	aspirations’.2	Analysis	of	the	1950s	
highlighted	the	media’s	willingness	to	compare	Britain’s	performance	with	its	perceived	competitors	
and	the	nature	of	this	discussion	evolved	as	declinism	grew	more	prominent.	The	prevalence	of	this	
narrative,	despite	an	apparent	rise	in	living	standards	and	relative	middle	class	affluence,	suggests	
the	media	played	a	part	in	buttressing	its	appeal	and	sustaining	impressions	of	looming	economic	
ruin.	Alan	Booth	has	reflected	on	the	‘manufacturing	failure	hypothesis	(MFH)’	of	British	declinism,	
where	he	concluded	that	while	productivity	growth	‘could	or	perhaps	should	have	been	a	little	
faster’	during	Britain’s	long	boom,	it	was	not	the	economic	hindrance	that	many	contemporary	
commentators	claimed.	Nor	were	accusations	of	British	industrial	‘ineptitude’	accurate.3	
Understanding	the	media’s	contribution	to	this	misleading	fixation	with	the	manufacturing	industry	
is	an	important	focus	of	the	following	section.	
	
																																																						
1	Michael	Shanks,	The	Stagnant	Society	(London,	1961),	p.	232.	
2	Barry	Supple,	‘Fear	of	Failing:	Economic	History	and	the	Decline	of	Britain’,	The	Economic	History	Review	47	
(1994),	p.	457.	
3	Alan	Booth,	‘The	Manufacturing	Failure	Hypothesis	and	the	Performance	of	British	Industry	During	the	Long	
Boom’,	The	Economic	History	Review	56	(2003),	p.	2.	
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This	chapter	analyses	media	perceptions	and	portrayals	of	trade	unionism’s	contribution	to	
productivity,	as	well	as	the	duties	demanded	of	unions	in	order	to	salvage	Britain’s	international	
reputation.	In	doing	so,	it	seeks	to	interrogate	relevant	frames	of	explanation	for	disappointing	
economic	performance,	noting	their	evolution	across	the	decade.	This	is	supported	by	content	
analysis	of	newspapers.	The	impact	of	media	coverage	on	perceptions	of	the	complex	emergent	
relationship	between	concerns	about	the	growth	of	inflation,	the	maintenance	of	a	feasible	wages	
policy	and	the	productivity	of	industry	is	explored,	with	particular	focus	on	trade	unionism’s	
reported	involvement	and	its	perceived	legitimacy.	While	the	persistence	of	strikes	inevitably	
informs	some	of	the	analysis	in	this	chapter,	particularly	in	view	of	the	rise	in	‘wildcat	strikes’,	
emphasis	shall	lie	in	industrial	strife’s	contribution	to	broader	economic	narratives	and	structures.	
	
Inflation,	Wages	and	Productivity	
Arguably	the	single	most	significant	issue	of	industrial	relations	coverage	during	the	1960s	was	
productivity.	On	the	surface,	it	is	perhaps	not	immediately	clear	why	that	agenda	topic	would	be	
directly	relevant	to	the	nature	of	trade	union	coverage.	Failing	industrial	productivity	could	be	
explained	by	a	variety	of	different	problems,	from	the	modernisation	of	industry	to	sufficient	capital	
investment.	However,	Britain’s	emerging	problem	with	rising	inflation	was	perceived	to	be	centred	
on	its	wage	policies	and	the	responsibilities	of	its	workforce.	This	meant	that,	according	to	
Tomlinson,	for	most	employers	productivity	was	deployed	in	‘long-term	standing	arguments	against	
trade	unions	and	their	alleged	restrictive	practices’,	and,	although	the	unions	were	‘happy	to	
embrace	at	least	the	rhetoric’,	they	soon	became	concerned	about	the	‘perceived	threats	to	free	
collective	bargaining’.4	Prior	to	Labour’s	election	in	1964,	opinion	polls	reflected	public	support	for	
Labour	providing	a	policy	to	limit	wage	increases,	more	so	than	their	Conservative	opponents	and,	
regardless	of	which	political	party	should	be	successful,	58	per	cent	agreed	that	wages	had	to	rise	
more	slowly	than	they	had	in	the	past.5	Tomlinson	argues	that	the	‘rush	of	enthusiasm’	for	
productivity	policies	in	1966,	evidenced	by	Labour’s	general	election	manifesto,	‘proved	to	be	short-
lived	and	productivity	soon	faded	from	political	and	public	concern’.6	Nevertheless,	for	three	
prominent	newspapers	of	the	British	press,	there	is	clear	quantitative	evidence	that	interest	in	
productivity	was	significant.	Figure	4.1	reflects	continued	growth	beyond	1966’s	high	tide	in	
Whitehall,	particularly	in	the	Times,	as	productivity	was	the	emerging	watchword	of	1960s	industrial	
relations	coverage.	
	
																																																						
4	Tomlinson,	‘The	British	“Productivity	Problem”’,	p.	207.		
5	Gallup,	Gallup	Polls:	Volume	1,	p.	705.	
6	Tomlinson,	‘The	British	“Productivity	Problem”’,	p.	205.	
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Figure	4.1:	Productivity	articles	(1960-69)	
	
As	Labour’s	relationships	with	both	unions	and	employers	deteriorated	and	made	negotiations	seem	
futile,	the	rhetoric	of	the	productivity	debate	shaped	press	coverage	of	industrial	relations	in	more	
enduring	ways,	beyond	1966.	Although	interest	showed	a	slight	dip	in	1967,	the	peak	of	press	
interest	in	productivity	was	in	1968-69,	when	the	economy	was	perceived	to	deteriorate	quickly.	
More	significantly,	the	specific	nature	of	this	focus	on	productivity	showed	significant	change	over	
time,	particularly	when	analysing	the	frames	of	explanation	employed	by	different	newspapers.		
	
	
Figure	4.2:	‘Government’	in	productivity	articles	(1960-69)	
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Figure	4.3:	‘Union’	in	productivity	articles	(1960-69)	
	
Figure	4.2	and	Figure	4.3	represent	the	proportion	of	productivity	articles	which	mentioned	the	
words	‘government’	and	‘union’	respectively.	Inevitably,	there	is	an	overlap	in	these	articles	and	
mentions	do	not	necessarily	indicate	specific	frames	of	explanation	but	broad	contextual	trends	can	
be	drawn	from	the	data	above,	such	is	the	clarity	in	particular	trends.	From	1962	onwards,	mentions	
of	unions	in	productivity	articles	showed	a	gradual	but	consistent	increase,	particularly	notable	in	
the	Daily	Mail.	Meanwhile,	although	mentions	of	‘government’	in	1966	exceeded	any	other	year	for	
both	categories	and	mentions	remained	prominent	until	the	end	of	the	decade,	its	decline	after	
1966	is	marked.	This	pattern	provides	further	evidence	to	support	Tomlinson’s	belief	that	1966	was	
the	‘high	tide’	of	productivity	policy	in	Whitehall,	with	significant	debate	in	the	preceding	years.	
There	is	evidence	of	a	transition	in	the	way	productivity	was	discussed,	as	focus	on	the	government’s	
role	declined	and	shifted	towards	scrutiny	on	unions.	Such	an	evolution	in	the	trends	of	productivity	
discussions	suggests	that	the	key	anxieties	expressed	in	industrial	relations	coverage	were	related	
increasingly	to	the	protracted	way	wage	improvements	were	obtained	in	the	late	1960s,	given	the	
growing	interest	in	industrial	strife,	rather	than	simply	the	increases	themselves.	By	October	1968,	
ten	per	cent	of	those	polled	by	Gallup	perceived	industrial	disputes	to	be	the	most	urgent	issue	for	
the	government,	the	most	since	the	Second	World	War.7	This	change	also	correlates	with	Labour’s	
change	in	policy	emphasis,	from	productivity	debates	towards	Donovan’s	structural	analysis	of	
industrial	relations	and	In	Place	of	Strife’s	anti-strike	legislation.	
	
																																																						
7	Gallup,	Gallup	Polls:	Volume	2,	p.	1017.	
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While	papers	followed	similar	patterns	in	coverage,	particularly	with	respect	to	the	government’s	
role,	indicative	of	a	broader	media	dialogue,	individual	newspapers	had	their	own	agenda	and	
focuses.	In	this	respect,	statistical	profiling	of	each	newspaper	provides	patterns	which,	although	
entirely	in-keeping	with	their	political	agendas,	shows	interesting	variety	in	which	the	issue	of	
‘productivity’	was	approached,	particularly	when	the	contribution	of	management	is	also	
considered.	
	
	
Figure	4.4:	Comparison	of	frames	of	explanation	in	the	Guardian	(1960-69)	
	
	
	
Figure	4.5:	Comparison	of	frames	of	explanation	in	the	Times	(1960-69)	
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Figure	4.6:	Comparison	of	frames	of	explanation	in	the	Daily	Mail	(1960-69)	
	
For	the	Daily	Mail,	management	was	consistently	the	least	mentioned	issue,	notably	so	at	the	
beginning	and	end	of	the	decade.	This	is	indicative	of	a	lack	of	scrutiny	of	non-labour	issues	in	
relation	to	the	supposed	productivity	problem.	Similar	analysis	was	conducted	with	mentions	of	
‘employers’	where	the	results	were	even	more	extreme,	as	the	term	was	hardly	mentioned	in	either	
the	Mail,	and	never	appeared	in	more	than	five	per	cent	of	a	year’s	productivity	articles.	When	this	
is	coupled	with	the	Mail’s	trend	towards	increasing	mention	of	unions,	which	overtook	both	
government	and	management	factors	by	1967,	it	is	clear	how	the	emphasis	evolved.	In	the	Times,	
mentions	of	both	management	and	unions	increased,	while	the	government	mentions	declined,	to	
the	point	where	all	three	were	very	similar	in	frequency	by	the	end	of	the	decade.	Both	the	Times	
and	the	Guardian	provided	consistent	coverage	of	matters	of	management	in	its	assessments	of	
productivity,	indicative	of	a	more	balanced	analysis	which	employed	a	greater	variety	of	frames	of	
explanation	than	the	Mail.		
	
By	the	end	of	the	decade,	the	Times	provided	the	only	annual	coverage	where	the	unions	were	not	
the	most	dominant	issue	in	productivity	coverage,	although,	as	the	chapter	explores,	the	Mail	and	
the	Guardian	addressed	unions	in	contrasting	ways,	despite	similar	frequencies.	It	appears	then,	that	
while	this	quantitative	analysis	alludes	to	some	interesting	trends	in	media	coverage	of	productivity,	
particularly	in	respect	to	trade	unionism,	it	also	raises	some	important	questions	about	the	reasons	
for	certain	focuses	and	shifts	in	emphasis,	partly	due	to	unexpected	commonalities	between	
newspapers.	
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Labour’s	moralised	rhetoric	and	the	media’s	response	
Amongst	his	body	of	work	on	economic	declinism,	Tomlinson	has	highlighted	the	‘moralisation’	of	
economic	discourse	in	the	post-war	era.	The	government’s	rhetoric	on	wages	was	shaped	for	a	
working-class	audience	that	had	been	long	seen	as	having	‘distinct	cultural	assumptions	of	a	
collectivist/solidaristic/moral	nature,	and	to	be	at	least	potentially	sceptical	about	how	far	such	
moral	values	could	be	reconciled	with	a	market	economy’.8	Although	the	meaning	of	‘fairness’	in	an	
economic	context	was	‘always	doubtful	and	contestable’,	one	of	the	key	versions	of	its	meaning	
propagated	by	the	government	was	derived	from	the	link	to	productivity,	part	of	the	establishment’s	
defence	of	its	ability	to	produce	‘morally	acceptable,	“fair”	outcomes	alongside	the	implementation	
of	the	Keynes	and	Beveridge	agenda’.9	Although,	as	this	research	has	already	established,	moralised	
language	was	not	new	to	the	field	of	industrial	relations	coverage,	the	shift	in	government	
engagement	of	such	themes	marked	an	important	change.	To	adjudge	a	wage	claim	as	‘fair’,	the	
alleged	and	attempted	breach	of	that	policy	was	to	be	considered	‘unfair’	or	‘bogus’.	If	this	
moralised	language	was	an	important	device	for	the	government	to	convince	working	class	groups	of	
modern	capitalism’s	merits	by	appealing	to	feelings	of	solidarity,	it	was	also	a	way	of	isolating	and	
delegitimising	those	that	did	not	respect	the	system.	In	this	respect,	the	media	played	a	vital	role	in	
defining	and	delineating	those	moral	boundaries	in	more	aggressive	and	partisan	ways	than	a	Labour	
government	could	dare.		
	
The	emphasis	of	the	Daily	Mirror’s	industrial	relations	coverage	changed	after	the	election	of	a	
Labour	government.	This	was	a	common	and	predictable	element	to	coverage	but	had	an	important	
impact	on	the	Mirror’s	attitude	to	wage	restraint.	In	1962,	the	Mirror	greeted	the	conclusion	of	the	
Conservative	government’s	‘Pay	Pause’	with	a	provocative	front	page	article,	headlined	‘Want	more	
Pay?	You’ll	be	lucky!’,	in	which	it	declared	the	government	would	provide	‘no	more	pay	just	because	
the	cost	of	living	goes	up;	no	more	pay	just	because	you	are	working	harder;	no	more	pay	just	
because	your	industry’s	profits	are	going	up’	and	other	reasons	presumably	deemed	worthy	of	an	
increase	by	the	Mirror’s	editors.10	In	1965,	the	Mirror	described	the	payment	gap	as	‘the	loudest	
wailing	baby	ever	dumped	into	the	arms	of	an	incoming	government’	but	already	alluded	to	the	
need	to	‘do	our	jobs	in	a	new	way,	with	a	new	spirit’.11	
	
																																																						
8	Tomlinson,	‘Reinventing	the	“moral	economy”’,	p.	363.	
9	Ibid.,	p.	373.	
10	Daily	Mirror,	3	February	1962,	p.	1.	
11	Daily	Mirror,	1	January	1965,	p.	1.	
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Within	a	few	months,	it	was	clear	that	the	Mirror	would	absorb	much	of	the	Labour	Government’s	
moralised	rhetoric	but	it	did	so	in	ways	which	were	far	more	partisan	and	outspoken	than	politicians.	
In	a	front	page	editorial	that	evoked	war-time	notions	of	solidarity,	‘the	Battle	of	Britain,	1965’,	the	
Mirror	claimed	that	‘dishonesty	and	lousy	service’	were	no	longer	regarded	as	‘shameful	and	
intolerable’	and	were	accepted	as	if	they	were	a	‘natural	malaise	of	our	time’.12	‘Ignorance,	sloth	or	
selfishness’	were	‘imperilling	the	position	in	the	world	of	us	all’,	suggesting	that	Britain’s	economic	
struggle	and	lack	of	global	competitiveness	was	underpinned	by	a	lack	of	pride	in	work,	rather	than	
the	failure	of	policy	or	the	anxiety	of	change.13		In	response	to	another	wage	claim	from	the	National	
Union	of	Railwaymen	(NUR)	in	February	1966,	Woodrow	Wyatt	launched	a	scathing	double-page	
attack	on	the	union.	Wyatt	argued	that	in	demanding	wages	which	far	exceeded	the	current	wage	
policy,	the	NUR	should	be	‘ashamed’	of	its	‘monstrous	blackmail’,	‘irresponsibility’	and	‘fatuous	
ways’	which	threatened	to	‘sabotage’	the	Labour	government,	indicative	of	a	kind	of	selfishness	on	
the	NUR’s	part.	14	Such	articles	from	the	Mirror	provided	a	distinct	and	toxic	mixture	of	moral	
judgement	with	political	indignation.	This	infusion	of	politics	into	coverage	of	wage	claims,	and	an	
expectation	of	political	loyalty	from	the	trade	unions,	provided	a	curious	inconsistency	to	an	
editorial	line	which	had	become	uncomfortable	with	political	intervention	from	trade	unions,	as	a	
threat	to	the	power	of	the	Labour	government.		
	
																																																						
12	Daily	Mirror,	26	April	1965,	p.	1.	
13	Daily	Mirror,	26	April	1965,	p.	1.	
14	Daily	Mirror,	16	February	1966,	pp.	16-17.	
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Figure	4.7:	‘Exposing	the	Fifth	Column’,	Daily	Mirror,	26	April	1965,	p.	1.	
	
While	a	double-page	Mirror	editorial	claimed	that	‘nobody’	disputed	that	‘men	and	women	must	
have	the	right	to	bargain	collectively	over	wages’,	it	was	claimed	that	trade	unions	were	‘groping	for	
the	shadow	of	victory	instead	of	the	substance’,	where	some	of	the	‘zanier’	wage	claims	suggested	
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unions	were	‘hellbent	on	sabotaging	the	national	economy’.15	In	their	demands	for	shorter	hours	
and	longer	holidays,	unions	had	been	‘basically	dishonest’,	arousing	the	moralised	language	of	
government	and	demands	for	wage	increases	without	a	corresponding	rise	in	productivity	was	
‘suckerdom	in	technicolor’.	16	In	these	cases,	no	mention	was	made	of	the	profitability	of	industries,	
concerns	about	the	cost	of	living	or	the	shortcomings	of	welfare	structures,	as	had	been	the	case	
with	1962’s	disgruntlement	over	slow	increases,	and	instead	focused	on	the	morality	and	rationality	
of	union	claims.	Although	it	claimed	to	support	the	principles	of	organised	labour,	the	Mirror	
supported	government	and	management	decisions	to	refuse	wage	rises	and	deflected	attention	
away	from	governmental	responsibility	for	a	lack	of	industrial	investment.		
	
Unsurprisingly,	this	kind	of	moralised	judgement	was	not	unique	to	the	Mirror	and	was	prevalent	
across	the	spectrum	of	British	newspapers.	When	the	1966	wage-freeze	kicked	in,	the	Times	argued	
that	there	was	simply	‘no	alternative’	because,	despite	claims	that	this	should	not	be	interpreted	as	
an	‘attack	on	trade	unions’,	too	many	had	‘refused	to	take	any	notice	of	interests	wider	than	their	
own’,	indicative	of	the	same	moral	judgements	on	union	self-interest	.17	The	strength	of	this	rhetoric	
was	apparent	from	the	kind	of	stories	seen	in	the	Daily	Express.	In	one	example,	during	1966’s	
freeze,	the	Express	reported	on	a	book-keeper	who	had	resigned	because	her	employer	had	offered	
her	a	minor	rise	to	reward	good	work,	one	which	she	rejected	not	just	on	grounds	of	legality	but	
because	she	believed	it	to	be	‘unethical’.18	
	
The	inconsistencies	and	problems	with	moralised	rhetoric	
However,	in	defining	these	moral	boundaries,	much	as	many	media	outlets	had	attempted	to	
delineate	and	qualify	‘political’	from	‘industrial’	strikes,	there	were	undoubtedly	moral	
inconsistencies	for	journalists	to	navigate.	In	February	1964,	prior	to	Labour’s	victory,	Trevor	Evans	
reminded	Express	readers	that	postmen,	in	being	granted	a	6	and	a	half	percent	wage	increase,	did	
so	because	they	were	a	‘special	case’,	and	that	other	unions	should	not	‘ignore	the	fact	that	the	
postmen	started	on	a	comparatively	low	rate	anyway’	or	‘conveniently	forget’	it	had	been	19	
months	since	their	last	‘measly’	increase.19	Of	course	this	kind	of	nuanced	contextual	information	
was	rarely	found	when	‘bogus’	or	‘dishonest’	claims	were	reported	on	and	these	kinds	of	exceptions	
would	continue	to	provide	problems	for	both	journalists	and	the	Labour	government.	As	far	as	the	
																																																						
15	Daily	Mirror,	25	October	1965,	pp.	16-17.	
16	Daily	Mirror,	25	October	1965,	pp.	16-17.	
17	The	Times,	26	July	1966,	p.	13.	
18	Daily	Express,	19	October	1966,	p.	15.	
19	Daily	Express,	27	July	1964,	p.	4.	
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Daily	Mail’s	editorial	line	was	concerned,	special	cases	and	exceptions	were	merely	‘gaps’	or	
vulnerabilities	in	the	wage	policy,	which	were	essentially	‘invitations’	to	trade	union	leaders	to	
‘squeeze	as	much	as	they	could	out	of	industry’	but	the	Mail	was	unusual	in	its	rejection	of	special	
cases.20	It	was	inevitable	that	in	a	rapidly	evolving	economy	such	as	Britain’s	in	the	1960s	that	some	
industries	would	be	more	‘deserving’	of	wage	increases	than	others,	in	these	moral	terms,	partly	due	
to	discrepancies	in	industrial	productivity.	The	precise	contours	of	this	moralised	support	were	rarely	
explained,	but	were	based	on	tacit	assumptions	and	deep-seated	social	attitudes.	Managing	these	
differences	would	either	mean	holding	those	that	had	earned	an	increase	back,	undermining	the	
very	moral	argument	of	the	policy,	or	the	less	productive	industries	riding	on	the	coat-tails	of	others,	
risking	further	inflation	and	degradation	of	the	productivity	policy.	Although	Labour	had	built	a	
policy	founded	upon	ideas	of	collectivist	solidarity	on	moral	terms	in	order	to	manage	wages,	the	
rewards	for	following	such	a	policy	were	divisive.	As	Shanks	had	predicted	in	1961,	a	widening	in	pay	
differentials	as	a	result	of	the	productivity	agreements	would	soon	be	regarded	as	‘socially	
intolerable’.21		
	
According	to	the	Times,	it	was	important	not	to	‘underestimate	the	difficulties,	even	absurdities’	in	
managing	a	wage	policy	which	made	it	‘difficult	to	accept’	that	productive	companies	like	Ford	and	
Vauxhall	should	be	kept	down	to	the	level	of	‘others	not	so	efficient’	just	to	avoid	wage	increases	
elsewhere.22	In	another	article,	it	argued	that	it	was	‘hard	to	see	why	a	generous	pay	offer	in	one	
trade’,	the	prosperous	motor	industry,	‘should	be	condemned	on	the	grounds	that	it	might	be	
followed	by	similar	increases	in	trades	unable	to	show	similar	prosperity’.23	Simultaneously	and	
paradoxically,	in	a	nod	to	its	readership,	a	primary	concern	for	the	Times	was	the	‘increasingly	
crushed’	workers	in	the	middle,	victims	of	the	government’s	emphasis	on	the	productivity	
agreements	of	the	lower	paid,	which	were	‘always	a	response	to	an	emergency’,	and	the	new	
willingness	to	commit	to	industrial	action	from	the	likes	of	air	pilots	and	white-collar	workers,	rather	
than	a	focus	on	the	maintenance	of	‘incentives	for	skill	and	responsibility’	or	adjustment	for	the	
‘long-term	needs	of	industry’.24	Having	helped	to	bolster	an	economic	narrative	which	emphasised	
the	importance	of	restrictions	rather	than	economic	opportunities	for	expansion,	enhanced	
industrial	productivity	in	the	manufacturing	industries,	particularly	the	automotive	industry,	was	
incredibly	complex	for	the	press	to	negotiate.	The	provision	of	socially	acceptable	solutions	which	
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21	Shanks,	The	Stagnant	Society,	p.	72.	
22	The	Times,	3	February	1964,	p.	11.	
23	The	Times,	2	November	1963,	p.	9.	
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minimised	gaps	in	pay	without	the	risk	of	inflation	threatened	to	compromise	the	very	essence	of	a	
‘fair’	wage	policy.	An	emphasis	on	union	tactics	and	industrial	strife,	particularly	when	the	car	
industry	became	so	adept	at	providing	newsworthy	cases,	was	one	technique	for	deflecting	critical	
attention	away	from	the	inconsistencies	of	low	wages	in	productive	industries.	
	
A	series	of	industrial	disputes	by	teachers	also	complicated	the	Mirror’s	moralised	rhetoric.	As	early	
as	1961,	the	Mirror	defended	the	teachers’	right	to	strike	as	a	‘devoted	group	of	people’	who	would	
only	use	striking	in	‘the	last	resort’.	It	even	went	so	far	as	to	describe	them	as	‘victims’	of	a	‘raw	deal’	
from	the	government.25	In	a	similar	article	earlier	that	year	it	adjudged	that	‘when	dedicated	people	
like	teachers	talk	about	striking,	something	must	be	wrong’.26	Despite	the	consistency	of	problems	
within	the	teaching	sector,	the	Mirror	was	convinced	that	teachers	would	not	choose	to	take	
industrial	action	lightly,	such	was	their	loyalty,	a	message	which	was	buttressed	by	the	juxtaposition	
of	such	articles	next	to	a	discussion	of	a	dispute	over	morning	breaks	at	Fords.27	There	was	a	clear	
implication	that	teachers	were	more	worthy	than	car	workers	of	financial	reward,	partly	as	a	result	
of	their	perceived	difference	in	moral	attitude	to	industrial	action.	Notably,	this	position	on	
industrial	action	by	teachers	did	not	change	under	a	Labour	government,	despite	the	Mirror’s	
enthusiasm	for	the	moralised	rhetoric	of	wage	restraint.		
	
In	1967,	once	again	in	reference	to	‘dedicated	people’,	the	Mirror	felt	it	was	important	to	reward	
‘the	quality	of	devotion	to	duty	which	every	teacher	must	have’	and,	although	it	rejected	the	union’s	
‘totally	unrealistic’	demand	for	a	30	per	cent	rise,	it	would	not	be	drawn	on	the	acceptability	of	the	
government’s	6	per	cent	offer.28		Gallup	Polls	suggested	that	teachers	commanded	a	great	deal	of	
public	sympathy,	as	60	per	cent	of	respondents	in	April	1966	believed	they	were	deserving	of	a	pay	
increase,	while	in	October	1969,	53	per	cent	sympathised	with	teachers,	compared	to	only	21	per	
cent	for	local	authorities.	At	the	end	of	1969,	Clive	Jenkins	wrote	a	column	to	urge	the	government	
to	avoid	a	‘barefisted	brawl’	with	teachers,	concerned	that	the	shortage	of	teachers	in	state	
education	was	worrying	enough	‘without	repelling	good	people	by	low	standards	of	pay’.29	
Explaining	the	Mirror’s	unswerving	defence	of	the	teachers’	claims	is	complex.	Firstly,	class	
perception	would	have	been	an	influence,	where	overtly	militant	industrial	action	was	firmly	
associated	with	low-paid	labour,	such	as	those	in	private	manufacturing,	rather	than	middle-class	
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public	sector	workers.	Furthermore,	the	support	of	the	teachers’	claim	would	have	strengthened	
and	been	consistent	with	the	newspaper’s	demand	for	improved	funding	in	state	education,	where	
teaching	represented	another	‘deserving’	sector.	Finally,	it	could	have	simply	been	driven	by	their	
enthusiasm	to	prevent	unnecessarily	lengthy	disruption,	as	exemplified	in	a	1969	column	that	
complained	about	the	‘leisurely	approach’	to	pay	negotiations.30	These	motivations	aside,	this	
example	further	illustrated	the	pressure	on	Britain’s	manufacturing	industries,	due	to	the	unspoken	
status	held	by	certain	groups	of	workers,	where	moralised	language	was	used	to	sustain	this	
inconsistent	position	on	wage	restraint.		
	
Public	doubt	about	Labour’s	intent	
Significantly,	polling	data	from	1968	suggests	that	the	moralised	language	of	productivity	and	wage	
restraint	had	not	been	wholly	successful	in	convincing	the	public,	perhaps	partly	due	to	these	
inconsistencies.	Although	there	is	limited	statistical	value	to	a	single	poll,	the	fact	that	the	majority,	
52	per	cent,	felt	that	unions	should	‘remain	free	to	negotiate	at	whatever	levels	the	unions	think	
[was]	right’	instead	of	following	the	government’s	wage	policy,	reflected	the	government’s	failure	to	
impress	the	economic	necessity	to	ground	wages.31	It	also	suggested	a	certain	respect	for	the	
government’s	judgement	on	what	could	be	deemed	‘right’	or	fair.	Doubt	about	the	power	of	
government	rhetoric	was	further	reinforced	by	the	fact	a	significant	proportion,	39	per	cent,	felt	
their	sympathies	lay	with	the	trade	unions	in	1968	when	Barbara	Castle	had	promised	to	‘veto’	wage	
rises.32	Geoffrey	Goodman	reflected	that	while	‘there	was	a	powerful	case’	for	the	government’s	
‘fair’	incomes	policy,	its	position	at	the	centre	of	domestic	economic	policy	meant	it	‘simply	couldn’t	
carry	that	weight	and	responsibility’,	as	confidence	in	the	government	slumped.33	In	his	travels	
around	the	country	at	that	time,	Goodman	found	that	many	union	officials,	workers	and	managers	
‘distrusted’	the	government,	as	Whitehall	was	perceived	as	distant	from	the	shop	floor	‘and	neither	
side	seemed	capable	of	bridging	the	gulf’.34	Whether	the	government	was	aware	of	the	severity	of	
working	class	cynicism	surrounding	their	economic	policies	is	doubtful.	Whereas	Labour’s	
revisionists	of	the	late	1950s	and	early	1960s	had	become	‘engrossed	in	polling	evidence,	
obsessively	tracking	the	polls	whenever	governments	made	major	or	controversial	decisions’,	the	
																																																						
30	Daily	Mirror,	16	December	1969,	p.	2.	
31	Gallup,	Gallup	Polls:	Volume	2,	p.	1003.	
32	Gallup,	Gallup	Polls:	Volume	2,	p.	983.	
33	Goodman,	From	Bevan	to	Blair,	p.	114.	
34	Ibid.,	p.	114.	
	
	
132	
attitude	within	the	Labour	Party	changed	to	the	point	where	opinion	polling	was	subordinated	to	
Wilson’s	‘own	instincts	and	political	gambles’	by	the	end	of	the	1960s.35	
	
The	Mail’s	criticism	of	both	government	and	the	labour	force	provided	further	explanation	for	public	
scepticism	about	the	government’s	wage	policy.		In	1965,	the	Mail	asked	how	long	Britain	could	
‘pursue	profligate	paths	and	expect	to	go	on	prospering?’,	as	it	made	reference	to	‘insidious’	
processes	within	unions	that	caused	wages	to	increase.	36	This	was	indicative	of	an	expectation	that	
the	contemporary	approach	to	wages	was	unsustainable.	Like	the	Mirror,	the	Mail	also	called	for	a	
refreshed	approach	from	all	involved,	with	‘a	new	outlook	and	new	ideas’,	again	in	vague	terms	and	
presumably	rather	different	terms	to	those	alluded	to	by	the	Mirror,	tapping	into	the	popular	
rhetoric	of	modernisation	and	innovation	which	had	been	so	successful	in	propelling	the	Labour	
Party	into	government.	However,	while	it	shared	this	modernising	tone	with	the	Labour	
government,	the	Mail,	was	predictably	enthusiastic	to	scrutinise	the	rhetoric	behind	the	
government’s	income	policy.	Although	encouraged	by	government	measures	to	curb	inflation	and	
frustrated	by	the	refusal	of	workers	to	‘play	the	game’	in	making	pay	claims,	the	Mail	felt	the	
Government	needed	to	admit	that	their	own	‘planned	incomes	growth’	was	no	different	to	the	
Conservative	Party’s	earlier	pay	pause,	the	details	of	which	were	just	as	‘unpalatable’	to	unions.37	
This	was	a	recurring	description	of	the	government’s	wage	policies	as	far	as	the	‘self-righteous’	
unions	were	concerned,	referring	to	such	policies	as	an	‘unpalatable	medicine’	that	was	to	be	
‘administered	by	a	Government	who	depended	so	much	on	trade	union	funds	for	their	election’.38	
There	was	a	deal	of	cynicism	about	the	‘rose-tinted	cloud	of	soothing	words’	from	government	and	
scepticism	surrounding	George	Brown’s	insistence	that	wage	restraint	was	‘transitional’	instead	of	
‘shocking	the	unions	into	a	sense	of	reality’.39	Brown’s	economic	plan	of	1965	was	criticised	for	its	
‘unfounded	optimism’,	based	on	an	apparently	misplaced	‘assumption	that	today’s	conditions	will	
be	repeated	tomorrow’.40	The	Mail	grew	increasingly	frustrated	that	economic	optimism	on	both	
sides	seemed	to	be	leading	to	a	lack	of	communication	between	the	government	and	TUC,	‘each	
party	wrapped	up	in	a	private	day	dream	of	painless	prosperity’.41	
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Media	concern	about	the	implications	of	productivity	
Just	as	they	had	shown	in	the	political	sphere,	the	Mail	demonstrated	a	discomfort	with	the	
apparent	gloss	Labour	applied	to	its	industrial	relations	rhetoric	and	its	attempt	to	more	furtively	
coerce	unions,	despite	similar	motivations	in	policy	to	the	troubled	Conservative	policies	of	the	early	
1960s.	The	Mail’s	cynicism	about	Labour’s	chosen	path	on	wage	policy,	and	its	associated	economic	
rhetoric,	even	came	down	to	a	concern	with	the	very	word	‘productivity’,	described	as	a	‘five-
syllable	horror’,	and	the	buzz	of	studies	and	discussion	surrounding	it.42	It	argued	that	Wilson’s	
Productivity	Conference	in	September	1966	would	amount	to	‘window-dressing’	when	‘top	men	in	
industry’	had	been	considering	the	issue	‘for	years’,	and	simply	illustrated	the	need	for	‘a	more	
purposeful	lead	from	the	top’.43	The	implication	of	an	irritation	with	Labour’s	ability	to	talk	about	a	
wage	policy,	to	commission	studies	and	organise	conferences,	was	rife	amongst	the	Mail’s	columns,	
frustrated	with	a	perceived	lack	of	action	or	direction	–	once	again,	a	dig	at	its	political	opponents.	
This	response	to	the	government’s	productivity	push	in	1966	explains	the	large	spike	in	the	Mail’s	
productivity	articles	referencing	the	government.	
	
With	regards	to	the	frames	employed	more	broadly,	the	Mail	was	sceptical	about	the	way	
prominent	members	of	the	Labour	Party	had	chosen	to	promote	certain	frames	about	the	
productivity	policy	–	either	in	Brown’s	case	as	a	way	to	ground	wages,	as	adopted	by	so	many	
members	of	the	press,	or	in	Frank	Cousins’s	case	as	a	way	to	increase	productivity,	a	more	minority	
view.	It	was	time,	by	1966,	for	the	government	to	‘forget	the	figures	and	the	theories’	and	start	
promoting	a	policy	which	had	‘some	connection	with	the	realities	of	industrial	life’.44	Rather	than	
focusing	on	wages	and	full	employment,	the	Mail	remarked	on	the	failure	of	government	to	address	
the	issue	of	restrictive	practices	and	industrial	resistance	to	modernisation.	In	some	ways,	the	Mail’s	
political	agenda	against	the	policies	of	the	Labour	government	tempered	its	acceptance	of	the	
moralised	and	negative	frames	of	an	incomes	policy	based	on	productivity,	although	it	was	
essentially	negative	about	the	role	of	unions	in	this	issue.		
	
Unusually,	there	were	commonalities	in	the	perspectives	adopted	by	the	Guardian	and	the	Express	
on	the	issue	of	wages,	despite	their	often	antagonistic	editorial	positions.	The	Guardian	opposed	the	
negative	framing	of	wage	rises,	much	as	it	had	it	done	with	Barbara	Castle’s	strike	legislation,	but	it	
was	also	enthusiastic	about	engaging	with	and	encouraging	the	popular	productivity	rhetoric.	The	
paper	certainly	did	not	object	to	the	prospect	of	British	industry	becoming	more	efficient.	In	doing	
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so,	the	Guardian	persistently	argued	for	economic	measures	which	were	‘creative’	and	could	
provide	for	growth,	instead	of		‘destructive	deflation’	based	on	limiting	incomes	and	governmental	
controls.45	Although	it	recognised	the	necessity	of	‘temporary	evils’,	such	as	wage	and	price	freezes,	
the	only	long-term	remedy	to	British	problems	lay	in	sustained	growth,	the	date	for	which	‘could	not	
be	forecast’	under	Wilson’s	measures.46	Rather	than	follow	the	government’s	attempts	to	use	the	
productivity	debate	to	ground	wages,	the	Guardian	argued	that	the	relationship	should	work	in	the	
reverse.	It	described	the	government	as	the	‘victim	of	a	myth’	which	linked	rising	wages	to	economic	
trouble,	the	same	myth	that	had	‘distorted	the	policies	of	successive	Administrations’.	While	many	
were	keen	to	emphasise	the	extent	of	the	“British	disease”,	the	Guardian	suggested	that	the	
situation	was	not	so	severe,	likening	the	coverage	to	exaggerated	British	weather	reports.47	
	
Instead,	the	Guardian	argued,	Britain’s	economic	problems	were	because	‘far	too	much	of	British	
industry	relies	on	using	inadequately	paid	labour	inefficiently	and	wastefully’.48	A	universal	increase	
in	wages	would	encourage	a	more	efficient	use	of	labour,	citing	the	example	of	America’s	higher	
wages,	and	encourage	innovation	in	industrial	machinery.	The	editorial	columns	recognised	that	
automation	had	developed	a	connotation	that	was	‘faintly	inhuman’,	‘blind	to	social	values	or	to	the	
needs	of	ordinary	human	beings’,	which	had	provoked	animosity	from	trade	unions,	but	argued	that	
Britain’s	lack	of	competitiveness	in	world	markets	was	because	of	the	‘slowness	of	technological	
change’	rather	than	too	much	automation.49	Such	reports	represented	a	hesitancy	to	be	absorbed	by	
the	rhetoric	of	immorality	and	irrationality	which	had	motivated	some	of	the	Mirror’s	explanations	
of	the	so-called	British	disease.	Once	again,	the	Guardian,	led	by	John	Cole,	provided	a	minority	
voice	in	rejecting	the	pervading	explanations	for	economic	uncertainty	found	on	rival’s	front	pages,	
although	it	was	technically	in	favour	of	a	voluntary	wage	policy	based	on	improving	British	industry’s	
productivity.	
	
The	Express	went	a	step	further	in	outright	rejection	of	this	strand	of	economic	policy.	The	paper’s	
adoption	of	a	position	coherent	with	its	1920s	campaigns	for	higher	wages	reflected	the	emerging	
limitations	with	a	post-war	consensus.50	The	principal	objection	to	the	government’s	wage	policy	ran	
along	strongly	anti-interventionist	lines	of	argument	and	a	reversion	to	pre-war	conventions.	The	
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Express	argued	that	the	new	wage	policy	was	unfair,	not	because	it	explicitly	opposed	a	productivity-
based	wage	policy,	but	because	the	Chancellor	had	produced	‘an	inflationary	budget’	which	forced	
others	to	ask	‘everyone	to	ignore	its	consequences’.	This	was	as	’the	sinister	combination	Dr	Jekyll	
and	Mr	Hyde’	which	made	‘victims’	of	the	‘innocent	tax	payer’.51	It	later	admitted	that	‘superficially’	
determining	wage	rates	‘may	be	attractive’	but	felt	that	government	controls	on	wage	rates	were	
‘simply	in	the	interest	of	the	present	government’	rather	than	the	much	vaunted	‘national	interest’,	
and	likened	the	TUC’s	potential	‘surrender’	of	authority	to	‘totalitarian	countries’.52	The	erosion	of	
consensus	that	is	typically	associated	with	the	emergence	of	Conservative	neoliberalism	of	the	late	
1970s,	was	already	quite	apparent	in	the	Express’s	dialogue	about	the	wage	policy,	to	the	extent	
that	it	found	itself	buttressing	the	language	of	trade	unionist	solidarity.	When	Wilson	introduced	a	
complete	pay	freeze	at	the	1966	TUC	annual	conference,	the	Express	felt	that	a	majority	of	the	
public	felt	that	the	policy	was	a	‘desperate,	last-minute	attempt’	to	deal	with	Britain’s	problems	and	
ran	‘counter	to	everything	the	trades	unions	stand	for’.53	When	the	TUC	accepted	the	freeze,	the	
Express	asked	if	there	was	anything	more	‘paradoxical’	or	‘misguided’	than	trade	unionists’	‘absurd	
and	destructive’	vote	to	hold	wages	down.54	Although	few	would	have	conventionally	identified	the	
Express	as	guardians	of	trade	unions’	traditional	rights,	the	newspaper’s	opposition	to	a	wage-freeze	
which	‘frustrated	the	exemplary	productivity	agreements’	at	major	firms,	left	the	newspaper	
supporting	union	rights.55	The	Express	provided	an	important	minority	voice	in	this	example	in	
rejecting	the	pervading	assumptions,	something	of	a	consensus,	about	the	need	to	limit	inflation	
through	wage	limits.		
	
The	nature	of	television	coverage	
The	timing	and	strategy	behind	television	coverage	contributed	to	public	perceptions	about	
industrial	relations,	including	the	dominant	frames	of	explanation	for	Britain’s	economic	failure.	This	
marked	an	important	change	since	the	early	post-war	period,	where	influence	was	primarily	limited	
to	newspaper	pages.	A	common	concern	from	industrialists	was	the	sporadic	and	sensational	nature	
of	the	BBC’s	specialist	industrial	relations	coverage,	particularly	where	the	car	industry	was	
concerned.	Prominent	industrialist,	William	Campbell	Adamson,	yet	to	join	the	government’s	
Department	for	Economic	Affairs,	conducted	a	report	and	interview	regarding	the	BBC’s	industrial	
coverage	in	1966.	This	was	intended	to	clarify	the	impacts	of	the	BBC’s	chosen	approach	to	industrial	
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relations	coverage.	Campbell	Adamson	was	concerned	that	the	BBC’s	treatment	seemed	to	‘lack	a	
broad	plan’,	predominantly	dependent	on	news	bulletins,	‘where	a	relatively	small	amount	of	
broadcasting	time	is	concerned	with	the	world	in	which	the	majority	earn	their	living’.56	He	was	in	
favour	of	the	BBC	creating	a	new	‘Head	of	Industrial	Programmes’	in	order	to	better	focus	on	these	
issues	‘in	a	more	interesting	and	entertaining	way’.		
	
In	a	similar	manner,	Oliver	Whitley,	then	Chief	Assistant	to	the	BBC	Director	General,	produced	a	
report	in	1965	which	argued	for	a	‘particular	emphasis	on	radical	analysis	and	re-thinking’	in	
industrial	relations	coverage	which	should	be	‘prepared	to	take	the	spotlight	away	a	bit	from	purely	
political	rethinking’.	57	This	was	important	in	the	context	of	the	parliamentary	sphere’s	deteriorating	
public	image.	According	to	Whitley,	although	the	BBC	produced	‘excellent	documentary	
programmes	on	an	extraordinary	range	of	subjects’,	their	programming	tended	to	‘skip	over	the	
relatively	unattractive,	less	tractable’	issue	of	industrial	relations.	If	the	BBC	poured	its	efforts	into	
documentary	programmes,	Whitley	felt	the	organisation	might	be	able	to	convince	industrial	and	
political	heads,	those	often	hesitant	to	participate	in	industrial	affairs	programmes,	that	the	BBC	was	
enthusiastically	involved	in	industrial	issues,	rather	than	‘as	many	of	them	now	seem	to	think,	just	a	
detached,	rather	cynical,	professionally	adept	reporter	of	other	peoples’	efforts’.58	It	is	clear	that	
some	within	the	BBC	believed	the	apparent	detachment	between	the	BBC	and	industry	was	more	
than	simply	a	symptom	of	top	industrialist’s	‘divided	interests’,	but	rather	a	consequence	of	the	
BBC’s	own	attitude;	they	cited	the	reluctance	of	the	troubled	BMC’s	board	members	to	appear	in	
interviews	as	an	example.59	
	
However,	despite	these	recommendations	for	more	focussed,	documentary-oriented	coverage	of	
industrial	relations,	the	BBC	remained	steadfast	in	its	preference	for	‘fragmentation’	and	
decentralisation	in	its	coverage	of	industrial	relations,	without	a	specific	lead	journalist,	as	this	
approach	promised	a	‘more	lasting	effect	than	the	succés	d’estime	of	full	length	documentaries	with	
smaller	audiences’.60	It	was	felt	that	‘worthy	documentaries’	were	unwise	because	they	had	already	
proven	in	the	past	to	be	‘remarkably	unsuccessful’	in	attracting	viewers.61	In	1961,	the	Guardian	
reported	that	both	ITV	and	the	BBC	had	rejected	for	broadcast	a	‘sane,	intelligent,	and	prize-winning	
																																																						
56	BBC	General	Advisory	Council	Paper	261,	20	December	1966;	BBC	Written	Archive	Centre,	(T16/564).	
57	BBC	Board	of	Management	Paper	(65)	106,	23	August	1965;	BBC	Written	Archive	Centre,	(T16/59/3).	
58	BBC	Board	of	Management	Paper	(65)	106,	23	August	1965;	BBC	Written	Archive	Centre,	(T16/59/3).	
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film	on	industrial	relations’	which	prompted	the	‘sad	conclusion’	that	British	television	regarded	‘the	
real	detail	of	industrial	relations	as	too	sober	material	for	their	respective	audiences’,	partly	because	
of	its	complexity	compared	to	the	‘werewolf	theory	of	strike	motivation’.62	This	description	alluded	
to	the	mythologised	nature	of	strike	coverage.	The	BBC’s	attitudes	towards	industrial	relations	
coverage	was	part	of	a	wider	debate,	which	culminated	in	speeches	by	Tony	Benn	and	Richard	
Crossman	in	1968,	regarding	the	trivialisation	of	important	political	issues	and	the	‘lack	of	sufficient	
serious	and	penetrating	coverage’.63	Understanding	Britain’s	industrial	problems	in	long-term	and	
broader	structural	terms	through	the	medium	of	television	was	thus	very	difficult.		
	
However,	despite	this	hesitancy	to	invest	time	and	money	in	full-length	programmes,	the	BBC	
Director	General	had	been	‘greatly	interested’	in	a	report	from	the	BBC’s	senior	Industrial	
Correspondent,	Bertram	Mycock,	on	‘Subversion	in	Industry’	in	Spring	1965,	and	felt	a	‘full-scale	
investigation’	of	the	subject	would	make	a	‘valuable	major	long-term	programme	project’.64	There	
was	continued	enthusiasm	from	the	Editor	of	News	and	Current	Affairs	some	two	years	later,	
prompted	by	a	Ray	Gunter	speech,	to	pursue	this	topic	in	depth	but	eventually	Mycock	decided	this	
would	require	too	much	work.65	Although	ultimately	fruitless,	the	BBC’s	protracted	interest	in	
following	this	issue	suggests	that	interest	in	more	focussed	coverage	of	industry		was	reserved	for	
controversial	aspects	of	industry,	deemed	‘newsworthy’.	In	line	with	this,	the	BBC	Head	of	Current	
Affairs,	Paul	Fox,	expressed	an	enthusiasm	to	‘pool	the	best	film	and	programme	makers	and	form	
them	into	an	emergency	team’	in	order	to	make	‘really	splendid	emergency	programmes’.66	This	
enthusiasm	for	‘of	the	moment’	industrial	relations	programming	which	would	be	popular	and	
bolster	audience	numbers,	coupled	with	the	continuance	of	high	profile	strike	coverage	in	BBC	News	
reports,	inevitably	provided	challenges	for	portraying	British	industry	in	a	positive	or	constructive	
light.	Consequently,	it	was	unsurprising	that	the	BBC	continued	to	struggle	to	persuade	industry	
bosses	to	appear	on	its	limited	coverage	to	provide	the	required	‘balance’	to	its	reports,	even	as	
Mycock	noted	deteriorating	BBC	relationships	with	union	leaders.67		
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This	dislocation	between	the	television	media	and	industrial	management	provides	an	important	
context	for	one	of	the	key	concerns	raised	by	Tomlinson	with	regards	to	corporate	attitudes	within	
the	car	industry.	Tomlinson	argues	that	‘the	industry	created	a	culture	of	complaint,	in	which	the	
cause	of	its	difficulties	was	seen	elsewhere’.	68Although	Tomlinson	recognises	that	the	trade	union	
and	government	situation	was	far	from	perfect,	‘the	key	problems	were	matters	of	corporate	
strategy	and	management’	or	‘corporate	culture’.	Although	television	reports	would	often	refer	to	
‘underlying	bitterness’	in	the	relationship	between	managers	and	shop	floor	workers,	the	
transactional	nature	of	such	a	problem	was	never	adequately	explored.69	The	BBC’s	continued	
indifference	towards	covering	a	‘management	angle’	provided	very	little	opportunity	for	the	likes	of	
Robin	Day,	who	had	moved	to	the	BBC	from	ITV	and	was	known	for	his	interrogative	style,	to	truly	
probe	leading	industrialists’	behaviour	during	moments	of	industrial	controversy.	Moreover,	these	
long	term,	structural	issues	of	‘corporate	culture’,	even	if	BBC-management	relations	had	been	
better,	were	unlikely	to	satisfy	the	BBC’s	enthusiasm	for	emergency	programming	or	its	desire	for	
‘newsworthy’	features.	Thus,	as	far	as	television	coverage	of	the	automotive	industry	was	
concerned,	the	management-centred	explanation	was	marginalised,	despite	its	validity.			
	
Absenteeism	and	Redundancy	–	a	contrast	of	industries	
However,	while	coverage	of	‘structural’	issues	was	marginalised,	ITV	did	provide	a	number	of	
extended	news	features	on	the	implications	of	mechanisation	on	mining	communities.	Here,	
‘absenteeism’	became	a	focus	as	‘idle	machinery	is	expensive	machinery’,	although	reports	
recognised	that	in	an	industry	where	‘uncertainty	hangs	over	it	like	a	cloud’,	‘devotion	to	duty’	did	
not	come	easy	to	miners	who	felt	they	were	‘doomed	long-term’.70	Although	with	such	moralised	
references	to	‘duty’	this	coverage	was	very	much	typical	of	the	popular	industrial	relations	narrative,	
there	was	a	difference	in	tone	and	attitude.	In	this	declining	industry,	of	dwindling	significance	to	
Britain’s	economic	performance,	there	was	a	sympathy	about	the	reasons	for	such	extreme	
absenteeism,	a	kind	which	would	have	been	almost	impossible	to	conceive	of	in	relation	to	the	car	
industry.	The	very	fact	that	workers	taking	time	off	work	was	referred	to	consistently	as	
‘absenteeism’	rather	than	‘idleness’	or	‘skiving’,	indicated	the	sensitivity	of	the	subject	and	the	social	
concern	with	which	the	issue	was	dealt	with	by	the	media.	A	Gallup	poll	in	January	1969	which	asked	
those	surveyed	to	consider	the	factors	which	had	influenced	a	rash	of	absenteeism	that	winter,	
revealed	that	39	per	cent	thought	that	it	was	‘very	important’	and	25	per	cent	thought	it	was	‘fairly	
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important’	that	‘workers	are	so	depressed	about	the	future	that	they	just	live	for	the	present’.71	
Overall,	respondents	felt	that	this	was	the	second	most	important	factor,	only	to	income	taxes,	and	
ahead	of	trade	union	leadership	or	government	policy.	From	this,	it	would	appear	that	the	fatalist	
attitude	towards	declining	industries,	albeit	sympathetic,	had	permeated	public	consciousness	so	
much	as	to	override	considerations	of	trade	union	leadership	at	a	time	when	anti-strike	legislation	
was	at	the	top	of	the	political	agenda.	
	
Away	from	the	mining	industry,	in	more	‘high-stakes’	manufacturing	industries	such	as	the	motor	
industry,	where	redundancy	was	perceived	to	mean	temporary	and	fluid,	rather	than	terminal,	
unemployment,	consideration	of	these	issues	was	rather	different.	There	were	key	inconsistencies	
and	incompatibilities	regarding	the	relationship	between	the	rhetoric	of	technological	optimism,	
that	had	been	so	powerful	in	convincing	the	British	public	to	vote	for	the	Labour	Party	in	the	1964	
general	election,	and	the	latent,	long-term	concerns	about	redundancy	that	had	existed	since	the	
popular	discussions	surrounding	the	car	industry	during	the	late	1950s.	It	was	felt	there	was	little	the	
unions	could	do	to	resist	redundancies,	which	became	more	common	as	the	problems	of	1966	
became	more	stark.	ITV	News	argued	that	any	attempt	at	strikes,	regardless	of	whether	they	were	
sanctioned	by	union	leadership,	were	‘pretty	barren	measures’	against	redundancies	that	were	
‘likely	to	continue’	and	the	ever-popular	‘work-sharing	plans’	were	no	longer	deemed	‘practical’	for	
answering	such	problems.72This	kind	of	attitude	to	union	action	against	redundancy	represented	
clear	continuity	from	the	dialogue	of	the	1950s,	where	strikes	against	redundancy	had	been	so	
harshly	judged,	irrespective	of	sympathy	for	the	unemployed.		
	
However,	some	media	coverage	did	show	limited	evidence	of	a	shift	in	attitudes	about	workers’	
rights	and	the	desirability	of	employment.	Despite	concerns	about	high	profile	redundancies	in	the	
car	industry	from	some	sources,	particularly	the	Mirror,	and	the	struggling	economy,	British	
unemployment	rates	were	very	manageable.	By	1965,	unemployment	stood	at	a	mere	one	and	a	
half	per	cent,	not	far	from	a	post-war	low	and,	as	the	Times	pointed	out,	compared	favourably	to	
Britain’s	rivals.73	In	this	context,	then,	and	roused	by	the	rhetoric	of	productivity	and	efficiency,	the	
Times	published	a	number	of	editorials	arguing	for	low	levels	of	temporary	unemployment,	in	what	
it	called	‘labour	mobility’.74	Although	it	conceded	that	‘enforced	idleness’,	such	was	the	strength	of	
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moralised	economic	language,	‘never	solved	anything’,	it	argued	that	the	‘right	measures	to	cure	
Britain’s	payments’	would	‘incidentally	and	temporarily	produce	–	even	encourage	–	some	
unemployment’.75	Earlier	in	the	decade,	it	had	lamented	that	the	working	week	in	the	motor	
industry	was	shortening,	citing	the	influence	of	the	shocking	redundancies	of	1956	on	the	attitudes	
of	management	who	wanted	to	‘avoid	trouble	and	keep	their	labour	force	intact’,	and	this	meant	
the	‘limit	of	idleness	must	be	very	near’.76At	a	time	when	the	prevention	of	unofficial	strikes	was	
high	on	the	public	political	agenda,	it	was	noteworthy	that	the	Times	expressed	confidence	that	such	
redundancy	would	not	have	the	same	inflammatory	impact	as	those	in	1956,	with	car	workers	
appeased	by	their	high	rates	of	pay.	Moreover,	it	remarked	on	the	connection	between	high	rates	of	
employment	and	the	predictability	of		‘a	spate	of	wage	claims’,	which	compromised	the	
government’s	attempt	to	moderate	inflation,	as	shortages	of	labour	encouraged	private	deals	
between	workers	and	employers,	without	the	input	of	union	leaders.77		In	an	economic	climate	
which	was	very	conscious	of	the	need	to	use	work	forces	productively	and	efficiently,	issues	high	on	
the	political	agenda,	the	surplus	of	labour	was	adjudged	as	a	‘waste’	which	required	a	‘good	deal	of	
justification’.78	Although	this	perspective	was	far	from	universal	by	this	point,	it	did	allude	to	a	
mounting	pressure	on	the	position	of	unions	to	defend	their	members’	jobs,	as	consensus	on	the	
ideals	of	full	employment	began	to	erode.	
	
As	significant	as	this	shift	was,	the	likes	of	the	Mirror	continued	to	show	sensitivity	to	working	class	
anxiety	about	redundancy	and	unemployment.	Geoffrey	Goodman	remarked	in	1962	that	it	was	a	
pity	that	there	was	not	a	more	‘sympathetic	phrase’	than	redundancy,	given	its	‘superfluous,	
uncalled-for	and	unwanted’	nature,	and	lamented	the	failure	of	the	Government	‘and	of	the	bulk	of	
employers’	to	provide	a	‘coherent	policy	for	redundancy’.79	Nevertheless,	the	discussion	of	the	
Times	clearly	illustrates	that	there	was	confidence,	or	perhaps,	with	hindsight,	complacency,	in	the	
long-term	continuance	of	high	employment	rates	in	Britain’s	modern	manufacturing	industries.	This	
conviction	lay	in	stark	contrast	to	the	bleak	outlook	for	the	mining	industry.	This	confidence	and	the	
rhetoric	of	productivity	gave	the	likes	of	the	Times	a	platform	on	which	to	suggest	better	ways	to	
deploy	its	work	force	in	more	efficient	ways.	Moreover,	the	case	exemplified	the	power	of	the	media	
to	steer	the	industrial	relations	agenda	so	that	once	again,	although	less	critical	of	unions,	the	focus	
of	reform	debate	was	the	labour	force.	
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Media	scrutiny	of	the	car	industry	
Tim	Claydon’s	study	of	media	coverage	of	the	car	industry,	albeit	focused	specifically	on	the	
coverage	of	the	Times	and	the	Mirror,	established	two	important	trends	in	coverage.	Firstly	it	
corroborated	claims	by	the	GMG	that	the	motor	industry	was	‘more	extensively	covered	than	any	
other	industry’	and	that	other	strikes	were	‘significantly	under-reported’,	in	proportion	to	their	
severity	and	extent.80	From	Claydon’s	quantitative	analysis,	it	is	clear	that	media	interest	in	the	car	
industry,	as	part	of	this	wider	declinist	preoccupation	with	manufacturing,	started	to	intensify	in	the	
late	1960s,	at	a	rate	which	was	disproportionate	to	the	increase	in	the	number	of	disputes	recorded	
by	the	Department	of	Employment.81	Above	all	industries	then,	media	coverage	of	the	car	industry	
was	significant.	When	these	data	are	viewed	in	tandem	with	the	results	of	Gallup’s	1968	opinion	
polls	on	the	car	industry,	the	nature	of	media	concern	with	the	car	industry	is	clear.	While	opinion	
was	fairly	evenly	divided	on	whether	management	was	doing	‘all	it	reasonably	could’	to	avoid	strikes	
in	the	car	industry,	only	23	per	cent	felt	unions	were	doing	all	they	could.	When	asked	who	they	
deemed	responsible	for	the	large	number	of	strikes,	14	per	cent	blamed	management,	29	per	cent	
blamed	unions	and	44	per	cent	blamed	‘groups	of	workers’.	Although	unions	drew	almost	twice	the	
amount	of	‘blame’	as	management,	hardly	surprisingly	given	the	dominant	frames	of	explanation,	it	
is	noteworthy	that	‘groups	of	workers’	were	considered	distinct	from	their	unions	and	much	more	of	
a	‘problem’	as	far	as	industrial	strife	was	concerned.	By	the	time	similar	questions	were	asked	about	
the	car	industry	in	April	1969,	workers	at	Ford	registered	very	limited	public	sympathy	–	only	16	per	
cent,	compared	to	the	39	per	cent	generated	by	the	management.82	
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Figure	4.8:	Total	references	to	‘Unofficial	strikes’	in	British	dailies	(1960-69)	
	
Explaining	why	‘groups	of	workers’	were	thought	to	have	been	such	a	disruptive	influence	on	the	
day-to-day	running	of	the	car	industry	is	complex	but	can	be	attributed	to	a	number	of	key	trends	in	
media	coverage.	Firstly,	as	evidenced	in	Figure	4.8,	unofficial	strikes	were	a	controversial	and	high	
profile	issue	for	newspapers	to	cover.	This	issue	was	not	new,	and	had	featured	to	a	more	limited	
extent	in	the	coverage	of	the	1950s,	but	it	seemed	to	be	the	subject	of	greater	media	interest	
towards	the	end	of	the	1960s.	Inevitably,	by	their	very	nature,	unofficial	action	increased	scrutiny	on	
shop	stewards	as	such	strikes	operated	without	approval	from	their	union	leadership.	However,	as	
Figure	4.8	also	illustrates,	the	true	upsurge	in	interest	only	happened	in	1969,	after	the	first	set	of	
polling	was	conducted.	Of	course	this	may	suggest	that	the	latent	interest	in	unofficial	strikes	had	an	
important	impact	on	public	perception,	but	does	not	entirely	explain	the	phenomenon.		
	
The	Mirror	believed	it	was	‘scandalous’	that	gentleman’s	agreements	with	official	union	
representatives	did	not	hold	water	against	unofficial	‘union	militancy’,	where	the	deterrents	against	
unofficial	industrial	action	so	small	they	could	‘barely	be	discerned’.83	After	a	major	strike	in	1968,	
the	Mirror’s	industrial	editor,	Roland	Hurman,	likened	the	return	to	work	to	‘an	alcoholic	nursing	a	
king-sized	hangover’,	and	attributed	the	year’s	‘unparalleled’	loss	of	production	and	exports	to	
‘wave	after	wave	of	unofficial	strikes’.84	This	provided	further	evidence	of	the	Mirror’s	attempts	to	
link	Britain’s	failing	productivity	with	the	effort	of	trade	union	members	and	their	dubious	political	
motives.	
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Figure	4.9:	‘This	bloody	mess	in	the	car	industry’,	Daily	Mirror,	30	September	1968,	pp.	16-17.	
	
This	double-page	spread,	Figure	4.9,	highlighted	a	notable	increase	in	the	number	of	days	lost	to	
strikes	in	the	car	industry	and	featured	articles	from	a	number	of	sources,	including	a	leading	trade	
unionist	and	a	Vauxhall	director.	All	elements	of	this	spread	focused	on	issues	such	as	outdated	
collective	bargaining	mechanisms,	strike	militancy	and	union	reform,	rarely	touching	upon	the	
attitudes	of	government	and	employers.	By	1969,	the	Mirror	considered	the	‘most	alarming	
problem’	for	Britain’s	economic	prosperity	was	‘industrial	anarchy’,	which	would	be	seen	by	foreign	
competitors	as	a	‘complication	of	the	“British	malaise”	which	verges	on	lunacy’,	and	threatened	‘the	
economic	equivalent	of	the	shock	of	military	defeat	administered	to	the	Germans	and	the	
Japanese’.85	This	kind	of	narrative	tapped	into	the	insecurity	about	foreign	competition,	a	legacy	of	
the	rhetoric	of	war-time,	and	thus	represented	a	clear	continuity	from	the	1950s.	It	also	pointed	to	
the	emerging	and	complex	relationship	between	perceived	British	exceptionalism	and	economic	
decline.	There	were	very	real	concerns	that	Ford	would	take	its	business	‘to	comparatively	trouble-
free	plants	in	Germany’	resulting	in	redundancy	and	lost	exports.86	Significantly,	these	articles	did	
not	attribute	Britain’s	lack	of	competitiveness	to	its	wage	levels	or	its	inflation,	the	issues	which	had	
been	such	an	important	part	of	the	prevalent	productivity	debate,	but	to	the	behaviour	and	tactics	
of	its	unions.	This	marked	an	important	shift	in	emphasis	and	aligns	with	the	quantitative	analysis	
from	the	beginning	of	this	chapter,	which	reflected	the	shift	from	government	scrutiny	to	unions.		
	
The	use	of	the	word	‘wildcat’	to	describe	unofficial	strikes	exploded	in	the	late	1960s	and	illustratec	
the	continued	frustration	and	value-laden	judgements	on	unofficial	groups	to	embark	on	industrial	
action	without	the	approval	of	their	union	leadership	(Figure	4.10).	It	was	particularly	popular	with	
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the	right-wing	Express.	Shop	stewards	were	consistently	referred	to	as	‘wreckers’,	such	was	the	link	
between	shop	stewards	and	so-called	industrial	‘sabotage’.	The	Mail	was	disgusted	that	some	shop	
stewards	had	allegedly	gone	as	far	as	suggesting	secret	ballots	were	‘undemocratic’,	in	contradiction	
of	the	Mail’s	long-held	editorial	line.87	There	were	continued	concerns	about	the	degradation	of	
centralised	control	in	the	TUC,	with	unions	‘too	often	impotent’	against	the	new	power	shop	
stewards,	coining	the	phrase	‘too	many	kooks	spoil	the	broth’.88	Shop	stewards	were	guilty	of	‘half-
baked	schemes’	and	‘class	warfare’,	according	to	the	Mail,	perturbed	by	the	reinforcement	of	such	
divisions	and	the	promotion	of	working	class	politics.89	They	were	more	often	than	not	directly	
implicated	in	these	loathed	wildcat	strikes,	either	by	their	dismissal	prompting	an	angry	reaction	
from	the	shop	floor,	or	by	promoting	‘wild	cat	walk-outs	on	grounds	so	frivolous	that	they	shame	
this	country’.90	They	continued	to	fall	victim	of	the	‘moderates	versus	militants’	rhetoric	of	the	1950s	
but	this	was	now	ensnared	in	the	increasingly	divisive	productivity	rhetoric,	which	provided	further	
evidence	of	the	blurring	of	‘industrial’	and	‘political’	issues.	
	
	
Figure	4.10:	Total	references	to	‘Wildcat’	industrial	action	in	British	dailies	(1958-71)	
	
There	are	important	caveats	to	the	immediate	public	impact	of	this	increased	anxiety	surrounding	
unofficial	or	wildcat	strikes.	Blumler	and	Ewbank’s	1968	survey	of	popular	attitudes	to	unofficial	
strikes	found	that	not	only	were	middle	class	respondents	the	most	worried	about	unofficial	strikes,	
there	was	little	correlation	between	what	kind	of	newspaper	people	read	or	the	political	party	they	
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supported	and	their	levels	of	concern.91	The	readers	of	‘more	Labour-inclined	newspapers’	were	just	
as	concerned	about	unofficial	strikes	as	readers	of	Conservative-supporting	newspapers.	Only	rank	
and	file	trade	unionists	were	likely	to	have	their	opinion	on	unofficial	strikes	affected	by	the	output	
of	the	mass	news	media	but	this	was	from	broadcast	news	media,	rather	than	the	so-called	partisan	
press,	and	this	impact	was	limited	purely	to	the	unofficial	cases,	rather	than	other	issues	facing	the	
trade	union	movement.	Therefore,	it	seems	unlikely	that	in	isolation	this	sort	of	coverage	had	a	
major	impact	on	public	opinion.	However,	such	discussion	would	have	had	an	impact	as	part	of	a	
broader	moralised	narrative	surrounding	productivity	and	the	involvement	of	unions	in	Britain’s	
decline.	
	
The	concern	with	shop	steward	influence	was	primarily	a	symptom	of	a	wider	debate	about	the	
leadership	and	direction	of	the	trade	unions	more	generally.	In	1960,	George	Woodcock	became	the	
TUC’s	General	Secretary.	While	many	obsessed	with	union	and	industrial	relations	structure	(the	
primary	focus	of	the	Donovan	Report)	Woodcock	was	in	a	minority	of	raising	the	issue	of	purpose.	
Discussion	about	structure	was	a	‘pointless	exercise’,	according	to	Woodcock,	without	a	consensus	
on	union	purpose,	where	he	was	particularly	concerned	about	the	‘free-for-all	society’	that	was	
emerging	as	a	result	of	employers’	abuse.92	In	expressing	rising	wages	in	such	terms,	Woodcock	
reflected	a	deference	to	the	dominant	narratives	of	inflation.	During	his	time	as	General	Secretary,	
Woodcock	sought	to	discover	how	trade	union	autonomy	could	be	‘reconciled	with	industrial	
efficiency	and	innovation’,	as	he	wrestled	to	balance	the	‘defence	of	trade	union	custom	and	
practice’	with	the	demand	for	reform	and	increases	in	productivity.93	Woodcock	benefited	from	a	
close	relationship	with	many	journalists,	including	Cole	at	the	Guardian	and	Wigham	at	the	Times	–	
‘his	coterie	of	admirers’	according	to	Robert	Taylor	–	and	initially	their	reception	of	Woodcock	was	
hopeful	about	the	new	direction	Woodcock	may	take	the	TUC	with	regards	to	economic	policy,	
applauding	his	‘reforming	zeal’.94	The	Guardian	praised	Woodcock’s	intention	to	address	the	issue	of	
the	trade	unions’	purpose	as	a	‘good	question	and	a	good	starting	point’	in	order	to	further	
understand	structural	reform,	and	provide	answers	to	questions	that	had	‘mystified	the	public	for	
many	years’.95	
	
																																																						
91	Blumler	and	Ewbank,	‘Trade	Unionists,	the	Mass	Media	and	Unofficial	Strikes’,	p.	51.	
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However,	even	at	the	beginning,	the	Times	was	sceptical	about	Woodcock’s	influence	on	economic	
attitudes	and	that	it	was	on	the	subject	of	‘influencing	wage	movement	that	Mr	Woodcock	was	least	
impressive’.96	The	suspicion	of	ITV	journalists	by	the	time	the	1964	TUC	Congress	arrived	was	that	
‘controversial	issues’	might	be	‘smoothed	over’	because	many	unionists	would	be	hesitant	to	‘rock	
Labour’s	vote’.97	By	mid-decade,	the	optimism	surrounding	Woodcock’s	leadership	soon	dwindled	
and	the	media	attention	on	Woodcock	translated	into	intense	scrutiny,	particularly	in	the	face	of	
these	unofficial	strikes.	Although	the	Times	was	sympathetic	that	the	1966	national	emergency	had	
blown	long-term	TUC	plans	‘to	pieces’,	it	was	clear	that	the	pace	of	TUC	reform	had	‘proved	too	slow	
for	the	politicians’	interpretation	of	the	country’s	needs’,	and	so	too	the	majority	of	the	media.98	On	
the	eve	of	the	TUC	annual	conference	in	1967,	ITV’s	reporter	suggested	that	nothing	said	at	the	
conference	would	‘have	very	much	effect	on	policy’	and	was	an	indication	that	Congress	was	
‘already	a	little	out	of	date’.99	Taylor	suggests	ultimately	it	was	Andrew	Shonfield	of	the	Observer,	in	
his	critique	of	the	Donvovan	Commission’s	recommendations,	who	came	the	closest	to	addressing	
the	issue	of	trade	union	function	with	his	‘one-man	minority	report’	against	voluntarist	bargaining	in	
such	an	interdependent	society,	rather	than	any	trade	union	leader.100	Ultimately,	Woodcock	
struggled	to	turn	the	questions	of	structure	into	questions	of	purpose,	and	it	was	the	continued	
media	interest	in	the	influence	of	shop	stewards,	above	all,	that	signalled	this	failure.	
	
When	a	strike	erupted	after	the	dismissal	of	seventeen	‘trouble-makers’	at	Dagenham,	the	Times	
argued	that	the	‘first	responsibility’	was	on	the	unions	‘to	see	that	their	shop	stewards	and	members	
honour	the	agreements’,	having	shown	themselves	previously	‘incapable	of	carrying	out	this	basic	
and	elementary	obligation’.	Although	the	newspaper	did	concede	that	there	was	‘ham-handed’	
management	at	play,	workers	had	been	‘supine’,	shop	stewards	‘provocative’	and	the	unions	
‘ineffectual’.	This	was	one	of	a	number	of	reports	that	placed	the	emphasis	of	malpractice	on	the	
labour	force	and	union	representation,	taking	the	company’s	claims	of	trouble-making	at	face	value	
and	defending	the	right	of	a	firm	to	dismiss	an	employee	‘who	persistently	breaks	his	contract	and	
induces	others	to	do	so’.101	Certainly,	very	little	of	ITV’s	news	coverage	represented	clear	interest	in	
the	long-term	and	structural	economic	experiences	of	the	British	car	industry,	but	on	the	attitudes	
and	agendas,	political	or	otherwise,	of	strikers.	When	faced	with	a	lengthy	strike	at	Ford’s	plant	in	
Dagenham	in	1962,	ITV’s	correspondent	was	keen	to	point	out	‘interesting	things’	about	the	strike.	
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This	predominantly	centred	on	the	timing	of	the	strike	(just	after	an	annual	holiday),	and	the	
position	of	the	strikers	(right	at	the	end	of	the	assembly	line),	in	order	to	raise	questions	about	the	
validity	of	the	strike.102	Correspondents	even	went	as	far	as	to	ask	workers	if	they	believed	the	strike	
to	be	‘a	communist	plot’.103	From	all	sides,	then,	shop	stewards	were	the	common	denominator	in	
worker	unrest	and	an	undesirable	evolution	in	the	structure	of	contemporary	trade	unionism.	
	
The	media’s	handling	of	shop	stewards	forms	an	example	of	Stanley	Cohen’s	conceptualisation	of	
media	‘symbolization’	–	the	mass	communication	of	stereotypes	where	supposedly	‘neutral	words’	
can	be	made	to	‘symbolize	complex	ideas	and	emotions’.	104	Although	Cohen’s	analysis	focussed	on	a	
different	set	of	symbols,	looking	at	the	likes	of	Mods	and	Teddy	Boys,	where	visual	and	material	
culture	was	important,	the	communication	processes	were	similar	with	shop	stewards.	As	with	the	
Teddy	Boy,	the	shop	steward	‘label’	acquired	its	own	‘descriptive	and	explanatory	potential’,	
indicative	of	an	individual	with	‘a	distinct	type	of	personality’,	where	such	symbolisation	was	
bolstered	through	the	use	of	‘dramatized	and	ritualistic	interviews’.	105	By	the	end	of	the	1960s,	the	
use	of	‘shop	steward’	in	industrial	relations	coverage	was	a	short-cut	to	important	stereotypes	and	
associations	–	impediments	to	national	prosperity,	reckless	self-interest	and	political	extremism.	This	
kind	of	symbolization,	combined	with	the	moralised	language	apparent	in	the	coverage	of	the	Daily	
Mirror,	allowed	industrial	relations	coverage	to	become	increasingly	personalised	and	one-
dimensional,	rather	than	tackle	the	complexities	of	wider	economic	structures.		
	
It	is	difficult	to	reconcile	these	toxic	portrayals	of	shop	stewards	in	newspapers	with	the	realities	of	
their	impact	on	industrial	productivity.	Tomlinson	has	convincingly	argued	that	one	of	the	
‘peculiarities’	of	the	reality	of	factory	life	was	that	‘the	much-abused	shop	steward	found	himself	in	
the	role	of	“progress-chaser”,	trying	to	maintain	his	members’	wages,	thus	effectively	playing	a	
managerial	role	in	keeping	production	going’.106	Considering	the	media’s	near-obsession	with	the	
impact	of	strikes	on	industrial	output,	one	might	think	this	would	have	warranted	praise.	Similarly,	
Tim	Claydon’s	study	of	the	car	industry	highlighted	that	shop	stewards	were	identified	as	‘more	of	a	
lubricant	than	an	irritant’	in	industrial	relations	by	the	government’s	Donovan	Commission.107	
However,	as	has	been	analysed	on	multiple	occasions,	such	a	role	was	incompatible	with	the	
productivity	narrative’s	emphasis	on	grounding	wages.	Shop	stewards,	in	seeking	ways	to	legitimise	
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improvements	for	workers	through	progress	and	productivity,	compromised	such	an	interpretation.	
Moreover,	their	successful	interventions	rarely	warranted	news	coverage	and	perhaps	would	have	
benefitted	from	the	type	of	in-depth	coverage	which	the	BBC	was	so	reluctant	to	provide.	Shop	
stewards	were	only	newsworthy	when	at	the	centre	of	a	strike	or	a	political	controversy,	tapping	
into	Cold	War	political	binaries,	perhaps	more	so	than	any	other	figures.	
	
The	Decade	of	Productivity	
Throughout	the	1960s,	Britain's	culture	of	economic	declinism	framed	the	relationship	between	
wage	increases	and	productivity	in	negative	terms.	Government	policy	and	indeed	the	majority	of	
the	media	narrative	understood	productivity	to	be	a	way	to	ground	wages	as	a	deflationary	
measure,	rather	than,	as	the	Guardian	had	suggested,	a	way	to	stimulate	economic	growth	through	
improved	productivity,	particularly	in	high	profile	manufacturing	industries.	The	moralised	and	
political	language	used	to	chronicle	wage	claims	and	union	conduct	helped	to	buttress	these	
negative	frames	and	assumptions	to	significant	effect,	although	it	was	not	without	its	inconsistencies	
and	problems.	The	emergence	of	such	rhetoric	was	particularly	notable	in	the	Mirror,	having	
previously	been	a	critic	of	the	Conservative’s	wage	pause,	which	also	drew	on	the	unions’	
traditional,	albeit	strained,	relationship	with	the	Labour	Party.	Understandings	of	a	British	post-war	
consensus,	specifically	in	the	industrial	sphere,	became	increasingly	complicated,	illustrated	by	the	
many	criticisms	of	Labour’s	decision	to	use	the	language	of	productivity	to	ground	and	restrict	
wages,	concerned	about	inflation.	Although	these	criticisms	varied	in	their	severity	and	nuances,	and	
not	all	were	as	extreme	as	the	Express’s	outright	rejection	of	a	wage	policy,	they	came	from	both	left	
and	right,	which	illustrated	the	erosion	of	Labour’s	increasingly	precarious	position	and	the	
divergence	of	economic	opinion.		
	
From	the	outset	then,	the	trade	unions,	although	initially	open	to	productivity	based	agreements,	
faced	an	uphill	battle	in	maintaining	a	positive	media	image	because	of	their	desire	to	seek	the	best	
wage	deals	for	their	members,	particularly	in	high-profile,	economically	vital	industries.	This	would	
have	been	the	case	almost	regardless	of	the	frequency	or	methods	of	industrial	action,	although	
strikes	provided	ideal	opportunities	for	'newsworthy'	criticism.	The	drive	for	‘emergency’	
programming	within	television,	now	an	important	part	of	media	coverage,	and	its	reluctance	to	
explore	long-term	structural	issues	through	documentaries,	due	to	the	pressures	of	commerciality	
and	competition	were	certainly	influencing	factors	in	the	focus	on	industrial	strife.	Moreover,	the	
unions’	apparent	failure	to	comply	with	or	consider	government	policy	in	understandings	of	their	
purpose	or	development	of	structure,	along	with	the	continued	erosion	of	centralised	power,	only	
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intensified	such	problems.	Shop	stewards,	in	assuming	a	leading	role	in	wage	bargaining	and	
promoting	industrial	action	where	deemed	necessary	(and	not	always	legally),	were	divisive	figures	
because	of	their	disregard	for	the	dominant	economic	rhetoric.	The	narrow	industrial	relations	
agenda	even	meant	that	less	contentious	issues	of	efficiency	and	productivity	still	revolved	around	
the	experiences	and	attitudes	of	the	labour	force,	as	exemplified	by	the	discussions	in	the	Times	on	
redundancy	and	redeployment.			
	
Increased	scrutiny	of	the	motivations	of	the	labour	force	meant	that	management's	role	in	
workplace	unrest	or	Britain's	faltering	productivity	was	largely	neglected	or	intentionally	deflected,	
as	indicated	by	the	BBC's	experience,	and	likely	contributed	to	the	damaging	and	complacent	
'corporate	culture'	that	Tomlinson	described.	Moreover,	in	many	ways,	the	increasing	focus	on	the	
trade	union	movement	in	scrutinizing	the	British	disease	and	its	productivity	problem,	driven	by	
strikes,	masked	the	growing	public	scepticism	regarding	the	ability	of	a	Labour	government	to	
manage	the	industrial	economy	through	wage	restraint.	If,	as	Tomlinson	described,	1966	was	the	
high	tide	of	the	productivity	debate	in	Whitehall,	the	frames	and	agendas	of	the	media	ensured	that	
the	problem	of	productivity	took	on	a	very	different	image	in	the	years	following.	
	
Although	the	experiences	of	1969,	typified	by	a	peak	in	media	concern	about	unofficial	strikes	and,	
as	explored	in	the	previous	chapter,	the	debate	over	In	Place	of	Strife,	cannot	be	framed	as	a	crisis,	
they	did	represent	an	important	stage	in	the	relationship	between	unions,	media	and	government.	
The	failure	of	Labour	to	answer	public	concerns	about	the	militancy	of	unions,	particularly	shop	
stewards,	through	incentives,	as	exemplified	in	productivity	legislation,	and,	on	the	other	hand,	the	
punitive	measures	of	In	Place	of	Strife,	led	many	to	doubt	the	party’s	ability	to	arrest	Britain’s	
economic	demise.	By	February	1969,	not	only	did	the	Conservatives	hold	a	lead	in	election	polls,	this	
was	underpinned	by	the	belief	that	the	Conservatives	could	better	maintain	prosperity,	with	a	22	
per	cent	lead	in	this	area,	as	well	as	a	perceived	superiority	in	handling	industrial	disputes,	albeit	
with	a	less	impressive	6	per	cent	lead.108		
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Chapter	Five	–	Public	disillusionment	and	the	Manufactured	Crisis	
Governance	and	Politics,	1970-79	
	
The	relationship	between	government,	unions	and	the	media	experienced	unprecedented	
transformation	during	the	1970s,	as	each	element	wrestled	for	influence	in	an	increasingly	hostile	
atmosphere.	While	this	final	decade	does	not	mark	a	clear	break	from	the	analysis	that	preceded	it,	
this	chapter	assesses	media	coverage	of	a	period	which	has	an	‘orthodox	internal	chronology	of	
escalating	problems’,	with	1978-79’s	‘Winter	of	Discontent’	as	its	finale.1	As	Geoffrey	Goodman	
reflected,	if	1979	was	the	‘watershed	year’	of	post-war	British	politics,	‘the	story	line	effectively	
began	with	Heath’s	victory’	in	1970’s	shock	election	result.2	As	this	chapter	illustrates,	the	story	line	
took	a	clear	turn	after	1974,	which	had	a	dramatic	impact	on	coverage	of	industrial	relations.	
Heath’s	period	as	Prime	Minister	was	characterised	by	intense	public	disillusionment,	particularly	in	
response	to	the	government’s	confrontation	with	major	unions,	and	its	dependence	on	unparalleled	
deployment	of	‘State	of	Emergency’	powers.	The	1974	miners’	strike,	with	the	February	general	
election	as	its	backdrop,	forms	the	first	of	the	political	case	studies	of	this	chapter,	as	Edward	Heath	
went	to	the	country	with	the	campaign	slogan	‘Who	Governs	Britain?’,	in	the	hope	of	consolidating	
his	position	in	a	supposed	battle	with	trade	unionism.	Although	historians	such	as	Jim	Phillips	have	
argued	that	government	authority	was	‘certainly	questioned’	but	‘not	seriously	jeopardised’	by	NUM	
industrial	action,	the	media	narrative	and	public	perception	of	the	strike	lies	relatively	unexplored.	3		
	
1974	and	the	winter	of	1978-79	represent	the	collision	of	trade	unionism	and	high	politics,	almost	
without	parallel	in	British	contemporary	history,	perhaps	with	the	exception	of	1926	and	1984-85.	
This	chapter	seeks	to	assess	the	influence	and	effectiveness	of	the	framing	of	these	case	studies	as	
moments	of	‘crisis’,	rather	than	the	validity	of	such	portrayals,	analysing	their	construction	and	
context.	In	the	case	of	1974,	despite	the	government’s	suggestion	that	the	unions	actively	
challenged	governmental	power,	the	development	of	a	crisis	narrative	in	the	British	media	was	
limited.	The	considered	response	of	unions,	public	perceptions	of	political	leadership	and	the	NUM,	
and	the	influence	of	the	election	agenda	is	examined,	in	order	to	further	explain	1974’s	contained	or	
limited	crisis.	In	the	assessment	of	1979,	the	influence	of	structural	changes	to	the	three	strands	of	
analysis	–	media,	politics	and	union	strategy	–	is	reviewed,	to	contextualise	the	clear	continuities	and	
changes	to	media	coverage.	Through	this	analysis,	this	chapter	explores	how	1979	had	such	radically	
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different	results	to	the	events	of	1974	and	why	it	has	been	considered	a	crisis	in	ways	that	1974	
could	not	fulfil.		
	
1974	and	Britain’s	agonising	drift	
Although	the	events	of	1974	did	not	constitute	a	serious	challenge	to	the	government’s	authority,	
the	media	narrative	depicted	clear	conflict	between	government	and	unions.	The	long-established	
language	of	war	and	conflict	in	the	industrial	context	changed	orientation	around	the	turn	of	the	
decade.	Although	James	Thomas	suggested	that	it	was	the	memory	of	the	poverty	of	the	inter-war	
period	which	established	consistency	in	the	media’s	meta-narratives	until	1970,	in	the	industrial	
example	it	is	clear	that	it	was	memory	of	the	Second	World	War	which	had	crystallised	attitudes.	4	
The	lexicon	of	the	1950s,	which	highlighted	Britain’s	dwindling	position	in	the	international	market	
as	a	deterrent	from	striking,	and	juxtaposed	British	performance	against	a	foreign	‘other’,	gave	way	
to	something	much	more	insular.	Increasingly,	the	‘other’	in	media	narratives	of	industrial	relations	
was	the	trade	unions,	posed	against	the	government	or,	in	the	case	of	the	right-wing	press,	the	
‘national	interest’.	This	had	already	been	evoked	during	the	In	Place	of	Strife	episode	under	Labour	
but	became	more	firmly	entrenched	as	the	unions	faced	conventional	Conservative	adversaries	in	
government.	According	to	the	Mirror,	the	first	of	the	two	miners’	strikes	under	Heath’s	leadership,	
formed	‘a	Blitzkrieg	for	which	Government	and	country	were	totally	ill	prepared’,	as	Heath	had	‘lost	
his	nerve’.5	In	1974,	the	NUM’s	decision	to	take	industrial	action	was	described	by	the	Express	in	a	
front-page	headline	as	the	miners’	intent	to	‘go	for	all-out	war’.6	Much	like	the	narrative	of	the	
Second	World	War,	this	was	understood	to	be	a	challenge	distinctive	to	Britain.	Fittingly,	the	Sun	
consistently	dubbed	the	government’s	confrontation	with	the	NUM,	or	vice	versa,	as	‘the	Battle	of	
Britain’.7	The	narrative	of	the	British	disease	that	had	become	an	entrenched	part	of	the	popular	
industrial	narrative	continued	to	sustain	a	popular	perception	of	a	country	with	unparalleled	
challenges	to	a	unique	national	character,	despite	a	European	context	which	suggested	that	British	
experience	of	striking	was	typical	of	the	period.		
	
1974’s	period	of	industrial	unrest	was	the	first	winter	to	be	dubbed	as	a	‘winter	of	discontent’,	but	
the	prevalence	of	this	styling	was	relatively	limited.8	The	majority	of	newspapers	were	reluctant	to	
describe	the	battle	between	government	and	unions	as	anything	perilous	or	critical.	This	was	despite	
																																																						
4	James	Thomas,	‘“Bound	In	By	History”:	The	Winter	of	Discontent	in	British	Politics,	1979-2004’,	Media,	
Culture	&	Society	29	(2007),	pp.	265-267.	
5	Daily	Mirror,	22	February	1972,	p.	2.	
6	Daily	Express,	6	February	1974,	p.	1.	
7	Sun,	14	December	1973,	p.	2.	
8	Daily	Mirror,	14	December	1973,	p.	1.	
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an	official	State	of	Emergency	and	an	impending	general	election,	both	bound	in	war	motifs.	The	
media	narrative	of	conflict	between	government	and	unions	insulated	these	industrial	issues	from	
the	‘national	interest’	or	the	general	public,	although	the	Conservative’s	‘Who	Governs	Britain?’	
slogan	reflected	attempts	to	widen	public	anxiety	about	these	issues.	The	Express	did	refer	to	‘the	
incredibility	of	our	industrial	crisis’	but	in	an	article	that	was	laced	with	hope	for	the	future	and	a	
sense	of	impermanence.	9	Similarly,	the	Guardian	referred	to	the	winter’s	strike	as	‘the	worst	
industrial	crisis	to	grip	the	country	since	pre-war’	but	conceded	this	was	likely	to	be	resolved	in	
‘good	old	soggy	compromise’.10	Throughout,	although	the	threat	to	the	country’s	governance	was	
recognised,	the	situation	was	rarely	framed	as	something	beyond	the	means	of	mediation	or	
negotiation.		
	
A	much	more	popular	narrative	of	Britain’s	political	and	industrial	situation,	fostered	by	the	most	
popular	tabloids,	was	a	sense	of	‘drifting	into	a	nightmare’	rather	than	the	expectation	of	any	kind	of	
denouement	or	climax.	11	The	Mirror,	although	it	recognised	the	anxiety	surrounding	this	‘drift’,	
denied	that	situation	was	immediately	‘serious’	and	insisted	that	in	thirty	years’	time,	the	supposed	
‘Great	Crisis	of	‘74’	would	be	remembered	for	the	‘ministerial	appeal	to	us	all	to	brush	our	teeth	in	
the	dark’.12	If	there	was	any	suggestion	of	crisis	in	any	transformative	terms,	it	was	pushed	by	left-
wing	newspapers,	for	example	the	Mirror,	which	sought	to	widen	the	political	agenda	beyond	
industrial	strife.	Both	the	Guardian,	under	John	Cole’s	influence,	and	the	Mirror	were	keen	to	
explore	the	‘real	issues’	such	as	‘collapsing	social	services,	‘soaring	rents’	and	‘astronomical	prices’.	13	
Moreover,	the	Mirror	consistently	referred	to	Heath’s	image	problem	as	part	of	a	‘crisis	of	
confidence’	from	both	the	public	and	those	inside	his	own	party.	14	As	far	as	the	industrial	scene	was	
concerned,	although	the	miners’	strike	provoked	anxiety	and	undermined	the	position	of	both	sides,	
the	situation	was	rarely	understood	as	a	crisis	of	governance.			
	
An	important	explanation	for	the	limited	crisis	narrative	of	1974	was	the	lack	of	union	action	which	
might	have	satisfied	right-wing	promises	of	extremism	or	violence	to	indicate	a	threat	to	
government	or	democracy.	The	Express	made	significant	attempts	to	frame	an	influential	minority	of	
trade	unionists	as	militant	aggressors	during	the	early	1970s,	with	foreboding	articles	about	‘the	
shadowy	men	who	thrive	on	strife’,	but	this	gained	very	little	traction	in	1974,	despite	the	popularity	
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12	Daily	Mirror,	30	January	1974,	p.	12.	
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of	conflict	themes.15	This	failure	to	convince	was	partly	a	symptom	of	the	paper’s	waning	influence,	
in	the	midst	of	a	succession	of	cover	price	rises	(eleven	between	1970	and	1983)	caused	by	a	surge	
in	running	costs,	and	its	failure	to	widen	its	appeal	beyond	its	aging	readership,	as	58	per	cent	of	its	
readers	were	over	the	age	of	45.16	In	many	ways,	the	Express	was	left	behind	by	the	dominance	of	
the	Mirror,	emergence	of	the	Sun	and	the	Mail’s	shift	to	the	tabloid	format,	something	the	Express	
did	not	follow	until	1977.	However,	these	commercial	issues	aside,	even	the	Express’s	columnist	
conceded	that	the	promise	of	‘rough	sailing’	had	been	denied	by	an	‘unexpectedly	pacific	
campaign’.17	The	conciliatory	campaign	was	partly	as	a	result	of	the	NUM’s	healthy	position	within	
the	wider	trade	union	movement,	as	‘their	political	and	social	clout	extended	far	beyond	their	
memberships’,	which	gave	the	NUM	the	ability	to	convince	and	persuade	in	very	small	numbers.18	
More	significantly,	the	peaceful	strike	and	ensuing	election	demonstrated	acknowledgment	by	both	
miners	and	the	Labour	Party	that	any	untoward	behaviour	at	picket	lines	could	have	damaging	
repercussions	for	Labour’s	performance	at	the	polls.	As	the	Sun	suggested,	‘Mr	Heath’s	Ace	for	an	
election	would	be	confrontation	with	the	unions…	but	it	takes	two	to	make	a	confrontation’.19		
	
Although	the	Sun	referenced	its	established	‘friendship’	with	the	miners,	in	reflecting	on	the	rise	of	
supposed	extremism	in	major	unions,	it	initially	warned	unions	that	‘no	group,	no	union,	no	party’	
could	be	allowed	to	challenge	the	government’s	authority,	the	result	of	which	would	be	‘the	death	
of	democracy’	–	and	this	seems	to	have	been	a	warning	that	the	NUM	was	largely	receptive	to.20	
NUM	members	voted	against	Gormley’s	request	to	delay	a	strike	in	1974	‘in	the	national	interest’	
but	recognised	concern	about	the	flying	pickets	of	1972	at	a	time	when	Britain	was	sensitive	to	the	
physical	threats	posed	by	football	hooliganism.21	NUM	leaders	at	national	and	local	level	employed	a	
'strict	code	of	behaviour',	understood	as	'victory	without	violence',	aware	of	the	potential	damage	to	
the	miners’	well-earned	public	image.22	The	election	‘gave	the	miners	a	very	strong	motive	for	
behaving	so	as	to	dissipate	as	little	support	for	the	Labour	Party	as	possible.’23	The	miners’	media	
awareness,	in	contrast	to	unions	in	other	disputes,	and	their	responsiveness	to	the	election	
campaign	confirmed	the	continuance	of	a	complex	relationship	of	loyalty	to	the	Labour	Party,	
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154	
despite	the	embittered	experiences	of	1969.	The	Express,	frustrated	by	the	unions’	refusal	to	fulfil	its	
predictions,	suggested	that	because	television	was	the	source	from	which	‘most	of	the	electorate	is	
likely	to	get	its	impressions	of	policies	and	personalities’,	there	was	a	‘determined	effort	on	both	
sides	to	swamp	the	box	with	sweet	reasonableness’.24	This	demonstrated	the	kind	of	awareness	
about	the	influence	of	television	coverage	on	public	opinion,	and	cultivating	media	image,	which	
Edward	Heath	had	consistently	either	overlooked	or	ignored,	having	‘neither	the	time	nor	the	
inclination	to	indulge	in	such	fripperies’.	25	
	
Personalised	Coverage	and	Heath’s	U-turn	
Heath’s	media	conduct	was	significant	for	the	way	1974’s	events	were	understood.	1972	had	
provided	important	warnings	for	Heath	about	media	coverage,	beyond	his	apparent	distaste	for	
television	appearances	and	editorial	pandering.	Although	cases	of	controversy	involving	NUM	
members	were	more	widespread	in	1972,	this	was	often	glossed	over	as	a	response	to	incitement	
from	the	government.	The	Sun	referred	to	miners	as	‘only	playing	at	Ted’s	game’,	which	was	‘tough’	
and	‘unsentimental’,	with	the	suggestion	that	their	response	was	dictated	by	the	pressures	exerted	
on	workers	by	the	government’s	industrial	policy.26	The	Times	described	the	Government’s	response	
to	the	long-term	commercial	difficulties	facing	the	mining	industry	as	‘crude	and	hurtful’.27	The	
moralised	norms	of	the	tabloid	lexicon	were	utilised	to	the	miners’	benefit,	rather	than	the	
government’s,	playing	on	concepts	of	justice,	for	an	underpaid	and	hard-working	group	of	
employees,	and	victimhood,	with	the	miners	framed	as	‘the	unlucky	victims	of	a	national	confusion’	
surrounding	modernisation	and	economic	management.	28	These	were	the	same	sympathetic	
patterns	of	coverage	which	had	typified	the	media’s	response	to	cases	of	absenteeism	in	the	mining	
industry	in	the	1960s	and	reflected	the	public	respect	for	the	miners’	contribution	to	the	nation.	The	
varied	nature	of	the	public	support,	governed	largely	by	affluence	and	class	to	surprising	effect,	and	
the	subsequent	moderation	of	volatile	currents	of	opposition	and	support	by	newspapers,	is	
explored	further	in	the	analysis	which	follows.	However,	at	the	conclusion	of	the	1972	strike,	81	per	
cent	of	those	polled	supported	the	generous	pay	settlement	offered	by	the	independent	Wilberforce	
Report	and	52	per	cent	said	their	sympathies	lay	with	the	miners,	as	opposed	to	20	per	cent	for	
employers.29	Between	1972	and	1974,	the	public	increasingly	saw	the	responsibility	for	Britain’s	
economic	problems	as	a	governmental	one,	as	polls	reflected	an	11	per	cent	rise	in	those	blaming	
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the	government,	while	the	number	apportioning	blame	to	the	unions	dropped	by	8	per	cent.30	
Following	the	first	of	the	national	mining	strikes,	45	per	cent	of	respondents	said	that	their	
impression	of	Heath	had	‘gone	down’	as	a	result	of	his	handling	of	the	dispute.31		
	
With	Heath’s	government	struggling	in	the	polls	after	the	events	of	1972,	Britain	was	said	to	be	at	‘a	
stage	of	disillusionment’,	which	could	only	be	recovered	by	a	‘learning	government’.	32	Heath	
responded	to	such	demands	by	implementing	a	more	interventionist	policy,	a	‘near-sensational	shift	
from	one	end	of	the	political	stage	to	the	other’.	33	Demonstrated	through	the	statutory	incomes	
policy	and	the	nationalisation	of	Rolls	Royce,	this	change	in	policy,	despite	being	a	reversion	to	the	
post-war	norms	that	many	had	demanded,	only	served	to	increase	scrutiny	on	Heath.	The	fraught	
situation	in	the	coal	industry	in	the	winter	of	1973	prompted	the	Sun	to	ask	‘WHERE	IS	OUR	
CHURCHILL?’	in	a	situation	apparently	reminiscent	of	Dunkirk.	34	This	preoccupation	with	
‘Churchillism’	was	indicative	of	Britain’s	long-term	desire	for	a	leader	with	Churchill’s	rhetorical	skills	
and	formed	part	of	the	cult	of	personality	which	had	become	such	a	prominent	part	of	media	
coverage	since	the	war.35	Concern	about	a	lack	of	effective	leadership,	typical	of	earlier	coverage	of	
the	TUC,	albeit	for	different	reasons,	now	applied	to	a	Conservative	government	that	was	
traditionally	tough	on	union	issues.	In	Ana	Ines	Langer’s	post-war	research	of	this	personalisation	
trend	in	British	politics,	quantitative	analysis	showed	Heath	to	be	far	less	prominent	in	the	coverage	
of	the	Times	compared	to	his	predecessors,	as	he	lacked	the	‘leadership	style’	to	inspire	its	
journalists.36	According	to	the	Guardian,	Heath’s	‘cold,	remote	and	unsympathetic’	approach,	
illustrated	by	his	apparent	public	detachment,	‘made	him	an	easy	and	inviting	target	for	criticism’.37	
This	was	particularly	damaging	when	he	embarked	on	such	a	sharp	change	in	policy	direction.	It	was	
clear	from	an	early	stage	then	that	a	positive	outcome	for	Heath	during	any	case	of	perceptible	
national	crisis	in	1974	was	far	from	guaranteed.		
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Figure	5.1:	‘U-Turn’	articles	in	national	dailies	(1945-77)	
	
Figure	5.1,	an	overview	of	the	period,	demonstrates	a	surge	in	the	use	of	‘u-turn’	in	newspaper	
coverage	following	Heath’s	change	in	policy	direction.	Although	the	upturn	in	its	usage	was	most	
distinct	in	the	Guardian’s	reports,	all	three	of	the	newspapers	showed	an	upturn	of	varying	degrees,	
indicative	of	the	near-universal	attention	paid	to	Heath’s	political	changes,	and	the	stigma	
associated	with	them.	The	sustained	coverage	and	political	scrutiny	of	Heath’s	multiple	u-turns,	
defied	expectations	of	a	disproportionate	focus	on	unions	in	order	to	suggest	that	their	activities	
warranted	‘closer	scrutiny	than	those	of	employers	because	their	legitimacy	is	suspect’.38	This	
surprisingly	balanced	coverage	provided	the	Conservatives	with	problems	in	their	single-issue	
campaign,	as	it	did	not	exert	the	pressures	on	unionism	that	would	be	traditionally	expected.	It	is	
also	notable	that	its	use	continued	after	Heath’s	incumbency,	suggestive	of	continued	public	
disillusionment	with	British	political	leadership,	despite	a	change	in	government,	which	established	
an	important	foundation	for	shaping	Margaret	Thatcher’s	conviction	politics.		
	
Narrow	agendas	and	public	disillusionment	
The	narrow	agenda	of	the	election	campaign,	at	the	instigation	of	the	Conservatives,	also	influenced	
the	way	the	debate	swung	in	the	media.	Many	commentators	argued	that	Heath	had	been	
outmanoeuvred	on	the	central	campaign	issue,	as	he	had	been	‘forced	to	fight	on	ground	that	in	
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many	ways	favours	his	opponents’.39	This	perspective	suggested	that,	although	the	Conservative	
campaign	suggested	otherwise,	a	narrow	media	agenda	focused	on	the	industrial	situation,	contrary	
to	conventional	expectations,	put	the	government	at	a	strategic	disadvantage	in	fighting	the	
election.	This	was	despite	the	fact	Sydney	Jacobson	from	the	Mirror	had	‘advised	Heath	strongly’	
that	the	single	issue	of	trade	unions	would	fail	him	in	a	general	election.40	On	the	other	hand,	Alistair	
Hetherington,	Guardian	editor,	recalled	that	even	the	Labour	‘stalwarts’	amongst	the	Guardian’s	
staff	had	been	‘notably	reserved	in	their	view	of	the	Labour	alternative’,	without	‘real	confidence’	in	
Wilson,	and	suggested	that	had	it	not	been	for	the	Conservative’s	tax	policies,	‘the	Guardian	might	
well	have	supported	Heath’.41	More	than	simply	illustrating	the	severity	of	popular	political	
scepticism,	the	Guardian’s	support	for	Wilson	after	consideration	of	the	wider	political	agenda	
alluded	to	Heath’s	problem	had	he	chosen	to	fight	something	broader	than	a	single	issue	campaign	
based	on	the	threat	of	trade	unionism.	The	Express’s	frustration	with	the	fact	state-ownership	had	
turned	the	miners	case	into	a	‘political	football’	hinted	at	the	continued	divisiveness	of	strikes	in	
public	sector	industries.42	
	
Both	sides	of	the	so-called	battle	struggled	to	convince	their	traditional	support,	indicated	by	the	
lack	of	endorsements	in	the	build	up	to	the	general	election.	The	Guardian	described	the	recent	
transition	in	public	mood	as	‘scepticism’	to	‘political	cynicism’.43	There	was	clear	evidence	that	public	
disillusionment	had	begun	to	reach	beyond	the	government	and	towards	the	trade	unions,	with	the	
conflict	perceived	to	be	focussed	on	‘not	really	principle	so	much	as	politics,	conducted	above	the	
heads	of	the	people’.	44	Although	this	assessment	alluded	to	the	lack	of	threat	posed	by	miners	to	
the	national	interest,	it	also	reflected	the	continued	attempts	of	the	press	to	separate	industrial	
matters	from	political	ones,	as	a	means	of	delegitimising	industrial	action.	John	Cole	felt	that	by	this	
point	‘the	Zeitgeist’	was	beginning	to	turn	against	the	union	movement,	despite	the	lack	of	effective	
resolutions	from	the	Conservatives.45	Despite	public	anxiety	about	the	rise	of	militancy,	a	consistent	
theme	across	the	period	of	research,	there	was	a	concern	about	the	inability	of	either	side	to	
effectively	counter	such	issues,	which	were	allowed	to	slip	between	the	cracks	of	political	policy.	The	
Guardian	believed	the	Conservatives	thought	it	was	‘up	to	Labour	to	expose	and	counter	left-wing	
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subversion	of	unions,	and	Labour	politicians	hesitate	to	say	anything	which	may	embarrass	the	
unions’.46		
	
The	difference	in	political	perspectives	between	the	country’s	leading	newspapers,	or	more	precisely	
the	Sun’s	lack	of	a	clear	political	position,	had	a	decisive	impact	on	the	outcomes	of	1974.	Although	
1974	is	often	emphasized	because	it	was	the	first	time	Murdoch’s	Sun	endorsed	a	Conservative	
campaign,	this	was	a	very	tepid	recommendation,	which	referred	to	the	decision	for	the	electorate	
as	between	‘the	Devil	and	the	Deep	Blue	Sea’,	with	Labour	perceived	to	be	‘even	less	likely	to	have	
the	answers’	to	Britain’s	economic	problems.47	In	the	lead	up	to	1974’s	election	campaign,	the	Sun’s	
emphasis	on	the	likes	of	Page	Three,	lifestyle	columns	and	other	cultural	endeavours,	had	further	
reflected	and	responded	to	the	country’s	political	disengagement.	When	required	to	take	a	political	
position	in	the	electoral	context,	the	tenuousness	of	the	Sun’s	support	for	the	Conservatives	was	
summed	up	by	the	presence	of	columns	in	that	same	pre-election	issue	which	fell	on	the	side	of	
Labour	because	Wilson	would	‘just	have	to	do’	for	Britain.48	Moreover,	earlier	in	the	campaign,	the	
Sun	had	adjudged	that	the	election	had	been	‘fought	in	the	no-man’s	land	between	aspiration	and	
belief’	where	the	Labour	manifesto	was	‘marginally	more	believable’.49	This	disparity	also	referenced	
an	emerging	trend	in	media	coverage	which	consistently	saw	a	much	higher	proportion	of	editors	
back	the	Conservatives	than	the	public	or	journalists	more	widely.	According	to	1977’s	Royal	
Commission	on	the	Press,	there	was	only	a	three	per	cent	disparity	in	voting	trends	between	
journalists	and	the	public,	compared	to	a	12	per	cent	disparity	between	editors	and	the	public.50	This	
kind	of	discrepancy	highlighted	the	state	of	flux	that	existed	between	editorial	opinion	and	public	
opinion,	along	with	the	success	of	the	Sun	in	gaining	popularity	via	cultural	interests,	rather	than	
traditional	political	allegiances.	Whether	this	flux	was	a	symptom	of	editors’	unconvincing	and	
reluctant	approval	for	the	government,	or	a	signal	of	editors	pulling	their	readerships	in	new	political	
directions,	it	is	difficult	to	say.	However,	it	did	raise	questions	about	the	influence	of	editors	over	
both	journalists	and	the	public,	despite	the	lack	of	compelling	political	choices.	
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49	Sun,	13	February	1974,	p.	6.	
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Figure	5.2:	‘For	all	our	tomorrows’,	Daily	Mirror,	28	February	1974,	p.	1.	
	
In	contrast	to	the	Sun’s	tepid	response	to	the	political	stalemate	which	confronted	Britain	at	the	first	
of	Britain’s	1974	general	elections,	the	Mirror	adopted	a	committed	position	in	Labour’s	favour.	Its	
front	page	on	election	day,	absorbed	entirely	by	the	slogan	‘For	All	Our	Tomorrows,	Vote	Labour	
Today’	(Figure	5.2),	which	only	offered	an	editorial	explanation	of	‘the	way	ahead’	on	the	following	
page.51	This,	according	to	Goodman,	had	an	‘astonishing	impact’	on	the	election,	used	as	a	poster	by	
many	Labour	supporters,	with	‘more	impact	on	voters	than	any	other	national	newspaper	on	polling	
day’.52	Such	a	suggestion	that	one	headline	could	decisively	influence	the	general	election	pointed	to	
the	prevalence	of	floating	voters	at	that	time	and	the	volatility	of	public	opinion.	While	there	are	
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questions	about	the	neutrality	of	the	source	in	this	case,	the	paper’s	confidence	in	the	message	was	
demonstrated	by	the	duplication	of	that	poster	headline	for	October’s	general	election.	
	
Heath’s	snap	election	was	regarded	by	many	as	an	act	of	brinkmanship	but	the	single	issue,	‘Who	
Governs	Britain?’,	was	perhaps	Heath’s	greatest	problem.	While	the	Royal	Commission	on	the	Press	
adjudged	that	the	coverage	of	the	period	was	‘usually	disapproving	of	industrial	action’	and	
‘supportive	of	the	Government’,	facets	of	1974’s	media	response	certainly	brought	into	question	
such	judgements.53	In	order	for	the	narrow	agenda	of	the	campaign	to	be	beneficial	for	the	
government’s	electoral	aspirations,	it	seems	probable	that	Heath	needed	to	be	campaigning	from	a	
much	stronger	position,	particularly	in	terms	of	public	impressions	of	his	leadership	style,	against	a	
union	movement	which	failed,	from	Heath’s	point	of	view,	to	provide	a	more	physical,	foreboding	
threat	to	principles	of	democracy	and	governance.		
	
The	fact	public	support	for	strikes	showed	very	limited	change	between	1966	and	1974,	despite	
concern	about	the	extent	of	union	power,	suggested	that	little	had	changed	to	tip	the	delicate	
balance.54	Residual	sympathy	and	solidarity	with	miners,	based	on	a	persuasive	media	narrative	of	
victimhood	and	struggle,	also	undercut	Heath’s	attempts	to	frame	unions	as	a	threat	to	national	
governance.	As	the	Guardian	aptly	assessed,	any	Conservative	attempt	to	portray	the	miners	as	
against	‘the	people’	or	the	national	interest	was	perceived	‘as	the	miners	against	the	Government’,	
where	the	public	‘did	not	see	much	between	them’.55	This	was	exemplified	in	the	election	results.	
The	language	of	conflict	did	not	translate	into	a	threat	against	the	national	interest,	like	earlier	
conceptions	of	‘war’	in	an	industrial	context	had,	and	instead	simply	illustrated	the	lack	of	
compromise	between	government	and	unions.	If	1969	raised	serious	questions	about	Labour’s	
ability	to	assert	government	power	in	the	face	of	union	pressure,	1974	had	a	similar	impact	on	
perceptions	of	Conservative	trade	union	policy.	As	the	Guardian	said,	neither	party	had	‘produced	
an	answer	to	the	unlimited	power	to	disrupt	life	and	ultimately	paralyse	government’	but	
simultaneously	the	country	would	‘not	lightly	forgive’	the	party	‘unwilling	to	make	a	reasonable	
compromise’.56		
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The	Winter	of	Discontent:	New	Contexts	and	Debates	
The	final	politically-orientated	case	study	of	this	research	is	markedly	different	from	those	that	have	
preceded	it.	The	‘Winter	of	Discontent’	described	a	series	of	public	sector	strikes	in	a	number	of	
essential	services,	including	ambulance	workers	and	grave-diggers,	during	the	winter	of	1978-79,	
one	of	Britain’s	coldest	since	the	war.	Whereas	much	of	industrial	relations	coverage	before	1978-79	
is	relatively	unexplored,	as	this	research	has	shown,	James	Thomas	has	reflected	on	the	way	1979	
has	formed	the	‘centrepiece’	of	contemporary	mythology	which	views	the	1970s	as	‘a	period	of	
backwardness,	anarchy	and	industrial	militancy’.57	Contemporary	politicians	have	found	this	
mythology	to	be	immensely	profitable	for	their	own	agendas.	Outside	politics,	the	winter	of	1978-79	
has	been	the	focus	of	a	number	of	interesting	historical	monographs	which	seek	to	‘move	beyond	
the	provocative	and	one-dimensional	representations	in	order	to	understand	the	underlying	
complexity	of	the	forces	that	shaped	these	events’.58	However,	as	Colin	Hay	argues,	there	is	a	good	
case	that	this	mythologizing	process	was	not	‘chronologically	subsequent	to,	but	simultaneous	with,	
the	events’	and	shaped	they	were	lived	and	experienced.59	Although	these	strikes	were	not	
essentially	co-ordinated	between	different	services	and	were	far	from	nationwide,	these	strikes	
were	‘packaged’	by	the	media	as	symptomatic	of	a	crisis	of	government.	In	this	case,	the	question	is	
‘not	just	the	accuracy	of	that	construction’	but	‘how	the	events	were	understood	at	the	time’.60	This	
section	explores	the	structural	changes	to	the	media	sphere,	with	a	specific	focus	on	the	new	
political	influence	of	the	Sun,	which	transformed	the	forms	and	reception	of	industrial	relations	
coverage,	despite	notable	continuities.	Beyond	this,	it	analyses	and	reflects	on	the	responses	and	
behaviours	of	political	leaders	and	union	chiefs	to	these	changes	and	their	impact	on	the	national	
response	to	the	crisis.		
	
In	September	1978,	five	per	cent	of	those	polled	felt	that	strikes	were	Britain’s	‘most	urgent	
problem’	but	by	January	1979,	53	per	cent	believed	it	to	be	the	most	urgent	issue,	which	provided	a	
clear	indication	of	the	anxiety	surrounding	the	industrial	situation.61	Figure	5.3	indicates	how	
conceptions	of	some	kind	of	nationally	peculiar	illness	–	endemic	and	contagious	in	nature	–	had	
become	increasingly	popular	in	the	build	up	to	the	Winter	of	Discontent,	as	media	concern	grew.	
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Although,	the	roots	of	this	economic	and	industrial	declinism	were	established	during	the	1960s,	it	
was	after	Wilson’s	1975	election	success	that	this	conceptualisation	became	part	of	mainstream	
coverage.	The	influence	of	the	IMF	crisis	of	1976,	as	Callaghan’s	government	was	forced	to	borrow	
an	unprecedented	sum	of	money	from	the	International	Monetary	Fund,	should	also	not	be	
underestimated	in	intensifying	such	anxieties.	Although	it	was	‘less	traumatic’	than	the	Winter	of	
Discontent,	it	too	formed	an	important	watershed	in	economic	terms,	as	the	‘post-war	consensus	on	
how	the	economy	should	be	managed	broke	down’.	62	This	context	is	crucially	important	for	
understanding	the	events	of	1978-79,	as	well	as	the	economic	aspect	of	industrial	relations	more	
widely.	
	
	
Figure	5.3:	‘British	Illness’	and	‘British	Disease’	in	British	Dailies	(1960-80)	
	
Whilst	sceptical	of	the	impact	of	the	press	on	day-to-day	public	opinion,	Larry	Lamb,	editor	of	the	
Sun,	believed	it	was	‘distinctly	possible’	that	the	Sun	played	an	important	part	in	deposing	the	
Callaghan	government	in	1979	as	the	Sun	‘was	probably	talking	to	most	of	the	people	who	could	be	
persuaded	to	switch	political	allegiance’	rather	than	its	competitors	who	were	‘preaching	to	the	
converted’.63	Although	Lamb	has	proudly	reflected	on	the	success	of	the	‘Winter	of	Discontent’	
branding,	this	was	not	the	first	time	journalists	had	attempted	to	frame	industrial	action	in	this	
way.64	In	fact,	this	was	the	third	‘Winter	of	Discontent’	of	the	decade,	with	the	phrase	used	during	
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1972’s	miners	strike	and	the	three-day	weeks	of	1974,	when	the	impact	of	strikes	was	more	
widespread.	Why	did	this	label	become	so	widely	used	and	central	to	popular	understanding	of	that	
winter,	where	it	had	failed	to	gain	traction	before?	In	previous	cases	cited	by	Dave	Lyddon	from	the	
late	1960s	and	early	1970s,	‘instances	of	mountains	of	rubbish	and	unburied	corpses	did	not	attract	
much	opprobrium’,	which	indicates	that	the	mythology	of	1978-79	was	‘contingent	on	a	particular	
set	of	economic	and	political	circumstances’.65	In	light	of	these	exceptional	circumstances,	it	is	
important	that	this	research	seeks	to	situate	this	‘myth’	and	the	ensuing	crisis	within	the	wider	
media	context,	in	order	to	appreciate	not	just	how	the	nature	of	industrial	relations	coverage	
changed	to	provide	such	a	compelling	construction,	but	also	the	threads	of	continuity	and	stylistic	
legacies	that	it	built	upon.	In	light	of	this,	rather	than	covering	primary	sources	already	addressed	by	
the	likes	of	Colin	Hay	and	James	Thomas,	the	bulk	of	this	section	reflects	on	the	relationship	
between	the	analysis	from	the	vast	collection	of	secondary	material	related	to	the	Winter	of	
Discontent	and	the	trends	and	patterns	of	coverage	that	this	research	has	already	established.	This	
case	study	concludes	by	assessing	the	TUC’s	response	to	changes	in	the	media	immediately	before	
the	events	of	1978-9.	
	
Media	Change:	The	emergence	of	the	Sun		
The	media	context	played	a	significant	part	in	defining	the	Winter	of	Discontent	from	the	confined	
chaos	of	1974,	specifically	with	regards	to	the	new	competition	to	the	Mirror’s	dominance,	provided	
by	Rupert	Murdoch’s	Sun.	For	James	Curran	and	Jean	Seaton,	the	period	after	1974’s	general	
election	marks	the	transition	to	a	new	period	in	newspaper	history.	Between	the	two	winters	
analysed,	the	newspaper	industry	‘increased	partisanship	and	centralised	control’,	as	a	response	to	
the	‘growing	polarization	of	British	politics’	and	‘interventionist	proprietors’,	with	Murdoch	as	
perhaps	the	most	infamous	example.66	Following	its	re-launch,	the	Sun	found	great	success	in	
targeting	younger	audiences,	while	pushing	a	‘disrespectful,	anti-establishment,	entertainment-
driven	agenda’	which	‘dropped	the	serious	ambition	of	the	Daily	Mirror’.67	By	1978,	the	Sun’s	
cultural	popularity	of	the	early	1970s	had	provided	platform	and	audience	for	a	‘new	articulation	of	
the	sentiment	and	policies	of	the	right’	and	the	Mirror,	finally	beaten	in	the	circulation	stakes	that	
year,	found	it	increasingly	difficult	to	resist	the	Sun’s	right-wing	narratives.68	Whereas	the	Sun	had	
been	‘solidly	resistant	to	attempted	Conservative	Central	Office	manipulation’	and	had	only	
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provided	a	‘grudging’	endorsement	of	Heath	in	1974,	their	position	was	much	more	transparent	by	
1978.69	The	Sun’s	decision	to	‘preach	right-wing	economics,	day	after	day,	week	after	week’	would	
have	or	should	have,	in	Lamb’s	words,	driven	customers	‘back	into	the	arms	of	the	Mirror’.	70	
However,	the	opposite	happened	because	the	Sun	was	interested	‘not	only	in	politics,	but	in	beer	
and	skittles’.71	The	success	of	the	Sun’s	political	message,	seizing	upon	the	potential	for	political	
alternatives	provided	by	Thatcher,	was,	at	least	initially,	secondary	to	its	cultural	popularity.	
	
It	is	significant	that,	for	many	readers	of	the	Sun,	this	shift	in	political	allegiance	was	not	immediately	
discerned.	According	to	polling	from	1979,	only	seven	per	cent	of	its	readers	perceived	its	editorial	
line	to	be	‘Pro-Conservative’,	while	48	per	cent	of	Sun’s	readers	thought	of	the	paper	as	‘Pro-
Labour’.	72	Significantly,	45	per	cent	believed	the	paper	had	no	political	allegiance,	which	was	a	
significantly	higher	figure	than	the	readers	of	the	Mirror,	Express	and	Mail.73	This	perception	of	the	
paper	reflected	the	Sun’s	powerful	potential	to	convey	influential	partisan	messages	beyond	
conventional	political	boundaries	under	the	sheen	of	popular	consumerism.	
	
Under	commercial	pressure	from	the	Sun,	the	Mirror	was	frequently	‘indistinguishable	from	the	Tory	
press	in	its	partiality’,	to	the	point	where	many	readers	were	confused	about	the	paper’s	political	
allegiances.74	Goodman	remembered	Hugh	Cudlipp’s	1974	resignation	from	the	Mirror	as	‘a	trumpet	
call	to	a	Fleet	Street	revolution’.75	If	this	was	the	case,	by	the	late	1970s	that	revolution	was	well	
under	way.	The	language	of	trade	union	solidarity	no	longer	found	a	footing	within	the	Mirror’s	
lexicon,	as	they	argued	that	Moss	Evans,	the	new	TGWU	General	Secretary	was	not	a	‘crusader’	but	
instead	a	‘pied	piper’,	who	lead	members	down	a	path	to	‘destruction’.76		Once	again,	the	presence	
of	a	Labour	government	appeared	to	decisively	shape	the	paper’s	approach	to	union	coverage.	In	
that	same	front-page	article,	the	emphasis	was	placed	from	the	outset	on	Callaghan’s	trip	to	‘sunny	
Guadeloupe	tackling	the	world’s	problems’	and	the	implication	of	his	ignorance	to	the	problems	of	
‘Bleakest	Britain’,	where	the	Mirror	too	created	a	list	of	seemingly	interconnected	public	sector	
strikes.	The	Mirror	announced	that	Evans	had	‘declared	war	on	British	industry’,	where	‘the	effect	
will	be	devastating’,	as	it	declined	to	frame	the	strike	as	an	issue	between	the	TGWU	and	
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government.77	As	far	as	concepts	of	‘the	public’	were	concerned,	the	Mirror	sought	to	widen	the	
perceived	target	of	industrial	action,	to	more	than	an	internalised	difference	of	interests	between	
the	industrial	and	political	branches	of	the	labour	movement.		
	
Geoffrey	Goodman	recalled	the	Mirror’s	task,	the	‘only	voice’	presenting	a	‘reasoned,	balanced	
picture	of	an	appalling	state	of	affairs’,	as	an	‘impossible’	one,	which	took	all	of	the	skills	the	Mirror’s	
journalists	possessed,	and	‘many	[they]	didn’t’.78	The	Mirror’s	attempts	to	mediate	and	moderate	
trade	unionist’s	responses,	as	seen	in	the	mining	strikes,	became	increasingly	desperate,	as	they	
sought	to	protect	Labour’s	electoral	interests.	In	late	1978,	Mike	Molloy,	then	Mirror	editor,	was	
asked	by	Callaghan	to	have	a	conversation	with	Moss	Evans	about	the	avoidance	of	pay	claims	over	
the	coming	winter	but	Molloy	found	this	task	to	be	a	‘hopeless’	cause,	as	Evans	declined	to	make	
any	promises.79	Although	Molloy	recalled	a	warm	relationship	between	the	Mirror	and	Callaghan,	he	
conceded	that	by	1979	the	paper	was	‘loathed	by	the	far	left’,	including	the	IRA,	and	was	nicknamed	
‘the	Running	Dogs	of	Capitalism’	which	was,	according	to	Molloy,	‘perfectly	true’.80	Given	the	
increasing	militancy	of	trade	unions	during	this	time,	it	is	unsurprising	that	the	columns	of	the	Mirror	
had	waning	influence	over	industrial	action.	Whereas	the	likes	of	Goodman	had	felt	the	Mirror	had	
played	a	pivotal	role	in	determining	Britain’s	political	direction	in	1974,	it	was	forced	to	defer	to	the	
Sun	by	1979,	conceding	its	political	agenda	in	the	process.	
	
Even	the	BBC	was	criticised	for	the	way	it	was	perceived	to	adopt	the	frames	and	lines	of	
investigation	which	had	been	popular	in	the	partisan	press.	This	was	despite	the	BBC’s	establishment	
of	a	long-term	consultative	group	on	the	subject,	after	an	initial	trial	of	two	years,	which	took	
opinion	from	a	broad	range	of	unionists	and	industrial	journalists.	Norman	Willis,	then	TUC	Assistant	
General	Secretary,	at	a	meeting	of	the	BBC’s	Consultative	Group	on	Industrial	and	Business	Affairs,	
‘expressed	unease’	with	the	way	the	BBC	had	chosen	to	cover	the	winter’s	events,	particularly	the	
way	it	had	accepted	the	narrative	of	‘crisis’,	as	framing	it	as	one	‘was	to	take	up	an	attitude	towards	
it’.81	Hugh	Williams,	editor	of	the	BBC’s	Nationwide	Programme,	‘acknowledged	the	validity	of	some	
of	the	points’	made	by	Willis,	but	did	not	think	the	use	of	crisis	was	‘necessarily	a	misjudgement’	
because	many	‘ordinary	people’	used	the	word	and	Nationwide	was	a	‘popular	programme	which	
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had	to	grab	the	viewer’s	attention’.82	John	Cole,	who	also	sat	on	this	group,	accepted	that	the	media	
often	‘took	in	each	other’s	washing’,	with	the	events	of	1978-79	being	no	exception,	but	that	both	
major	television	networks	were	influenced	more	by	‘the	serious	press	than	by	mass	circulation	
papers’,	in	order	to	‘take	a	good	look	at	serious	issues’.83		
	
In	a	later	meeting	of	the	group,	Andrew	Taussig,	Special	Assistant	to	the	BBC	Director	of	News	and	
Current	Affairs,	expressed	a	comparable	matter	to	those	raised	against	the	unions’	enthusiasm	for	
documentaries	during	the	1960s.	Taussig	said	that	‘audiences	very	often	did	not	want	background	
features	and	analytical	pieces’	but	preferred	‘specific	stories’	about	ongoing	strikes.84	It	appeared	
that	while	the	BBC	had	clearly	made	an	effort	to	make	sure	it	maintained	its	commitments	to	
neutrality,	it	often,	by	the	very	nature	of	British	media	dynamics,	absorbed	many	of	the	frames	of	
reference	utilised	by	the	national	media.	In	order	for	coverage	to	appeal	to	audiences	and	engage	
with	their	primary	concerns,	the	BBC’s	coverage	of	the	winter	of	discontent	was	forced	to	at	least	
mention	the	predominant	frames	of	reference.	
	
Beyond	the	Sun’s	emerging	popularity,	strikes	within	the	newspaper	industry	also	had	a	significant	
impact	on	the	attitude	of	journalists	and,	more	importantly,	editors.	In	1978,	strikes	by	printers	at	
the	Times	forced	the	newspaper	to	close	for	almost	a	year,	while	strikes	at	the	BBC	were	only	
avoided	through	a	generous	pay	deal	negotiated	shortly	before	the	events	of	the	Winter	of	
Discontent.	John	Cole	had	already	developed	concerns	about	the	impact	of	strike	action	on	the	
Guardian’s	1974	election	coverage,	convinced	that	the	union’s	‘follies	washed	off	on	the	papers’	
attitudes	to	trade	unionism	as	a	whole’.85	Reflecting	on	the	impact	of	industrial	action	in	newspaper	
production,	Larry	Lamb	concluded	that:		
Anyone	who	had	suffered	as	we	had,	physically,	financially	and	emotionally,	at	the	hands	of	the	
politically	motivated	thugs	who,	though	few	in	number,	had	dominated	so	many	Fleet	Street	
branches	for	so	long,	could	hardly	be	expected	to	support	a	political	party	which	more	and	more	
seemed	dedicated	to	the	proposition	that	the	trade	unions	were	themselves	an	arm	of	
government.86		
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This	sort	of	attitude	confirmed	the	significance	of	the	newspaper	editors’	experience	as	consumers	
and	employers,	actively	enduring	industrial	action,	rather	than	purely	as	mediators	and	reporters	of	
strikes.	As	print	unions	had	become	more	militant,	editorial	attitudes	had	hardened.	Moreover,	this	
quotation	provided	clear	evidence	of	the	longevity	of	the	binary	perceptions	of	political	and	
industrial	picketing,	and	the	supposed	boundary	between	them,	as	a	means	of	legitimation.	
Whereas	newspapers	of	the	1950s	could	criticise	the	busmen’s	political	strikes	as	a	worrying	
exception,	strikes	with	political	motivations,	whether	by	miners,	gravediggers	or	printing	
technicians,	were	increasingly	understood	as	the	norm.	Strikes	were	perceived	as	inherently	
political,	even	when	they	had	‘economic’	motivations	such	as	the	rejection	of	pay	restraint.	
	
The	TUC	response:	‘Strikes	are	more	appealing	than	sex’	
In	stark	contrast	to	the	dynamic	media	landscape,	the	TUC’s	response	to	this	rapidly	shifting	media	
atmosphere	was	ponderous.	The	TUC	hierarchy	clearly	recognised	the	tabloid	preoccupation	with	
covering	strikes,	as	evidenced	in	an	article	written	by	the	TUC’s	Press	and	Publications	Department	
in	1970	for	the	National	Graphical	Association’s	journal,	in	which	it	was	adjudged	that	‘to	some	of	
the	papers,	strikes	are	more	appealing	than	sex’.87	The	General	Secretary	of	the	National	Society	of	
Operative	Printers	Graphical	and	Media	Personnel	(NATSOPA),	Dick	Briginshaw,	wrote	to	Vic	Feather	
warning	him	of	the	‘illusion	to	believe	that	because	Press	reporters	are	often	good	trade	unionists	
this	is	a	safeguard’	and	the	second	‘illusion’	of	editorial	freedom	because	of	the	influence	of	
‘controlling	witch-doctors’,	newspaper	owners.88	However,	although	the	problem	was	highlighted	
attention	at	the	1971	Congress	and	resolutions	were	passed	at	the	1974	and	1975	regarding	the	
issue,	relatively	little	progress	was	made	until	the	late	1970s,	despite	TUC	awareness	of	the	GMG’s	
research.89		The	TUC’s	monitoring	group	eventually	met	in	December	1978	and	the	first	serious	
output	from	TUC	monitoring	was	a	critical	and	well-argued	report	on	the	coverage	of	the	Winter	of	
Discontent,	although	the	increasingly	complicated	loyalty	of	the	TUC	to	the	incumbent	Labour	
government	discouraged	members	from	publishing	the	report	before	the	1979	election.	According	
to	meeting	minutes	from	March	1979,	both	Geoffrey	Goodman	and	Terrence	Lancaster	had	advised	
that	while	the	report	was	worthy	of	publication,	doing	so	before	the	election	would	‘merely	draw	
attention	to	the	difficulties	experienced	this	winter	and	would	not	serve	the	purpose	the	Group	
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intended’.90	Unsurprisingly,	this	blunted	the	impact	of	the	TUC’s	research	but	illustrated	the	complex	
and	compromised	political	position	which	hindered	the	TUC’s	approach.		
	
Moreover,	this	emphasis	on	research,	part	of	what	Paul	Manning	describes	as	‘media	pressure	
politics’	and	a	common	strategy	for	trade	unions	worldwide,	was	underpinned	by	a	number	of	
hurdles	for	the	TUC	in	pursuing	the	media	more	directly.91	One	company	wrote	to	the	TUC	to	offer	
‘television	acclimatisation	courses’	for	unionists,	in	order	to	help	unionists	present	their	‘cases	
effectively	and	authoritatively’	during	television	interviews.92	Once	this	letter	was	forwarded	to	the	
TUC	General	Secretary,	he	suggested	that	only	a	‘small	pilot	scheme	might	be	worth	considering’	
and	preferred	‘some	quiet	enquiries’	to	be	made	to	the	BBC	about	assistance	in	this	regard.93	When	
the	company’s	proposal	was	discussed	amongst	TUC	staff,	it	recognised	the	problem	of	‘noisy,	
aggressive	shop	stewards	all	talking	at	once’	on	television	but	felt	this	would	have	to	be	‘put	up	with	
from	time	to	time’.	In	another	case,	a	former	employee	of	the	BBC	wrote	to	Jack	Jones,	then	General	
Secretary	of	the	TGWU,	convinced	that	the	trade	union	movement	was	in	‘desperate	need’	of	‘able	
publicity’	for	its	‘much	misrepresented	cause’,	a	need	which	he	was	willing	to	support,	given	that	the	
BBC	in	particular	were	not	‘willing	to	tackle	the	subject	of	industrial	relations	in	the	proper	analytical	
manner’.94	Although	Jack	Jones	forwarded	Glyn	Jones’s	offer	onto	Len	Murray,	TUC	General	
Secretary,	Murray’s	response	lacked	urgency,	offering	to	have	a	chat	with	Jones	‘if	at	some	time	you	
are	in	the	vicinity	with	some	time	to	spare’.95		
	
These	two	examples,	amongst	many	similar	ones,	provide	a	clear	illustration	of	both	the	TUC’s	
hesitancy	to	confront	such	problems,	along	with	the	organisation’s	apparent	dependence	on	long-
established	links	with	the	BBC.	This	relationship,	which	bordered	on	deference	at	times,	persisted	
despite	concerns	from	its	own	former	employees	about	the	BBC’s	ability	to	represent	the	union	
movement’s	case	appropriately	and	effectively.	To	compound	this	problem,	the	TUC	continued	to	
push	a	media	agenda	to	the	BBC	that	was	of	diminishing	attraction	to	the	increasingly	competitive,	
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ratings-driven	television	sphere.	In	drafting	questions	for	a	meeting	with	BBC	representatives,	
intended	to	‘explore	ways	in	which	closer	contact	can	be	established’,	the	TUC	asked	the	BBC	to	
consider	‘more	programmes	in	which	trade	union	spokesmen	give	information	broadcasts	on	
matters	of	trade	union	concern’,	with	topics	such	as	‘the	Employment	Protection	Act’,	‘Health	and	
Safety	at	work’	and	‘Industrial	Democracy’.96	Although	this	sort	of	accommodation	and	collaboration	
was	perhaps	the	best	strategy	for	the	TUC	to	employ	in	such	a	toxic	media	atmosphere,	it	showed	
little	awareness	of	broader	public	interests	or	the	commercial	pressure	on	BBC	directors.	
	
Explaining	the	trade	union	movement’s	hesitancy	to	tackle	these	problems	is	more	difficult	and	was	
likely	about	more	than	limited	financial	resources.	Although	finance	would	have	influenced	the	
TUC’s	ability	to	counter	negative	coverage	through	a	nationwide	advertising	campaign,	it	does	not	
explain	the	reluctance	to	engage	with	the	issues	through	other,	less	demanding,	means.	In	a	1977	
statement	at	a	special	TUC	conference	on	the	media,	Len	Murray	hit	on	a	central	problem	for	trade	
union	media	coverage	which	was	that	union	members	continued	to	‘obtain	their	impressions	of	the	
Movement	and	information	about	it	from	the	media	first	and	from	their	own	official	sources	later’,	
despite	good	internal	communications.97	Murray	urged	that	the	TUC	could	no	longer	regard	itself	as	
‘a	club	or	a	secret	society	whose	affairs	are	closed	to	the	outside	world’	but	that	did	not	mean	it	had	
to	‘accept	passively’	the	way	unions	were	reported	in	the	press	and	urged	the	need	for	training.98	
Whether	Murray	could	have	expected	to	have	a	considerable	impact	on	such	attitudes	is	certainly	
dubious,	given	the	erosion	of	centralised	TUC	authority	since	the	late	1950s.	However,	Murray’s	
statement	suggested	that	there	was	growing	concern	amongst	the	TUC’s	hierarchy	that	union	
communications	had	been	too	insular	or	introspective	as	a	result	of	an	underlying	scepticism	and	
animosity	towards	the	mainstream	media,	referring	to	those	in	the	wider	movement	who	felt	there	
was	a	‘conscious	conspiracy’	by	the	media	against	the	labour	movement.		
	
Callaghan’s	role	in	perceptions	of	crisis	
The	political	climate	changed	significantly	in	the	period	between	1974’s	strikes	and	the	unrest	of	
1978-79.	1974	ushered	in	another	Labour	government	confident	that	it	could	resolve	industrial	
tension	through	the	heralded	Social	Contract,	and	provide	the	leadership	that	Heath	had	lacked	in	
an	increasingly	fraught	economic	situation.	By	1978-79,	economic	policy	change	prompted	by	the	
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IMF	crisis	had	‘both	intellectually	and	practically	demolished	consensus	politics’,	as	the	government	
wrestled	with	inflation	and	internal	division	through	public	sector	cuts.99	The	relationship	between	
Labour	government	and	the	unions	steadily	broke	down	as	the	compulsory	incomes	policy	triggered	
an	‘ultimate	disintegration	which	was	damaging	both	in	terms	of	individual	strike	action	and	
consensus	politics’,	a	process	for	which	1978-79	symbolised	the	previously	‘unthinkable’	and	final	
straw.100	The	contrast	between	these	two	periods	of	industrial	unrest	was	significant,	not	for	a	
change	in	government,	but	a	radical	change	in	Labour’s	policy	approach.	
	
However,	just	as	in	1974,	the	significance	of	personality	politics	in	defining	the	coverage	of	the	
Winter	of	Discontent	should	not	be	underestimated.	As	Hay	highlighted,	the	tabloid	media	
juxtaposed	‘the	activity	and	decisiveness	of	Thatcher	with	the	complacency,	arrogance	and	
indecision	of	the	Prime	Minister’,	including	the	false	attribution	of	the	‘Crisis?	What	Crisis?’	response	
to	Callaghan,	a	phrase	which	became	part	of	the	‘new	political	lexicon’.101	The	Mail	devoted	an	
entire	page	to	unpicking	‘the	quotes	of	the	crisis’	from	union	leaders	and	Labour	politicians,	
described	as	‘the	mad,	sad	things	they	said	while	Britain	went	mad’,	and	included	four	less-than-
complimentary	pictures	of	Callaghan	across	the	page.102	Similarly,	the	Express	published	a	full-length	
Cummings	caricature	of	an	emaciated	and	cowering	Callaghan,	accompanied	by	the	accusatory	
headline	‘NOTHING	UP	HIS	SLEEVE’	(Figure	5.4).103	As	this	research	has	shown,	the	personalisation	of	
politics	was	of	increasing	and	long-established	significance	to	industrial	relations	coverage,	having	a	
decisive	impact	on	public	perceptions	on	the	likes	of	Frank	Cousins,	Barbara	Castle,	and	Edward	
Heath.	In	this	regard,	the	focus	on	personality	was	nothing	particularly	new.	However,	this	did	not	
mean	that	Margaret	Thatcher’s	emergence	as	a	forceful	political	personality	was	any	less	significant,	
as	she	capitalised	on	the	media’s	preoccupation	and	increasing	public	concern.		
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Figure	5.4:	‘Nothing	up	his	sleeve!’,	Daily	Express,	19	January	1979,	p.	1.	
	
Aside	from	emphasising	Callaghan’s	geographical	detachment	in	Barbados,	the	Mail	sought	to	
isolate	‘the	ostrich	Prime	Minister’	from	the	public	in	terms	of	perception	and	mentality,	as	‘the	only	
man	in	Britain	who	does	not	see	a	crisis’,	as	he	had	‘petulantly’	dismissed	the	crisis	as	‘parochial	
hysteria’.104	The	Mail	intensified	criticism	of	Callaghan’s	leadership	by	contrasting	him	against	his	
own	‘iron-fisted’	Chancellor,	Denis	Healey,	who	‘barged	into	the	union-Government	furore	last	
night’.105	The	determination	to	isolate	Callaghan	from	the	industrial	situation	extended	to	his	
relationship	with	his	own	colleagues,	seemingly	disconnected	from	the	priorities	of	his	political	
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allies.	A	common	complaint	or	inference	during	1974’s	general	election	was	a	lack	of	democratic	
alternatives,	that	few	could	see	the	advantage	of	one	party	over	another	in	dealing	with	the	‘trade	
union	problem’.	In	such	a	context,	Thatcher’s	commitment	to	the	conviction	politics	which	Heath	
had	deserted	in	1972,	to	much	ridicule,	was	powerful	in	remoulding	the	media	landscape.	In	
February	1979,	in	the	midst	of	the	supposed	crisis,	Thatcher	enjoyed	a	10	point	surge	in	approval	
ratings	as	leader	of	the	Opposition	to	a	height	which	Heath	had	not	experienced	in	that	role	since	
1966,	while	Callaghan	endured	dissatisfaction	from	58	per	cent	of	respondents,	not	suffered	by	a	
Prime	Minister	since	Heath	in	1971.106	Although	personal	approval	levels	returned	to	normal	after	
the	strikes,	it	appeared	that	this	episode	had	an	important	impact	on	the	way	the	public	perceived	
Callaghan’s	strength	of	leadership.	
	
Newspaper	content	and	the	balance	of	coverage	
With	the	structural	influences	established,	which	partially	account	for	the	Winter	of	Discontent’s	
exceptional	influence,	it	is	important	to	further	illuminate	the	patterns	of	coverage	of	the	Winter	of	
Discontent.	There	were	important	continuities	in	the	approaches	employed	in	reporting	industrial	
news,	although	exogenous	pressures	intensified	the	communication	and	perception	of	these	
conventional	features.	The	cumulative	influence	of	focussed	coverage	over	the	previous	decade	
should	not	be	underestimated	in	contributing	to	this	climax	of	political	tensions.		
	
The	specific	sectors	where	industrial	action	took	place	made	media	coverage	in	1979	particularly	
powerful.	The	strikes	primarily	took	place	in	industries	with	a	long	history	of	public	and	press	
preoccupation.	As	the	GMG	reflected	in	1976,	television	and	tabloid	coverage,	as	opposed	to	the	
‘quality	papers’,	had	developed	a	‘highly	specific	focus	upon	chosen	disputes	within	some	sectors’	
which	meant	that	there	was	a	‘tendency	to	overstate	contextually	the	significance	of	disputes	
isolated	in	this	way’.107	This	was	particularly	true	when	the	popular	press	failed	to	provide	updates	
on	dispute	progress	or	its	resolution.	Moreover,	the	effect	of	this	narrow	focus	was	intensified	by	
the	disproportionate	front-page	coverage	provided	to	the	1978-79	strikes.	Between	the	beginning	of	
December	1978	and	the	end	of	February	1979	(the	peak	of	industrial	hostility),	the	Express,	Mail	and	
Mirror	devoted	between	43	per	cent	and	46	per	cent	of	their	front-page	lead	stories	to	either	
industrial	action	itself	or	issues	directly	related	to	strikes,	such	as	pay	claims.	In	January	1979	
specifically,	this	percentage	was	much	higher,	with	more	than	two	thirds	of	the	Mirror’s	front-page	
headlines	devoted	to	these	issues.	This	represented	a	kind	of	intense	scrutiny	which	the	industrial	
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sphere	had	rarely	experienced	before.	Even	where	strikes	were	not	the	focus	of	front	pages,	lead	
stories	were	primarily	focussed	on	the	IRA	bomb	threat	or	the	winter’s	infamous	blizzards,	
enhancing	narratives	of	assault	and	confrontation.		
	
Although	explaining	the	imbalance	of	industrial	focus	was	complex,	the	GMG	suggested	that	much	
of	the	focus	on	transport,	communications	and	public	services,	as	opposed	to	their	long-established	
interest	in	the	car	industry,	was	derived	from	a	‘concern	for	the	inconvenienced	consumer	of	goods	
and	services’	which	provided	problems	for	the	production	of	coverage	which	did	not	‘implicitly,	at	
least,	blame	those	groups	who	precipitate	action	that,	in	one	way	or	another,	is	defined	as	
“disruptive”.’108	Essentially,	labour	interference	in	patterns	of	consumerism	was	established	as	a	
driving	force	behind	the	media’s	industrial	agenda	long	before	1978.	This	interest	was	hardly	
surprising	given	the	tabloids’	status	as	vehicles	for	consumption:	the	Sun	regularly	placed	material	
encouraging	consumption	‘at	the	centre	of	its	editorial	agenda’	and	both	the	Mirror	and	the	Sun	
encouraged	its	readers	to	‘define	themselves	by	what	they	consumed’.109	As	Lyddon	has	already	
established,	industrial	strife	in	the	sectors	under	scrutiny	during	the	Winter	of	Discontent	was	
nothing	new.	In	the	case	of	grave	diggers,	strikes	had	‘always	happened’,	including	the	pre-war	
years,	and	the	‘dirty	jobs’	strike	in	1970	posed	a	much	greater	threat	to	public	health	than	1978-79,	
in	the	absence	of	arctic	conditions.110	As	this	research	has	shown,	the	1958	bus	strike,	although	
coordinated	in	a	very	different	political	climate,	was	also	principally	covered	as	an	issue	of	
widespread	public	inconvenience,	indicative	of	a	thread	of	continuity	to	media	attention.	In	many	
ways	then,	the	Winter	of	Discontent	built	on	these	preoccupations,	at	a	time	when	threats	to	
consumerism	were	high	on	the	media	agenda.	The	specific	conditions	and	circumstances	gave	the	
focus	of	the	industrial	agenda	new	significance.		
	
Beyond	the	specific	focuses	of	coverage,	there	were	key	similarities	in	the	emphases	of	reporting	
between	1978-9	and	the	industrial	coverage	which	had	preceded	it.	In	the	case	of	1975’s	Glasgow	
Rubbish	Strike,	‘the	framework	used	concentrated	on	issues	other	than	the	conflict	between	
Glasgow	Corporation	and	their	employees’	with	a	clear	focus	on	its	status	as	a	health	hazard,	which	
was	‘established	as	the	initial	focus	of	the	coverage,	even	before	the	dumps	had	been	created’.111	
BBC1	made	use	of	library	film	of	rubbish	dumps	from	a	previous	strike,	seven	weeks	before	the	
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Corporation	announced	a	health	hazard	existed.112	The	media’s	tendency	to	make	predictions	in	
order	to	reinforce	‘moral	panics’	has	been	underlined	by	Stanley	Cohen,	who	contended	that	these	
predictions	are	commonly	fulfilled	by	media	reports,	even	if	it	means	coverage	of	‘non-events’,	as	
‘discrepancies	between	expectations	and	reality	are	resolved	by	emphasizing	those	new	elements	
which	confirm	expectations’.113	Despite	1978-79’s	record	cold	temperatures	curbing	any	real	threat,	
ITV	reporting	of	the	dustmen’s	strike	shared	the	same	emphasis.	Rather	than	providing	any	detail	of	
the	grievances,	and	while	accepting	‘officially	there	is	no	health	hazard’,	ITV	reports	from	February	
broadcast	shots	of	rubbish	cluttering	parks	and	noted	that	health	officers	had	laid	rat	bait.	ITV	
highlighted	‘the	many	pavements	that	are	already	partly	blocked,	not	only	with	more	hygienic	plastic	
bags	but	also	with	cardboard	boxes	dripping	with	food	scraps’,	showing	close-ups	of	the	most	
unpleasant	cases.114		
	
Similarly,	a	focus	on	‘voxpops’	and	assimilating	the	public’s	thoughts	on	strikes	was	nothing	new	to	
television	coverage.	During	the	winter	of	1978-79,	voxpops	were	collated	to	reflect	public	distaste	
for	the	inconvenience	caused	by	the	rail	strike,	with	a	focus	purely	on	their	challenges	in	getting	to	
work	than	on	the	strike	itself.115	A	few	days	later,	ITN	also	provided	voxpops	to	punctuate	their	
report	on	‘panic	buying’,	again	reflecting	a	focus	on	the	inconvenience	to	consumers,	despite	the	
fact	supermarket	business	had	not	risen	‘as	much	as	they	had	expected’.116	Early	research	found	this	
was	common	thread	of	coverage	as	early	as	the	1950s,	and	it	was	certainly	commonplace	by	the	
1970s.	The	GMG’s	study	found	that	the	majority	of	voxpops	on	television	news	occurred	in	the	
industrial	relations	field,	with	the	use	of	experts	below	average,	along	with	a	‘tendency	to	seek	
“photogenic	discord”	which	characterises	industrial	coverage’,	as	opposed	to	business	news	where	
experts	were	used	‘with	relatively	frequency’	and	spokesmen	for	management	outnumbered	labour	
spokesmen.117	In	terms	of	both	patterns	and	focuses	of	coverage,	the	Winter	of	Discontent	showed	
considerable	continuity	from	previous	cases,	which	capitalised	on	public	interest	and	expectation.	
	
Stylistically	and	linguistically	there	were	other	important	continuities,	in	both	press	and	television,	
but	the	political	context	and	controversial	nature	of	public	sector	strikes	gave	these	linguistic	
conventions	new	meaning.	As	the	research	on	the	1960s	in	particular	reflected,	morality	had	
become	an	important	part	in	delegitimising	strike	action	and	this	aspect	intensified	in	the	coverage	
																																																						
112	Ibid.,	p.	245.	
113	Cohen,	Folk	Devils	and	Moral	Panics,	pp.	26-27.	
114	ITV	Evening	News,	3	February	1979.	
115	ITV	Evening	News,	9	January	1979.	
116	ITV	Evening	News,	12	January	1979.	
117	Glasgow	Media	Group,	Bad	News,	p.	138.	
	
	
175	
of	1978-79.	However,	although	concepts	of	conscience	and	greed	were	already	well	established,	
these	absorbed	new	meaning	in	the	face	of	strikes	amongst	hospital	workers	and	ambulancemen.	
This	language	was	particularly	pertinent	during	industrial	action	on	Britain’s	children’s	wards	as	the	
Mirror	published	a	front	page	plea,	‘Don’t	let	the	children	suffer’,	evoking	the	themes	of	victimhood	
which	had	been	utilised	by	the	same	newspaper	in	favour	of,	rather	than	against,	strikers	in	1974.118	
The	Mail	depicted	the	same	strikes	as	reflective	of	the	‘callowness	shown	towards	patients	by	
pickets’.119	One	nurse	interviewed	by	ITN	at	Great	Ormond	Street	hospital	explained	that	she	had	
torn	up	her	NUPE	membership	card	because	she	did	not	feel	she	could	do	her	job	‘in	all	conscience’	
while	she	belonged	to	a	union	which	was	‘trying	to	disrupt	care’.120	The	prominence	of	her	interview,	
compared	to	striking	unionists	who	were	merely	quoted,	reflected	an	imbalance	to	the	coverage,	
while	her	use	of	language	illustrated	the	pervasiveness	of	such	moralised	motifs	during	the	strike.	In	
the	case	of	the	ambulance	strike,	ITV	commentary	suggested	that	such	a	strike,	‘born	out	of	anger’,	
was	‘something	that	their	consciences	had	never	allowed	before’.121	This	coverage	further	
demonstrated	a	trend	apparent	in	the	tabloids	that	the	traditional	allegiances	and	loyalties	of	the	
British	public	for	brave	nurses,	a	similar	one	to	the	respect	for	the	miners	that	was	present	in	1974,	
could	now	be	utilised	to	buttress	criticism	for	industrial	action.	
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Figure	5.5:	‘The	Sick	Men	at	the	Gate’,	Daily	Mail,	7	December	1978,	p.	1.		
	
Along	with	gravediggers,	this	rash	of	hospital	strikes	meant	that	issues	of	morality	could	be	shaped	
into	powerful	issues	of	life	and	death,	with	trade	unions	as	the	greatest	threat.		The	Mail	even	drew	
parallels	between	union	‘bully-boys’	and	‘Hitler’s	brown	shirts’	(Figure	5.5),	in	reference	to	their	
attitude	towards	strike-affected	cancer	patients.122	This	not	only	reflected	the	merciless	attitude	of	
strikers	but	also	anxiety	about	the	authoritarian	and	anti-democratic	power	exerted	by	unions	at	
picket	lines.		
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Black	and	Pemberton	have	rightly	highlighted	that	Stanley	Cohen’s	theory	of	moral	panics,	given	its	
focus	on	groups	that	are	considered	a	threat	to	societal	values,	has,	despite	its	problems,	a	‘broader	
relevance’	to	studies	of	the	1970s,	beyond	Cohen’s	purely	cultural	emphasis.123	This	is	clear	in	a	
number	of	aspects,	beyond	the	simple	creation	of	ominous	predictions.	Cohen	theorised	that	‘the	
very	reporting	of	certain	“facts”	can	be	sufficient	to	generate	concern,	anxiety,	indignation	or	
panic’.124		When	this	analysis	is	juxtaposed	against	the	research	conducted	by	James	Thomas	to	
highlight	the	deliberately	exaggerated	or	oversimplified	the	reports	of	the	Winter	of	Discontent,	it	is	
clear	what	an	important	impact	this	may	well	have	had	on	the	situation.	Thomas	has	highlighted	
how	only	a	sixth	of	lorry	drivers	went	on	strike,	only	two	and	a	half	per	cent	of	schools	were	closed	
in	the	UK	due	to	the	caretakers’	action,	and	the	number	of	days	lost	in	strikes	was	relatively	minor,	
far	exceeded	by	previous	episodes	and	the	engineering	strikes	under	the	new	Conservative	
government	later	that	year.125	Again,	this	was	not	particularly	novel,	as	exaggeration	and	
simplification	were	rising	trends	in	the	new	tabloid	scene,	but	the	boundaries	were	pushed	to	a	new	
level	in	the	way	strikes	were	now	applied	to	matters	of	life	and	death.	Even	the	reporting	of	
verifiable	facts	were	problematic,	such	as	the	50	cancer	patients	sent	home	due	to	hospital	strikes,	
as	they	were	framed	under	controversial	headlines	such	as	‘Life	or	Death	Picket’,	alongside	
interviews	with	infuriated	doctors	who	insisted	it	was	‘inevitable’	that	short-term	absences	would	
mean	‘some	people	will	lose	their	lives’.126	Similarly,	the	links	drawn	between	strikes	in	disconnected	
areas	were	already	apparent	in	1975,	as	the	dustmen’s	dispute	was	linked	to	the	ambulance	
controllers’	dispute	as	early	as	the	second	day,	and	this	trend	to	continued.127	ITN	used	their	
coverage	to	place	strikes	in	different	sectors	together	in	one	report,	starting	with	schools,	moving	
through	to	strikes	in	care	homes	and	ending	with	cemeteries,	playing	on	the	moralised	‘life	and	
death’	narratives	already	established	in	the	press.128	This	integration	of	separate	strikes	into	a	wider	
union	‘conspiracy’	was	a	central	principle	to	the	crisis	narrative.	
	
In	the	same	vein,	the	media’s	evocation	of	conflict	motifs	was	nothing	new,	particularly	through	
introspective	language	which	reoriented	the	position	of	‘the	other’	from	foreign	competitors	to	the	
‘enemy	within’,	as	was	evident	during	the	1974	miners’	strikes.	The	Royal	Commission	on	the	Press	
concurred	that	by	1977	there	was	a	clear	tendency	for	‘conflict	themes	to	be	more	frequently	
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invoked	than	others’.129	However,	while	many	had	commented	on	the	miners’	discipline	regarding	
physical	violence	in	1974,	there	were	now	new	concerns	about	the	physical	threat	posed	by	large-
scale	industrial	action.	The	attendance	of	miners	at	the	year-long	Grunwick	strike	in	1977,	described	
by	Margaret	Thatcher	as	the	‘Ascot	of	the	Left’,	crystallised	concerns	about	trade	union	respect	for	
law	and	order,	as	industrial	action	at	a	film-processing	works	attracted	media	attention	for	violent	
confrontations.130	The	Times	argued	that	an	assault	on	a	police	officer	at	Grunwick	illustrated	a	lack	
of	respect	for	police	authority	and	threatened	Britain’s	‘social	equilibrium’.	131	More	broadly,	as	
Richard	Clutterbuck	analysed,	the	‘major	lessons’	from	the	Grunwick	episode	concerned	the	law,	
particularly	the	‘strong	public	reaction	against	the	interference	of	students	and	other	politically	
motivated	demonstrators’	in	industrial	conflict.132	Clutterbuck’s	research	on	the	‘growth	of	political	
violence’	in	1977	encapsulated	the	sense	of	public	anxiety	about	such	trends	in	popular	culture,	not	
just	in	industrial	relations.		
	
The	influence	of	other	issues,	most	notably	football	hooliganism	and	the	punk	movement,	
intensified	public	concern	about	violence.	Although	the	TGWU	attempted	to	exert	pressure	to	get	
The	Sex	Pistols	dropped	from	their	record	label,	the	punk	movement	was	associated	with	the	same	
phenomenon	as	trade	unionists,	when	‘the	punk	message	of	anarchy,	pop	and	violence	occasionally	
seemed	very	literal	due	to	the	few	incidents	where	anarchy	and	violence	were	made	explicit’.133	
Stuart	Hall	noted	how	the	British	media	at	that	time	simplified	and	stigmatised	the	explanations	for	
football	hooliganism,	in	order	to	‘whip	up	public	feeling	about	it’,	and	legitimise	strict	law	and	order	
agendas.134	The	threat	posed	by	industrial	action	in	1979	applied	to	law	breaking	beyond	basic	
violence.	Following	Arthur	Scargill’s	public	endorsement	of	out-lawed	secondary	picketing,	the	
Mirror	declared	this	as	approval	for	‘the	rule	of	the	mob’,	as	Scargill’s	comments	made	frontpage	
news	under	the	headline	‘Defy	the	Law’.135	Industrial	action	was	not	commonly	violent	during	the	
Winter	of	Discontent	but	the	right-wing	press,	evidenced	by	the	Express’s	coverage	of	a	lorry	union	
‘terror	squad’	who	assaulted	a	van	driver,	capitalised	upon	those	infrequent	examples.136	In	this	
context,	the	language	of	war	and	confrontation	absorbed	new	significance.	Headlines	which	referred	
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to	the	lorry	drivers’	‘stranglehold	on	Britain’s	ports’	were	purely	metaphorical	but	the	violent	
connotations	of	such	phrasing	made	the	threat	of	lorry	drivers	against	the	national	interest	all	the	
more	foreboding	and	antidemocratic.	137		
	
The	national	interest	and	audience	positioning	
In	1978-79,	strikes	were	understood	to	be	targeted	at	the	national	interest.	This	was	unlike	1974,	
where	the	language	of	war	was	used	to	refer	to	a	conflict	between	unions	and	government	and	
generally	resisted	application	to	conceptions	of	the	wider	public.	Hay	has	commented	on	the	
noteworthy	positioning	of	the	public,	apparent	in	the	likes	of	the	ITV	coverage	and	in	headlines.	An	
important	part	of	the	readership’s	decoding	of	media	texts,	particularly	apparent	on	this	occasion,	is	
the	tendency	to	‘actively	position	ourselves	as	subjects	within	the	narrative’.138	Hay	cites	the	
potential	for	readers	to	identify	with	the	‘we’	or	‘us’	in	stories,	positioned	against	an	other,	‘a	
collectivity	of	potential	victims	threatened	by	the	irresponsible,	macabre	and	self-serving	actions	of	
a	homogenous	band	of	militant	activists’.139	Even	the	Mirror,	from	its	left-leaning	perspective,	
utilised	such	a	device	to	argue	that	pickets	had	‘got	a	stranglehold	on	our	industrial	life	and	they	are	
tightening	it	every	hour’.140	This	sort	of	phraseology	positioned	the	unions	against	the	public	by	
referring	to	its	violent	threat	against	a	collective	interest.	Further	on,	the	same	article	argued	that	
winning	the	dispute	was	all	that	mattered	to	the	transport	workers,	‘nothing	else’,	including	‘the	
wage-packets	of	fellow	workers’	or	‘the	country’	and	‘certainly	not	the	Labour	government’.141	This	
was	further	evidence	of	the	attempts	to	expand	the	strike’s	threat,	beyond	conventional	political	
antagonisms.	The	Mirror’s	loyalty	to	supporting	the	interests	of	the	Labour	Party,	combined	with	the	
rapidly	declining	position	of	the	trade	unions	in	face	of	such	media	criticism,	ensured	that	the	paper	
was	forced	to	isolate	the	unions	from	its	own	interests	or	those	of	its	readership.	The	extrication	of	
Labour	interests	from	the	plight	of	James	Callaghan	was	perhaps	impossible	for	the	Mirror	but	the	
toxicity	of	union	action	made	the	simpler	isolation	of	the	union	movement,	despite	the	complex	
loyalty	between	both	sides,	almost	imperative	to	in	order	to	defend	the	Mirror’s	political	agenda.	
	
The	significance	of	this	kind	of	audience	positioning	filtered	into	television	reports	as	well.	ITN’s	
report	of	strikes	in	Southwark	in	mid-January	argued	that,	in	bad	weather	conditions,	‘the	last	thing	
the	people	of	Southwark	needed	was	this	strike’,	separating	the	unions’	decision	to	strike	from	‘the	
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people	of	Southwark’	more	generally.142	Although	this	was	a	much	less	obvious	example	of	
prejudicial	audience	positioning	than	the	kind	found	in	the	press,	with	the	television	industry	legally	
bound	to	a	more	neutral	agenda,	it	nevertheless	reflected	the	continued	isolation	of	unions	from	the	
public.	Although	Hay	rightly	recognised	potential	resistance	to	such	subject	positioning	from	
readerships	(and	by	extension,	audiences),	there	is	a	good	deal	of	evidence	to	suggest	that	this	
resistance	may	not	have	been	as	strong	in	1979	as	it	commonly	would	have	been	in,	for	example,	
1958.		
	
As	a	whole,	this	research	has	indicated	the	slow	dislocation	of	trade	union	members	from	the	
‘public’,	generally	associated	with	‘the	national	interest’.	Such	a	process	referred	to	both	the	
apparent	political	gap	between	the	two	as	well	as	the	quantity	of	union	members	isolated,	as	
extremist	minorities	were	increasingly	seen	to	be	more	dominant	within	the	trade	union	movement.	
Moreover,	there	was	a	growing	concern	about	the	breakdown	of	conventional	class	ties	to	political	
parties,	or	the	‘traditional	class-party	nexus’.143	Parties	could	no	longer	assume	support	for	their	
policies	based	on	the	socio-economic	background	of	the	electorate,	as	class	issues	became	less	
influential	on	party	loyalties	which,	by	the	mid-1970s,	were	in	discernible	flux.	In	1978-79,	this	
disconnection	had	become	something	of	a	rupture,	allowing	the	media	to	frame	strikes	in	
particularly	powerful	ways,	as	well	as	politicians.	For	example,	the	Mail	devoted	a	page	to	publishing	
the	script	of	a	televised	speech	by	Margaret	Thatcher	which	had	insisted	that	the	country	should	be	
‘one	nation	or	no	nation’,	but	reserved	judgement	for	the	industrial	action	by	‘the	wreckers	amongst	
us	who	don’t	believe	in	this’,	‘directed	at	the	public	to	make	you	suffer’.144	
	
In	conclusion,	the	events	of	the	winter	of	1978-79	not	only	symbolised	the	crisis	of	an	over-reaching	
Labour	government,	shown	once	again	to	provide	ineffective	relief	against	powerful	unions,	but	also	
the	intense	power	and	influence	of	the	national	media.	Undoubtedly,	in	the	five	years	between	the	
two	case	studies	analysed	here,	a	great	deal	changed	in	order	for	industrial	strife	in	public	services,	
which	had	strong	historical	precedent,	to	have	such	a	clear	impact	on	public	perceptions	of	
governance	and	power.	Although	it	is	clear	that	trade	union	militancy	and	combativeness	played	an	
important	part	in	this	transformation	of	attitudes,	with	the	rank	and	file	less	committed	to	
defending	Labour’s	reputation,	the	changes	to	the	media	landscape	during	the	interim	should	not	be	
underestimated.	The	Mirror	went	from	a	key	role	in	the	outcome	of	the	1974	election	to	the	
																																																						
142	ITV	Evening	News,	23	January	1979.		
143	Ivor	Crewe,	Bo	Särlvik	and	James	Alt,	‘Partisan	Dealignment	in	Britain	1964-1974’,	The	British	Journal	of	
Political	Science	7	(1977),	p.	134.	
144	Daily	Mail,	18	January	1979,	p.	6.	
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challenges	of	a	peripheral	role	in	the	Winter	of	Discontent,	where	it	became	difficult	for	the	paper	to	
mediate	union	action	or	resist	the	language	and	frames	utilised	by	the	increasingly	popular	Sun.	The	
majority	of	this	powerful	coverage	built	on	the	legacies	of	media	coverage	from	as	early	as	the	
1950s.		
	
However,	common	patterns	of	coverage,	as	evidenced	through	the	use	of	conflict	motifs	and	
moralised	language,	either	acquired	fresh	meaning	thanks	to	the	evolving	political	context	or	were	
taken	to	greater	extremes	than	had	previously	been	the	case.	The	dislocation	of	trade	unionists,	
understood	in	broad	terms	despite	the	minority	of	extremist	influence,	from	wider	conceptions	of	
the	British	public	or	the	national	interest	only	allowed	criticism	to	be	more	distinct	and	hyperbole	
more	widely	accepted.	The	wider	trade	union	movement’s	refusal	to	show	the	same	restraint	as	in	
1974,	further	exemplified	the	fractured	nature	of	left-wing	politics.	Meanwhile,	the	TUC	wrestled	
with	its	own	insecurities	and	cynicisms	regarding	the	national	press,	and	only	began	to	formulate	a	
clear	strategy	for	media	research,	rather	than	positive	engagement,	on	the	eve	of	the	Winter	of	
Discontent.	In	such	a	context,	the	provision	of	new	political	alternatives	by	Margaret	Thatcher,	
following	a	period	of	political	stalemate	under	Heath,	was	particularly	attractive.		
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Chapter	Six	–	Britain’s	‘bureaucratic	Imposition’	and	new	economic	priorities			
Economic	Futures,	1970-79	
	
Aside	from	the	‘headline-grabbing	events’	of	the	Winter	of	Discontent	and	the	miners’	strikes,	
contemporary	commentators	‘never	had	the	feeling	of	writing	in	the	midst	of	panic’	but	saw	‘people	
groping	with	the	novelty	of	the	situation	and	searching	for	new	understandings’.1	While	there	is	
plenty	of	value	in	research	which	questions	the	reality	of	the	1970s	as	a	decade	of	decline,	the	
purpose	of	this	research	is	not	to	evaluate	economic	facts	but	public	perceptions	of	the	economy	
and	their	cultural	impacts.	Despite	the	rise	of	post-materialist	social	movements,	Mark	Abrams’s	
1974	polling	research	found	that	the	key	change	in	the	values	of	British	society	was	‘a	greater	
emphasis	on	the	terminal	value	of	a	comfortable	life,	and	on	the	instrumental	value	of	more	money’,	
across	all	age	groups,	while	maintaining	an	egalitarianism	which	was	‘both	tinged	by	envy	and	held	
in	check	by	deference	towards	their	traditional	“betters”’.2	The	continued	emphasis	on	living	
standards	and	economic	prosperity	increased	the	pressure	on	the	position	of	trade	unions.	Figure	
6.1	represents	the	degree	of	public	pessimism	that	surrounded	the	economy	under	Labour,	despite	
a	brief	recovery	in	the	18-month	period	prior	to	the	‘Winter	of	Discontent’.	Aside	from	that	period,	
nearly	every	poll	found	that	more	people	expected	a	deterioration	in	Britain’s	economic	fortunes	
than	an	improvement.	
	
																																																						
1	James	E	Alt,	‘The	Politics	of	Economic	Decline	in	the	1970s’,	in	Lawrence	Black,	Hugh	Pemberton	and	Pat	
Thane	(eds),	Reassessing	1970s	Britain	(Manchester,	2013),	p.	27.	
2	Mark	Abrams,	‘Changing	Values:	A	Report	on	Britain	Today’,	Encounter	43	(1974),	pp.	32,	38.	
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Figure	6.1:	British	Economic	Optimism	
Source:	Wybrow	and	King,	British	Political	Opinion,	p.	312-314.	The	‘Optimism	Factor’	is	based	on	the	
deduction	of	‘Deteriorate’	responses	from	‘Improve’	responses,	to	the	Gallup	Poll	question	‘Do	you	consider	
that	the	general	economic	situation	in	the	next	twelve	months	is	likely	to	improve?’	
	
The	repeated	cases	of	industrial	strife	at	Ford	and	newly	nationalised	British	Leyland	automotive	
companies,	along	with	the	two	miners’	strikes	of	the	early	1970s,	provide	key	examples	through	
which	to	explore	perceptions	of	the	relationship	between	trade	unionism	and	the	economy.	Both	
Ford	and	British	Leyland	experienced	intense	and	persistent	industrial	strife	during	the	1970s	which	
threatened	these	companies’	fortunes	in	an	increasingly	competitive	market.	In	1975	British	Leyland,	
a	largely	unsuccessful	merger	of	multiple	companies	including	BMC,	was	nationalised	by	the	Labour	
government,	following	the	advice	of	the	Ryder	Report.	This	represented	a	final	attempt	to	rescue	it	
from	bankruptcy	and	stabilise	the	future	of	British	car	manufacturing.	Meanwhile,	Ford	continued	to	
deal	with	the	problems	of	strikes	from	the	late	1960s,	and	in	the	latter	part	of	the	decade	showed	a	
willingness	to	contravene	the	government’s	wage	policy	in	order	to	pacify	trade	unions	and	maintain	
levels	of	production.	Through	these	contrasting	case	studies,	this	research	explores	the	burdens	on	
government	to	intervene	in	industry	to	control	inflation	and	unemployment,	and	the	responses	of	
the	media	to	this	intervention.		
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The	primary	motivation	for	economic	anxiety	was	inflation.	In	1973,	as	Britain	wrestled	with	
economic	recession,	the	Guardian	described	inflation	as	‘an	obsession	for	the	1970s’.3	Just	as	
commentary	about	British	productivity	had	exerted	pressures	on	the	position	of	trade	unions	during	
the	1960s,	this	new	preoccupation	with	inflation	encouraged	further	scrutiny	of	the	labour	
movement.	According	to	Tomlinson,	the	press	of	the	early	1970s	not	only	shaped	the	media	agenda	
around	inflation	but	also	supported	a	perspective	which	linked	this	inflation	problem	with	the	
‘peculiar	recalcitrance	of	British	union	behaviour,	however	difficult	this	focus	on	a	national	cause	
was	to	reconcile	with	the	international	scope	of	the	problem’.4	This	chapter	seeks	to	understand	the	
tensions	this	intervention	caused	for	the	relationship	between	the	media	and	the	government,	as	
well	as	media	perceptions	of	the	relationship	between	government	and	trade	unions.	It	reflects	on	
how	changing	priorities	in	economic	outlook	influenced	perceptions	of	government	involvement	in	
industry,	as	widespread	unemployment	became	a	reality	of	British	life.	Moreover,	this	chapter	
explores	the	broader	themes	of	this	research	established	so	far,	from	understandings	of	British	
exceptionalism	and	its	declining	status	in	world	trade,	to	the	boundaries	between	the	‘political’	and	
the	‘industrial’	which	now	encompassed	industrial	policy-making.	Finally,	this	section	of	the	research	
reflects	on	the	pressures	that	these	themes	and	issues	placed	on	concepts	of	working	class	solidarity	
and	ideas	of	‘social	conscience’,	at	a	time	when	industrial	action	was	seen	to	have	greater	impact	on	
day-to-day	life,	beyond	simple	headlines	in	newspapers.	It	also	assesses	attempts	by	the	press	to	
mediate	these	relationships,	as	they	sought	to	buttress	their	political	agendas.	
	
Inflation	and	Public	Perception	
The	following	three	figures	(6.2,	6.3	and	6.4)	indicate	a	number	of	important	trends	which	illuminate	
perceptions	of	inflation	and	the	cost	of	living.	The	first,	depicting	public	perceptions	of	the	
government’s	most	important	problems,	as	indicated	by	Gallup	Polls,	reflects	the	strength	of	public	
concern	about	the	cost	of	living,	driven	by	inflation.	At	the	beginning	of	the	1970s,	there	was	a	great	
deal	of	flux	in	perceptions	of	the	country’s	problems.	From	the	end	of	1973,	as	Edward	Heath	
wrestled	with	the	problems	of	inflation	and	struggled	to	convince	the	country	of	his	leadership,	the	
cost	of	living	was	consistently	perceived	as	the	country’s	greatest	priority,	only	surpassed	by	other	
concerns	during	periods	of	intense	industrial	crisis,	as	clear	from	the	miners’	strikes	and	the	winter	
of	discontent.		
	
																																																						
3	Guardian,	1	October	1973,	p.	23.	
4	Jim	Tomlinson,	The	Politics	of	Decline:	Understanding	Postwar	Britain	(Abingdon,	2000),	p.	86.	
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Figure	6.2:	Government	problems	according	to	Gallup	polling	(1970-79)	
Source:	Wybrow	and	King,	British	Political	Opinion,	pp.	264-267.	
	
Figure	6.3:	Perceptions	of	the	cost	of	living	problem	and	the	Retail	Price	Index	(1970-79)	
Source:	Wybrow	and	King,	British	Political	Opinion,	pp.	264-267.	RPI	data	from	the	Office	of	National	Statistics	
website,	https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/inflationandpriceindices/timeseries/czbh/mm23	-	[Accessed	1	
December	2017]	
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Figure	6.4:	Perceptions	of	the	cost	of	living	problem	and	press	coverage	of	inflation		
	
The	latter	two	graphs	(6.3	and	6.4)	compare	this	polling	data	on	the	cost	of	living	to,	firstly,	the	
Retail	Price	Index	(RPI)	as	an	indication	of	the	actual	‘reality’	of	inflation	problems,	and,	secondly,	
the	Guardian’s	coverage	of	inflation,	as	determined	by	total	article	mentions	of	‘inflation’	each	
month.	The	first	of	these	figures	indicates	the	way	public	concern	about	inflation	and	the	cost	of	
living	rose	much	more	quickly	in	the	first	part	of	the	1970s	than	actual	increases	in	RPI.	Although	
both	peaked	at	a	similar	time,	in	the	summer	of	1975,	concern	about	inflation	soared	in	1973	before	
RPI	showed	considerable	change,	and	spiked	again	in	1974,	despite	no	sudden	crisis	in	rates	of	
inflation.	Conversely,	comparing	these	spikes	in	public	concern	to	the	Guardian’s	coverage,	as	a	
broader	indicator	of	press	coverage,	there	is	a	much	clearer	correlation.	As	Tomlinson	noted,	the	
‘deployment	of	apocalyptic	notions	about	the	effects	of	inflation	was	widespread	in	the	1970s’,	and	
began	‘well	before	its	peak	in	1975/76’.5	In	November	1974,	64	per	cent	of	those	polled	were	
'dissatisfied'	with	the	future	facing	their	family.		By	1975,	95	per	cent	of	those	polled	by	Gallup	
expected	a	year	of	rising	prices	and	85	per	cent	expected	a	year	of	'economic	difficulty'	for	the	
																																																						
5	Jim	Tomlinson,	‘The	politics	of	declinism’,	in	Lawrence	Black,	Hugh	Pemberton	and	Pat	Thane	(eds),	
Reassessing	1970s	Britain	(Manchester,	2013),	p.	45.	
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country.6	While	panic	about	the	economy	was	an	episodic	phenomenon,	generalised	anxiety	about	
the	future	of	the	British	economy	was	a	constant	issue,	as	narratives	of	economic	decline	were	
normalised.	The	correlation	is	apparent	in	the	relative	volatility	of	both	coverage	and	public	concern,	
including	the	increase	in	interest	between	the	two	miners’	strikes,	despite	the	relative	stability	in	
RPI,	as	well	as	the	spikes	in	concern	in	1974	and	1975.		
	
While	this	data	does	not	on	its	own	provide	information	on	the	nature	or	intent	of	industrial	
relations	coverage,	it	does	provide	important	context	for	understanding	the	influence	of	the	British	
press.	The	data	are	indicative	of	the	media’s	power	to	mediate	and	generate	public	concern.	In	their	
analysis	of	the	declining	popularity	of	trade	unions	during	the	1970s,	P.K.	Edwards	and	George	
Sayers	Bain	adjudged	that	‘regardless	of	how	far	unions	cause	inflation,	of	how	far	they	are	solely	
responsible	for	strikes,	and	of	how	far	strikes	really	damage	the	economy’,	there	were	‘strong	
grounds’	to	conclude	‘inflation	and	strikes	are	associated	with	union	power,	and	union	popularity	
declines	as	a	result’.7	This	chapter	explores	the	media’s	role	in	the	development	of	these	
associations	between	inflation	and	union	activity.	
	
The	continued	emphasis	on	responsibility	
The	language	of	responsibility	which	had	been	a	constant	feature	of	newspaper	coverage	of	trade	
union	action	began	to	change	in	emphasis,	as	expectations	of	the	centralised	leadership	of	trade	
unions	continued	to	decline.	There	was	a	growing	feeling	amongst	the	press	that	while	some	groups	
of	workers	might	have	had	‘reasonable	cases	in	normal	times’,	they	had	failed	to	appreciate	that	
these	were	not	normal	times,	and	disputes	that	the	economy	‘could	once	take	in	its	stride	may	now	
be	the	straws	that	break	its	back’.	8	This	kind	of	judgement,	evoking	concepts	of	justice	and	common	
interest,	linked	closely	to	the	patterns	of	moralised	language	which	had	been	established	under	the	
Labour	government	of	the	1960s	but	the	language	now	had	more	apocalyptic	undertones.	However,	
the	commentary	of	newspapers,	particularly	the	Times,	increasingly	suggested	that	unions	could	not	
be	deterred	from	strikes,	and	was	indicative	of	the	perceived	futility	of	union	reform	and	
government	intervention.	This	placed	greater	demand	on	the	role	of	the	public	in	resisting	union	
demands.	Initially,	the	Times	commended	a	perceived	‘improvement	in	psychology’	in	1970	which	
forced	managers	to	‘rein	in	the	demoralized	pressure	which	had	made	this	year	so	dangerously	
inflationary’	and	claims	beyond	the	‘bounds	of	respectability’	had	meant	there	was	‘nothing	
																																																						
6	Neeltje	Wiedemayer,	‘Do	People	Worry	About	the	Future?’,	The	Public	Opinion	Quarterly	40	(1976),	p.	388.	
7	P.K.	Edwards	and	George	Sayers	Bain,	‘Why	are	Trade	Unions	Becoming	More	Popular?	Unions	and	Public	
Opinion	in	Britain’,	British	Journal	of	Industrial	Relations	26	(1988),	p.	323.	
8	Daily	Mirror,	6	January	1975,	p.	2.	
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unnatural	about	resisting	them’.9	It	believed	that	the	‘endless	slippage	of	petty	concessions’	could	
only	be	halted	by	an	appeal	to	the	country’s	determination,	even	if	that	meant	Ford	had	to	take	a	
‘multimillion	pound	loss’	or	enduring	a	prolonged	fuel	strike	because	there	was	‘no	discouragement	
to	strikes	like	the	knowledge	that	people	are	determined	to	see	the	matter	through.’10	This	framing	
once	again	separated	writer	and	reader	from	the	position	of	the	unions	and	suggested	that	the	
language	of	‘responsibility’	had	shifted,	as	a	result	of	the	severity	of	the	economic	situation	and	
disappointment	with	the	response	of	both	unions	and	government.	Such	determination	was	the	only	
way	to	restore	‘the	balance	between	strikes	and	the	national	interest’	and	failure	to	do	so	would	be	
spell	the	country’s	acceptance	of	inflation’.11		
	
Fatalist	Warnings:	‘Remember	Weimar’	
Rather	than	the	German	example	being	used	as	a	contemporary	motivation	for	industrial	
improvement,	as	had	been	the	case	in	earlier	industrial	coverage,	its	dictatorial	past	was	now	used	
as	a	threat	to	strike-prone	Britain.	The	Mail	used	several	pieces	in	1972	to	warn	against	the	perils	of	
wage	increases	and	their	relationship	with	inflation,	directly	addressing	‘those	who	persist	in	asking	
for	more	than	they	have	earned’,	who	were	told	to	‘Remember	Weimar’.	12	The	Mail	even	led	with	
an	opinion	article	entitled	‘Do	we	want	a	return	ticket	to	Weimar?’13	Whereas	Japan	and	Germany	
were	once	seen	as	healthy	competitors,	Britain’s	relationship	with	these	two	countries	was	now	
framed	in	defeatist	and	fatalistic	terms,	primarily	as	a	result	of	Britain’s	propensity	to	strike.	The	
Times,	in	the	following	year,	attempted	a	more	optimistic	framing,	as	it	cited	Britain’s	‘healthy	
export	performance’,	‘heavy	home	demand’	and	the	devaluation	of	the	pound	which	had	provided	
Britain	with	‘a	greater	competitive	price	edge	over	foreign	manufacturers’,	but	its	coverage	
fundamentally	focussed	on	a	‘golden	opportunity	for	the	industry’	which	was	slipping	away	
‘ungrasped’.	14	This	kind	of	framing	placed	industrial	relations	and	the	production	line	as	the	primary	
factor	in	Britain’s	possibly	terminal	decline	on	the	world	stage.		
	
The	Mirror	made	attempts	to	query	the	prevalence	of	the	perception	that	Britain	was	uniquely	
challenged	by	its	strike	record,	despite	the	scrutiny	prompted	by	British	Leyland’s	largely	
unsuccessful	nationalisation.	Initially,	the	Mirror	made	significant	attempts	to	reject	the	‘strikes	kill	
the	car	industry’	narrative,	as	it	highlighted	the	industry’s	inherent	insecurity	of	‘slump,	boom,	
																																																						
9	The	Times,	20	November	1970,	p.	13.		
10	The	Times,	10	February	1973,	p.	17.	
11	The	Times,	20	October	1975,	p.	19.	
12	Daily	Mail,	19	June	1972,	p.	6.	
13	Daily	Mail,	15	May	1972,	p.	6.	
14	The	Times,	21	September	1973,	p.	17.	
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slump,	boom,	loping	each	other	like	the	Blackpool	“Big	Dipper”’	but	this	argument	waned	as	scrutiny	
on	the	industry	increased.	15	Instead,	it	increasingly	sought	to	undermine	the	suggestion	that	the	
British	car	industry’s	strike	record	was	anything	exceptional.	Geoffrey	Goodman,	leading	criticism	of	
the	dominant	frames	of	explanation,	queried	if	the	image	of	the	British	car	worker	as	a	strike-happy,	
unproductive,	overpaid	worker’	was	a	‘fair	one’,	given	that	productivity	levels	in	America,	Japan	and	
Germany	were	‘coming	closer	to	the	British	level’,	where	absenteeism	was	a	particular	problem.	16	
Goodman,	whose	new	eponymous	opinion	column	illustrated	the	centrality	of	industrial	relations	to	
the	media	agenda,	reflected	on	this	criticism	of	industrial	relations	as	a	symptom	of	Britain	adjusting	
to	a	new	position	in	international	trade.	He	argued	that	Britain	had	been	‘slow	to	recognise	that	we	
are	no	longer	at	the	centre	of	the	Industrial	universe’	and,	contrary	to	public	perception,	there	was	
‘nothing	unique	about	Britain’s	so	called	“industrial	sickness”’,	which	would	‘eventually,	spread	to	
every	industrialised	country’.17	The	Guardian	even	went	as	far	as	to	describe	inflation	as	‘a	disease	of	
prosperity	as	much	as	of	poverty,	and	the	more	people	have	to	lose	the	more	frightened	they	are	of	
losing	it’,	as	it	attempted	to	stress	Britain’s	relative	and	continued	affluence.18	
	
However,	given	the	entrenchment	of	British	exceptionalism,	a	constant	feature	of	media	self-
assessment,	this	sense	of	perspective	on	Britain’s	position	in	the	world	was	difficult	to	establish	
more	broadly.	Even	though	the	Times	recognised	labour	problems	for	Britain’s	competitors	at	
Renault,	‘torn	apart	by	a	major	strike’,	Citroen	and	Fiat,	troubled	by	‘continuous	labour	difficulties’	-	
the	kind	of	trends	that	Goodman	had	been	keen	to	raise	in	the	Mirror	–	it	still	offered	‘fuller	
cooperation	of	the	labour	unions’	as	British	Leyland’s	best	chance	for	survival.19	
	
This	belief	in	British	exceptionalism,	despite	waning	pride	in	British	industry,	also	provided	further	
hurdles	to	explaining	Britain’s	declining	fortunes	in	international	manufacturing.	Despite	dwindling	
sales,	a	significant	proportion	of	the	right-wing	press	struggled	to	accept	criticisms	of	the	quality	of	
British	cars	which,	as	has	already	been	discussed,	had	existed	since	the	Second	World	War,	and	only	
seemed	to	be	intensifying	in	nature.	The	Mail	claimed	that	Britain	made	‘brilliant	cars’	but	
associated	problems	with	‘reliability,	durability	and	availability’	solely	with	the	lines	of	production,	
labour	and	unions,	rather	than	design	or	resources.20	The	Express,	as	it	confronted	the	‘humiliating	
fact	that	over	half	the	vehicles	sold	here	are	made	abroad’,	argued	in	1977	that	there	was	‘nothing	
																																																						
15	Daily	Mirror,	6	March	1970,	p.	7.	
16	Daily	Mirror,	15	June	1973,	p.	11.	
17	Daily	Mirror,	16	March	1971,	p.	8.	
18	Guardian,	14	January	1973,	p.	8.	
19	The	Times,	3	June	1971,	p	23.	
20	Daily	Mail,	20	October	1976,	p.	6.	
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wrong	with	British	cars’	compared	with	rivals	and	cited	supply	as	the	‘crunch	of	the	British	problem’.	
What	caused	the	supply	shortages	which	rendered	British	car	companies	uncompetitive?	‘The	
reason	boils	down	to	one	word.	Strikes.’21		
	
	
Figure	6.5:	‘Can	our	cars	ever	catch	up?’,	Daily	Express,	1	October	1977,	p.	10.	
	
The	prevalence	of	this	perception	was	remarkable	given	the	fact	that,	in	the	case	of	British	Leyland	
before	its	fateful	nationalisation	project,	‘if	productivity	had	improved,	strikes	had	been	eliminated,	
investment	guaranteed,	marketing	rationalised	and	overmanning	reduced,	the	problem	would	still	
have	remained	while	the	product	range	remained	so	inadequate’	but	this	issue	with	Leyland’s	
product	range	was	‘not	deemed	worthy	for	public	comment’,	by	either	government,	or	as	it	appears	
from	research	of	coverage,	the	majority	of	the	media.22	The	Sun	did	recognise	the	problem	of	‘wrong	
and	shoddily	finished	models’	from	British	Leyland	but	placed	emphasis	on	the	problem	of	‘over-
manning	and	feather-bedding’	as	the	most	‘fatal’	of	mistakes.23	It	seems	clear	that	when	the	influx	of	
investment	was	unsuccessful,	the	persistence	of	industrial	strife	and	over-manning	at	British	Leyland	
became	the	media’s	primary	frame	of	explanation	for	Leyland’s	decline.	
	
Shallow	coverage	and	the	problems	of	public	image	
The	Mirror’s	response	to	criticisms	of	the	performance	of	the	workforce	also	took	on	a	psychological	
element.	The	modernisation	of	assembly	lines	which	had	prompted	anxiety	about	unemployment	in	
the	1950s,	was	now	viewed	by	some	as	potentially	problematic	for	those	now	in	employment,	
around	newly	optimised	assembly	lines.	The	Mirror	reflected	on	the	frustrations	that	arose	from	the	
boredom	of	an	automated	production	line,	which	was	seen	as	particularly	problematic	for	the	car	
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22	Holmes,	The	Labour	Government	1974-79,	pp.	49-50.	
23	Sun,	25	April	1975,	p.	2.	
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industry,	under	the	same	kind	of	threatening	headlines	which	had	typified	1950s	coverage	of	
automation	–	‘The	day	of	the	robot…’.	Geoffrey	Goodman	pondered	if	there	was	a	manual	job	in	
modern	industry	‘as	back-breaking,	monotonous,	spiritually	and	mentally	unrewarding	as	a	job	on	a	
car	assembly	line’.	24	Significantly,	this	concern	about	the	welfare	of	workers	was	driven	by	the	
search	for	explanations	for	industrial	strife	in	the	industry.	The	Mirror	suggested	the	‘real	villain’	of	
car	strikes	was	such	problems,	and	asked	if	the	assembly	line	system	‘ought	to	continue	unchanged	
much	longer’,	despite	the	paper’s	recognition	of	the	fact	that	abandonment	of	assembly	line	
methods	by	any	one	company	would	render	it	‘uncompetitive’.25	The	persistence	of	scepticism	
about	automation	and	shaken	confidence	in	Britain’s	industrial	future	amongst	the	left-wing	press	
resulted	in	this	issue	being	reshaped	to	explain	one	of	the	great	problems	of	modern	British	
industry.		
	
Notably,	this	sympathetic	perspective	on	the	pressures	on	workforces	in	automated	assembly	lines	
remained	fairly	marginal,	unlike	the	widespread	sympathy	that	miners	had	benefitted	from	during	
the	strikes	and	absenteeism	of	the	1960s.	While	the	language	of	sympathy	for	miners	had	drawn	on	
mining’s	ties	to	Britain’s	glorified	industrial	past,	workers	in	the	car	industry	struggled	to	gain	such	
status	and	respect.	This	was	partly	because	of	the	industry’s	inextricable	link	to	industrial	strife,	that	
there	was	‘something	about	the	British	motor	industry…	which	drives	otherwise	sane	and	
responsible	people	to	the	most	ludicrous	and	suicidal	confrontations’,	and	also	because	their	work	
was	not	considered	either	brave	or	essential	in	the	way	mining	had	once	been	considered	–	and	
1973’s	oil	crisis	had	reminded.26	In	a	period	where	employment	itself	was	seen	by	many	
commentators	as	reward	enough,	and	moralised	rhetoric	made	maximum	productivity	essential	at	
all	costs,	it	is	easy	to	see	why	such	a	deep	understanding	of	the	psychological	motivations	behind	
industrial	discontent	failed	to	gain	traction	beyond	the	commentators	sympathetic	to	the	labour	
movement.	Even	the	miners,	after	two	nationwide	strikes,	found	a	much	less	responsive	and	
sympathetic	media	atmosphere.	In	the	judgement	of	Milton	Shulman,	writing	for	the	Express,	there	
was	still	a	‘surprising	amount	of	sympathy’	but	this	was	‘trickling	away	fast’.27	
	
According	to	evidence	from	the	TUC	archives,	the	trade	union	movement	was	well	aware	of	the	
image	problems	workers	in	the	car	industry	suffered,	although	this	was	a	difficult	issue	to	tackle.	The	
TUC	recognised	in	its	report	of	media	coverage	of	the	Winter	of	Discontent	that	some	professions	
																																																						
24	Daily	Mirror,	15	June	1973,	p.	11.	
25	Daily	Mirror,	15	June	1973,	p.	11.	
26	Daily	Express,	20	October	1978,	p.	8.	
27	Daily	Express,	21	February	1974,	p.	8.	
	
	
192	
received	‘more	sympathetic	coverage	than	others’.	It	adjudged	that,	while	some	popular	groups	of	
workers	such	as	nurses	enjoyed	coverage	which	was	sensitive	to	their	financial	concerns,	others	
could	expect	coverage	to	focus	on	‘an	average	pay	figure	and	a	percentage	claim,	which	in	
journalistic	terms	is	far	less	likely	to	arouse	sympathy	than	a	“human	interest”	story	showing	an	
individual	worker’.28	Car	workers	most	certainly	fell	into	the	latter	category,	as	the	press	kept	a	
constant	check	of	each	round	of	negotiations	in	percentage	terms	and	personal	stories	were	few	and	
far	between.	This	kind	of	archival	evidence	suggests	that,	consistent	with	other	patterns	of	media	
engagement,	the	TUC	struggled	to	come	to	terms	with	and	contest	the	representation	of	workers	
and	failed	to	mobilise	any	kind	of	serious	response	to	such	image	issues	on	behalf	of	those	working	
in	the	car	industry.		
	
Industrial	strife	and	‘The	British	in	Looneyland’	
As	the	British	economy	struggled,	themes	surrounding	pride	in	British	industry	shifted	in	industrial	
relations	coverage,	as	Britain	confronted	its	changing	position	in	the	international	economy.	If,	as	
Tomlinson	has	argued,	‘allegations	of	economic	decline	have	been	given	much	greater	force	by	their	
linkage	to	declining	world	status’,	a	narrative	which	naturally	fits	the	‘cultural	and	political	
pessimism	for	the	right',	media	coverage	of	the	car	industry	contributed	to	such	a	representation	
and,	in	the	process,	directly	implicated	trade	unions	in	decline.29	ITV’s	reporters	asked	workers	at	
British	Leyland	if	they	would	be	‘slightly	bothered	that	a	Japanese	company	would	get	a	foothold	
into	the	British	car	industry,	an	even	bigger	one	than	they	have	already’,	indicative	of	past	attitudes	
towards	the	maintenance	of	British	manufacturing,	but	the	message	‘from	the	shop	floor’	was	
summarised	as	‘if	the	money’s	right,	they’ll	do	it’.30	Such	questioning	reflected	media	concern	with	
attitudes	towards	British	industry	amongst	its	workers,	although	the	response	was	a	reminder	of	the	
public	concern	about	rising	wages	and	the	cost	of	living.	The	Mail	was	now	forced	to	concede,	that	
although	ten	years	previously	the	idea	of	Japanese	cars	being	assembled	in	Britain	would	have	
meant	‘all	patriotic	hell’	would	have	broken	loose,	‘feelings	of	relief’	were	now	prevalent.	The	Mail	
insistent	that	the	public	should	‘thank	heavens	somebody	from	abroad	finds	it	worthwhile	to	shack	
up	with	a	company	like	Leyland’.31		
	
																																																						
28	TUC	Report	–	Media	Coverage	of	Industrial	Disputes	January-February	1979,	24	April	1979;	TUC	Archive,	
Modern	Records	Centre,	University	of	Warwick	(MSS.292D/786/4)	
29	Tomlinson,	‘Thrice	Denied’,	p.	248.	
30	ITV	Evening	News,	3	April	1979.		
31	Daily	Mail,	18	May	1979,	p.	6.	
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The	nationalisation	of	British	Leyland	in	1975	placed	pressure	on	the	relationship	between	
government,	media	and	trade	unions.	While	both	Ford	and	Leyland	struggled	with	ongoing	industrial	
conflict,	this	was	framed	in	very	different	ways,	largely	as	a	result	of	their	differences	in	ownership.	
On	the	part	of	the	labour	force,	there	were	concerns	amongst	the	press,	across	the	political	
spectrum,	that	workers	had	a	more	relaxed	attitude	towards	taking	industrial	action	because	of	the	
government’s	involvement	in	the	enterprise.	British	Leyland	was	regarded	by	the	Mail	to	be	the	
victim	of	a	deliberate	‘Sting’	by	the	unions,	which	involved	waiting	for	public	funding	before	
descending	into	‘carefree	anarchy’.32	The	moralised	implication	of	industrial	blackmail	directed	at	a	
publicly	funded	company	was	a	key	component	of	the	Mail’s	criticism	of	Leyland’s	nationalisation,	as	
‘no	temporary	adverse	factor’	could	‘disguise	the	endemic	unwillingness	of	Leyland	workers	to	make	
significant	and	sustained	improvements’.33	Although	the	Mail	conceded	that	some	workers	at	
Leyland	may	have	had	‘plausible	grievance’,	unions	had	failed	to	appreciate	that	‘transcending	
sectional	demands	for	distributive	justice	is	the	common	interest	of	survival’,	and	strikes	could	‘only	
hasten	the	day	of	reckoning’.34	Leyland’s	nationalised	background	this	sort	of	near-apocalyptic	
framing	placed	the	unions	sectional	interests	against	those	of	the	country.	This	further	illustrated	
the	vulnerability	of	unions	in	nationalised	industry	to	public	scrutiny	and	criticism.	The	Times	argued	
that	the	‘chief	reason’	for	industrial	unrest	at	Leyland	was	that	the	‘disputants	know	perfectly	well	
that	they	do	not	put	Leyland	future	in	jeopardy’	because	of	the	Government’s	commitment	to	‘keep	
the	place	open,	whether	there	are	disputes	or	not,	and	for	that	matter	whether	anybody	in	this	or	
any	other	country	wants	to	buy	the	goods	they	produce’.35	Such	coverage	framed	the	government’s	
unpopular	policy	decision	as	the	inspiration	of	industrial	action	amongst	the	workers	of	an	industry	
that	was	allegedly	naturally	predisposed	to	shop	floor	militancy.		
	
The	Mirror	recognised	the	problematic	relationship	between	the	government’s	determination	to	
save	Leyland	and	the	attitude	of	workers	in	the	car	industry,	although	it	phrased	it	in	less	sinister	
terms.	It	accepted	that	Leyland	would	not	be	allowed	to	‘sink	without	trace’	but	that	was	‘precisely	
the	point	which	some	–	though	not	all	–	British	Leyland	workers,	shop	stewards	and	even	some	of	
the	management	are	counting	on’.36	This	sort	of	assessment	alluded	to	the	Mirror’s	doubts	about	
government	policy	in	this	field,	despite	its	wider	political	commitment	to	Labour.	Although	the	
Mirror	phrased	its	anxiety	with	qualifications	about	the	diversity	of	attitudes	to	strikes	inside	car	
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35	The	Times,	27	September	1977,	p.	14.	
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factories,	this	concern	about	the	attitudes	of	workers	to	public	ownership	permeated	discussions	of	
other	struggling	companies.	In	coverage	of	Chrysler’s	1975	‘suicide	strike’,	long	before	the	climax	of	
tensions	at	Leyland,	the	Mirror	insisted	that	if	strikers	at	Chrysler	were	‘banking	on	the	Government	
to	bail	them	out	they	had	better	think	again	because	one	nationalised	motor	company	was	the	‘very	
most	that	Britain	can	afford’.37	There	was	a	clear	fear,	even	amongst	those	sympathetic	to	trade	
union	concerns	that	unions	may	try	to	trap	the	government	into	making	further	unpopular	
interventionist	policy	decisions.	This	illustrated	the	complexity	in	navigating	the	relationship	
between	a	Labour	government,	which	the	newspaper	supported,	and	the	trade	unions,	which	still	
accounted	for	a	significant	proportion	of	the	Mirror’s	readership.	
	
Figure	6.6:	‘Jim	Reads	the	Riot	Act’	(The	British	in	Looneyland),	Sun,	2	March	1977,	p.	2.	
	
The	significant	expense	of	Leyland’s	nationalisation	directly	tied	the	public	interest	with	the	future	of	
Leyland.	This	was	used	to	significant	effect	by	the	right-wing	press.	According	to	the	Sun,	industrial	
strife	which	put	the	‘British	in	Looneyland’	was	not	only	problematic	for	the	government	but	also	
‘humiliating’	for	the	taxpayer	(Figure	6.6).38	This	kind	of	emotive	reference	placed	the	case	at	
Leyland	close	to	the	public’s	damaged	pride	in	British	industry	and,	more	significantly,	the	cost	of	
living.	At	the	climax	of	tensions	at	Leyland,	it	framed	the	choice	as	an	issue	of	‘your	money	or	your	
Leyland’,	a	‘monstrosity’	that	was	‘constantly	fed	with	more	and	more	of	the	working	man	and	
woman’s	money’.39	This	article	placed	the	future	prospects	of	Leyland	as	directly	at	odds	with	the	
prosperity	of	working	people,	despite	the	major	role	that	Leyland	played	as	an	employer	–	a	primary	
motivation	for	the	government’s	investment	in	Leyland.	This	coverage	was	indicative	of	the	
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increasing	tendency	for	the	press	to	oversimplify	the	tensions	in	complex	industrial	issues.	More	
significantly,	the	right	wing	press’s	coverage	of	British	Leyland’s	management	and	the	government’s	
interventionist	economic	strategies	provided	evidence	of	what	Stuart	Hall	terms	as	the	perceived	
‘contradiction	between	“the	people”,	popular	needs,	feelings	and	aspirations	–	on	the	one	hand	–	
and	the	imposed	structures	of	an	interventionist	capitalist	state’,	or	a	‘bureaucratic	imposition’.40		
This	tension	in	public	understanding	had	strong	links	to	rising	anti-collectivism.	This	framing	of	
government’s	interests	against	those	of	the	people,	was	a	consistent	feature	in	media	coverage	of	
trade	unionism,	and	was	also	evoked	in	coverage	of	industrial	relations	at	Ford.	
	
ITN	coverage	of	events	at	Leyland	provided	a	more	nuanced	perspective	but	it	also	tapped	into	
these	themes	of	governmental	mismanagement	and	union	sabotage.	Perceptions	of	waste	and	
mismanagement	were	only	intensified	by	ITN’s	focus	on	surplus,	depicted	in	the	many	lines	of	cars	
being	stored	on	former	airfields.	Early	news	coverage	of	the	situation	at	Leyland	had	placed	
emphasis	on	motivations	of	strikers,	which	had	prompted	reporters	to	ask	Scanlon	if	‘there	was	
some	kind	of	union	conspiracy	to	wreck	British	Leyland’.	41		This	provided	evidence	of	a	background	
to	the	union	‘sting’	accusations	which	arose	after	nationalisation.	However,	as	these	shots	of	surplus	
cars	appeared	on	television	screens	in	1978,	the	reporter	suggested	that	this	quantity	of	cars	meant	
Leyland	could	no	longer	blame	production	and	posed	that	if	these	could	not	be	sold	they	would	‘only	
serve	as	a	monument	to	a	national	disaster’.42	This	coverage	framed	the	situation	at	Leyland	as	an	
issue	of	national	importance	and,	more	significantly,	illustrated	a	shift	in	media	scrutiny	from	issues	
of	production,	which	had	directly	implicated	the	labour	force,	onto	Leyland’s	management,	under	
nationalisation.			
	
As	this	research	has	established,	the	press	continued	to	be	critical	of	what	it	believed	to	be	political	
motivations	behind	strikes,	as	opposed	to	industrial	ones.	The	Guardian,	increasingly	critical	in	its	
assessment	of	the	labour	movement,	condemned	the	strikes	at	Leyland,	putting	them	down	to	a	
matter	of	principle,	which	‘like	drugs,	are	occasionally	needed	but…	the	car	industry	has	an	
overdose,	and	that	can	be	fatal’.43	However,	the	cynicism	about	the	motivations	of	workers	also	
extended	to	the	role	of	the	government,	allowing	industrial	policy	to	be	delegitimised	in	similar	ways	
to	union	action.	This	trend	tied	to	growing	discomfort	about	Labour’s	relationship	with	the	labour	
movement,	in	particular	the	TUC.	The	Express	summed	up	the	intent	of	British	Leyland,	dubbed	
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‘British	Lossmaker’,	as	a	company	which	operated	on	‘political	rather	than	managerial	principles’,	
where	the	government’s	apprehension	about	plant	closures	and	company	restructuring	would	‘have	
no	place	under	competent	management’.44	The	criticism	that	government	was	using	public	money	
to	further	its	own	political	interests,	rather	than	the	commercial	interests	of	the	company,	bore	
interesting	parallels	with	the	well-established	distinction	made	between	the	political	and	industrial	
strikes	and	illustrated	further	anxiety	about	the	political	significance	of	industrial	relations	in	
contemporary	Britain.	Political	interference	in	the	industrial	sphere	was	no	longer	a	criticism	
reserved	for	trade	unions	and	this	had	important	economic	implications.	
	
Economic	Priorities:	Employment	versus	Inflation	
In	the	media’s	discomfort	with	the	government’s	protection	of	jobs,	there	was	further	evidence	of	
the	implications	of	changing	attitudes	towards	employment.	This	research	has	already	established	
the	significance	of,	and	the	media’s	preoccupation	with,	soaring	inflation	but	this	had	a	knock	on	
effect	on	attitudes	towards	unemployment.	Peter	Hall	has	highlighted	a	shift	in	economic	policy,	or	
policy	‘paradigm’,	initiated	in	the	early	1970s,	where	‘inflation	replaced	unemployment	as	the	
preeminent	concern	for	policy	makers’,	particularly	after	a	string	of	Labour	policy	failures	
undermined	the	government’s	authority.45	While	Margaret	Thatcher’s	election	is	seen	as	the	
greatest	symbol	of	the	shift,	the	industrial	context	of	the	1970s	provided	an	important	platform	for	
these	ideas,	illustrated	through	the	media’s	grudging	acceptance	of	unemployment	in	the	
contemporary	economic	climate	and	the	public’s	increasing	prioritisation	of	anti-inflationary	
measures.	In	September	1975,	respondents	to	a	Gallup	Poll	were	asked	which	issue	the	Government	
should	give	greater	attention	to	–	curbing	inflation	or	reducing	unemployment	–	61	per	cent	
believed	the	former	should	be	the	government’s	policy	priority.46	The	fact	that	the	same	set	of	
polling	data	suggested	that	unemployment	should	be	the	trade	unions’	‘most	urgent	problem’	
illustrated	the	problems	for	the	trade	union	movement	in	fulfilling	public	expectations	of	its	role	in	
the	British	economy.47	
	
The	Mail	hoped	that	the	time	was	approaching	when	‘every	other	consideration	–	of	jobs,	of	wishing	
to	have	a	purely	British	stake	in	the	motor	industry,	of	votes	even	–	will	be	brushed	aside	in	view	of	
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46	Gallup,	Gallup	Polls:	Volume	2,	p.	1449.	
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the	mounting	cost’.48	The	first	of	these	points,	jobs,	appeared	to	be	the	overriding	concern	for	the	
government	in	the	case	at	Leyland	and	underpinned	another	important	debate	in	British	economics	
at	the	time,	as	unemployment	soared.	The	Times	recognised	that	closures	of	Leyland’s	problematic	
car	division	would	turn	‘the	West	Midlands	with	its	marginal	seats	into	an	industrial	disaster	area’,	
which	rendered	the	‘political	and	practical	arguments	of	letting	things	drift	on	downwards’,	‘only	too	
obvious’	to	the	government.49	The	Times	coverage	of	the	situation	at	British	Leyland	suggested	a	lack	
of	bravery	from	government	which	had	‘shrunk	from	the	political	and	psychological	consequences’	
of	allowing	Leyland	to	run	down	‘until	there	was	a	better	balance	between	demand	and	capacity’,	
largely	because	of	the	social	impact	of	such	a	decline.50	While	this	emphasis	on	over-manning	did	
not	explicitly	target	the	policy	of	trade	unions,	being	principally	an	issue	of	nationalisation	and	
government	policy,	it	did	have	implications	on	the	position	of	the	labour	force	more	generally	and	
issues	with	management	continued	to	be	marginal.		
	
In	the	face	of	continued	problems	at	Leyland,	the	Mail	pondered	if	Britain	could	‘do	without	a	motor	
industry	altogether’,	in	order	to	return	to	‘what	we	are	good	at	–	being	a	nation	of	shopkeepers’.51	
This	sort	of	question	underlined	popular	disillusionment	and	frustration	with	the	car	industry,	and	
hinted	at	a	change	in	attitudes	towards	the	significance	of	manufacturing	for	British	prestige.	Under	
the	headline	‘learning	to	live	with	unemployment’,	the	Mail	warned	against	the	creation	of	‘artificial	
jobs’	which	could	take	Britain	‘from	crisis	to	crash’,	as	‘economic	realism’	compelled	Britain	to	
confront	the	fact	it	could	not	keep	its	young	people	in	‘worthwhile’	employment.52	This	position	on	
the	maintenance	of	employment	also	began	to	spread	across	the	media	spectrum,	as	the	Guardian,	
in	its	criticism	for	the	government’s	involvement	at	Leyland,	warned	against	‘setting	out	to	protect	
existing	jobs	in	existing	firms	at	all	costs’	because	mass	market	car	production	was	‘probably	an	
industry	with	a	limited	future	in	the	industrial	world’.53	Such	concerns	about	‘artificial’	employment	
underlined	anxiety	about	the	distorting	impact	of	government	intervention	in	industry	and	its	
political	intentions.		
	
The	Times	exacted	its	criticism	on	the	role	of	trade	unions	in	causing	unemployment,	as	it	suggested	
that	‘many	good	trade	unionists	have	gone	on	strike	this	year	in	order	to	get	themselves	the	sack’	
which	was	part	of	‘the	process	of	destroying	the	full	employment	policy	which	has	been	maintained	
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since	the	war’.54	The	Express	described	the	unions	as	‘great	machines	for	the	production	of	
unemployment	through	pricing	their	members	out	of	jobs’,	the	kind	of	framing	which	directly	linked	
unions	to	unemployment,	not	just	lost	production	and	failing	industry.55	The	paper	even	went	as	far	
as	to	link	the	two	issues	in	the	simplest	terms	–	‘one	man’s	excessive	wage	rise	is	another	man’s	
unemployment’.56	According	to	this	perspective,	not	only	was	employment	drifting	from	the	centre	
of	economic	policy	concern,	this	was	at	least	partly	a	result	of	the	attitude	of	unions	and	their	
apparent	willingness	to	strike.	
	
	
Wage	restraint	at	Ford	and	the	realities	of	policy	
The	other	prominent	case	study	for	analysing	the	nature	of	media	coverage	of	trade	unions	in	the	
motor	industry	is	Ford.	Consistent	with	their	experience	of	the	1960s,	Ford	continued	to	deal	with	
industrial	unrest,	which	was	alleged	in	front	page	headlines	to	have	‘cost	Britain	the	chance	of	
having	a	new	£30	million	Ford	factory’.57	As	a	private	company,	its	relationship	with	the	government	
was	very	different	and	this	had	important	implications	for	the	way	industrial	relations	at	Ford	were	
treated	by	the	media.	When	Ford	granted	a	17	per	cent	pay	increase	to	workers,	which	contravened	
the	government’s	rigid	five	per	cent	pay	policy,	this	decision	was	framed	in	diverse	ways,	as	a	
consequence	of	contrasting	political	agendas.	The	Express	felt	that	efforts	to	‘compel	Ford	to	
observe	a	mystical	figure	of	five	per	cent’	was	like	‘ordering	water	to	run	uphill’,	which	indicated	the	
perceived	futility	of	the	government’s	attempts	to	curb	wages.58	According	to	the	Express,	in	
granting	a	wage	increase	which	treated	government	policy	with	‘blatant	contempt’,	Ford	had	been	
forced	to	‘choose	between	satisfying	its	workers	or	satisfying	the	government’.	59	The	Sun	
empathised	with	the	frustration	of	workers,	branding	their	demand	for	more	wages	as	‘entirely	
understandable’,	as	the	paper	directed	criticism	at	the	‘morale-sapping	rigidity’	of	the	pay	policy	
which	meant	that	‘regardless	of	effort	or	special	skills	–	virtually	every	worker	gets	the	same	
increase’.60	This	coverage	framed	Ford’s	action	as	a	matter	of	satisfying	working	class	interests	
against	government	interests,	rather	than,	as	had	been	conventional	for	coverage	of	wage	
settlements,	the	interests	of	unions	against	those	of	the	nation.	Conservative	criticism	of	the	
government’s	interventionism	dictated	the	right-wing	press’s	position	on	industrial	settlements.		
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The	extent	of	this	support	for	the	interests	of	the	British	car	worker	hit	such	heights	that	the	Sun	
even	went	out	of	its	way	to	emphasise	groups	of	workers	who	had	made	a	settlement	under	the	
terms	of	the	government’s	policy.	At	the	peak	of	tensions	at	Ford	and	Leyland,	Vauxhall	workers	
decided	not	to	strike	against	their	company’s	four	and	a	half	per	cent	pay	offer	which	the	Sun	
branded	as	a	famous	victory	for	‘common	sense’,	as	the	company	could	not	afford	any	more.	Aside	
from	using	this	wage	agreement	as	a	way	to	show	shop	stewards,	proponents	of	the	strike,	as	‘out	of	
touch’,	the	Sun	suggested	that	such	a	rejection	of	strike	measures	had	shown	that	‘if	you	tell	the	
British	worker	the	truth	there	is	a	good	chance	that	he	will	react	in	a	responsible	way’.61	Such	an	
article	illustrated	the	willingness	of	the	working-class	Sun	to	highlight	success	stories	in	its	opinion	
columns,	in	a	way	which	was	less	comfortable	for	the	middle-class	papers,	in	order	to	encourage	
scrutiny	of	the	government’s	pay	policy.	The	agreement	at	Vauxhall	could	be	used	to	undermine	the	
supposed	necessity	of	a	statutory	wage	policy.	Given	the	confidence	of	such	articles,	it	is	no	
coincidence	that	this	was	the	year	that	Sun	established	itself	as	the	forerunner	of	the	British	tabloids	
and	firmly	nailed	its	colours	to	the	Conservative’s	mast,	much	to	the	delight	of	Conservative	
strategists.62	
	
According	to	the	Mail,	as	Ford	had	endured	a	strike	allegedly	inflicted	by	previous	attempts	to	abide	
by	the	government’s	rigid	pay	policy,	Ford	had	‘suffered	enough’.63	The	government’s	threat	of	
sanctions	against	Ford	was	the	‘unacceptable	face	of	economic	fascism’,	which	handicapped	‘the	go-
getters’,	in	Ford,	and	cossetted	the	‘dead-lossers’,	British	Leyland.64	Along	similar	lines,	the	Sun	used	
the	language	of	victimhood	which	had	previously	been	to	support	the	miners’	case	in	favour	of	Ford.	
In	a	front	page	article,	it	described	Ford	as	the	‘victim’	of	the	government’s	‘hypocritical	and	absurd	
charade’,	and	a	punishment	which	was	‘about	as	logical	as	putting	an	old	lady	in	charge	for	being	
mugged’.65	This	same	opinion	article	on	the	sanctions	against	Ford,	entitled	‘Big	Jim’s	Cop	Out’,	was	
consistent	with	the	Sun’s	continued	personalisation	of	the	failures	of	the	government	and	its	desire	
to	pit	Margaret	Thatcher	against	ailing	‘Big	Jim’.	More	significantly,	this	article	highlighted	great	
frustration	with	the	discriminatory	application	of	the	policy	and	this	was	used	by	the	right-wing	
press	to	undermine	the	legitimacy	of	the	government’s	authority.	Callaghan’s	sanctions	policy	was	
referred	to	as	having	the	‘morality	of	Mussolini’	where	the	principle	of	‘selective	enforcement	of	
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Callaghan’s	code’	was	deemed	repulsive	and	unlikely	to	be	applied	to	pay	claims	in	nationalised	
companies	or	the	trade	unions	–	‘Will	the	TUC	be	made	to	answer	for	allowing	huge	code-busting	
increases	for	its	officers?	Not	on	your	life!’.66	The	suggestion	that	the	government	was	using	its	own	
pay	codes,	without	the	backing	of	democratic	legislation,	to	further	its	relationship	with	its	allies	but	
to	the	detriment	of	successful	private	companies,	directly	undermined	its	social	democratic	values.	
	
	
	
Figure	6.7:	‘Surrender!’,	Sun,	10	October	1978,	p.	1.	
	
However,	despite	other	articles	by	the	Sun	that	alleged	that	the	strike	at	Ford	had	‘demolished’	
impressions	of	a	special	relationship	between	government	and	unions,	this	was	part	of	a	wider	trend	
of	clashes	surrounding	the	government’s	pay	policy	(Figure	6.7).	67		Coverage	illustrated	a	continued	
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discomfort	about	the	government’s	soft	attitude	towards	unions,	in	its	failure	to	punish	unions	for	
the	contravention	of	the	pay	policy.	The	case	at	Ford	was	likened	to	a	mugging	and	it	was	clear	who	
the	‘mugger’	was	in	this	analogy	–	the	unpunished	unions.	This	discomfort	also	tied	to	widespread	
frustration	with	the	government’s	expectation	that	profitable	companies	should	endure	strikes	to	
suit	the	government’s	political	agenda.	Anxiety	of	this	kind	had	also	been	apparent	at	Leyland,	
where	it	had	been	suggested	that	the	government’s	involvement	had	nullified	the	deterrence	
against	trade	union	action,	with	the	company	virtually	assured	of	survival.	Both	cases	helped	to	
contribute	to	a	perception	that	the	government’s	intervention	let	unions	get	off	scot-free,	whilst	the	
taxpayer	and	profitable	companies	shared	the	burden.	This	scrutiny	of	government	policy	fed	into	
the	press’s	own	business	matters,	with	many	newspapers	dealing	with	varying	degrees	of	industrial	
strife,	either	with	printers	or	the	National	Union	of	Journalists	(NUJ).	After	the	Sun	had	been	forced	
into	a	short-term	closure	due	to	a	dispute	with	the	NUJ,	it	lamented	that	the	paper’s	‘room	for	
manoeuvre	was	severely	limited	by	the	provisions	of	the	Government	Pay	Policy’,	and	declined	to	
place	emphasis	on	the	nature	of	the	dispute	with	the	NUJ	or	the	wider	motives	for	the	strike.68		
	
In	this	context,	the	response	of	the	Mirror	to	Ford’s	actions	was	predictable,	as	it	attempted	to	
bolster	the	position	of	the	government,	despite	some	reservations	about	the	sustainability	of	the	
pay	policy’s	rigidity.	Rather	than	this	being	a	matter	of	workers	against	the	government,	the	Mirror	
concluded	that	Ford	had	chosen	to	‘put	their	interests	before	the	country’s’	and	had	‘left	the	
Cabinet	little	choice	but	to	invoke	sanctions	against	them’	because	‘to	continue	to	buy	the	
company’s	cars	as	though	nothing	had	happened	–	will	look	like	complete	surrender’.69	The	
Guardian	framed	the	settlement	in	very	similar	terms	as	it	declared	that	what	was	in	Ford’s	interest	
‘was	not	necessarily	good	for	Britain’,	and	warned	readers	of	a	‘national	mood	of	complacency	
about	inflation’,	striving	to	convince	them	that	the	social	contract	was	still	Britain’s	‘best	hope’.70	
The	kind	of	deal	at	Ford	underlined	the	‘paradox	of	free	collective	bargaining’	which	took	‘no	notice	
of	the	wider	national	interest’	and	was	‘underlined	by	the	decision	of	the	transport	workers’	
executive	council	to	vote	£150,000	to	the	election	funds	of	a	Government	and	simultaneously	arm	
up	to	torpedo	the	principal	policy	–	control	of	inflation	–	on	which	that	Government	seeks	re-
election.’71	The	implication	of	the	Guardian’s	line	of	argument	was	that	the	relationship	between	the	
TUC	and	a	Labour	government	would	always	be	under	strain	unless	the	labour	movement	showed	
greater	respect	for	the	government’s	attempts	to	control	inflation.	In	contrast,	the	Guardian	had	
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initially	suggested	that	the	Heath	government	should	be	‘less	obsessed	with	inflation’	so	it	could	‘at	
last	go	for	economic	growth	and	with	it	expansion	of	the	social	services’,	indicative	of	the	way	the	
press’s	attitudes	to	inflation	and	wage	bargaining	were	shaped	by	their	support	for	the	incumbent	
government.	72	
	
Social	tension	and	the	fissiparous	society	
With	increasingly	attitudes	towards	the	prevalence	of	unemployment	and	most	outlets	focussed	on	
the	impact	of	wage	increases	on	inflation,	heightened	social	tension	was	a	prominent	theme	to	
media	coverage,	albeit	not	always	along	traditional	fault	lines.	As	Claydon	has	explored,	the	
preoccupation	with	political	motivations	inside	the	trade	union	movement	did	not	change.	In	many	
ways	they	intensified,	particularly	with	the	personalised	coverage	of	militant	shop	stewards	such	as	
British	Leyland’s	Derek	Robinson,	known	in	media	circles	as	‘Red	Robbo’.	Coverage	of	events	at	
Leyland,	including	unofficial	protests	against	the	dismissal	of	‘Red	Robbo’,	showed	how	the	
‘narrative	of	political	extremism	and	irresponsible	militancy	among	shop	stewards’	continued	into	
the	1970s,	despite	frequently	incoherent	argument.73	It	is	noteworthy	that	the	personalisation	of	
trade	union	coverage	was	reshaped	around	the	‘militants’	on	the	shop	floor,	rather	than	the	likes	of	
Frank	Cousins	and	prominent	union	leaders,	as	had	been	the	case	in	the	1950s.	However,	while	this	
continuity	of	political	divisions	was	important	for	understandings	of	power	inside	the	trade	union	
movement,	broader	social	fracturing,	which	had	an	impact	on	notions	of	class	and	collectivism	
became	more	significant.	
	
Traditional	class	division,	contrary	to	earlier	predictions,	remained	a	prominent	issue	in	industrial	
relations	coverage.	The	Mail,	in	keeping	with	its	traditional	allegiances,	was	concerned	with	the	
situation	of	the	middle	classes.	It	felt	the	middle	classes’	‘only	reward	for	accepting	responsibility	is	
an	ulcer	and	an	increased	tax	demand’,	and	queried	why	they	should	‘back	British	industry	when	
their	money	could	be	more	profitably	spent	on	an	antique	snuff	box’.74	In	demanding	action	from	
the	government	against	the	TUC,	the	Mail	insisted	that	‘no	anti-inflation	strategy	will	work	unless	
most	of	us	–	not	just	the	middle	classes	–	are	prepared	to	take	a	real	drop	in	living	standards’,	which	
alluded	to	the	belief	that	the	middle	classes	had	experienced	greater	sacrifices	than	the	unionised	
working	classes.	This	sentiment	of	middle	class	injustice	fed	into	the	broader	narrative	about	the	
negative	impact	of	industrial	strife	on	patterns	of	consumption.		
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In	response	to	such	narratives,	the	Guardian	warned	against	the	perceived	tendency	of	government	
to	‘bash	unions’	in	its	attempts	to	counter	inflation.75	It	became	concerned	that	a	‘new	sense	of	
social	or	national	purpose’	was	significant,	in	order	to	avert	‘class	war’.	76	Alistair	Hetherington	
recalled	that	John	Cole	had	‘objected	to	the	implication	that	we	were	simply	trying	to	pick	the	most	
reliable	team	of	economic	managers’	because	‘the	social	purposes	and	power	base	of	each	party	
were	as	important’,	as	far	as	he	was	concerned.77	The	fact	Cole	felt	the	need	to	challenge	such	
assumptions	in	political	decision	making	reflected	the	dominance	of	economic	policy,	and	the	
preoccupation	with	inflation,	over	social	policy,	which	linked	to	the	increasing	acceptance	of	
unemployment	as	a	necessary	evil	of	economic	recovery.	His	columns	reflected	concern	that	Britain	
was	succumbing	to	‘a	mood	which	rejects	a	national	solution	to	anything	and	places	greater	
emphasis	on	personal	economic	salvation’.78	The	Mirror	warned	of	the	possible	impact	of	a	‘poverty	
boom’,	as	the	gap	‘between	the	“haves”	and	“have	nots”’	began	to	increase.	79	It	is	clear	then	that	
class	issues	were	very	much	on	the	public	agenda	as	increases	in	living	standards	began	to	decline.	
	
However,	while	the	persistence	of	traditional	class	tensions	should	not	be	ignored,	pressures	on	
Britain’s	affluence	and	economic	prosperity	caused	much	more	complex	divisions	which	concepts	of	
‘class’	or	divisions	on	party	political	grounds	did	not	address,	particularly	with	regards	to	working	
class	identity.	Social	division	in	this	period	with	all	its	nuances,	including	cases	of	unconventional	
solidarity	or	cohesion,	was	conceptualised	by	the	Guardian	as	the	‘fissiparous	society’:	‘as	class	
divisions	crumble	–	more	slowly	in	Britain	than	anywhere	else	in	Europe	–	new	divisions	open	up	to	
take	their	place.	There	may	have	been	two	nations	in	Disraeli’s	day.	There	are	more	than	two	now.’80	
This	fracturing	process,	beyond	the	breakdown	of	the	‘class-party	nexus’,	placed	new	pressures	on	
the	position	of	unions,	as	media	coverage	further	isolated	them	from	their	conventional	allies,	which	
formed	part	of	a	wider	trend	of	detachment	from	conceptions	of	the	public	or	the	nation.		
	
While	the	Mail	sought	to	highlight	the	negative	experiences	of	the	middle	classes	as	a	result	of	
industrial	insecurity,	this	was	not	the	whole	story.	Although	Tomlinson	has	highlighted	the	
‘apocalyptic’	tone	to	public	discussion	of	the	economic	situation	and	the	advocacy	of	‘extreme’	
solutions,	he	noted	that	the	‘chattering	classes	in	the	mid-1970s	embraced	with	great	enthusiasm	
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the	notion	of	Britain’s	decline’.	81	This	is	clear	from	coverage	of	the	Guardian	which	referred	to	
people	enjoying	a	‘camaraderie	of	adversity’	which	was	‘nostalgic	and	fun’.	82	The	‘end	of	the	
hyperrazmataz’	had	prompted	Britain	to	be	more	thoughtful	about	its	use	of	resources.83	According	
to	this	social	commentary,	often	scathing	in	tone,	the	British	middle	class	had	a	‘peculiar	passion	for	
austerity’	and	the	experiences	of	industrial	unrest	had	‘aroused	a	strange	sort	of	masochistic	
delight’,	indicative	of	a	broader	discomfort	with	patterns	of	affluence	and	consumerism.	The	
moralised	language	of	productivity	and	wage	restraint	had	also	permeated	attitudes	towards	
consumerism	and	affluence,	indicative	of	the	irregularity	to	public	attitudes.	Of	course,	this	did	not	
necessitate	open	approval	for	the	miners’	strike	but	indicated	a	certain	degree	of	tolerance,	clear	
from	opinion	polls,	which	perhaps	would	not	have	been	clear	from	the	likes	of	the	Mail’s	claims	of	
middle	class	injustice.		
	
As	Lawrence	Black	has	suggested,	and	this	evidence	on	middle	class	attitudes	supports,	the	1970s	
need	to	be	‘understood	as	more	than	just	a	shift	to	a	more	individualistic	market	society’	because,	
while	the	economic	context	was	significant,	‘it	did	not	determine	its	politics	or	culture’.84	However,	it	
is	important	to	understand	why	this	period	has	often	been	understood	in	such	terms	and	the	
coverage	of	industrial	relations	provides	some	indication	of	the	strains	placed	on	notions	of	
collectivism	and	working	class	solidarity.	The	Guardian	theorised	that	it	was	‘fun’	for	affluent	middle	
class	Britain	to	endure	the	pressures	of	a	three-day	week	when	they	were	guaranteed	a	five-day	
income.85	Although	there	was	enjoyment	in	the	conditions	of	austerity,	this	was	partly	as	a	result	of	
its	impermanence	and	insulation	from	genuine	poverty.	When	it	came	to	the	lower	paid,	
relationships	with	striking	workers	and	attitudes	towards	events	such	as	the	three-day	week	were	
much	more	problematic.	According	to	media	commentary,	some	of	these	fault	lines	emerged,	or	
threatened	to	emerge,	between	the	strongly	unionised	and	the	lower	paid,	between	public	sector	
workers	and	those	working	for	private	companies,	and,	in	the	context	of	supposed	economic	
decline,	between	the	employed	and	unemployed.	Such	tensions	were	narrated	and	analysed	in	
contrasting	ways	by	the	media,	as	they	attempted	to	shape	public	opinion.	
	
The	contrasting	media	responses	between	the	cases	of	industrial	unrest	at	Ford	and	those	at	British	
Leyland,	already	analysed,	generated	tensions	in	the	perceptions	of	what	public	workers	should	
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expect,	in	contrast	to	their	private	company	counterparts.	The	government	appeared	to	find	it	
increasingly	difficult	to	manage	the	expectations	and	settlements	in	industries	outside	the	public	
sector	and	newly	nationalised	companies.	On	the	one	hand,	the	likes	of	the	Guardian	argued	that	a	
major	motivation	for	the	miners’	strike	had	been	the	bitterness	amongst	public	sector	workers	
created	by	watching	car	workers	in	private	companies	‘racing	ahead	of	them’.	86	The	Times	conceded	
that	industrial	workers	in	public	service	who	had	‘fared	comparatively	badly’	would	feel	‘particularly	
sardonic	about	the	consequences	of	Mr	Henry	Ford’s	personal	odyssey	of	criticizing	Britain’	and	the	
settlement	at	Ford	would	intensify	public	service	suspicion	that	‘private	industry	can	always	in	the	
end	opt	out	of	the	Government	pay	policy	by	exhortation’.87	These	kinds	of	perceptions	were	not	
without	merit	as	low-paid	public	sector	workers	were	the	most	squeezed	section	of	the	working	
classes	during	the	1970s,	as	inflation	had	an	impact	on	both	wages	and	welfare.88	Such	bitterness	
may	well	have	been	intensified	by	the	kind	of	agendas	advanced	by	the	Mail	which,	in	its	criticism	of	
public	sector	spending,	argued	that	the	government	had	to	‘hold	down	pay	awards	in	the	public	
sector,	where	it	is	effectively	the	paymaster’,	while	it	adopted	a	much	more	relaxed	attitude	to	wage	
rises	in	productive	private	companies.	89	
	
Union	representation	and	concepts	of	morality	
The	moralised	language	which	had	been	used	to	great	effect	for	the	miners’	cause,	was	also	used	to	
address	the	supposedly	damaging	influence	large	unions	were	having	on	the	fortunes	of	
underrepresented	groups	of	workers,	which	also	undermined	notions	of	working	class	solidarity.	
Despite	the	strength	of	public	opinion	in	the	miners’	favour,	which	ultimately	helped	their	battle	
against	the	Heath	government,	there	was	anxiety	that,	particularly	in	the	case	of	the	1973-74	strike,	
the	miners	were	excessively	demanding	in	their	claims.	The	Sun,	self-professed	allies	of	the	miners,	
questioned	Britain’s	‘equality	of	sacrifice’	when	an	overtime	ban	meant	the	basic	pay	packet	of	
miners	lay	‘untouched’	despite	the	fact	they	were	the	people	who	‘brought	Britain	face-to-face	with	
doom’.	90	Although	Goodman	used	his	column	in	the	Mirror	to	insist	that	several	recent	claimants	
had	done	‘rather	better	than	the	miners’	and	the	largest	increases	would	apply	to	a	small	minority,	
there	was	a	common	suggestion	that	the	NUM	might	disregard	the	implications	of	their	action.91	
Criticisms	of	sectional	interests	were	not	reserved	purely	for	the	NUM	but	were	applied	to	the	more	
powerful	unions	in	general.	In	its	attacks	on	hospital	strikes	in	March	1973,	the	Mail	said	weaker	
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unions	that	hospital	workers	belonged	to	could	not	‘win	anything	worthwhile	by	continuing	to	
strike’,	despite	the	fact	‘many	hospital	workers	are	not	being	paid	a	living	wage’,	because	‘strong	
unions’,	citing	miners	and	car	workers,	who	‘usually	pave	the	runway	for	inflation	to	take	off	are	
running	a	slow	bicycle	race’.92	This	reflected	the	fact	that	criticism	of	the	sectional	interests	of	strong	
unions	was	not	just	reserved	for	the	peak	of	national	wage	claims,	at	a	time	when	the	Mail	
supported	Heath’s	interventionist	policies,	but	was	a	criticism	of	the	power	of	unions	to	dictate	the	
wage	market	at	all	times.	The	Guardian	was	critical	that	the	TUC	had	failed	to	reflect	the	
movement’s	‘social	conscience’,	as	‘undiluted	competitiveness’	had	jeopardised	the	futures	of	the	
lower	paid	and	elderly	which	the	unions	had	‘traditionally	stood	to	defend’.	93	This	kind	of	account	
used	moralised	language	of	union	solidarity	and	tradition	in	criticism	of	the	unions,	despite	common	
complaint	that	the	unions	had	failed	to	adapt	to	modern	industrial	conditions.	The	Mirror	also	took	a	
moral	approach	to	arguing	against	free	collective	bargaining,	concerned	that	the	lower	paid	had	
become	‘worse	off	compared	to	highly	paid	workers’,	who	‘like	the	upper	classes,	have	gained	and	
held	advantages	through	better	education,	better	housing	and	better	social	conditions’.	94	This	kind	
of	framing	played	on	conventional	class	animosities	to	emphasise	the	disparity	between	union	
members	and	the	division	of	interests	inside	the	labour	movement.	Such	perceptions	of	power	and	
influence	of	large	unions	in	determining	the	economic	prospects	of	its	members	may	go	some	way	
to	explaining	that,	despite	negative	media	coverage,	trade	union	membership	continued	to	rise	until	
the	turn	of	the	decade.	
	
Rather	than	purely	an	issue	of	‘differentials’	and	‘equalities	of	sacrifice’,	increased	unemployment	
meant	that	the	impact	of	wage	disputes	on	companies	could	be	placed	in	much	starker	terms,	as	
Callaghan	did	in	pursuit	of	buttressing	his	wage	policy	–	a	point	not	lost	on	the	Mirror.	During	a	
period	of	intense	scrutiny	on	events	at	British	Leyland,	the	Mirror	encouraged	worker	co-operation	
by	repeating	Callaghan’s	implicit	threat	that	‘the	real	differential	now	has	become	the	difference	
between	having	a	job	–	and	being	in	the	unemployed	queue’.	95	A	return	to	‘straightforward	jungle	
warfare’,	the	Mirror’s	chosen	framing	of	free	collective	wage	bargaining,	would	not	only	lead	to	a	
wider	gap	in	wage	differentials	but	would	prompt	the	creation	of	a	‘third	group’	which	would	get	
‘nowt	but	employment	pay’.96	There	was	an	important	implication,	indicative	of	the	negative	
portrayals	of	Britain’s	economic	future,	that	other	strong	striking	unions	should	be	grateful	for	the	
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work	they	received,	with	a	lack	of	guarantees	about	the	future	of	those	jobs,	particularly	in	the	
miners’	case.	Just	had	been	the	case	in	the	1950s,	under	the	influence	of	Walter	Reuther,	the	press	
continued	to	insist	that	unions	should	change	their	priorities	during	negotiations,	‘to	put	greater	
emphasis	on	claims	for	more	leisure	(longer	holidays	and	shorter	working	time);	for	better	fringe	
benefits	such	as	pensions,	and	welfare	schemes’,	and	insisted	that	this	was	not	‘pie-in-the-sky	
stuff’.97	However,	with	inflation	so	high	on	the	media	agenda	and	people	concerned,	above	all,	
about	the	cost	of	living,	the	encouragement	of	this	kind	of	reorientation,	which	had	been	argued	
during	Britain’s	period	of	affluence,	became	even	more	difficult.	
	
Media	Moderation	
It	is	clear	that	left	wing	press	appeals	for	moderation	from	unions,	the	NUM	and	more	widely,	had	a	
political	agenda	behind	it.	Geoffrey	Goodman	warned	that	the	miners	were	at	risk	of	‘overplaying	
their	hand’	by	sending	the	government	to	the	polls	‘with	the	probable	result	of	a	substantial	Tory	
victory’	and	a	‘much	more	entrenched	Conservative	government	in	power’.98	Nevertheless,	there	
were	concerns	that	the	miners’	strikes	went	beyond	‘political	point-scoring’,	as	the	paper	urged	the	
miners	to	make	a	deal	with	the	government	which	would	‘show	that	the	miners	are	not	indifferent	
to	the	fact	that	nearly	a	million	of	their	fellow	workers	are	out	of	a	job’.99	Two	days	later,	they	were	
urged	to	‘Grasp	the	Olive	Branch’,	as	the	newspaper	commended	Heath’s	willingness	to	meet	with	
the	TUC	and	ask	for	‘precise	guarantees’.100	In	a	similar	vein,	the	Guardian’s	concerns	about	the	
plight	of	the	lower	paid	was	frequently	used	to	buttress	their	case	for	supporting	the	government’s	
wage	policy.	Rather	than	being	purely	for	anti-inflationary	purposes,	much	was	made	of	the	security	
it	could	offer	weaker	unions	and	less	organised	groups.	Moreover,	while	the	wage	policy	was	the	
responsibility	of	government,	this	kind	of	mediation	by	the	Labour-supporting	press	offered	the	
opportunity	to	reallocate	or	at	least	share	responsibility	for	the	maintenance	of	the	wage	policy	with	
the	unions	by	increasing	scrutiny	on	their	willingness	to	accept	the	government’s	terms.	In	a	similar	
way,	the	Mail	had	initially	supported	a	wage	freeze	during	Heath’s	period	of	economic	intervention,	
having	argued	that	it	was	necessary	so	that	‘the	people	at	the	back	of	the	queue	can	get	a	look-in’,	
insistent	that	a	compulsory	freeze	would	be	met	with	gratitude	that	‘somebody	is	doing	something	
at	last’.101	Concern	for	vulnerable	elements	of	the	working	class	was	much	less	prevalent	when	the	
Conservatives	offered	opposition	to	Labour’s	wage	freeze.	While	coverage	of	working	class	
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relationships	offered	an	important	insight	into	social	anxieties,	contextual	evidence	suggests	that	
attempts	at	mediation	of	these	tensions	by	the	press	were	not	solely	noble	in	intent.	
	
Paul	Hartmann’s	1979	study	concluded	that	the	influence	of	the	press	had	made	it	‘more	difficult	for	
members	of	the	working	class	to	become	aware	of	their	common	interests	and	conscious	of	the	
importance	of	class	relations	within	their	society’.102	Archival	evidence	suggests	that	the	impact	of	
industrial	relations	coverage	on	societal	and	class	cohesion	caused	anxiety	amongst	those	in	the	
TUC.	In	1977	Len	Murray	attempted	to	address	the	‘many	examples	of	blatantly	bad	reporting’	
which	portrayed	industrial	issues	as	‘primarily	responsible’	for	Britain’s	economic	plight	and	poor	
reputation	abroad.	More	significantly,	Murray	highlighted	the	limited	media	understanding	of	the	
problems	facing	unions	in	times	of	‘great	technological	change	and	economic	stress’,	where	inflation	
and	unemployment	threatened	the	‘ordinary	families’	that	the	labour	movement	sought	to	
represent,	while	‘any	suggestion	that	something	over	the	odds	may	be	sought	by	unions	is	
immediately	highlighted’	by	the	media,	as	he	reserved	particularly	criticism	for	the	press.103	It	seems	
unlikely	that	the	decision	to	speak	publicly	about	these	issues	was	simply	a	symptom	of	the	TUC’s	
well-documented	failure	to	respond	to	media	pressure	on	trade	unionism’s	reputation.	Although	
this	focus	on	industrial	unrest	and	provocative	wage	claims	was	not	a	new	trend,	as	this	research	has	
already	attested,	it	is	evident	that	these	patterns	were	of	particular	concern	to	the	trade	union	
movement	at	a	time	of	national	anxiety	about	the	inflationary	impact	of	wage	claims	and	the	cost	of	
living.	Such	a	statement	reflected	the	intense	difficulty	of	the	TUC	to	convince	the	public	of	its	desire	
and	ability	to	defend	the	general	interests	of	working	people,	as	a	collective	group,	rather	than	the	
sectional	demands	of	strong	and	militant	unions.	Comprehensive	media	scrutiny	of	industrial	unrest	
was	a	major	hurdle	in	this	aim.	
	
Overall,	the	overlap	of	this	research's	central	threads,	politics	and	economics,	reflects	the	centrality	
of	industrial	relations	in	British	media	culture	at	this	time,	as	well	as	the	increasing	role	of	the	state	
in	industry.	The	intervention	of	the	government	in	industrial	relations	was	increasingly	unwelcome,	
building	on	scepticism	about	productivity	initiatives	from	the	1960s.	Not	only	did	the	government’s	
approach	to	industrial	relations	inflame	tensions	between	unions	and	government	in	the	settling	of	
wage	policies,	but,	arguably	more	significantly,	government	intervention	in	companies,	public	and	
private,	was	seen	to	be	counterproductive	to	industrial	peace	on	the	shop	floor,	as	well	as	the	
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competitiveness	of	British	industry.	The	right	wing	press	was	consistently	and	persuasively	able	to	
portray	the	political	interests	of	the	Labour	government	as	antithetical	to	those	of	the	British	
taxpayer	and	raised	questions	about	the	willingness	of	the	government	to	reward	genuine	success	in	
industry.	Nationalisation	had	undermined	confidence	in	British	management	of	industry,	despite	
continued	faith	by	some	newspapers	that	the	product	line	was	adequate.	This	perception	of	
industrial	mismanagement	was	particularly	problematic	due	to	the	continued	perceptions	of	the	
‘British	disease’	and	the	complex	relationship	between	Labour	and	the	TUC.	
	
As	far	as	the	portrayal	of	unions	was	concerned,	they	continued	to	be	directly	implicated	in	Britain's	
rising	inflation	and	its	failing	industry,	as	myths	about	their	peculiar	willingness	to	strike	continued	to	
shape	media	narratives.	Influential	elements	of	the	media	continued	to	be	frustrated	by	the	
sectional	interests	of	individual	unions,	despite	the	country’s	economic	plight,	and	their	perceived	
lack	of	'social	conscience’.	There	was	increasing	concern	that	government	involvement	at	both	
Leyland	and	Ford	had	let	unions	off	the	hook,	as	they	were	seen	to	make	the	most	of	the	Labour	
government's	electoral	instability	and	its	complex	ties	with	the	TUC.	Soaring	inflation	encouraged	
widespread	acceptance	of	some	degree	of	unemployment,	in	a	crucial	change	in	economic	outlook,	
which	had	further	negative	implications	for	the	labour	force	and	expectations	of	the	union	
movement	to	defend	its	members’	interests.	Where	the	labour	force	did	find	support	from	media	
outlets,	this	was	largely	inconsistent,	and	was	often	implemented	in	order	to	pursue	or	undermine	a	
certain	political	agenda.	
	
As	far	as	the	media	was	concerned,	the	nature	of	newspaper	debate	reflected	the	emerging	
influence	of	the	Sun	as	it	sought	to	reshape	language	around	the	priorities	of	its	growing	working	
class	readership,	and	provide	the	foundations	for	Margaret	Thatcher’s	political	success.	The	tabloid	
Mail	found	a	stronger	voice,	indicated	in	its	cautionary	references	to	Weimar	Germany	and	union	
conspiracies	at	Leyland,	albeit	in	a	very	different	way	to	the	Sun.	The	lukewarm	reception	for	
government	intervention	in	industry	from	the	Mirror	and	the	Guardian	illustrated	the	degree	of	
uncertainty	about	Labour’s	response	to	perceived	decline	amongst	its	supporters.	The	Mirror,	
implicated	in	Labour’s	decreasing	popularity,	found	it	increasingly	difficult	to	appeal	to	the	concerns	
of	its	established	readership,	as	conventional	social	conflicts	evolved	and	the	influence	of	industrial	
correspondents,	like	Goodman,	waned.		
	
Whilst	political	militancy	continued	to	be	a	popular	theme	of	press	coverage	of	trade	unionism,	this	
period	was	more	notable	for	the	fractures	that	threatened	to	appear	along	new	fault	lines,	beyond	
	
	
210	
traditional	concepts	of	class,	and	ultimately	undercut	notions	of	solidarity	and	social	conscience	
amongst	the	labour	force.	The	preponderance	of	unemployment	opened	up	possible	divisions	
between	the	employed	and	unemployed,	the	growing	militancy	and	bargaining	power	of	the	major	
unions	provided	questions	about	the	status	of	weaker	organized	groups,	and	the	inconsistencies	of	
political	intervention	frustrated	public	sector	workers,	as	their	private	company	counterparts	
enjoyed	wage	increases.	The	fractured	portrayal	of	the	working	class	in	coverage	of	trade	union	
affairs	not	only	dislocated	trade	unionists	from	their	traditional	roots,	which	allowed	them	to	be	
more	easily	singled	out	by	the	media,	but	also	fed	into	patterns	of	cultural	consumerism,	placing	
emphasis	on	the	working	class	individual.	Such	coverage	helped	to	support	the	strategy	of	the	Sun,	
now	so	influential	in	the	press	arena,	as	the	‘populist	champion	of	down-to-earth	pleasure-seekers,	
as	opposed	to	the	humourless	intellectuals,	do-gooders	and	officials	who	sought	to	intervene	in	and	
disrupt	the	lives	of	ordinary	working-class	readers’.104	
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Conclusions		
	
Reflecting	on	Labour’s	1979	election	defeat,	in	conversation	with	Mirror	journalist	Geoffrey	
Goodman,	Len	Murray,	former	General	Secretary	of	the	TUC,	termed	the	events	of	1979	as	a	
‘fragmentation	of	trade	unionism’	that	forced	him	to	‘question	[his]	assumptions	and	all	the	things	
[he]	had	always	worked	for’.1	Murray’s	description	of	fragmentation	reflected	a	gradual	and	
contingent	process,	which	applied	not	only	to	trade	unionism’s	relationship	with	the	Parliamentary	
Labour	Party	but	the	ultimate	disintegration	of	consensus	in	British	politics.	The	decline	in	public	
support	for	trade	unions	was	intensified	by	the	mediation	of	press	and	latterly	television,	as	patterns	
of	partisanship	and	tabloidization	played	an	influential	role.	From	the	mid-1970s,	the	new	tabloid	
culture	shifted	decisively	against	them.	
	
Three	key	factors	combined	to	generate	this	change	in	trade	unionism’s	status.	Firstly,	the	fragility	
and	decline	of	the	left-wing	media,	as	well	as	a	lack	of	strategy	from	the	TUC,	left	the	labour	
movement	without	a	voice	in	the	mainstream	media.	This	was	particularly	problematic	as	the	Labour	
Party	wrestled	with	the	tensions	between	representing	its	party	and	the	nation.	Secondly,	broader	
social	change	damaged	the	basic	collectivist	assumptions	that	trade	unionism	was	built	upon,	as	
society	became	more	individualistic	and	consumer-orientated.		Thirdly,	the	resurgence	of	the	right-
wing	media,	led	by	the	Sun	and	the	tabloid	Mail,	was	important	in	undermining	trade	unionism’s	
position.	The	success	of	its	rhetoric	was	demonstrated	in	its	ability	to	permeate	supposedly	neutral	
news	providers	such	as	the	BBC.	
	
A	significant	element	of	union	demise	was	the	disintegration	of	the	left-wing	media’s	response	to	
the	political	pressure	on	the	unions.	This	was	indicated	initially	by	the	Herald’s	slump	in	sales	and	
eventual	closure,	and	subsequently	the	Mirror’s	declining	power	and	appetite	for	trade	union	issues.	
The	Mirror	struggled	to	deal	with	the	popular	impact	of	the	Sun	in	redefining	industrial	relations	
coverage.	This	degradation	of	left-wing	media	authority	made	the	TUC’s	prospects	of	challenging	
prevalent	themes	and	frames	of	coverage	difficult,	even	if	they	had	been	able	to	provide	a	more	
convincing	response	to	the	changing	media	landscape.	The	archival	evidence	has	suggested	that	the	
charge	of	‘fatalism’	on	the	part	of	the	unions	is	an	unfair	one,	given	the	continued	discussions	about	
publicity	both	inside	the	TUC	and	with	media	representatives.	In	1974,	the	miners’	strategy	was	
directly	influenced	by	the	impact	negative	coverage	could	have	on	the	strike’s	success	and	Labour’s	
election	campaign.		
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However,	it	is	clear	why	such	negative	impressions	of	trade	unionism’s	approach	to	publicity	have	
been	so	widespread.	Where	the	TUC	attempted	to	improve	its	image,	deeply	held	scepticism	about	
the	motives	of	the	press	undermined	its	actions.	Both	the	TUC,	in	its	discussions	with	the	BBC	over	
educative	programmes,	and	the	Herald,	in	its	commitment	to	‘serious’	news,	demonstrated	a	lack	of	
understanding	about	popular	tastes.	The	perceived	public	demand	for	‘emergency	coverage’	and	
simplified	narration	masked	the	complexities	of	the	trade	unions’	role	in	British	industry	and	the	
movement	struggled	to	respond	directly.	The	decision	to	research	and	report	on,	rather	than	
intervene	in,	the	Winter	of	Discontent	coverage	epitomises	the	TUC’s	approach.	
	
Wider	media	trends	undermined	the	core	relationships	and	accepted	attitudes,	referenced	by	
Murray,	which	trade	unionism’s	positive	status	had	been	built	upon.	As	time	went	on,	concepts	of	a	
cohesive	British	public	identity	became	problematic	and	the	media	often	cast	trade	unionists	outside	
or	against	such	interests.	As	the	realities	of	Britain’s	changing	place	in	the	world	economy	became	
apparent,	accounts	of	rivalry	with	old	enemies	became	less	compelling	and	the	appeal	of	nostalgia	
faded.	Instead,	this	rhetoric	was	orientated	around	the	relationship	between	unions	and	the	
national	interest.	As	far	as	international	competitors	were	concerned,	they	now	came	to	be	
understood	as	the	potential	saviours	of	British	manufacturing.	Moreover,	the	media’s	binary	
distinction	between	moderates	and	militants,	established	in	the	1950s	Cold	War	context,	changed	
balance	across	the	period,	so	as	to	define	increasing	numbers	as	extremists	and	underplay	the	role	
of	moderating	influences.	This	was	part	of	the	media’s	growing	discomfort	with	the	disintegration	
and	destruction	of	the	boundaries	between	the	industrial	and	political:	a	pattern	that	was	firmly	
established	by	the	late	1960s.	The	media	frequently	attempted	to	reconstruct,	conjure	or	recall	this	
out-dated	demarcation	as	a	means	of	delegitimising	politicised	industrial	action.	The	process	of	
politicisation	in	the	industrial	sphere	was	almost	exclusively	portrayed	as	desirable	for	fulfilling	
unions’	aims	and	thus	instigated	solely	by	union	representatives,	despite	direct	involvement	in	
industrial	matters	from	the	likes	of	Wilson,	Heath	and	Castle.	Significantly,	this	gradually	permeated	
the	way	left-wing	newspapers	also	understood	trade	unions’	political	role.	While	the	Mirror	had	
been	keen	to	embrace	trade	unionism’s	politicisation	under	a	Conservative	government	in	the	
1950s,	this	soon	changed.	Its	influential	coverage	of	the	1960s	and	early	1970s	often	only	intensified	
perceptions	of	the	union’s	political	threat,	as	it	sought	to	bolster	the	position	of	the	government.	
The	Guardian	was	more	discerning	in	its	position	on	Labour	policy,	as	a	primary	critic	of	Labour’s	
attempts	to	ground	wages,	but	it	too	became	critical	of	the	political	motives	of	trade	unionism.		
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Notions	of	working-class	collectivism	and	solidarity,	initially	used	by	the	media	to	exert	pressure	on	
the	principles	of	trade	unionism,	became	increasingly	difficult	for	organised	labour	to	negotiate,	as	
their	appeal	declined.	Sections	of	the	centre-left	sought	to	distance	themselves	from	traditional	class	
identities	in	order	to	broaden	their	appeal,	or	represent	a	‘national	interest’,	and	respond	to	
changing	perceptions	of	what	it	meant	to	be	‘working	class’.	Simultaneously,	the	Labour	
government,	which	was	often	called	on	to	intervene	in	industrial	planning	and	wage	management,	
was	increasingly	seen	as	an	ineffective	or	interfering	force	in	industrial	issues.	The	complex	
relationship	between	nationalisation	and	industrial	action,	which	stemmed	from	cynicism	towards	
the	Attlee	government’s	nationalisation	programme,	through	to	the	extensive	financial	
commitments	to	British	Leyland,	gradually	undermined	media	support	for	Labour’s	attempts	to	
support	Britain’s	key	industries.	The	Leyland	case	allowed	the	media	to	suggest	that	the	union’s	
involvement	in	the	company	was	exploitative,	whilst	also	arguing	that	Labour’s	investment	was	
motivated	by	the	party’s	electoral	interests,	rather	than	those	of	the	nation.	These	two	forces	
combined	to	cloud	Labour’s	identity	and	hinder	its	attempts	to	provide	unifying	answers	to	Britain’s	
industrial	problems.	
	
The	Sun	was	particularly	successful	in	responding	to,	and	stimulating,	this	change	in	cultural	
attitudes,	as	it	sought	to	provide	messages	to	transcend	conventional	class	boundaries.	Its	influence	
was	initially	established	by	its	broader	entertainment	provision	but	it	gradually	gained	a	footing	in	
political	discourse.	Under	Larry	Lamb’s	editorship,	it	was	a	primary	driver	in	ensuring	that,	as	the	
left-wing	media’s	messages	fragmented,	the	right-wing	press	converged	on	powerful	patterns	of	
industrial	coverage.	This	primarily	consisted	of	an	intensification	of	established	narratives,	indicative	
of	the	cumulative	impact	of	industrial	relations	coverage,	as	coverage	became	more	uniform	in	style.	
Over	the	course	of	the	period,	reports	of	trade	unionism	were	simplified	and	shortened	to	skim	over	
the	intricacies	of	strikers’	motivations.	Newspapers	published	sensationalised	headlines	that	
highlighted	the	impact	of	industrial	action	on	daily	lives,	typically	through	rising	prices,	diminished	
supplies	or	redundancies.	The	emphasis	on	everyday	life	was	one	of	the	key	ways	in	which	
newspapers	regularly	sought	to	mobilise	public	support	for	its	industrial	agendas	and	purposes,	even	
at	times	of	supposed	apathy	or	indifference.	Likewise,	the	growing	personalisation	of	coverage,	part	
of	the	cult	of	celebrity	which	permeated	wider	entertainment	coverage,	also	affected	industrial	
relations	coverage.	This	tendency	applied	to	coverage	of	both	politicians	and	trade	unionists,	often	
focussing	on	matters	of	personality	and	appearance,	and	placed	responsibility	for	broader	structural	
problems	at	the	feet	of	individuals.	The	power	of	this	coverage	was	ultimately	demonstrated	in	the	
personalised	criticisms	of	James	Callaghan	to	emphasise	a	supposed	crisis	of	authority.	Overall,	
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these	trends	in	tabloid	journalism	helped	editors	and	journalists	to	maintain	public	interest	and	
influence	opinion	but	they	often	masked	the	realities	and	problems	within	British	industry.	
	
The	emergence	of	this	consumer	age	was	not	a	phenomenon	that	news	organisations	simply	
promoted	or	commentated	on.	The	press	had	to	engage	directly	with	these	trends	in	order	to	
survive	in	an	increasingly	competitive	market.	This	meant	newspapers	had	to	make	sure	they	were	
successful	sources	of	entertainment	to	maintain	a	commercial	image	to	appeal	to	popular	tastes	and	
the	demands	of	advertisers.	These	demands	inevitably	contributed	to	issues	of	simplification	and	
personalisation	in	industrial	relations	coverage.	Most	significantly,	the	clamour	for	improved	living	
standards	and	the	increase	in	shop	floor	activity	had	a	direct	impact	on	the	media’s	relationship	with	
press	and	production	unions.	It	is	clear	by	the	late	1970s	that	the	financial	strain	on	media	
organisations	caused	by	industrial	action,	indicated	by	events	at	the	Times	and	the	BBC	and	directly	
referenced	by	Larry	Lamb,	caused	an	important	shift	in	editorial	attitudes.		
	
As	the	media	became	more	forthright	in	its	partisanship,	the	media’s	frames	of	explanation	for	
Britain’s	supposed	decline	gradually	converged	and	contracted	in	their	range	and	variety.	This	was	
particularly	true	amongst	the	press	but	these	convergences	gradually	permeated	television	
coverage,	despite	the	BBC’s	consultation	with	trade	unionists	and	its	commitment	to	neutrality.	By	
the	end	of	the	period,	problems	with	industrial	productivity	and	competitiveness	were	broadly	
explained	as	a	failure	of	the	labour	force	and	the	indiscipline	of	unions,	despite	the	many	other	
shortcomings	of	British	industry.	This	convergence	in	the	frames	of	explanation	simultaneously	
placed	pressure	on	the	union	movement,	whilst	absolving	government	and	employers	from	
responsibility.	
	
This	research	has	provided	a	more	holistic	understanding	of	the	varied	motivations	for	specialised	
and	unbalanced	media	scrutiny	of	British	industry.	The	media’s	preoccupation	with	manufacturing	
industries	was	significant	in	the	proliferation	of	the	decline	narrative	and	reflected	struggles	to	
adjust	to	Britain’s	loss	of	status	in	this	field.	As	Tim	Claydon’s	work	demonstrates,	the	motor	industry	
bore	the	brunt	of	criticism,	disproportionate	to	the	number	of	strikes	experienced.	The	influence	of	
militant	shop	stewards	in	stimulating	strikes	was	a	key	focus	and	provided	an	important	platform	for	
the	media	to	divide	strikers	from	the	public	interest.	Research	by	the	Glasgow	Media	Group	
suggested	that	trade	unionism’s	disruptive	threat	to	Britain’s	emergent	patterns	of	consumption	
was	a	significant	influence	on	levels	of	industrial	scrutiny.	This	research	has	suggested	that,	beyond	
the	cases	in	the	mid-1970s,	the	influence	of	disruption	to	production	and	inconvenience	to	
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consumers	was	so	significant	as	to	prompt	newspapers	to	request	compromise	on	wage	
agreements,	even	at	the	expense	of	government	policy.	Moreover,	as	with	the	balance	of	particular	
industries,	this	research	has	established	the	imbalance	in	television	coverage	also	applied	to	the	
interviews	and	sources	used.	Repeatedly,	media	coverage	focused	on	workers	and	their	
representatives,	or	sometimes	customers	or	patients,	rather	than	employers	and	management.	
Given	the	continued	dialogue	amongst	trade	unionists	about	the	problematic	image	of	trade	
unionists	provided	by	such	coverage,	and	the	continued	lack	of	scrutiny	of	managerial	roles	in	
Britain’s	industrial	demise,	this	was	another	important	influence	in	the	decline	of	the	status	of	the	
trade	unions.	
	
The	increased	partisanship	of	newspapers	was	particularly	important	as	the	dominant	
understandings	of	the	management	of	the	economy	evolved.	The	‘post-materialist’	turn	of	the	
media,	to	encourage	unions	to	turn	their	attention	away	from	simple	wage	increases	and	towards	
greater	rights	and	security	for	workers,	seems	to	have	been	primarily	motivated	by	an	anxiety	about	
the	so-called	wage	‘leap-frog’.	Strikes	and	high	wage	demands	were	predominantly	understood	as	a	
cause	of	inflation,	rather	than	a	response	to	the	rising	living	costs	which	newspapers	regularly	
reported.	As	inflation	became	a	greater	problem	for	the	British	economy	in	the	1970s,	the	British	
media,	symptomatic	of	a	broader	change	to	the	‘policy	paradigm’,	became	more	relaxed	about	the	
prospect	of	so-called	‘temporary	unemployment’	as	a	means	of	stemming	inflation.	This	shift	in	
attitude	placed	significant	pressure	on	the	trade	unions,	as	the	labour	force	became	increasingly	
anxious	about	the	future	of	their	jobs.	This	was	particularly	true	in	manufacturing	industries	after	
early	experiences	of	modernisation	and	automation.		
	
Morality	was	a	common	thread	to	debates	over	wages	and	the	economy,	despite	this	change	in	
emphasis,	and	its	influence	gradually	intensified	over	the	period.	Jim	Tomlinson’s	work	explores	how	
the	government	used	ideas	of	morality	in	order	to	‘manage	the	people’	and	curb	wage	
expectations.2	This	thesis	has	expanded	on	the	themes	of	this	work	to	illustrate	how	these	ideas	
were	utilised	by	the	press,	initially	as	a	means	of	delegitimising	supposedly	excessive	wage	claims.	It	
was	given	new	meaning	by	Labour’s	1960s	productivity	drive,	as	government	rhetoric	had	a	long-
term	impact	on	the	narratives	of	the	media.	By	the	1970s,	the	tabloid	press	infused	morality	with	
greater	emotive	influence,	particularly	during	the	1978-79	strikes	where	coverage	emphasised	the	
threat	to	lives	and	communities.	Gradually,	moral	language	was	employed	to	denounce	industrial	
																																																						
2	Tomlinson,	‘Reinventing	the	“moral	economy”’,	p.	356.	
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action,	regardless	of	the	terms	of	strikers’	demands,	and	its	power	was	indicative	of	the	influence	of	
impact-orientated	coverage.	
	
Morality	was	one	of	a	number	of	themes	that	were	malleable	and	were	regularly	shaped,	often	
incoherently,	to	suit	a	media	organisation's	broader	political	agenda.	Industrial	action	in	the	mining	
industry	was	dealt	with	rather	differently	to	other	industries	for	the	majority	of	the	period,	despite	
widespread	‘absenteeism’	and	public	scepticism	about	nationalisation,	partly	because	of	respect	for	
the	miners,	which	deemed	them	‘justified’	or	‘deserving’	in	their	pursuit	of	higher	wages	or	better	
conditions.	These	kinds	of	specific	attitudes	towards	groups	of	workers,	bound	in	complex	moralised	
rhetoric,	were	rarely	explained	or	made	explicit	but	were	ad	hoc	and	underpinned	by	complex	social	
assumptions.	A	further	indication	of	such	inconsistencies	was	found	in	notions	of	British	
exceptionalism,	which	were	simultaneously	bound	in	nationalistic	satisfaction	and,	on	the	other	
hand,	negative	declinism.	Symptomatic	of	British	attempts	to	adapt	to	its	new	position	in	the	
international	economy,	this	inconsistency	placed	significant	pressure	on	the	role	of	organized	
labour,	through	debates	about	productivity	and	the	‘British	disease’,	despite	many	similar	
experiences	abroad.	This	shifted	media	focus	away	from	the	justified	scrutiny	of	the	design	and	
quality	of	British	products,	and	the	management	of	manufacturing,	which	was	generally	considered	
to	be	unproblematic,	or	often	sources	of	British	pride.		
	
The	greatest	indication	of	the	inconsistency	of	coverage	was	the	fact	a	media	organisation’s	position	
on	industrial	action	was	often	dictated	by	their	views	on	the	incumbent	government.	Contrary	to	
popular	perceptions,	the	British	media	did	not	universally	denounce	all	forms	of	industrial	action,	
and	were	often	sympathetic	to	miners’	grievances,	even	if	they	opposed	the	nature	of	their	protest.	
Where	media	organisations	opposed	the	incumbent	government	or	their	industrial	policies,	striking	
unions	could	expect	greater	support	or	sympathy	for	their	position,	albeit	with	important	caveats.	
Similarly,	as	concerns	grew	about	the	stifling	impact	of	strict	pay	policies	on	productivity,	the	right-
wing	newspapers	were	increasingly	supportive	of	‘deserving’	attempts	by	unions	to	defy	voluntary	
wage	restraint.	This	flexible	perspective	on	industrial	action	is	significant,	given	common	
assumptions	about	right-wing	media	attitudes	towards	trade	unionism.	However,	by	the	same	
token,	left-wing	newspapers	would	sometimes	be	more	critical	than	their	right-wing	counterparts	of	
particular	strikes,	as	seen	with	the	‘red	scare’	of	the	1966	NUS	strike,	in	order	to	provide	support	for	
the	Labour	government.	Moreover,	inconsistencies	and	incoherencies	were	not	reserved	for	
columnists	and	editors,	but	pollsters	and	their	respondents	too.	This	made	the	job	of	policymakers	
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increasingly	difficult,	as	they	attempted	to	navigate	these	forums	of	opinion	while	the	rhetoric	of	
union	conflict	intensified	and	media	partisanship	became	more	common.		
	
Media	coverage	of	trade	unionism,	along	with	the	Troubles	in	Northern	Ireland,	underpinned	the	
portrayal	of	Britain	as	an	‘ungovernable’	nation,	as	the	Winter	of	Discontent	symbolized	an	
‘ideological	failure	to	which	the	only	answer	was	the	neoliberal	alternative’.3	This	was	the	key	
ingredient	in	making	the	‘manufactured	crisis’	of	the	tabloid	press	so	successful.	1979	represented	
the	final	annual	increase	in	membership	and	trade	unionism	would	never	attract	the	same	attention	
as	it	had	during	the	1970s.	Industrial	relations	faded	from	the	political	agenda	and	the	influence	of	
trade	unionism	over	British	politics	was	punctured.	As	this	research	has	highlighted,	the	media	
demand	for	control	and	reform	of	the	union	‘problem’	was	not	new	in	1979,	but	perceptions	of	the	
correct	solution	had	changed.		
	
In	the	years	that	followed,	it	became	clear	that	the	fractured	left-wing	of	British	politics	lacked	the	
ability	to	resist	the	dominant	frames	and	presented	‘no	major	drive	to	build	an	alternative	
understanding	of	what	had	gone	wrong’	in	British	industry.4	These	trends	undermined	opposition	to	
Conservative	policies	of	deindustrialisation	which	further	damaged	the	position	of	working-class	
trade	unionism.	Where	industrial	unrest	did	occur,	the	right-wing	tabloids	continued	to	intensify	
their	pressure	on	trade	unionism,	which	in	turn	became	more	radical	in	its	forms	of	action.	In	the	
case	of	the	1984-85	miners’	strike,	the	miners’	concerns	about	the	economic	impact	of	large-scale	
pit	closures	were	largely	ignored	by	the	media	in	favour	of	a	focus	on	Arthur	Scargill,	the	supposedly	
despotic	leader	of	violent	miners.	In	continuance	of	conflict	motifs,	their	undemocratic	action	was	
posed	against	the	police,	respectable	representatives	of	law	and	order.	Although	coverage	of	this	
defeated	strike	symbolised	a	significant	change	in	public	moral	status	for	the	miners,	many	of	the	
themes	to	coverage	represented	considerable	continuity	with	strike	reports	of	the	1970s.	The	
industrial	tensions	of	the	1980s	formed	a	coda	to	the	battles	played	out	in	the	1970s.	
	
																																																						
3	Thomas,	‘“Bound	in	By	History”’,	p.	273.	
4	Greg	Philo,	‘Political	Advertising,	Popular	Belief	and	the	1992	British	General	Election’,	Media,	Culture	&	
Society	15	(1993),	p.	413.	
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